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FOREWORD
Major General Steve Gower
I regard it as a singular honour to be asked to write the foreword to 
this book. I write it not as a member of the battalion, as such, but as an 
attached artillery forward observer.
In the period September to December 1966 I was part of A Company 
on Operations Canberra, Robin, Queanbeyan, Bundaberg, Yass, 
Hayman and Canary with Peter Cole, then Max Carroll as the company 
commander. It was an intense operational period, and it gave me a good 
insight into the 5th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR), 
approach to countering the VC (Viet Cong) insurgency, as well as the 
chance to observe closely the fighting capability of the battalion and its 
spirit. I was impressed.
With my parent battery (101st Field Battery) moving into direct support 
of 6 RAR, my time as 103rd Field Battery’s fourth forward observer in 
A Company came to a close. I was sorry to leave, as I had developed a great 
respect, indeed affection, for the battalion and those who served in it.
I regard this book as very important. It is much more contemplative and 
a more detailed record of the first half of the battalion’s tour of duty than 
has been available before. I hasten to say that observation is in no way 
a criticism of Bob O’Neill’s unit history, a copy of which has long graced 
my bookshelf. Rather, the contributions in this book have resulted from 
the passage of time and the opportunity to contemplate, reflect and think 
more deeply about what was achieved and perhaps what might have been.
The battalion’s tour of duty was unique in a number of ways. It was the 
first battalion to be deployed with national servicemen, and the first to be 
deployed to occupy the Task Force’s operational base at Nui Dat within 
an autonomous area of operations. Among other things, the battalion 
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came to develop a very effective technique for conducting cordon and 
search operations, a fundamental way of disrupting the VC hold on 
surrounding villages. It was also innovative in other ways, such as forming 
a battalion reconnaissance platoon. To me, the battalion’s approach could 
be characterised as deliberate but flexible rather than doctrinally rigid, 
based on intelligence assessments complemented by its own analyses and 
not one that needlessly took risks.
5 RAR’s tour was very successful by any measure, but its resilience was to 
be tested severely when it suffered the loss of two company commanders 
and other officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers in a series of 
tragic mine incidents in early 1967. These incidents could have broken 
a lesser group of men.
This book contains many worthwhile lessons, particularly those relating 
to the challenges of facing a capable and determined enemy. It is a tribute 
to all members of the battalion who served so valiantly in Phuoc Tuy 
Province. Over 50 years later I remember, commemorate and celebrate 
their service.
Congratulations to those involved in producing this book, especially Bob 
O’Neill, Ron Boxall and Roger Wainwright, and to all the authors.
Steve Gower AO AO(Mil)
Director, Australian War Memorial (1996–2012)
Steve Gower graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1961 with the 
Sword of Honour and the Queen’s Medal. In 1966 he went to Vietnam as a forward 
observer in the 1st Field Regiment. A highlight of his time in Vietnam was being 
the forward observer attached to A Company of 5th Battalion, the Royal Australian 
Regiment, before leaving mid-tour to move to the 6th Battalion. On  returning 
to Australia, he had several artillery appointments and was Commanding Officer 
of 8th/12th Medium Regiment. He had numerous other training and policy 
appointments before becoming General Officer Commanding Training Command, 
then Assistant Chief of the Defence Force for Logistics, and later for Personnel. 
He  retired from the Army as a major general to accept the Directorship of the 





Private Errol W Noack, 21, of Adelaide, South Australia,
died 24 May 1966
Private John R Sweetnam, 20, of Melbourne, Victoria,
died 9 June 1966
Corporal Brendan F Coupe, 23, of Sydney, New South Wales,
died 10 June 1966
Private Leslie T Farren, 20, of Reservoir, Victoria,
died 10 June 1966




Marinko Tomas, 21, of Nannup, Western Australia,
died 8 July 1966
Private Raymond J Kennedy, 26, of Canley Vale, New South Wales,
died 15 August 1966
Private Graham FA Warburton, 21, of Warrnambool, Victoria,
died 1 October 1966
Corporal Norman J Womal, 28, of Bowen, Queensland,
died 17 October 1966
Private Gordon H D’Antoine, 20, of Derby, Western Australia,
died 18 October 1966




Private Erald H Nilsen, 20, of Dunwich, Queensland,
died 14 November 1966
Private Noel A Pracy, 20, of Sydney, New South Wales,
died 14 November 1966
Private Paul C Sullivan, 21, of Lane Cove, New South Wales,
died 27 December 1966
Major Donald M Bourne, 35, of Tamworth, New South Wales,
died 14 February 1967
Captain Robert J Milligan, 30, of Taree, New South Wales,
died 14 February 1967
Private Donald M Clark, 21, of Northampton, Western Australia,
died 21 February 1967
Private Michael D Poole, 20, of Fitzroy, Victoria,
died 21 February 1967
Private Richard W Sandow, 20, of Broken Hill, New South Wales,
died 21 February 1967




George B Green, 21, of Granville, New South Wales,
died 21 February 1967
Lieutenant John Carruthers, 28, of Mount Morgan, Queensland,
wounded 21 February 1967
died 24 February 1967
Major M Bruce McQualter, 29, of Braidwood, New South Wales,
wounded 21 February 1967
died 5 March 1967




Kerry P Rinkin, 21, of Taree, New South Wales,
died 7 April 1967
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– and our sister unit, 6  RAR, were the first two Australian battalions 
in Vietnam to be composed of both regular (volunteer) soldiers and 
conscripted national servicemen. Given the controversial nature of the 
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the land’ in order to be able to function properly in terms of food, tentage, 
radios and weapons. Tony, a young graduate medical officer, had to keep 
over 800 young Australians fit and healthy, and treat all the injuries and 
sicknesses that are regular occurrences in war. Sometimes he was called 
upon to expose himself to danger in order to assist those who had been 
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seriously wounded. He and some of the rifle company medical assistants 
have given us their perspectives on what it was like to meet the same 
challenges over lengthy periods.
Other battalion members who have contributed to the book include 
Captains Ron Bade and Ron Boxall, who served separately at Binh Ba 
for several weeks. Ron Boxall’s detachment from the battalion saw him 
involved with a CIA-sponsored charade. Ron Bade later mentored a South 
Vietnamese Regional Force company in the same environment.
The battalion could not have functioned without the assistance of other 
parts of the army, and the Royal Australian Air Force. We thank three of 
our supporting Sioux helicopter pilots, aided by Captain Bob Supple, 
and our supporting artillery team, led by Captain George Bindley, who 
have contributed their perspectives on their problems and how they 
increased their effectiveness during our very testing first months of 
operations. And finally, there are two friends who, although both army 
officers, did not serve in 5  RAR during 1966–67. They are Brigadier 
Ernest Chamberlain CSM, an intelligence specialist who has studied and 
written on the Viet Cong over many years, and Colonel Professor David 
Horner AM, who knows more than most people about how the Australian 
commitment to the Vietnam War was made in 1965–66 and why we were 
stationed in Phuoc Tuy Province. We are very grateful to them both for 
their major contributions.
There are also many other individuals who have contributed to the book 
behind the scenes. The members of the Executive Committee of the 5 RAR 
Association, chaired by Colonel Roger Wainwright, have helped with the 
financing of this publication and its general administration. Roger, who 
is in his 15th year as the Association’s president, has been of invaluable 
assistance to us. Our perfect backstop, he has been an inveterate chaser 
of information through his innumerable contacts and is an ever-reliable 
source of detailed knowledge about the battalion from its earliest days up 
to the present. Other association members, particularly Gary Townsend 
and Ted Harrison, have helped with the illustrations. Author and Vietnam 
veteran Major Bruce Davies MBE (Retd) magically provided pristine 
military map coverage of Phuoc Tuy Province in 1966; and Alan Mayne 




We are grateful to Ashley Ekins and other members of the staff of the 
Australian War Memorial for their assistance, especially in obtaining 
access to photographs and official records of our operations. We appreciate 
also the very helpful way in which members of the staff of ANU Press, and 
our copyeditor Beth Battrick, have assisted us in the publication process.
We also gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the Commonwealth 
Government’s ‘Saluting Their Service’ Commemorations Program, which 
provided a significant grant towards the funding of the project. Any 
benefits that accrue from the project will be dedicated to the support 
of 5 RAR veterans or serving members of 5 RAR.
Finally, we wish to thank our wives, Sally O’Neill and Joan Boxall, for 
their comments and support of our work and their tolerance of the time 
commitment it has imposed on us for almost three years. They are well 
qualified for the task, having been our partners for over 50 years, including 
our various times in Vietnam. Sally helped Bob to produce Vietnam 
Task, based on his letters to her of 1966–67. Joan’s management of all 
family affairs throughout Ron’s two tours of duty was a source of helpful 
reflection, and her many years as a soldier’s wife provided invaluable 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Map 1: Phuoc Tuy Province 1966.






Professor Robert O’Neill, the intelligence officer of the 5th Battalion of 
the Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR) during its first tour of duty in 
South Vietnam in 1966–67, proposed this book. The battalion was the 
leading element of the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) when it was 
inserted into Phuoc Tuy Province, the area which was to remain Australia’s 
principal area of land operations for the next six years. His book, Vietnam 
Task, published in 1968, was the original firsthand account of an entire 
tour of operations by an Australian infantry battalion in Vietnam. 
It  immediately became an important reference for those who were to 
follow 5 RAR. Some 50 years later, in retirement, he could see that there 
was more that should be told in detail about 5 RAR operations in the 
western mountains of Phuoc Tuy Province during late 1966.
Bob suggested that such details would best be revealed by a selection of 
willing contributors from among 5  RAR’s participants, together with 
a few others; some who had been providers of close combat support and 
yet others who, while not directly involved, could provide expert overview 
material. Discussions inevitably questioned whether such a book was 
needed, what its purpose might be, who could best contribute to it and so 
on. Among many wise voices, one opined, ‘Who would write about these 
finer details if we don’t? It is our history!’ And so, the die was cast. It is 
notable that the first national servicemen to be committed to combat in 
Vietnam made up half of the battalion’s strength, so it was important that 
they should be represented among the contributors.
A collegial approach to solving operational problems pervaded the 
original 5 RAR. These traits again came into play 50 years later during 
the gestation of this book. The inward flow of discussion and contributions 
propounded the idea that the book should also give an account of the 
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battalion’s preparations for deployment to Vietnam and how it settled 
into its initial operations in the vanguard of 1 ATF, before highlighting its 
pathfinding incursions into the Nui Thi Vai hills.
This book’s contributors share the prized common thread of having 
been full-time soldiers at some time in their lives and are at ease about 
being veterans of Australia’s most unpopular war, Vietnam. In canvassing 
potential contributors for each chapter, a formidable hurdle arose. 
Survivors  of the battalion’s first tour in Vietnam who might readily 
contribute were declining in number; a sobering reality which lent a touch 
of urgency to the project.
Accordingly, nearly every part of this book has been written by men 
ranging  in age from their early 70s to their late 80s. They have all 
led happy and productive postwar lives and the keenness of their 
memories, undimmed by intervening years, is remarkable. Unsurprisingly, 
each of them has completed his task with a blend of discernment and 
sagacity acquired through 50 years of reflection. Their reflections, well-
tempered by the time-bestowed benefits of detachment and perspective, 
are valuable insights. Their writings help to flesh out the necessarily 
broader approach of the official history which records that war.
The comprehensive article republished in Appendix C was written by the 
battalion’s commanding officer, John Warr, in 1967, soon after the return 
of 5  RAR to Australia. John passed away in 1999. His account shows 
how cordon and search operations were rapidly developed in Vietnam by 
5 RAR. It highlighted and temporarily filled a vacuum in Australian Army 
doctrine on tactics and techniques that needed to be employed in a much 
more virulent type of warfare than that experienced in the previous two 
decades. Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the army’s focus had 
been the low-level counterterrorist operations of the Malayan Emergency 
and the Indonesian Confrontation of Malaysia. Thus, 1  ATF was the 
first Australian Army formation since the Second World War committed 
to operations in circumstances where it was largely free of allied tactical 
dictates. It fell to John Warr, as the commander of the first battalion to 
be inserted into 1 ATF’s assigned area of operations, to interpret, adapt 
and invent the essence of his battalion’s modus operandi. Contributors to 
Chapter 16 have provided a memoir that gives readers a revealing look at 
a well-respected Australian infantry battalion commanding officer.
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PREfACE
Apart from its more prosaic purposes, a book of this kind is both a nod 
of acknowledgement to old mates and, especially, a respectful salute to 
those who left our sight on the battlefield over 50 years ago. It is to them 
that this book is dedicated. In crafting a tribute, we could not render 
a better summation than that given by the great Athenian warrior-
statesman, Pericles. Around 430  BC he delivered a lengthy tribute to 
his dead soldiers. It included a peroration of a mere 50 words in which 
he neatly compressed the deepest of soldierly reflections. His few, plain 
words require no elaboration:
They gave their bodies for the common good and received, each 
for his own memory, praise that will never die; and with it, the 
grandest of all sepulchres – not that in which their mortal bones 
are laid, but a home in the minds of men where their glory 
remains fresh.1
The writings of this book’s contributors may well be their last hurrah in 
terms of adding detail to the proud history of 5th Battalion, the Royal 
Australian Regiment, widely known as the Tiger Battalion. Their hearty 
and indomitable camaraderie will be apparent to the reader. Their more 
elusive literary motives are suggested by lines adapted from Banjo 
Paterson’s The Daylight is Dying:
Now, we still half hearing
An old-time refrain,
With memory clearing
To hear it again,
Bring tales, roughly wrought of
Young men and their ways,
That call back much thought of
Our soldiering days,
And, blending with each
In the mem’ries that throng,
There haply shall reach
You a clear-ringing song.




PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK
Robert O’Neill
This book focuses on a series of operations carried out by the 5th Battalion, 
the Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR), during the Vietnam War in 1966. 
They were challenging and keenly fought by both sides. They were also 
productive because we developed careful new methods – hence the title of 
this book, Vietnam Vanguard. These operations had the strategic purpose 
of making a major road and its surrounding countryside secure for allied 
troop and supply movements. The Viet Cong had exerted control over 
this region, western Phuoc Tuy Province, for many years.
The country north of the road was mountainous, and several villages were 
situated along the road itself. It was a real test of our abilities to drive 
the Viet Cong off the mountains while avoiding damage to the villages 
and loss of life to the local people. In April and May 1966, some 800 
young Australians arrived in South Vietnam for a year of war service. 
I was one of them, a captain, then second in command of B Company 
of 5 RAR. Half of the battalion were national servicemen, conscripted 
by the government. The other half was made up of regulars who, for the 
most part, were pleased to be doing the job that they had enlisted for – 
sustaining the defence of our nation. I think it is fair to say that we all 
felt that Australia was in greater peril than it actually was at that time. 
We certainly applied our best efforts, and we all put our lives on the line.
We were a year or two in advance of the wave of dissent which drove 
Australian public opinion on the war. All members of 5 RAR thought that 
we had an important job to do, and we pressed ahead with it. We were 
not riven by internal debates over the morality of the whole undertaking. 
Those debates impacted on us all once we returned to Australia, but more 
in the context of our civil social life than our work in the army or our 
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comradeship with former members of our battalion once they had been 
discharged. Ex-members of 5 RAR have remained reasonably united in 
believing that what we did in Vietnam was honourable. Had the wider 
war gone successfully for the South Vietnamese Government and the 
United States, good would have come out of our actions in 1966–67. But 
that was not the case, and we have all had to struggle with the fact that we 
fought in a war which was ultimately very unpopular and largely disowned 
by the Australian people, and many of our national governments since 
the early 1970s.
Because of the war’s unpopularity, public interest in what Australian 
servicemen and servicewomen did in Vietnam has been low, and focused 
largely on a few short, spectacular events such as the battles of Long Tan, 
Binh Ba and Fire Support Bases Balmoral and Coral. While these were 
well-fought, successful actions by Australian soldiers, they were of brief 
duration and did not typify the careful, continuing tussle which went on 
throughout Phuoc Tuy Province, the Australian area of responsibility, for 
over five years. This contest, for control of territory and for Vietnamese 
public support, was conducted by both sides, on a continuous basis. This 
book attempts to shed light on an Australian battalion’s engagement in 
that kind of war, over a period of several months, to give Australian readers 
who were not directly involved in the war a fuller understanding of what 
we did, why we did it and what we felt about all that we had to endure.
That this book is being published in 2020, 54 years after the events it 
describes, is due largely to the recent occurrence of the 50th anniversaries 
of these events. From mid-2016 onwards I found myself receiving many 
letters, personal accounts and diary entries from former 5 RAR members, 
asking me to check them for accuracy. This awoke in me a feeling of regret 
that we did not already have all this material available in some enduring 
and publicly accessible form. I had written a book on the battalion’s year in 
Vietnam, 1966–67, Vietnam Task, while out on operations or back at our 
Nui Dat base while we were in Vietnam. However, it was relatively brief, 
covering our year in 256 pages; it was written over 50 years ago and it 
was the work of a single author (assisted by the editorial skills of his wife). 
The interesting nature of the evidence from the 1960s that I was reading 
50 years later made me think that we ought to publish it soon. There was 
clearly a strong desire on the parts of surviving ex-5 RAR members to 
have their memories restocked with fuller, up-to-date descriptions of what 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: 5 RAR in Vietnam, 1966.
Source: Diagram designed and produced by Ron Boxall.
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A second factor stimulated me further in this direction: the accuracy 
and scope of the memories of many of those who had been showing me 
material were quite remarkable. I soon came to believe that out of the 
surviving group of 5 RAR veterans, we could put together an interesting 
book, with chapters written by a team of some 30  authors. I wanted 
this team to include people who had held ranks from private to major, 
and others who, while not being members of the battalion, played vital 
roles in our operations, especially the gunners who supported us in heavy 
actions, and the helicopter pilots who had to take great risks in evacuating 
our wounded and supplying us in action. I was fortunate in being able to 
enlist the cooperation of Captain (later Brigadier) Ron Boxall as co-editor. 
He has been very busy helping with selection of authors, decisions on what 
to include in the book and editing the contributions that the individual 
authors delivered to us. It has been a great pleasure for me to have worked 
again with Ron. We found that we were ‘on net’ over many issues of 
historical fact and editorial policy that could have caused problems in the 
production of the book.
The book has been structured and written with three sets of readers in 
mind: the Australian public, readers elsewhere and the surviving members 
of the battalion’s first tour of duty in Vietnam. We have been fortunate in 
being able to select a fine team of contributors from the ranks of surviving 
members of 5 RAR, and of other units who worked directly with us during 
1966–67. Having edited several other multi-authored books during my 
professional life, I feel particularly blessed by this team who have been 
willing to accept guidance from Ron, myself and other editorial assistants 
who have worked on the text with us.
I need to pay a special tribute to Major (later Colonel) Max Carroll, our 
operations officer for the first six months in Phuoc Tuy, and then a rifle 
company commander for the remaining six months. He undertook to 
write three central chapters on how our operations were conducted in 
the period May to October 1966, and he achieved this goal splendidly. 
There was nothing wrong with his memory at the age of 87, or with his 
judgement in selecting events to write on!
The first issue that we have focused on is the nature of the challenge 
that we faced in Vietnam. Was it primarily a military challenge or was 
it more of a social and political one? How did we prepare ourselves to 
face both over the course of the year ahead of us? Next we consider why 
we were sent to Phuoc Tuy Province rather than other parts of Vietnam. 
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Who made the choice and for what reasons? How far was it an American 
decision and how far was it driven by Australian preferences? It is a large 
and complex topic, deserving a chapter on its own and calling for an 
accomplished historian to tackle. From Australia’s perspective, the chief 
person involved in the selection of Phuoc Tuy as our area of responsibility 
was General Sir John Wilton. His distinguished biographer, Professor 
(Colonel) David Horner, was the obvious person to invite to write such 
a chapter: Chapter 2.
So that readers could have a more detailed picture of what the Viet Cong 
had been doing in Phuoc Tuy before we arrived, we invited former director 
of military intelligence Brigadier Ernest Chamberlain to contribute 
Appendix  D. Ernie not only spent many years focusing on the Viet 
Cong and North Vietnamese from an intelligence perspective, but also 
is a Vietnamese linguist and historian, and has translated and published 
several histories originally produced by the Viet Cong regiments and 
battalions that we faced when on operations.
Chapters 3 to 17, except Chapters 12 and 14, are all written by former 
5  RAR members. Chapter 12 is the work of our supporting gunners 
of 103 Field Battery, Royal Australian Artillery, led by Captain George 
Bindley. Captain Jim Campbell, Second Lieutenant Bob Askew and 
Second Lieutenant Bill Davies of 161 (Independent) Reconnaissance 
Flight helped Captain Bob Supple with Chapter 14, on the challenges of 
flying helicopters into enemy fire in all types of terrain.
One point on which we all agree is that we were very lucky to have 
faced the challenges of being at war for a year under the outstanding 
leadership of John Warr. It has not been difficult to find several authors 
capable of throwing light on why he was such a good commanding 
officer. I  am particularly grateful also to members of the Warr family, 
John’s widow Shirley, and their three children Anne, Mark and Peter, for 
their contributions to the words and the thoughts behind Chapter 16. 
John’s thoughts on making counter-insurgency more effective, written 
soon after our return to Australia in 1967, are set out in Appendix A, 
which is a  republication of an article he contributed to the Australian 
Army Journal, No. 222, November 1967.
As I try to make clear in Chapters 5 and 17, the war in Vietnam was 
partly an intellectual struggle. In some ways it was a continuation of the 
frequently occurring nationalist, anti-colonialist conflicts of the mid-
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20th century. Yet in one key aspect it was different: it was conducted 
by the insurgent side with public opinion on the opposing, potentially 
dominant, side as their main target. General Vo Nguyen Giap, the former 
North Vietnamese commander, had learned during the early 1950s to 
attack the resolve of the French Government by shaping French public 
opinion to believe that their army was suffering heavy losses without 
making appropriately compensating gains.
By 1967–68, when the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front 
leaders were planning their decisive Tet Offensive of 1968, Giap had 
lost much of his power, being displaced by Communist Party Secretary-
General Le Duan and his assistant Le Duc Tho. They decided to hit hard, 
regardless of the damage this policy would do to the North Vietnamese 
economy and the casualties that their forces would suffer. Giap, Ho Chi 
Minh and several other leaders did not want to intensify the war to this 
extent. They could see that much of their work of the 1950s and ’60s would 
be placed at risk by the weight of American counter-attacks in response 
to a major Viet Cong and North Vietnamese offensive. The spectacle of 
so much chaos in South Vietnam, and the loss of control by the South 
Vietnamese Government and American forces were a great stimulus to 
the anti-war movement throughout Western countries. Political turmoil 
resulted, forcing US and allied governments to review their policies in 
Vietnam and open negotiations, which led to allied, including Australian, 
withdrawal in the early 1970s.
Of course, this was not all obvious in 1966–67, but John Warr could see 
that we were in an unusual kind of conflict, and that we needed to keep 
two things in mind. First, heavy casualties on our side would be very 
counter-productive because they would turn Australian public sentiment 
more firmly against the war. Second, we needed to foster support among 
the Vietnamese people in our area of operations if we were to have any 
prospect of enduring success. He gave me his thoughts, both on the details 
of current operations and on the larger strategic issues, when we talked 
together every day during the nine months for which I was his intelligence 
officer. As a battalion commander, he had limited freedom in which to 
plan his operations, but he was careful throughout our time in Vietnam 
to pay due regard to the needs of the local people, and to engage the 
Viet Cong in such a way that we had a good chance of success without 
losing Australian soldiers. Soon every officer on Battalion Headquarters 
and all his company commanders came to know and understand the 
way that John Warr thought, and the finely balanced path that he trod. 
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His personality, his mind and his evident concern for the welfare of his 
soldiers played a great role in keeping the battalion together and in good 
spirits for this very testing year.
A final author that I will mention is our regimental medical officer, Captain 
Tony White. We are fortunate to have a chapter in which he describes the 
tough challenges he repeatedly had to face when we were operating in the 
Nui Dinh hills and along Route 15. These few months were typical of 
Tony’s entire year. Whenever casualties occurred, Tony would be involved 
in treating them. Usually he was not far from the spot where the injuries 
were suffered, but sometimes they occurred simultaneously in multiple 
places. Then the company medics would come into their own, but usually 
with guidance from Tony by radio. Tony’s courage must be mentioned. 
Time after time he had to expose himself to danger, from snipers, from 
Viet Cong soldiers manning prepared defences, and from concealed 
mines and booby traps. I have several memories of him moving through 
minefields to reach badly wounded soldiers before they bled to death. 
We were all so glad to have him as our doctor, and that he has recorded his 
experiences at war in his 2011 book Starlight: An Australian Army Doctor 
in Vietnam.
This book focuses on our operations in western Phuoc Tuy, conducted 
between August and November 1966. This was a crucial period for 
5 RAR, as we sought to put into practice what we had learned in our 
training in Australia. These lessons were polished up by application in 
our opening few months of operations, described by Max Carroll and 
Peter Isaacs in Chapter 4. In September we began a series of operations 
with an important strategic purpose: to regain the use of Route 15 and 
enable incoming American formations to move large numbers of men and 
quantities of materiel through to their intended bases in the Bien Hoa 
area. For the following three months we operated in mountainous terrain 
which had been used by the Viet Cong for several years. It was a period in 
which many members of 5 RAR distinguished themselves both in battle 
and in relating to the local Vietnamese people.
In inviting authors to contribute to the volume, we have tried to make 
a balance between those who were in command of the major aspects of 
our operations and those who were at the sharp end, carrying out their 
orders. We have 30 authors, ranging in rank from private to brigadier, 
to give  us their differing perspectives on what we were doing. We are 
particularly glad to have among them nine officers and one non-
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commissioned officer from other units who were supporting 5  RAR 
operations, particularly the gunners and helicopter pilots. We also 
welcome the contributions of key persons on Battalion Headquarters, 
especially our operations officer, Max Carroll, and our adjutant, Captain 
Peter Isaacs. Captain Ron Bade, second in command of A Company, 
also contributed a half-chapter. I have already referred to Captain Tony 
White’s contribution. Parts of the book have been written by my co-editor 
Ron Boxall and myself. We are particularly grateful for the foreword to 
Major General Steve Gower, former director general of the Australian War 
Memorial, and in 1966 a captain, forward observation officer with 101 
Field Battery, Royal Australian Artillery, who took part in several 5 RAR 
operations.
The 5 RAR Association warmly embraced the proposal to publish this 
book, and I am grateful to the Executive Committee and members of the 
association for their support and cooperation, particularly for the help of 
the president, Colonel Roger Wainwright, and also of the president 
of the Royal Australian Regiment Association, Mick von Berg. Both of 
them were distinguished platoon commanders in 1966–67.
I hope that the readers of this book will come to have a fuller understanding 
of what we were doing in Vietnam in 1966–67. We have the several large 
volumes of the official history of Australia’s part in the Vietnam War 
for comprehensive reference, but, as with our involvement in the two 
world wars, it is now time for the publication of shorter books on how 
individual battalions fought and what their members thought about their 
part in the Vietnam War. The epithet ‘Lest we forget’ applies not only to 
our memories of our fallen comrades but also to our memories of events 





What were the challenges we would be facing in Vietnam and how should 
we meet them? These were the dominant thoughts in the minds of most 
members of the 5th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR), 
in early 1966. The battalion was raised for service in Vietnam on 1 March 
1965 at Holsworthy, south of Sydney. Nothing firm was said publicly 
about its mission until January 1966, and its destination was not revealed 
until April 1966. However, word had been spreading since August 1965, 
from discreet but reliable sources within the army, that we were destined 
for Vietnam. The government wanted to send a two-battalion task force 
to support the Americans. We all knew from one source or another that 
we had to be ready for operational service by early 1966. New members 
of the battalion came in through 1965, and by the beginning of 1966, 
we were clearly entering the final phases of training. We expected to be in 
Vietnam in May.
What were we heading for? How did we feel about it? Nobody in 5 RAR 
believed that this commitment was going to be a relatively short one—all 
over in two or three years—for Australia. We were about to enter a long 
struggle between communist and anti-communist forces in Vietnam, 
a conflict which had flowed naturally out of the defeat of the French in 
Indo-China in 1954. This struggle had been going on for a long time 
before 1954, when the Viet Minh inflicted their decisive defeat on the 
French at Dien Bien Phu. Nationalists, including communists, had 
been in action against the French since the 1920s and ’30s. The outside 
world looked on but then became embroiled in the Second World War. 
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For a brief time at the end of this war, some younger Americans in the US 
State Department looked favourably on the Viet Minh, the nationalist–
communist force which intended to step in to govern their own country 
once the Japanese had left. Things did not work out that way. The great 
powers became caught up in the Cold War, in which it was natural for 
the Americans to want to resist all communist encroachments around the 
world, despite the differing causes and consequences of the many regional 
security problems that the United States faced. By 1964 the balance 
of power in East and South-East Asia looked to some, particularly the 
governing parties in Washington and Canberra, to be sliding into a crisis. 
The danger was summed up by the ‘Domino Theory’. If Vietnam went 
communist, Laos and Cambodia would follow. The threats to the anti-
communist government in Thailand would then intensify and bifurcate, 
flowing on to Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia. Then communists would 
be on Australia’s doorstep.
As history has shown, there were many weaknesses in this theory but that 
was the prevailing wisdom in 1964–65. Official adherence to it as a basis 
for policy had been strengthened by the forthright way in which the 
Americans had entered the war in Vietnam with their own forces. We, as 
soldiers, were aware that our government was strongly committed to this 
point of view, so we took our final phase of preparation for combat very 
seriously. From our perspective, the Vietnam War was one of counter-
insurgency. Many of the senior members of the battalion, both by rank 
and by length of service, had taken part in controlling the Malayan 
Emergency and in resisting Indonesian Confrontation of Malaysia in 
Borneo. They knew that the essence of success in counter-insurgency was 
to win the political and social support of the civilian population, both in 
the major cities and in the rural areas. There was a key military dimension 
to the war, but without the support of the local people, any success in the 
military dimension would not translate into a lasting victory. In Malaya, 
our major allies, the British, understood this well and had been successful. 
In Vietnam, we had to hope that our major allies there also understood 
this basic truth of counter-insurgency. We were optimistic that the 
Americans would apply a ‘hearts and minds’ approach – it was their term 
after all – and that success would follow. It might take a long time but it 
would come – or so we thought in early 1966.
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1. THE CHALLENGE
Against this backdrop of strategic purpose the battalion began a demanding 
program of acquiring skills in training and then applying them in tactical 
exercises in distant training areas. In the four months before we departed for 
Vietnam, we spent around seven weeks in testing exercises, including two 
or three weeks at the army’s rigorous Jungle Training Centre at Canungra, 
Queensland. We also spent a fortnight in the Gospers Mountain training 
area, in rugged sandstone country, essentially a continuation of the Blue 
Mountains. However, the trees were sparse and the weather turned cold. 
We were soon carrying out what we nicknamed ‘jungle exercises in the 
snow’. By late April we were all slimmed down, physically fit and keen 
to do our job. 5 RAR was made up of both regular (volunteer) soldiers 
and national servicemen, in roughly equal proportions. The national 
servicemen were in the army for two years, which allowed for a year’s 
training and then another year’s active service. Although the average age 
of the national servicemen in the battalion was around 20 – a year or more 
older that many of our regular infantrymen – the two types of soldier 
melded very smoothly. The national servicemen performed as well as 
the regulars of similar experience. There were some national servicemen 
who would rather not have been in the army at that time of their lives, 
and they made their thoughts known occasionally. But they all accepted 
military service as a legitimate obligation, and we were spared most of the 
problems which ate at the structure of authority in the US Army during 
the Vietnam War.
An infantry battalion is not simply a military organisation. It is also 
a  linkage of many families. Soldiers, when they are abroad on active 
service, think of their families and loved ones a lot. It therefore matters 
to the harmony and confidence of the battalion abroad that their family 
members at home should be in touch with each other and offer support 
when it was needed. Thus, in the first few months of 1966, some of us 
devoted a significant part of our off-duty time to getting to know each 
other’s families, particularly the wives, girlfriends and children of the 
people  that we would be working most closely with. It made a great 
difference, when we had been on operations for a few months, to be 
able to circulate family news and photos to others with whom we were 
working. And when the sad news of a soldier’s death or severe wounding 
came through to his family in Australia, there were other friends ready 




As our preparation time moved on, there were indications that we might 
not have the full and active support of the Australian people in this war. 
The principal issue which brought dissent to the surface was conscription 
for overseas service – hardly surprising given the intense political 
confrontations which had taken place on this issue during the two world 
wars. By the middle of 1965 an organisation of dissenting mothers had 
been founded called ‘Save our Sons’. By the time of our departure for 
Vietnam they were still a relatively small force in Australian politics, 
but we were aware of their protest meetings and occasional picketing of 
barracks where national servicemen were being trained. While Australia 
was still two or three years away from the massive moratorium assemblies 
and marches that took place in the major cities, there was something 
here to keep a weather eye upon. In 1966, through personal contacts, 
I became more aware of dissent in our universities. But at that point, 
Australian public opinion overall was strongly supportive of Australia’s 
commitment in Vietnam, and the opposition that was expressed did not 
weigh on our morale or undercut our belief that we were doing the right 
thing in Vietnam. Little did I know that I would be dealing with this 
opposition for many years to come once I had entered into the academic 
world professionally.
Another index of public attitudes to Australian participation in the 
Vietnam War was the nature of the questions that journalists put when 
visiting our barracks on the outskirts of Sydney, or when accompanying 
us on exercises. Overall, the media were supportive of the government’s 
policy to accept commitment with the United States, but some of our 
leading writers such as Denis Warner could see problems ahead and wanted 
to test our own thinking on what we expected from the Americans, given 
their own unfamiliarity with this kind of conflict. Did we believe that 
American prospects of success were as great as those of the British in the 
1950s in Malaya? Such questions gave us pause for thought.
As the opening months of 1966 passed by, we all became sharply 
focused  on  the nature of the dangers and difficulties we would soon 
be facing on the ground in Vietnam. Our commanding officer (CO), 
Lieutenant Colonel John Warr, saw the conflict in historical depth 
and wanted the battalion to have some understanding of the social and 
political complexities of what we were embarking upon, as well as the 
military problems that we would face. I, by then a captain and second 
in command of B Company, had recently returned from studying 
international relations at Oxford, so the CO detailed me to give a series 
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of lectures to the companies on the course and nature of the conflict 
since 1945. We were also receiving current intelligence information via 
army channels, and some of this was passed on to us directly by the 
battalion intelligence officer, Captain Don Willcox.
By April 1966 we knew exactly where we would be stationed in Vietnam 
– in the central part of Phuoc Tuy Province, around the hill Nui Dat. This 
was an area which included only a few hamlets, but which had several 
large villages around the edge, and included the province capital of Ba 
Ria, whose population exceeded 10,000. Ba Ria was some 60 kilometres 
south-east of Saigon and 25 kilometres north of the port of Vung Tau, 
which was about to become our logistical support area. The population 
of the province plus Vung Tau was approximately 150,000 people, and 
they were occupying a key strategic area for whoever happened to be the 
governing power in Saigon. The National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong 
as we knew them, had strong base areas to the east and north-east of 
Saigon. Saigon itself had the Saigon River to connect it with the sea, but 
this route was vulnerable to intercepting attacks, leaving the main road 
from Saigon to Vung Tau, Route  15, as one of the principal logistical 
links between the capital and the ships of distant allies. Making Route 15 
secure for the passage of reinforcing American soldiers and their supplies 
was the first major task of the Australian battalions coming into the area 
around Nui Dat.
The economy of Phuoc Tuy was made up of peasant agriculture, market 
gardening, rubber plantations, timber-getting, charcoal production and 
fishing. Phuoc Tuy fed some of its produce into the markets of Saigon 
and Vung Tau. There was a poor road network to carry all the produce 
and people necessary to move goods to market. Route 15 to Saigon had 
a bitumen surface with two traffic lanes, but for the most part when 
we arrived, the other roads were earth-surfaced and usually single lane, 
augmented by passing places. Because of the climate, there were many 
streams and rivers dissecting the road network, therefore there were many 
small bridges which were relatively easy for the Viet Cong to cut and inflict 
additional costs on the people whose livelihoods were thereby placed at 
risk. Some of the roads were well suited to the placing of temporary Viet 
Cong tax-gathering points. The Viet Cong also exercised direct control 
in some of the villages by demanding a substantial portion of their 
agricultural production or some of their young men, to serve as conscript 
soldiers or porters for their comprehensive supply system.
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Before we could tackle the long-term problem of gaining support for the 
Saigon government from the people of Phuoc Tuy, we needed to establish 
security for our bases and ourselves against the military threat posed by 
the Viet Cong. We were therefore particularly keen in early 1966 to be 
briefed on our direct opposition and what they had been doing in recent 
times. We learned that we, a two-battalion task force, would be opposed 
by a division consisting of two regiments of what we termed ‘Main Force’ 
Viet Cong. These regiments, 274 and 275, had three battalions each and 
had been built up over the past two years from smaller Viet Cong units 
– platoons and companies of village-based guerrillas – which had then 
expanded into full-sized regiments of 2,000 men or more, who served 
on a full-time basis. A key enabling factor in this growth of Main Force 
regiments was the increasing availability of equipment from the North, 
especially machine guns, mortars, artillery and radios. It had taken 
some time for the two major supply routes from North Vietnam, the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail and the ‘sea channel’ via the coast of Phuoc Tuy, to 
become effective. But by 1966 the military strength of the Viet Cong 
in the south-eastern sector of South Vietnam had to be taken seriously 
by an intervening force of two Australian infantry battalions plus 
supporting arms (See Figure A.2 in Appendix D).
The Viet Cong combined their two regiments to form the Fifth Infantry 
Division of around 4,500 men in 1965, so that by the time of our arrival 
in Phuoc Tuy they could pack a powerful punch, and we needed to take 
that into account, particularly in the early months of our operations in 
Phuoc Tuy. We knew that it would take time to build secure fixed defences 
around Nui Dat, and until we had, we would be vulnerable to testing 
attacks. If our enemy was willing to take a major risk with his own forces 
in an all-out battle with a couple of thousand of his own men against 
a  few hundred of ours, we could have been in a serious predicament. 
What seemed more likely was that the Viet Cong would seek to attack 
one of our companies when it was on patrol outside of our base area, 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Map 2: Phuoc Tuy Province 1966: Main Viet Cong locations and 
district boundaries.
Source: Drawn and produced by Ron Boxall from data provided by Ernest Chamberlain.
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The Viet Cong relied on three major base areas in Phuoc Tuy. The largest 
of these was the May Tao Secret Zone, in north-eastern Phuoc Tuy. 
It was spread around Nui May Tao (nui means hill or mountain), and it 
could normally support a Main Force regiment. By 1966 the base could 
take the whole Viet Cong Fifth Infantry Division when there was need 
to concentrate it. Viet Cong jungle bases were not like those of their 
opponents. They were much less visible from the air, and their sheds were 
built of materials ready to hand in the jungle. The second Viet Cong 
base, in north-west Phuoc Tuy, was the Hat Dich area, built near a small 
village of that name. The third was in the Long Hai hills in south-eastern 
Phuoc Tuy, extending northwards into the Minh Dam area. This base was 
more of a resting and replenishing point for the Viet Cong battalions than 
a major supply source. However, as it was close to the coast, some supplies 
could be brought in by sea. The other two bases were supplied from the 
north by the Ho Chi Minh Trail directly from North Vietnam, or by the 
‘sea trail’ direct from North Vietnam or from the more northerly coastal 
areas of South Vietnam, which were themselves supplied by the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail.
Although the Main Force Viet Cong forces were reasonably well equipped 
for fighting under the protection of jungle-clad mountains and hills, they 
were not well suited for fighting in the more open areas. Here they had 
to divide into small groups which lacked the firepower and support that 
we could rely on in the event of a major engagement. Where they were 
strongest was in the jungles to the east and north-east of Nui Dat, closer 
to the Nui May Tao base area. However, as the Battle of Long Tan was to 
show, even in that relatively favourable situation, 275 Regiment suffered 
heavy casualties while trying to overwhelm one company of 6 RAR. The 
weight of supporting artillery, airpower and armoured personnel carriers 
from other elements of the Task Force was telling.
We knew from the operations conducted by the US 173 Airborne 
Brigade (including 1 RAR) earlier in 1966 that the Main Force Viet Cong 
soldiers were brave and able fighters. Their marksmanship with rifles and 
machine guns was good, and they could usually rely on mortar support. 
They thickened their defences by copious use of minefields and booby 
traps, often using ammunition they had obtained from South Vietnamese 
sources. They were also supported effectively by their own locally recruited 
and supplied platoons and companies. Several of these local companies 
had been combined to form D445 Provincial Mobile Battalion, a force 
of some 400–450 men, whom we constantly had to take into account 
17
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in our operational planning. D445 Battalion published its own history, 
The Heroic 445 Battalion: Its History and Tradition, in 2004, and it has 
been translated and republished by Brigadier Ernie Chamberlain, a senior 
Australian intelligence officer, and one of the contributors to this volume. 
This history of D445 Battalion is one of the major sources for Brigadier 
Chamberlain’s contribution to this volume (Appendix D).
The Viet Cong could also draw on the people of the areas under their 
control  (fully or in part), for recruits, supplies, porters and medical 
assistance. The contest for the hearts and minds of the people of Phuoc 
Tuy had been in progress for several years before our arrival. Initially the 
Viet Cong were able to work out informal ‘coexistence’ arrangements with 
several of the smaller, local subunits (companies or platoons) of the Army 
of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) that were stationed nearby. The 
province remained nominally under the control of the Saigon government, 
but we knew that its writ did not run far from the province capital, Ba Ria, 
or the several district administrative centres of Phuoc Tuy. ARVN forces 
and vehicles could move around by day, although they were occasionally 
attacked or ambushed. The Viet Cong had a fairly free rein at night but 
kept out of sight of the ARVN forces by day. Provincial administration 
was controlled largely by the ARVN, which provided the province chief 
and his staff, and the district chiefs and their small headquarters.
Our main challenge, therefore, was to turn this situation around, so 
that the Viet Cong no longer had the necessary support from the civil 
population of the province to maintain the flow of recruits that they 
needed or to weaken the administrative grip of the South Vietnamese 
Government and drive out its administrators, military and police 
personnel. Before we could begin work on achieving this change, we had 
to ensure our own security in a military sense. We were vulnerable to 
attacks, raids and ambushes which could result in significant Australian 
casualties, and therefore undermine the Australian Government’s ability 
to stay the course.
Obviously the quality and capacities of the South Vietnamese civil 
authorities and armed forces would have a substantial influence on our 
prospects for success. We knew very little about these issues until we 
had been active in Phuoc Tuy for several months. What we did hear, 
from our friends in 1  RAR and from others who had been members 
of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam during the past year, 
was disturbing. Corruption in the local administration was rife, justice 
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was often dispensed on a partial basis to favour those in authority, and 
it was very much a ‘top-down’ system of rule. The decrees came from 
on high, but not a lot of notice was taken of the complaints and wishes 
of Vietnamese civilians, particularly in the rural areas. Consequently, 
although there were some districts which were well governed, there were 
others in which the Viet Cong found it easy to gain a footing and to 
recruit supporters. As we had limited resources, one of our key tasks in the 
early stages of our deployment was to get to know the individual villages 
and districts, so that we could concentrate first on the ones in which we 
were likely to be more successful.
One of the most helpful groups of people in the province were the 
Catholic clergy in the villages. These were men who had to live without 
any guarantee of their own security. They were protected and helped by 
their parishioners because they exercised useful leadership, and often 
could get people to work effectively together when nobody else could. 
They were anti-communist but they could also be nationalist to the extent 
of wanting an open, honest, independent system of government which 
was rather different from what they had in 1966. Getting to know these 
men and establishing relationships, which were viable and useful in both 
directions, was one of the most interesting challenges of our time in Phuoc 
Tuy. It helped that they also spoke French or English.
The language barrier was another challenge we had to tackle. The process 
began with elementary classes in Vietnamese while we were still in 
Australia in early 1966. Of course in a brief instruction period of a few 
hours a week, not a lot could be accomplished. But for those who were 
minded to communicate directly with the local Vietnamese once we 
arrived in Phuoc Tuy, it made a difference to be able to offer basic greetings, 
using the masculine and feminine forms correctly as appropriate, and to 
be able to say please and thank you. Once that initial barrier had been 
surmounted, some of us were able to progress more deeply into the 
Vietnamese language. That step made a powerful psychological difference 
on both sides once we made progress in the language. It was very easy, 
in fact natural, for local people to be afraid of us and therefore unwilling 
to help in important ways, but breaking through the language barrier 
enabled them to see us in a very different light and our relations became 
much more productive for both sides.
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When we set off for Vietnam in April and May 1966, some went via the 
‘grey funnel line’ – that is, the former aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney – 
and others went via Qantas jet. By that stage, the challenge was looming, 
large and threatening, for most of us and our families, our nearest and 
dearest. We had those final intense hugs that departing soldiers and their 
families have been exchanging for hundreds of years. Then, alone with 
our thoughts, we began coming to terms with the fact that a year is a long 
time in warfare, and who knew what our fortunes, both individually 
and collectively as a battalion, would be? We had a certain amount of 
confidence as a result of our training and our faith in each other’s natures 
and capacities. But there was no knowing who might be the target of 
a well-aimed enemy shot or who would be blown up by a mine whose 
activating trigger we had failed to see. And then there were the other 
risks – not so obviously fatal – that came with service in South-East Asia, 
such as insect-borne diseases and poisoning by Agent Orange. We did not 
know about post-traumatic stress disorder in those days, but it came to 
affect some of us in later years.
Fortunately, by the time we had reached deeply into that imagined trail 
of the personal dangers and challenges we had to face, we had arrived in 
Vietnam. We were then diverted by the demands of having to cope with 
our settling into the most basic of accommodation, tents on a sandhill 
near Vung Tau. Here we came to know one of our principal supporting 
units in coming months, the US Army 68 Assault Helicopter Company, 
our helicopter transport. They gave us a particularly warm welcome, 
because, in the words of their liaison officer, Lieutenant Charles Brinnon, 
‘You are not here just as advisers. You are here to do something about the 
situation!’ As we spent many hours over the following week climbing into 
and out of the ubiquitous Iroquois helicopters, better known as Hueys, 
we seemed to enter a new world. Our recent anxieties fell away as we 
focused on meeting our most direct challenges in the very near future. 




WHY WAS 5 RAR STATIONED 
AT NUI DAT?
david Horner
Phuoc Tuy Province and Nui Dat are two names that resonate strongly 
with Australian Vietnam veterans. More Australian soldiers served in 
Phuoc Tuy than in any other part of Vietnam and, while operating in the 
province and sometimes in nearby provinces, they were based at Nui Dat 
in the centre of the province. Certainly, members of the Australian Army 
Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) served throughout South Vietnam, 
and the 1st Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR), was based 
at Bien Hoa in the province of the same name in 1965–66. But from 
1966 to their withdrawal at the end of 1971, 15 Australian infantry 
battalions, along with supporting arms and services, served in Phuoc 
Tuy. The Australian Logistic Support Group and the helicopters of No 9 
Squadron RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force), based at nearby Vung Tau, 
were not located within the province, but elements were deployed to Nui 
Dat, and the helicopters operated throughout the province.
So why was Phuoc Tuy selected as the focus of Australian operations, why 
was the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) based at Nui Dat, and who was 
responsible for locating it in the province? The answer to the last question 
is clear – it was the chief of the general staff (CGS), Lieutenant General 
Sir John Wilton. But what were the factors behind Wilton’s decision? This 
chapter seeks to answer these questions. It also examines why Australia 
sent a two-battalion, rather than a more balanced three-battalion, task 




Appointed CGS in January 1963 at the age of 52, Wilton had extensive 
command, operational and staff experience.1 After graduating from the 
Royal Military College (RMC) in 1930, he served in the British artillery 
in India before joining the Indian Mountain Artillery in Burma. By May 
1939 he was back in Australia, serving in the coast artillery until May 1940 
when he joined the Australian Imperial Force. He was brigade major 
of the 7th Division Artillery in the Syrian campaign in 1941 and attended 
the Middle East Staff School. From August 1942 to August 1943 he was 
chief operations staff officer of the 3rd Division in the advance towards 
Salamaua in New Guinea. He then joined the Australian Military Mission 
in Washington DC, before returning to operations in May 1945 as a key 
member of General Sir Thomas Blamey’s headquarters on Morotai and, 
for a while, in Manila.
After the war, Wilton moved to Army Headquarters (AHQ) Melbourne, 
and by 1947 was director of military operations and plans (DMO&P). 
In July 1950 he visited Malaya as part of a mission reporting on the British 
Commonwealth campaign against communist terrorists in that country. 
He attended the Imperial Defence College, London, in 1952 and then 
took command of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade in Korea. Part of the 
1st Commonwealth Division, the brigade consisted of two Australian and 
two British battalions. It occupied a key defensive area, covering Seoul, 
along the battle-line that stretched across the Korean peninsula.
By November 1955 Wilton was brigadier, general staff at AHQ, 
concentrating on the defence of South-East Asia, including issues 
surrounding the Malayan Emergency, Vietnam and the South-East Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO). Promoted to major general in March 
1957, he was commandant of the RMC until June 1960, when he became 
chief of the Military Planning Office in SEATO headquarters, Bangkok. 
There  he dealt with the alliance’s strategic problems in the region, 
especially the conflicts in Laos and Vietnam. From that position he was 
appointed CGS.
1  For Wilton’s career, see David Horner, Strategic command: General Sir John Wilton and Australia’s 
Asian wars, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2005.
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Wilton was well suited for his task as the government’s principal 
military adviser. Reserved, self-disciplined and tactful, he easily won the 
confidence of ministers. He had a vision for the services and he had clear 
and considered ideas about the importance of alliances in the defence 
of Australia. Above all, he was a man of strong character; he believed 
in what he was doing and could not be seduced by personal ambition. 
He seemed less suited for command in the field. Nonetheless, he had 
much command experience, having had continuous regimental postings 
for the first decade of his service, and he had performed well as a brigade 
commander in Korea. But he did not reveal an engaging personality when 
dealing with soldiers or more junior officers. Known as ‘Smiling Jack’ and 
later as ‘Sir Jovial’, he was renowned for his lack of small talk. Soldiers 
would follow him because they had confidence in his judgement and 
knew that he cared for their welfare, not because of his charisma.
Few heads of the army have faced such a range of challenges as Wilton did 
in his three-year tenure as CGS. A major concern was the deteriorating 
strategic situation in South-East Asia. Indonesia began its confrontation 
of the new state of Malaysia in 1963, and sent ‘volunteers’ to fight in 
Sabah, Sarawak and even mainland Malaysia. Australian troops were based 
in Malaysia and the government deployed army engineers to Sabah. The 
AATTV had been sent to Vietnam in 1962 and in 1964 the government 
approved the employment of team members as advisers in the field.
As the pressure for more deployments mounted, Wilton advised the 
government that the army was too small to meet the commitments. 
Eventually, in November 1964, the government announced a huge 
expansion of the army, to be achieved by the introduction of a selective 
national service scheme. The increased manpower was matched by the 
purchase of new weapons and equipment, and the construction of 
additional accommodation. Wilton changed the army from the Pentropic 
organisation, with five large battalions per division, and no brigade 
structure, to a ‘Tropical’ organisation, with a division consisting of nine 
smaller infantry battalions and intermediate task force headquarters. This, 
and the national service scheme, allowed the army to grow from four 
battalions in 1964 to nine in 1967. In March 1965, 3 RAR and a Special 
Air Service (SAS) squadron were sent to Borneo, and in June 1965 1 RAR 
arrived in South Vietnam.
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Wilton did not shy away from these operational commitments. Indeed, he 
believed that, provided that the Australian Government was clear about 
its purpose, a combat commitment to Vietnam was necessary. But based 
on his past experience, he was determined to ensure that 1 RAR was not 
exposed to suffering unnecessary casualties.
1 RAR’s role
To understand why 1 ATF was deployed to Phuoc Tuy in May/June 1966, 
it is necessary to understand how 1 RAR was employed in the previous 
year. When the Cabinet approved the deployment of 1  RAR in April 
1965, Wilton advised Sir Edwin Hicks, Secretary of the Department of 
Defence, that as the Australian battalion would operate as part of a US 
force, it required a compatible role; in no circumstances could it be given 
‘responsibility for a separate area as it is not large enough nor is it organised 
to handle such a situation’.2 On 20 April the Defence Committee discussed 
Wilton’s concerns.3 During the meeting Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary of 
External Affairs, questioned Wilton closely, and stated that:
Australian troops should not be used on their own in exposed 
positions. If Australia’s only battalion in Vietnam was completely 
lost, our presence there would be gone, quite apart from other 
considerations. The expression of this to the Americans would 
need to be handled carefully, and we must avoid any suggestion 
of mollycoddling our forces, but something could be said orally 
between the relevant Commanders.4
On the following weekend, Wilton reviewed the plans with Brigadier Ken 
Mackay, the DMO&P at AHQ. Mackay was later to play a major role 
in the decision to base 1 ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province. The 48-year-old 
Mackay was a highly qualified officer. After graduating from the RMC 
in 1938 he had served in both artillery and infantry appointments in the 
Second World War. He had valuable experience in joint staff positions. 
2  Letter, Wilton to Hicks, 15 April 1965, CCOSC (Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee) 
files, box 16, file 513.
3  Defence Committee Minute, 20 April 1965, CCOSC files, box 16, file 513. Chaired by the 
Defence Secretary, the Defence Committee included the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
(COSC), the service chiefs and the permanent heads of External Affairs, Treasury and the Prime 
Minister’s Department.
4  Note for File re: Defence Committee minute 21/1965, M, 22 April 1965, NAA (National Archives 
of Australia): A1838, TS 696/8/4 pt 8.
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Towards the end of the Second World War he served in the small 
secretariat responsible for providing up-to-date briefings to the chief of 
the imperial general staff, Field Marshal Brooke in London. He was joint 
secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia during the establishment 
of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan and served at 
Australia House in London during the 1956 Suez Crisis.
Wilton directed Mackay to begin planning to send a full battalion group, 
including a battery of artillery and a troop of engineers, to Vietnam. It was 
the first step in building the force beyond the initial battalion.5 Although 
the government had decided to send a battalion it had still not formally 
committed it, and the army’s planning was kept secret until the evening 
of 29 April 1965, when prime minister Robert Menzies announced in 
parliament that 1 RAR would be deployed to Vietnam.
Three days later, Mackay and a small planning team arrived in Saigon 
where  General William Westmoreland, commander of US Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (US  MACV), welcomed them. They 
learned that the Americans planned for 1  RAR to become the third 
battalion in the 173rd Airborne Brigade that was to defend the Bien 
Hoa airbase, near Saigon. They discussed 1  RAR’s proposed roles and 
conducted a reconnaissance of Bien Hoa and Vung Tau, which would be 
the entry point for the battalion. At Wilton’s direction, Mackay examined 
the US 173rd Brigade and satisfied himself that 1 RAR would be joining 
a first-rate organisation. By then the commander of the AATTV, Colonel 
David Jackson, had been appointed Commander, Australian Army Force 
Vietnam (AAFV), and together they agreed on a Military Working 
Arrangement with the Americans that Mackay signed on 5 May.6
Returning to Canberra, on 13 May Mackay accompanied Wilton to the 
Defence Committee, which endorsed his report, approved draft directives 
for the Commander AAFV and the battalion commander, and approved 
the command arrangement whereby Westmoreland, not the South 
Vietnamese, would exercise operational control over the Australians.7 
Wilton and Mackay also attended the meeting of the Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committee of Cabinet on 18 May that approved the Defence 
5  Letter, AM Morris (External Affairs representative on Joint Planning Committee) to Jockel, 
27 April 1965, NAA: A1838, TS 696/8/4 pt 8.
6  Report, Mackay to CGS, ‘Report by the Leader of Planning Team Visit to Saigon’, 11 May 1965, 
NAA: A1945, 248/4/114.
7  Defence Committee Minute, 13 May 1965, AWM (Australian War Memorial) 121, 161/A/4.
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Committee’s report.8 Mackay recalled that he and Wilton came under 
intense questioning about the security of 1 RAR’s position at Bien Hoa. 
Menzies even asked about ‘adequate fields of fire’.9
With 1 RAR preparing for operations at Bien Hoa, it was time for Wilton 
to check that all was in order there. He arrived in Saigon on 22  June 
determined to ensure there would be no problems integrating 1 RAR into 
an American brigade. He had clear views of his own on this issue, but 
before leaving Canberra, his deputy, Major General Frank Hassett, had 
reminded him of the pressures he (Hassett) had borne in Korea when 
commanding the lone Australian battalion there in 1951.10 Wilton would 
have been less concerned if it had been an Australian brigade in a US 
division, but a battalion was a relatively small command and he did not 
want the brigade commander thinking he could ‘treat an Australian 
battalion in the same way as he can an American battalion’. He told 
Westmoreland and the brigade commander that ‘we wouldn’t agree to 
it’, and as tactfully as possible said he disapproved of the way some US 
brigade commanders had acted in Korea. This was, he recalled:
a delicate situation; I received assurances all round that this 
wouldn’t happen, but that the battalion commander would 
be brought in and consulted in planning arrangements for the 
employment of his battalion, they wouldn’t just be committed at 
five minutes notice to a badly organised and planned operation. 
So with that sort of ‘preparation’, shall we say, things went off 
smoothly because they said: ‘Look we’ll just get the task agreed 
upon and let them do it in their own way’. I said: ‘That’s fine, you 
won’t be disappointed’.11
Having resolved these command concerns, Wilton departed for Australia, 
leaving Colonel Jackson to ensure the directives concerning the security 
of the Australians were followed and 1 RAR’s operations conformed to its 
agreed role.
8  Cabinet Minute, Decision No  975 (Foreign Affairs and Defence), 18  May 1965, NAA: 
A1945/43, 248/4/116.
9  Interview, K Mackay with author, 7 April 1986; letter, McMahon to Paltridge, 23 June 1965, 
NAA: A1945/39, 248/4/19.
10  Interview, FG Hassett with author, 14 March 2003.
11  Army Historical Programme, interview with Gen Sir John Wilton, 9, 13, 14 September 1976, 
p 12, AWM 107 (hereafter: Wilton interview).
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Wilton had been back in Canberra less than two weeks before there was 
an apparent attempt to change 1 RAR’s role. On 4 July Jackson informed 
him that Westmoreland planned to form a general reserve based on 
the 173rd Brigade that could be deployed anywhere in Vietnam and he 
recommended the inclusion of 1 RAR.12 Wilton did not agree, explaining 
in a letter to the Minister for the Army, Jim Forbes, that 1 RAR’s inclusion 
would involve it in ‘a succession of hazardous operations which would 
inevitably result in heavy casualties’.13 Jackson (now promoted to brigadier) 
replied that Westmoreland wanted to conduct offensive operations, 
particularly in the II  Corps Tactical Zone, and although 1  RAR was 
located in the III Corps Tactical Zone, he thought it should be permitted 
to take part, as the proposed operations would allow the Australians to 
‘have the greatest impact’ on the war. Wilton was unmoved; he considered 
that Jackson would not be able to watch over Australian national interests 
effectively and there was the possibility of higher casualties.14
The restrictions on the use of 1 RAR were still in force when Wilton, 
accompanied by Major General Tom Daly, General Officer Commanding 
Eastern Command, visited Saigon for two days at the beginning of 
September on the way to a British Army conference in London. On the 
morning of 2 September, he called on Westmoreland who recorded in his 
diary that Wilton was apologetic that certain constraints had been placed 
by his government on the deployment of his troops. 
I informed him that the last proposal that his forces could be used 
in operations contiguous to Bien Hoa was acceptable at this stage 
of the war. General Wilton suggested, and I heartily agreed, that 
we should try to solve these problems in military channels and try 
and keep them out of diplomatic channels, which serve only to 
complicate or confuse the situation.15
Next morning, Wilton signalled Hassett in Canberra that, after discussion 
with Westmoreland, he believed 1 RAR should be permitted to operate 
anywhere in the III Corps area. He directed Hassett to put this proposal 
through the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger) to the Defence Minister, adding that 
12  Signal, Jackson to Wilton, 4 July 1965, AWM 121, 161/A/4.
13  Letter, Wilton to Army Minister, 6  July 1965, AWM  121, 161/A/4, and NAA: A1945, 
248/4/124.
14  Signal, Wilton to Jackson, 9 July 1965, AWM 121, 161/A/4.




1 RAR should now ‘have a more active role. It is the best battalion in the 
theatre and its morale will suffer if it is not used to best effect in the mobile 
offensive role’.16 Securing the extension to 1 RAR’s area of operations took 
longer than Wilton had hoped, mainly because the Defence Minister, 
Shane Paltridge, had fallen ill, and because of the need to get agreement 
from the Minister for External Affairs.17 It was 1 October before Wilton 
signalled Jackson that 1 RAR was ‘available for operations more distant 
from Bien Hoa’.18
The importance of this episode lies in what it reveals about the attitude 
of the  Australian Government, and particularly of Wilton, who was 
determined to limit casualties and not expose Australian troops to 
capricious American operations. Wilton and the Australians had 
a  different philosophy to the Americans, believing that the Americans 
favoured a direct approach, using plentiful firepower to kill as many 
enemy soldiers as possible. Such an approach might result occasionally 
in heavy allied casualties, and Australia could not afford to take the risk 
that its sole battalion might be the one that took the casualties. In any 
case, the Australians preferred a more methodical approach to counter-
revolutionary warfare.
Considerations on expanding the 
Australian force
Wilton played the key role in planning to expand the force in Vietnam. 
Indeed, as soon as 1 RAR arrived in Vietnam, Wilton and his advisers 
began considering how the force could be built up to an independent 
task force, so the Australians could apply their own doctrine for counter-
revolutionary warfare. At a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
on 15 July, he argued that they should begin planning to build up the 
commitment to a task force of two infantry battalions with supporting 
elements, plus a detachment of RAAF Iroquois helicopters.
16  Signal, Wilton to Hassett, 3 September 1965, NAA: A1945/42, 248/4/128.
17  Signal, Mackay to Wilton, 13 September 1965, AWM 121, 161/A/5.
18  Ian McNeill, To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, 1993, p 121.
29
2. wHY wAS 5 RAR STATIONEd AT NUI dAT?
Meanwhile, information arrived that the US Government might soon 
request Australia to increase its force contribution. Setting out how 
Australia might respond, Wilton explained to Scherger on 20 July:
The war in Vietnam is essentially an infantry war and the 
requirement for additional forces is basically for more infantry 
battalions. Other supporting arms such as artillery, APCs and 
engineers are important but have a less vital part to play in the 
present situation.19
He continued that 3  RAR had just completed a ‘strenuous two-year 
tour in Malaya and Borneo and is due for relief and return to Australia’. 
It was to be relieved by 4 RAR, which was about to deploy to Malaysia. 
On  return from Malaysia, 320 members of 3 RAR were to transfer to 
the embryonic 7 RAR to help form the new battalion. The only available 
battalions were 2 RAR, 5 RAR and 6 RAR; each had a strength of about 
550, but these included some 100 soldiers who were ineligible for service 
overseas because of under-age or medical classification reasons. The 
earliest these battalions would be ready for operations would be February 
1966. If another infantry battalion were sent to Vietnam at short notice it 
would seriously disrupt and delay the national service program and should 
only be contemplated if it were ‘a matter of dire operational necessity’. 
Wilton concluded:
I believe that we should plan now to build up our existing force 
to a Task Force of two infantry battalions plus the required scale 
of combat and logistic support units, together with a detachment 
of army light aircraft and a detachment of RAAF Iroquois utility 
helicopters.20
Noting this advice, on 29  July the Defence Committee recommended 
increasing the force by an artillery battery and an engineer troop in the 
short term, with another infantry battalion to be made ready by February 
or March 1966.
With these plans in mind, in early August Brigadier Mackay visited Saigon 
where Lieutenant General John Throckmorton, acting commander 
US MACV, and Throckmorton’s chief of staff, Brigadier General William 
DePuy, told him that president Johnston was requesting additional 
19  Letter, Wilton to Scherger, 20 July 1965, and attached paper, ‘An assessment of the Army’s ability 




Australian forces, and asked what Australia had in mind.21 Johnston 
had approved the deployment of a further 125,000 troops to Vietnam, 
and the Republic of Korea was expected to dispatch a division.22 Anxious 
to reserve an area for an Australian task force, Mackay called on DePuy 
before he left to return home. As he recalled:
I said, you know, old Bill, ‘Just put a ring around Phuoc Tuy 
Province. If we’re going to come in with a force, this is the place 
I believe we ought to come in to … Now flog off this other area, 
flog off this and that, do what you like, but don’t let this one go.’ 
He laughed and said: ‘OK, we’ll put a thumb mark on it for you’.23
This was just prudent planning. While Wilton wanted to expand the force 
to two battalions, he recognised such a force could not yet be sustained. 
But clearly the idea of a larger force was being discussed; for example, 
on 12  August Wilton advised the Defence Minister, Senator Shane 
Paltridge, that:
if it became necessary to provide forces in the field in addition to 
the proposed task force of 3,500 plus existing commitments in 
Malaysia and New Guinea, we would be very close to the stage 
when a defence emergency should be declared.24
On 17 August the Cabinet agreed to send an additional 350 troops to 
Vietnam, but directed that the army not undertake any further planning 
to deploy a task force.25 The additional 350 troops enabled the battalion 
to be reinforced with a battery of artillery and a troop of engineers to form 
a battalion group – the force first suggested by Wilton on 27 April.
The army ceased planning for a two-battalion task force for the remainder 
of the year. On 29 November, however, the US Secretary for Defense, 
Robert McNamara, told the Australian ambassador of Saigon that 
a request for a second battalion would be made shortly.26 On 7 December 
Hicks advised the Acting Defence Minister, Alan Hulme, that:
21  Letter, Wilton to Forbes, 19 August 1965, AWM 121, 161/A/1.
22  Report, Mackay to Wilton, 9 August 1965, AWM 121, 161/A/4.
23  Army Historical Programme, interview with Maj Gen K  Mackay, 8  March 1972, p  12, 
AWM 107 (hereafter: Mackay interview). McNeill, To Long Tan, pp 182–4.
24  Letter, Wilton to Hicks, 12 August 1965, AWM 121, 161/A/4.
25  Letter, Secretary, Department of Defence to CGS, 18 August 1965, AWM 121, 161/A/5.
26  Report by the Joint Planning Committee at a meeting on 7  February 1966, CCOSC files, 
box 16, file 513, pt 3.
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if an additional Australian contribution in Vietnam is judged to 
be the most effective Australian contribution, then it would seem 
that nothing short of a task force of at least two battalions with 
appropriate supporting units (say a total of 3,500 men) would 
meet the requirement.27
In the preceding months General Westmoreland had been anticipating 
the deployment of an Australian task force. For example, on 12 August 
Brigadier Jackson reported to Wilton that Westmoreland had said he would 
‘be very pleased to know … how the possibility of an Australian task force 
was progressing’.28 While there is no record, it is likely Westmoreland 
discussed this issue with Wilton when he visited on 2 September. Jackson 
was present for their meeting. Jackson recalled later that in the three to 
four months preceding the arrival of the Task Force, Westmoreland sought 
his views as to where an Australian task force could be deployed:
I think the sort of thing I tried to get across to him was that 
Australian troops were trained for operations in jungle and 
mountain warfare. They were trained particularly in patrol type 
operations and I didn’t think they would be really suitable in the 
[Mekong] Delta unless they were given considerable support, 
particularly equipment support, as we had not really examined 
this sort of fighting in flooded paddy fields and miles and miles of 
water, and very heavy rain, and dense population.29
Jackson also recalled that when he visited the US Marines near the 
demilitarised zone at the far north of South Vietnam, the Marine 
commander said he would be delighted to have an Australian force there. 
Another suggestion was to base the Australian Task Force at Bien Hoa 
airfield, but there was not sufficient room as the 173rd US Brigade was 
already based there. Phuoc Tuy Province was also mentioned because it 
was ‘sufficiently close’ to Saigon.
It was an area which had gone bad in recent years. The VC 
[Viet Cong] were pretty much in control of it and it was therefore 
a thorn in the side of the Saigon defence … It was an area in which 
there were no other major forces deployed so we had the position 
where allied forces were needed there and there was really nobody 
else likely to be available to go there – at that stage any rate.30
27  Letter, Hick to Acting Defence Minister, 7 December 1965, NAA: A1945/42, 248/4/138.
28  Signal, Jackson to Wilton, 12 August 1965, AWM 121, 161/A/4.
29  Army Historical Programme, interview with Brig OD  Jackson, 9  March 1972, AWM  107 
(hereafter: Jackson interview).
30  Jackson interview, p 45.
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Brigadier Mackay visited Vietnam between 14 and 20 December 1965, 
but before he departed Australia he was specifically briefed ‘not to give 
any indication that Australia would be prepared to supply additional 
units for service in Vietnam at this stage’.31 Nonetheless, during Mackay’s 
visit Jackson received the ‘first firm information’ that the Australian 
effort might be increased to the task force level.32 Mackay recalled that he 
discussed possible areas with General Westmoreland:
I don’t know which visit it was on, but I can remember he had a very 
good grasp of the situation. He wanted a spread of forces into areas 
where the VC had not been challenged, and it was important that 
he have the various provinces covered, particularly where the ARVN 
[Army of the Republic of Vietnam] just had no forces at all.33
As Mackay indicated, he was not sure when he met Westmoreland. In fact, 
he visited Vietnam three times in 1965, in May, August and December, 
and on the latter two occasions Westmoreland was absent from Saigon. 
In  December Mackay certainly had discussions with Westmoreland’s 
deputy, as well as his chiefs of operations, plans and logistics.34
Mackay was clear about the alternatives being offered: the Phan Rang area 
in central South Vietnam, the Mekong Delta and Phuoc Tuy Province. 
Phan Rang was ‘pretty easy to eliminate because it was too isolated, there 
wasn’t much enemy activity up there, and you’d be open to all sort of 
criticism, not pulling your weight etc.’. The problems with the Delta have 
already been mentioned. According to Mackay, the Americans were ‘very 
keen to have our forces in Phuoc Tuy’. Considering the geography of the 
province, he thought:
it would be relatively easy to put our force, small as it was, between 
say 100,000 people in Phuoc Tuy and the VC who were out in the 
bush … if we with a national force could sit in the centre of things 
here we could play an important role in the liberation and defeat 
of the VC.35
31  Minute, Secretary, Department of Defence to Wilton, 16 December 1965, AWM 121, 161/A/5.
32  Jackson interview, p 42.
33  Mackay interview, p 10.
34  Report, Brigadier K Mackay, ‘Report on visit to South Vietnam by DMO&P’, 27 December 
1965, NAA: A1945/42, 248/4/138.
35  Mackay interview, pp 10–11.
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Approving a two-battalion task force
While Mackay was still in Saigon, on 18  December the Minister for 
External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, who was also visiting Saigon, cabled 
Canberra that the South Vietnamese prime minister, Nguyen Cao 
Ky, had made ‘almost  a request’ for additional army and air force 
assistance.36 The head of the Australian Defence staff in Washington, 
Major General Charles Long, followed this on 23 December with advice 
that Westmoreland had said he envisaged an ANZAC brigade with two 
Australian and one New Zealand battalions plus supporting arms and 
services, logistic support units and a SAS squadron.37 Moving quickly, on 
4 January Hicks sent Hulme two papers – one prepared by Scherger in 
consultation with the military chiefs, the other by Hicks’s staff – outlining 
the forces that could be sent to Vietnam.38 The Cabinet considered them 
on 5 January; although it took no decision, it permitted the Chiefs of Staff 
to prepare a formal proposal.39
The Joint Planning Committee, chaired by the Director of Joint Service 
Plans, Major General Mervyn Brogan (a later CGS), now prepared 
a detailed report on what forces could be made available for service in 
Vietnam. The committee stated that the ground war was ‘essentially an 
infantry war with brigade-sized forces securing major bases throughout 
the country’. In view of later criticism that Australia should have provided 
a three-battalion task force, as this would have allowed two battalions to 
operate throughout Phuoc Tuy Province while the third protected the Nui 
Dat base, it should be noted that Australia was responding to a specific 
US request for a second battalion. Further, at this stage 4 RAR was still on 
operations in Borneo, and the committee considered that while Indonesia 
was ‘unlikely to step up confrontation … the possibility of limited war 
cannot be excluded’. Both 5 RAR and 6 RAR would be ready for operations 
by May/June 1966, but 3 RAR, which had returned from operations in 
Borneo, and 7 RAR, which had recently been formed, would not be ready 
until September 1966. In addition, 1 RAR was still in Vietnam and it, 
and 2 RAR, would not be ready for operations until October 1966. The 
final battalion, 8 RAR, which was being raised, would not be ready until 
36  Peter Edwards, A Nation at war: Australian politics, society and diplomacy during the Vietnam War 
1965–1975, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1997, p 86.
37  Cable WA1666, Washington to Canberra, 23 December 1965, NAA: A1945/42, 248/4/138.
38  The papers are in NAA: A1945/42, 248/4/138 and 248/4/145.
39  Cabinet Minute, No 1467, Melbourne, 5 January 1966, NAA: A1845/42, 248/4/138.
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March 1967. Planning needed to be based on ‘the  possibility that the 
operations may have to be sustained for an indefinite period’. That is, at 
this stage only a two-battalion task force could be supported. There was 
no suggestion of sending tanks to Vietnam – such a proposal does not 
seem to have been even considered.40
The Defence Committee endorsed this report on 10  February 1966.41 
Wilton was adamant that if further forces were requested for service 
in South Vietnam it would not be practical ‘to meet such a request in 
a situation short of a defence emergency’.42 Air Chief Marshal Scherger 
noted that a brigade was ‘the optimum unit which operates alone’ in 
Vietnam. If Australia did not deploy ‘one national force incorporating 
all Australian units in the theatre’ it risked the loss of national identity, 
the loss of valuable experience, especially in command appointments, 
the ‘repetition of the problems which General Monash had in World 
War I and General Blamey in World War II of getting national units 
together under national command’, and ‘subjection to tactical doctrine to 
which we may not subscribe’. A national force would preserve ‘national 
identity’, provide essential military experience particularly in command 
and, because it would use Australian tactical doctrine, provide a force that 
was militarily more effective.43
These issues went to the heart of the problem of a small country operating 
in a larger coalition and were brought home just a few days later when 
Jackson reported that the Americans planned to use 1 RAR in operations 
close to the Cambodian border. Jackson objected and 1  RAR was 
withdrawn. Wilton agreed with Jackson’s action and advised Hicks that 
this was ‘the first occasion on which it has been necessary for Brigadier 
Jackson to exercise his responsibility, laid down in his Directive for the 
safety and well-being of AAFV’.44
On 2  March the Cabinet considered the Defence Committee’s report 
and approved the deployment of a task force of two infantry battalions, 
an SAS squadron, combat and logistic support units, and eight RAAF 
40  Report by the Joint Planning Committee at a meeting on 7  February 1966, CCOSC files, 
box 16, file 513, pt 3.
41  Minute by the Defence Committee at a meeting on Thursday, 10  February 1966, NAA: 
A1945/42, 248/4/145.
42  Letter, Wilton to Hicks, 3 February 1966, NAA: A1945/42, 248/4/145.
43  Paper, Sir Frederick Scherger, ‘South Vietnam—Australian Military Assistance’, 10 February 
1966, CCOSC files, box 16, file 513, pt 3.
44  Letter, Wilton to Hicks, 18 February 1966, NAA: A1945/42, 248/4/145.
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Iroquois helicopters. The total contribution of about 4,500 would include 
national servicemen.45 Much of the initiative for expanding the force had 
come directly from Wilton, who saw sound military reasons for it. As he 
said later:
When we sent our first battalion up, it was the most we could do 
in terms of the size of the force. We’d always, I think, known in the 
backs of our minds that when our manpower and other resources 
permitted this would have to be increased.46
Wilton selects Phuoc Tuy Province
On 12 March, just four days after prime minister Harold Holt announced 
that the Task Force was going to be deployed, Wilton departed for Saigon 
for meetings with Westmoreland and the Chief of the Vietnamese Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Cao Van Vien. Wilton had prepared a brief, setting 
out what he hoped to achieve in Vietnam, and he forwarded this through 
Scherger to the Defence Minister for his concurrence. In preparing the 
brief Wilton had discussed his proposals with the new Minister for the 
Army, Malcolm Fraser, explaining the advantages of finding a separate 
‘piece of geography’ for the Australian Task Force.47 Accompanying 
Wilton were Brigadier Bob Hay, shortly to take over from Mackay as 
DMO&P, and Lieutenant Colonel Alan Stretton, from the Directorate of 
Staff Duties. Soon after departing from Sydney, Wilton called Hay and 
Stretton into the aircraft’s private compartment usually reserved for off-
duty crew and, as Stretton recalled, ‘set about planning the details of the 
Australian build-up in Vietnam’.48
Accompanied by his advisers from Canberra, as well as Brigadier Jackson, 
in Saigon Wilton went straight to a meeting with Westmoreland. They 
agreed that, on all matters concerning the Australian forces, Westmoreland 
would deal directly with the Commander, Australia Force Vietnam 
(COMAFV), who would be an officer of major general rank. Mackay was 
shortly to be promoted to fill this position. Operational control of the 
1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) would be through the commanding 
general of II  Field Force, who was co-located with the commander of 
45  Cabinet Minute, Decision No 60, 2 March 1966, NAA: A1945/42, 248/4/145.
46  Wilton interview, p 13.
47  Interview, JM Fraser with author, 18 November 2002.
48  Alan Stretton, Soldier in a storm, Collins, Sydney, 1978, p 181.
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II Vietnamese Corps near Bien Hoa. 1 ATF would be located in Phuoc 
Tuy Province, while the Australian Logistic Support Group would be at 
nearby Vung Tau.
Subsequent discussions between their staffs established the roles for 
1  ATF. First, it was to secure and dominate the assigned tactical area 
of responsibility in Phuoc Tuy Province. Second, it was to conduct 
operations related to the security of the highway linking Vung Tau and 
Saigon as required. Third, it was to conduct other operations in the 
province. Fourth, it was to conduct operations anywhere in the III Corps 
Tactical Zone and also to conduct operations anywhere in the adjacent 
province of Binh Tuy (in the II Corps Tactical Zone) as agreed between 
Westmoreland and COMAFV. Thus, Australia placed clear limits on the 
geographic extent of 1 ATF’s operations.
The key decision was the allocation of Phuoc Tuy Province to 1  ATF. 
As we have seen, Mackay had already identified it and Wilton had 
probably discussed possibilities with Westmoreland when they had met 
in September. Wilton, Mackay and other staff at AHQ considered the 
requirements for an Australian operational area, which Mackay described 
later in a presentation to the CGS Exercise in 1971. These were that the 
operational area should have significant enemy activity so there need be 
‘no thought by any party that Australia was pulling less than its share’; the 
area should not be contiguous to the borders with Cambodia, Laos or the 
demilitarised zone; it should be a geographically distinct area which could 
be left largely to the Task Force and with which the Australian national 
effort could be readily identified; and it should offer reasonably secure 
access to shipping and overseas aircraft.49
Wilton recalled later that the choice was between Phuoc Tuy and 
Bien Hoa. Although for military reasons 1  ATF had to be under US 
operational control, he ‘preferred not to be brigaded with an American 
position. I  wanted to have as much independence within the force 
limitations as I could, so I could keep a closer eye on it’. He thought ‘our 
two-battalion task force was worth any US three-battalion brigade’, and 
that placing it in the province gave ‘us the best opportunity to make the 
most impact nationally—which is always an important consideration in 
a war like this’. He wanted ‘to get clear of the American densely populated 
49  Maj Gen Mackay, Chief of the General Staff’s Exercise 1971, Notes for Speaker – Maj Gen 
Mackay. Papers from the CGS Exercise in author’s collection (hereafter: CGS Exercise 1971).
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area, and get into a place where they could operate, in a way we thought 
was most effective’. Another disadvantage in selecting Bien Hoa was that 
Australian resupply ships would have to sail right into Saigon where they 
might be delayed for some time. Phuoc Tuy could be resupplied through 
Vung Tau.50
But the most important reason concerned the safety of the force. Vung 
Tau was on a nearby and isolated peninsula, so 1 ATF could be evacuated 
or reinforced by Australian national resources should the situation in the 
province deteriorate. As Wilton explained, ‘if the war went really bad and 
some frightful disaster was impending, we could look after ourselves’. 
Considering all these reasons, Wilton said: ‘all right, we’ll go to Phuoc 
Tuy Province’.51 Then, according to Stretton, they went through ‘a face-
saving exercise with the South Vietnamese’, visiting various generals who 
each said that he had decided to allocate the province to the Australians. 
Stretton thought that in selecting the province ‘Wilton showed remarkable 
military judgement and that there would have been a greater loss of life 
if the Australian force had been allocated to any other province’.52
The decision to base the Australian Logistic Support Group at Vung Tau 
caused more problems. The only available site was a windswept sandy 
area east of the city, but the local mayor told Wilton and Jackson that 
a senior military officer in Saigon had to give his approval. So, they went 
back to Saigon and, as Wilton described it, he ‘nailed this fellow down at 
a reception a couple of nights’ before they left Saigon. Wilton said, ‘Now 
look, this is the place we want. Can you give me your assurance that this 
will now be allocated without delay?’ ‘Oh yes’, replied the general, ‘that 
will be done’. Wilton accepted this assurance but reminded the general 
that if the area was not made available ‘we can’t bring in our force’.53 
As it happened, Jackson secured final approval when the first ship carrying 
supplies was only a week from Vung Tau, and only after he threatened to 
have the ship turned around.54
50  CGS Exercise 1971.
51  Wilton interview, p 21.
52  Stretton, Soldier in a storm, pp 182–3.
53  Wilton interview, p 24.




Wilton’s decision to locate 1 ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province has not been 
seriously questioned, but the decision to base 1 ATF specifically at Nui 
Dat in the centre of the province has been criticised. Brigadier Jackson, 
who had been nominated to command 1 ATF, selected Nui Dat, and his 
decision was confirmed by Wilton when they flew over the area in the 
afternoon of 14 March. As Jackson recalled:
I remember flying over the Nui Dat with General Wilton and he 
looked down there and he said, ‘Well one day there’ll be an empire 
down there won’t there?’ And we had in other words pretty much 
agreed that that’s where the Task Force would go.55
Jackson later explained that he selected Nui Dat because it was located 
between the enemy’s Main Force bases and the areas of most dense 
civilian population. The base had to be capable not only of being held 
by a minimum force but also of providing for a small airfield, a task force 
maintenance area, and tactically located unit base areas with room to fight 
should the base come under heavy attack. There were three other factors. 
It had to be on ground which would be above water level during the wet 
season, which was due to begin one week after forward deployment began. 
It needed to be in relatively open ground and not too close to densely 
settled areas to enable maximum use of firepower rather than manpower 
for its defences. And it should be located close enough to the Vung Tau–
Ba Ria area to avoid diversion of forces for line of communication security 
duties or alternatively to allow maintenance by air.56 After the war Jackson 
still believed it was right to base 1 ATF at Nui Dat.57
Stretton thought the decision to base 1 ATF at Nui Dat was one of the 
‘cardinal blunders’ made by the Australian commanders in Vietnam.58 
The huge complex that was eventually developed had to be defended, thus 
reducing the numbers of troops that could be deployed on operations. 
If the troops had been located at Vung Tau fewer would have been needed 
to defend the base.
55  Ibid, p 50.
56  Brig OD Jackson, CGS Exercise 1971, Presentation Operation Hardihood – Deployment of 1 AF 
to Nui Dat.
57  Jackson interview, p 52.
58  Stretton, Soldier in a storm, p 213.
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Wilton’s successor as CGS, Daly, thought ‘with the advantage of hindsight’ 
that ‘it would have been a better proposition to develop Vung Tau as the 
Task Force base. In any future operation such as that, I think it would be 
most unwise to set up two permanent bases’.59 Further, the construction 
of the Nui Dat base required a large-scale engineering effort that was 
not appreciated at the time it was selected. As Brigadier Philip Greville, 
historian of the Royal Australian Engineers, has argued, there was no one 
‘accompanying General Sir John Wilton who understood engineering 
matters upon which the well-being of the forces would largely depend’.60
Lieutenant General Sir Donald Dunstan, who was deputy commander 
of 1 ATF in 1968, COMAFV in 1971–72, and later CGS, thought the 
army made a:
fundamental mistake when we went into Phuoc Tuy in that 
we sat at Nui Dat in the manner in which we did. Nui Dat 
was always a pain in the neck; it was a large base, it became a 
relatively sophisticated base and it was always a heavy consumer 
of manpower.61
He thought if the base had been at Vung Tau there would have been 
a saving of personnel and the defensive task would have been far less 
demanding. Then, with the number of people the army had in Vietnam, 
it would have been possible to raise a force of four battalions. At any time, 
three battalions could have operated continually in Military Region 3 or 
Phuoc Tuy. To operate in Phuoc Tuy it was only necessary to provide 
fire support bases: ‘I don’t believe that you have to put the base there to 
separate the enemy from the civil population.’62
Wilton rejected this argument. He wanted the troops based away from 
a populated area. Placing the base in the centre of the province posed 
a  continuing threat to Viet Cong operations. And importantly, if the 
troops had been at Vung Tau the American high command might have 
wished to deploy them away from the province on the sort of deep 
operations that, from the beginning, he had wanted to avoid.
59  Army Historical Programme, interview with Lt Gen Sir Thomas Daly, 22 November 1974 and 
4 June 1975, p 22, AWM 107.
60  PJ Greville, The Royal Australian Engineers 1945 to 1972: Paving the way, Corps Committee 
of the Royal Australian Engineers, Moorebank, NSW, 2002, p 721.
61  Army Historical Programme, interview with Maj Gen DB Dunstan, 4 October 1973. Copy of 




Major General Mackay, who took up his appointment as COMAFV in 
May 1966, thought the idea of basing 1 ATF at Vung Tau was ‘ridiculous’:
You can’t go in as the big bold boys to sort this problem out and 
sit back … at Vung Tau and then get in your damned trucks or 
helicopters every day and go for miles out in the bush and do 
something and come back [to] live in a villa or live by the seaside.63
But Mackay claimed the Nui Dat base he had in mind ‘bore no relation 
to the hideous monster that developed later on’. He thought the task force 
maintenance area should have been at Vung Tau rather than Nui Dat.
When I went up there as QMG [quartermaster general] I almost 
blew a valve. I think there were about 290 fellows sitting on their 
backsides with a bloody great engineer’s stores yard there with 
refrigerators and logs and timber and stuff  …  I didn’t envisage 
this enormous area of bitumen where you could bring in half the 
American air force.64
The historian Greg Lockhart has provided the most detailed criticism 
of the  decision to locate 1  ATF at Nui Dat.65 He points out that 
Australian Army counter-revolutionary warfare doctrine encouraged the 
establishment of a forward operational base, and indeed this concept 
had been practised during Exercise Sky High near Singleton in NSW in 
November 1963.66 Lockhart argues that Wilton and Jackson (and for that 
matter Mackay also) misunderstood the nature of the war in Vietnam 
in claiming that a base at Nui Dat would separate the enemy from the 
population in central and south-western Phuoc Tuy. Lockhart points 
out that many residents in Ba Ria and Long Dat, which the Nui Dat 
base was supposed to separate from the Viet Cong, supported or were 
actual members of the Viet Cong. Lockhart sees the decision as evidence 
of Wilton’s ‘barrier mentality’. He and successive 1  ATF commanders 
never ‘understood the web of mutually supportive relations between the 
local semi-regular and regular guerrilla units and national PAVN [People’s 
Army of Vietnam] main forces’. Lockhart argues that Wilton ‘never 
fully comprehended’ that the ground of tactical importance in Phuoc 
Tuy Province was in the south, in the Long Hai Hills, where substantial 
63  Mackay interview, pp 17, 18. Mackay was QMG from 1968 to 1973.
64  Ibid.
65  Greg Lockhart, The minefield: An Australian tragedy in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2007, 
ch 2.
66  McNeill, To Long Tan, pp 18, 19.
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Viet Cong forces had been based for many years.67 That is, Wilton and the 
other Australian Army leaders not only failed to understand the nature 
of the war in Vietnam, but had no knowledge of the history of the Viet 
Cong in Phuoc Tuy Province.
There is, however, a contrary view. Ian McNeill, author of the official 
history, has shown that senior North Vietnamese and Viet Cong officers 
agreed that the location of 1 ATF at Nui Dat presented a great obstacle to 
their operations.68 Further, in discussing the Battle of Long Tan in August 
1966, McNeill concluded:
The decision to place the task force at Nui Dat and the subsequent 
operations had been designed to separate the guerrillas from the 
people, a fundamental tenet of Australian counter-insurgency 
doctrine. These activities had apparently taken effect, forcing the 
enemy to confront the task force as Jackson had anticipated.69
Major General Bob Hay, who as a brigadier accompanied Wilton and 
Jackson on the reconnaissance to Phuoc Tuy in March 1966 (and was 
COMAFV in 1969–70), agreed that the Task Force should have been 
located at Nui Dat:
It was better to put this on the ground between the main centres of 
population and true jungle area, which were dominated by the VC 
and NVA [North Vietnamese Army] … In the long term I think 
this proved to be a wise move, although it did mean a substantial 
base was, in fact, developed in Nui Dat, and this really was not, I 
am quite sure, the thought in 1966.70
While Wilton and Jackson’s decision to locate 1 ATF at Nui Dat can be 
understood in terms of creating a presence in the province, in retrospect 
perhaps there was another alternative. As Dunstan suggested, the Task 
Force could have been based at Vung Tau with a large fire support base 
located forward at Nui Dat, but still much smaller than the eventual 
1 ATF complex. This is a variation on Mackay’s idea. Later in the war, 
67  Greg Lockhart, ‘Extracts from The Minefield ’, The Vietnam Veteran Newsletter, September 2003, 
pp 18, 19.
68  McNeill, To Long Tan, p 200. For further criticism of the decision, see Ian McNeill and Ashley 
Ekins, On the offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War, January 1967–June 1968, Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney, 2003, pp 63–4.
69  McNeill, To Long Tan, p 366.




battalion fire support bases were established at Courtenay Hill and the 
Horseshoe for months on end. They had the desired effect of dominating 
the surrounding areas.71
Important decisions
The decision to locate 1 ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province and specifically at Nui 
Dat reveals Wilton’s determination not to place the lives of Australians at 
risk in more adventurous American operations. He also wanted to ensure 
that 1  ATF had the best possible opportunity to conduct operations 
according to Australian tactical doctrine. He had been reminded of 
the differences between Australian and American doctrine when, on the 
afternoon of 13 March 1966, he visited 1 RAR on Operation Silver City, 
deep in War Zone D, where the 173rd Brigade was engaged in destroying 
the headquarters of the Viet Cong 7th Military Region. Three days 
later three Viet Cong battalions attacked one of the US battalions and 
Australian gunners fired continuously for four hours to break up the Viet 
Cong assaults.72
Wilton concluded his visit to Vietnam in the morning of 17 March, when 
he signed a Military Working Agreement with Westmoreland, who noted 
in his diary that the ‘Australians are pleased to deal with us and there is 
apparently a mutual friendship between the officers of our two nations 
and a common outlook’.73 Wilton then headed home and on 23 March 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee endorsed the arrangements that he had 
made in Vietnam.74
Wilton’s visit to Vietnam in March 1966 was the most important by 
any Australian military chief during the Vietnam War and, according 
to Malcolm Fraser, it was carried out ‘brilliantly’.75 Lockhart and others 
would argue, however, that the decision to place 1  ATF at Nui Dat 
was flawed. Whatever the judgement on this issue, Wilton’s decision 
established 1  ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province and set guidelines for its 
71  For a description of 1 ATF fire bases see Bruce Picken, Fire support bases Vietnam: Australian and 
allied fire support base locations and main support units, Big Sky Publishing, Newport, NSW, 2012.
72  Bob Breen, First to fight: Australian diggers, N.Z. kiwis and U.S. paratroopers in Vietnam 1965–
66, Allen & Unwin, Sydney 1988, p 233.
73  Westmoreland Diary, 17 March 1966, US Army Center of Military History.
74  COSC Minute, 23 March 1966, CCOSC files, box 25, file 1910.
75  Interview, JM Fraser with author, 18 November 2002.
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employment that were to continue for the remainder of the war. These 
guidelines were a clear reflection of the Australian Government’s policy of 
minimising the chances of excessive casualties. His visit also established 
the command arrangements. The decision to appoint the COMAFV, 
who reported to the Chiefs of Staff Committee through its chairman, set 
a precedent for appointing an Australian national commander with joint 
service responsibilities. This approach has persisted to the present day. 
As for the two-battalion task force, in December 1967 it was expanded 
to three battalions. Confrontation had ended in August 1966 and 9 RAR 
was raised in November 1967.
Before 1 ATF arrived at Nui Dat, Wilton had taken over from Scherger as 
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and when he was promoted 
to general in September 1968 he was the first Australian Army officer 
to reach this rank since General Sir Thomas Blamey was promoted in 
September 1941. In his new position, Wilton would continue to provide 
oversight of Australia’s Vietnam commitment until he retired in November 
1970. At that time 1 ATF, based at Nui Dat and reduced again to two 









Stan Maizey was second in command of 5th  Battalion, the Royal 
Australian Regiment (5 RAR), from January 1966 until December 1966, 
when he was posted as the senior operations staff officer at Headquarters, 
1st Australian Task Force (HQ 1 ATF). He spent 16 months in Vietnam, 
eight months each with 5  RAR and HQ 1  ATF. Stan, sadly, died on 
18 June 2018, while this book was still being written. Fortunately, several 
years ago, he had written an article about his experiences with 5 RAR and 
he agreed that this could be published in Vietnam Vanguard.
This chapter is about 5 RAR’s preparations for its first tour of duty in 
Vietnam, and the inherent logistic difficulties encountered. Getting ready 
for a lengthy period of war service is a complex process, especially in terms 
of assembling the necessary equipment. As second in command of the 
battalion, it was principally Stan’s responsibility to see that we went to war 
with all our necessary equipment. If we could not get all that we needed 
in Australia, he then had to negotiate with the Americans to make up 
for the deficiencies in equipment and other essential supplies. Bearing in 
mind that Australia had not sent a multi-battalion-sized force abroad on 
operations since the Korean War of the early 1950s, there was much to be 
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done in terms of equipping and supplying 5 RAR and 6 RAR before they 
went to Vietnam in April 1966. Here is Stan’s account of how he met the 
challenges confronting him in 5 RAR’s initial year of service in Vietnam.
Stan Maizey
I was posted as second in command (2IC) of 5 RAR in December 1965, 
arriving at Gallipoli Barracks, Holsworthy, in early January 1966. The 
commanding officer (CO), Lieutenant Colonel John Warr, was visiting 
1  RAR at Bien Hoa, South Vietnam, but had left instructions for the 
training he required until his return.
At this stage, the battalion was a nucleus of regular army officers, non-
commissioned officers and men. Reinforcements started to arrive during 
January 1966 and included many national servicemen (NS) from the 
Officer Training Unit, Scheyville (near Windsor, NSW), and from 
the various NS recruit training battalions.
While no official announcement had been made, it was understood 
that 5  RAR would replace 1  RAR in Vietnam in April/May 1966. 
Correspondence between counterparts of the battalions was taking place 
and the logistic information included: bring as much timber/flooring as 
possible; scale holdings of consumable items for at least six months, not 
three months as shown in the various equipment tables; get a fisheye lens 
for the movie projector; be aware of the various US codes and code words 
(such as Dustoff, for casualty evacuation), and requisition procedures; 
and get used to US rations.
The battalion’s training concentrated on shooting, platoon drills, company 
movement, helicopter familiarisation and getting to know one another. 
During February and early March 1966, each company was phased 
through a company training exercise in the Gospers Training Area, near 
Rylstone, NSW, and evaluation at the Jungle Training Centre, Canungra, 
Qld. Finally, in March a battalion exercise under the direction of the CO 
took place in the Gospers Training Area to be followed immediately by an 
assessed exercise under the direction of the 1st Brigade.
During this training, the quartermaster’s (QM) staff were extremely busy 
ensuring that the battalion was properly equipped. Unfortunately, the 
army’s supply depots refused to accept our requisitions as we submitted 
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them in a multi-listed format, and not by single items (that is, one item to 
one page). Achieving this level of detail required all the battalion’s clerks 
to be seconded to the QM for about 10 days to rewrite the paperwork. 
Then, because no formal announcement had been made regarding 
5  RAR replacing l  RAR in Vietnam, our requisitions for any items in 
the infantry battalion equipment tables – which were designated as 
restricted warlike stores – were endorsed ‘Not Approved’ and returned to 
us. Lastly, when we tried to follow 1 RAR’s advice to scale our holdings 
for six months (instead of the customary three months), the staff officers 
at HQ Eastern Command either refused to approve an extra holding 
or replied, ‘the items are to be taken over from 1 RAR in situ’. It was 
not until late February or early March 1966, after the announcement 
that the Australian commitment was to be significantly increased to a 
two-battalion task force with supporting arms and a logistic support 
group named 1st Australian Logistic Support Group (1 ALSG), that our 
demands were reluctantly processed. However, with the introduction of 
national service in June 1965, many items of clothing and equipment 
were in short supply and the army’s procurement system proved sadly 
inadequate. For example, some soldiers had only one set of jungle green 
uniforms (other than protective dress, which was usually an outdated but 
recycled khaki summer uniform). Most soldiers had only one pair of calf-
length general purpose (GP) boots with protective stainless-steel inserts 
in the soles, so each soldier was issued with a pair of 1944-era tropical 
studded ankle boots and a pair of canvas gaiters (leggings). All soldiers had 
their full entitlement of personal load-carrying equipment and there was 
little or no reserve in the battalion QM Store.
The final training exercise saw the battalion using a range of equipment 
recently received and still in protective packaging. The exercise was 
held in foul weather so, with the connivance of the regimental medical 
officer (RMO), we managed to get a rum issue for all ranks through the 
supply system.
During the preparatory phase, and on advice from 1 RAR, we tried to shed 
our anti-tank (ATk) weapons: an 84 mm rocket launcher (Carl Gustav) 
held by each of the rifle companies; and six 106  mm recoilless rifles 
(RCLs) held by the Anti-Tank Platoon. Sadly we were unsuccessful in this 
endeavour. The RCLs were mounted on modified Land Rovers and, after 
discussion within the battalion, our armourer, Sergeant Mick Henrys, 
suggested that we mount a machine gun on each vehicle, primarily for 
convoy protection. These six vehicles became known as ‘Sports Cars’ and 
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were invaluable in their adapted, albeit technically illegal, role. We were 
required to take the anti-tank equipment to war where it languished in 
the QM  Store, except for two 106  mm RCLs, which were located on 
either side of the flag pole ‘guarding’ Battalion Headquarters in the base 
area. At the same time, and with a submission by 1 RAR to support our 
request, we tried to amend the equipment table to obtain more M60 
general purpose machine guns (M60 GPMG), radios and telephones 
for base area defences, but this was refused with the comment ‘not until 
the CO has personally established the need’. How we overcame these 
deficiencies is told later in this chapter.
During the build-up of men and materials, as bad as the ordnance stores 
supply system was, the engineer and medical systems were magnificent. 
The engineer system provided us with a good supply of timber and the 
School of Military Engineering at Casula provided instructors for training 
in the use of mines and booby traps, barbed wire fencing and sandbagging. 
The medical system, particularly 2 Camp Hospital at Ingleburn, provided 
instructors for first aid, health and hygiene training, and vital associated 
stores. They also gave high priority to members of the battalion with 
respect to inoculations.
In April 1966, the battalion Advance Party flew out, to be initially fostered 
by 1 RAR at Bien Hoa, then to proceed to the sand dunes at Vung Tau 
to establish a camp for the battalion prior to the occupation of the 1 ATF 
base at Nui Dat. C Company and all the battalion’s stores, equipment 
and vehicles departed in mid-April 1966 on HMAS Sydney, while the 
remainder of the battalion flew out from Richmond Royal Australian 
Air Force (RAAF) base in Boeing 707s over a period of three weeks. 
In mid-May 1966 the last element of the battalion, including myself, 
departed for South Vietnam. On arrival at Saigon’s Tan Son Nhut airport, 
we disembarked and collected our weapons and equipment. We  then 
embarked on a US C123 Provider transport aircraft for the flight to Vung 
Tau. We waited nearly two hours inside the aircraft, in atrocious heat and 
humidity, before take-off.
On arrival in Vietnam, it was immediately obvious that some of the 
stores and equipment we were required to take over from 1 RAR were 
unserviceable from 12 months of hard use, especially tentage and M16 
rifles. The rifles arrived without cleaning accessories and our armourers 
were required to fashion cleaning rods from heavy gauge fencing wire.
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Life at Vung Tau was hectic as we acclimatised, and got to know our 
supporting troops and their jargon, and conducted aerial reconnaissance 
of Phuoc Tuy Province (some of these flights were decidedly hair-raising). 
The US Army’s 68 Assault Helicopter Company, based at Vung Tau air 
base, deserves special mention because this unit provided wonderful 
support whenever required. Prior to leaving Vung Tau, we had an officers’ 
dining-in night at the Pacific Hotel (a big French colonial hotel taken over 
by the US troops as officers’ quarters) where the aviators were present. 
The battalion provided the cooks and stewards and the Battalion Band 
played a tremendous rendition of ‘Those Magnificent Men in their Flying 
Machines’, which brought the house down.
Operation Hardihood, the clearing and then occupation of the Task 
Force’s  operational base at Nui Dat, began in mid-May 1966, initially 
conducted by the US 173  Airborne Brigade with, in late May 1966, 
5 RAR placed under its command for the final phase of the operation. The 
battalion was assisted by a company of 1 RAR. During the operation, 
the  battalion was  very active to the north of Nui Dat and had many 
contacts, mostly with groups of three to five Viet Cong (VC).
In early June 1966, our contacts with the enemy diminished, and it was 
decided to commence occupation of the Task Force base at Nui Dat. 
Prior to the administrative echelons of the battalion and the Task Force 
moving into the area, we were warned of a likely assault by 274  Viet 
Cong Regiment. The CO called for an urgent resupply of ammunition, 
particularly belted ammunition for the M60 machine guns, Claymore 
mines and mortar rounds. While the ammunition was being gathered, 
I asked for helicopter support, from the US Army’s 68 Assault Helicopter 
Company to lift the heavy loads forward. Our QM Platoon had removed 
most of the packaging to reduce weight and bulk, but there was still 
considerably more to move. When the helicopters arrived, I asked a pilot 
how much weight could be carried by each aircraft. With typical US 
nonchalance, the pilot replied, ‘Fill it [the aircraft] up’. When we could 
put no more aboard, he gave the thumbs up, lifted off about one metre, 
bounced the aircraft to about three metres then moved forward, settled, 
bounced again and was finally airborne.
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Life at Nui Dat was a constant struggle – against the elements (the wet 
monsoon season had started), the stores and equipment shortages, the 
discomforts of ‘home’, the inability to defend the base adequately when 
the battalion was out on an operation – all endured while developing the 
base’s defence works.
Many problems complicated our efforts. With the wet season, each time 
a weapon pit was dug and before any overhead cover/protection could be 
found, the pit filled with water. Thank goodness the weather was not cold. 
Trying to fill sandbags with wet clay, the predominantly available filling 
material at Nui Dat, was extraordinarily difficult so, whenever possible, 
I would send a convoy of Land Rovers and trailers to Vung Tau to fill 
sand bags with sand. Whenever the battalion was on operations there 
were only three radios (mine and those of the officer commanding (OC) 
Administration Company and the QM) left in the battalion’s base area. 
Our field telephones were required on operations, therefore we literally 
used message sticks for communications between company positions at 
Nui Dat until the ‘Scrounging Platoon’ (formed in country for obvious 
reasons and consisting of company 2ICs, company quartermaster 
sergeants and most of Administration Company) found, by the side of the 
road, an unattended switchboard, some telephones and radios. The other, 
and most worrying, deficiency was a lack of machine guns for the defence 
of the base. Administration Company had a handful of heavy-barrelled 
rifles, capable of magazine-fed automatic fire, but nothing more by way 
of defensive weapons. Again, the Scrounging Platoon, by exchanging 
a  couple of slouch hats and some butter with our allies, gained several 
.30 and .50 calibre machine guns. The former were immediately mounted 
onto the Sports Cars and the latter were positioned in bunkers in the 
company areas. Further defence and other base stores were obtained when 
the Scrounging Platoon under my command, and using our Land Rovers 
and trailers, visited the US Supply Depot at Vung Tau. We left the Depot 
with all trailers full of borrowed stores, a stores truck and a water truck. 
After we spent most of the day at the ‘supermarket’, the new guard on 
duty demanded written authorisation, which of course we did not have. 
As it was getting very late and because the road to Nui Dat was classified 
black (unsafe) at night, I explained as courteously as possible that it was 
late and we could sort out the paperwork later. I sent the convoy on its 
way and when the Sergeant went into the guardroom for advice, I took 
off. The Sergeant fired at us but fortunately his aim was not accurate. 
After this foray, we became more secure and more comfortable.
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By about July 1966 shortages were causing significant problems. We had 
no replacement clothing, boots and personal equipment for our men; 
the 1944-era tropical-studded boots had provided nourishment for the 
rubber ants, the clothing had succumbed to wear and tear and could 
not be replaced, and although we took personal equipment from our 
administrative elements, we could only put about two thirds of the fighting 
troops into an operation. During a visit by the Commander, Australian 
Force Vietnam (COMAFV), Major General Ken Mackay, the CO was 
wearing a very tattered and torn shirt. When the Commander learned of 
our plight, he had his headquarters QM Store in Saigon scoured, and we 
received about 100 sets of clothing and a box of equipment.
Many of the soldiers were not living in tents because the new tents arrived 
without tent poles, and an RAAF C130 transport aircraft due to bring 
poles arrived full of toilet paper. The transport ship HMAS Jeparit arrived 
with many crates empty. We could only construe that there had been 
sabotage somewhere!
Because of problems with belted ammunition for the M60  GPMG, 
it was decided to make a sheath for each 100-round belt from inflatable 
inserts for the field mattresses we usually slept on. This precaution kept 
rubbish from fouling the belts. However, the ammunition sweated and 
the steel links, which joined each round to the next, rusted very quickly; 
so we decided to use regimental funds (non-government moneys owned 
collectively by the battalion’s members) to obtain a gross of WD40 
aerosol cans of anti-rust spray. After a few weeks, when the goods had not 
arrived, we started to investigate and found them, together with crates of 
GP boots and green floppy hats, on the garbage tip at Vung Tau! Some 
people at 1 ALSG needed to lift their game.
Food became our next major concern; Australian combat rations were not 
readily available, and we were forced to use the bulky and unpopular US 
combat rations. When the battalion was due to return from operations, 
we would order fresh rations, but most of the time the arrival of fresh 
rations  would seem to signal a need for the battalion to return to 
operations, where packaged, individual combat rations were consumed. 
As there was a delay in the installation of cool rooms in our base, the fresh 
rations quickly became inedible. Indeed, the CO received, in August, 
a bill for US$25,000 for fresh rations; but these were the spoiled fresh 
rations that had been written off by our RMO and the QM. One soldier 
asked the CO not to order fresh rations because with their arrival the 
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battalion would be ordered back onto operations. Towards the end of July 
1966, the fresh rations system broke down completely and we ate nothing 
but frankfurts and sweet corn for about five weeks. We had them baked, 
boiled, fried, grilled and minced. I even sent our warrant officer caterer 
to fly 300 kilometres to Dalat (in central South Vietnam’s highlands) to 
buy some fresh vegetables; again using money from our regimental funds. 
The dysfunction of the system was demonstrated by the repeated delivery 
to our base of fresh rations and ice cream when the battalion was out on 
operations and while we had no refrigerated storage in base.
By about mid-September 1966, ‘home’ was becoming more habitable 
and, while the battalion was on operations, its rear elements built and 
consolidated the base area. A large movie screen was erected (we were 
fortunate to find a fisheye cinemascope lens in a US Amenities Unit in 
Saigon). Also, in the outdoor theatre, named ‘The Mayfair’, we built 
a small kitchen to serve steak sandwiches, the inevitable hot dogs plus the 
CO’s favourite, goffers (flavoured milk in a can which could be enjoyed 
hot or cold – canned soft drinks went by the same nickname). The screen 
was a beauty, somewhat like the old drive-in theatre screens, I am not 
sure if any VC, lurking outside the wire, liked our selection of movies! 
The tents were erected, the cool rooms and refrigeration arrived and were 
installed. When a couple of Nissen huts arrived, these were allocated to 
the RMO and padres (chaplains). The rain was dissipating, the weather 
was cooler at night, the company kitchens and canteens were up and 
running, and the QM Store started to get some replacement clothing and 
equipment. During operations and whenever any maintenance resupply 
to our troops in the field was required, we had the company cooks prepare 
a meal of hot soup, which we sent out in plastic jerrycans (5-gallon cans 
similar in appearance to those used by the Germans for the safe carriage of 
petrol during the Second World War) and steak sandwiches. These fresh 
meals, delivered during operations, gave our men a welcome break from 
the monotony of combat rations.
On 18 August 1966, D Company of 6 RAR fought the Battle of Long 
Tan and used RAAF Iroquois helicopters for combat resupply in late 
afternoon amid torrential rain. The RAAF performed very well. Prior to 
this battle, the RAAF seemed to be constrained by hangover peacetime 
regulations which applied in Australia. After Long Tan we felt that they 
were full members of the team. However, during Operation Queanbeyan 
in October 1966, the battalion was required to clear the Nui Thi Vai 
hills. As the operation progressed, we found occupied caves, live booby 
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traps and determined VC opposing us. The CO decided to clear the caves 
using flame-throwers. The necessary equipment and incendiary fuel were 
assembled at Nui Dat and the RAAF Iroquois arrived to fly them across 
to Nui Thi Vai. The pilot then said he was not permitted to carry fuel 
in his aircraft. After discussion between myself and the pilot, I consulted 
higher authority, namely the task force commander, who then brought 
the RAAF component commander and COMAFV into the discussion. 
The result was that the RAAF agreed to carry the fuel if the steel jerrycans 
were packed in wooden crates. In the meantime our troops in close 
contact with the enemy had to wait while the issue was resolved!
In November 1966, I acted as operations officer while Max Carroll 
was on rest and recreation leave. During this period, 5 RAR undertook 
a cordon and search of a small village, Phuoc Hoa, north-west of Ba Ria 
on Route 15. Immediately following this task, we were required to clear 
Long Son Island, which was used by the VC as a stepping stone between 
the Mekong River and the Nui Thi Vai hills. During this operation, the 
task force commander decided to deploy his headquarters onto the island. 
These operations gave me a break from administrative duties and provided 
some operational experience for my next posting as the operations officer 
at Task Force Headquarters.
I was to leave the battalion in mid-December 1966 after a most eventful 
year, but one right off the top shelf.
Editors’ conclusion
We have included this chapter, essentially on administrative and logistic 
matters, to give readers an understanding of how important they are in 
determining operational capability. As has been demonstrated in the early 
years of other wars, it takes a long time to prepare a peacetime army for 
service in war. Moving from a standing start to full operational capability 
takes a huge effort and demands great determination and ingenuity. 
We in 5 RAR were very fortunate to have Stan Maizey as our 2IC and 
principal logistics officer. He had a deep insight into what we needed to 
have available once we were in operations in Vietnam. He then showed 
high resolve and negotiating abilities to get what we needed, both in 
Australia and Vietnam. Once he had seen that we had enough stores and 
equipment to be able to go to war with confidence, he kept all our stocks 
of food, fuel, ammunition, tentage and other essential supplies up to the 
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level that we required. In personal terms he was one of the battalion’s great 
characters, with a formidable sense of humour, a warm affection for sport, 
particularly if it offered betting opportunities, and a strong determination 
to improve the day-to-day lives of our soldiers when they were not on 
operations by making sure that they were given decent meals and a place 
in which to relax and enjoy a drink or two. Underpinning his desire to 
give outstanding service to those who had to rely on him was a very strong 
personal commitment to ‘the Regiment’, meaning the Royal Australian 
Regiment. He saw operational service with a battalion of the Regiment as 
his highest aspiration and the most satisfying time of his professional life.
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5 RAR ON OPERATIONS,  
MAY–SEPTEMBER 1966
Max Carroll, Peter Isaacs, Roger wainwright 
and Robert O’Neill
Editors’ introduction
The Battalion Headquarters (BHQ) staff officers principally responsible 
for operational planning and assisting the commanding officer (CO) in 
all aspects of 5th  Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR), 
battlefield activity were the operations officer, Major Max Carroll, and 
his deputy, Captain Peter Isaacs, who was also the battalion’s adjutant. In 
this chapter they describe how 5 RAR entered the fray and embarked on 
the steep learning curve which confronted all members of the battalion.
Max Carroll
5  RAR was complete on the ground at Vung Tau by 13  May 1966. 
The Battalion Advance Party, of which I, as officer commanding (OC) 
Support Company and battalion operations officer, was a member, had 
arrived on 20 April 1966. We were fostered by our sister battalion 1 RAR, 
which was part of the US 173 Airborne Brigade based at Bien Hoa, where 
we dispersed to learn the ropes. This attachment was invaluable for all 
of us. It enabled me to meet the brigade headquarters staff with whom I 
would be working, and to accompany the 2nd Battalion, 503 Airborne 
Infantry Regiment (2/503), on a helicopter-mounted assault and 
subsequent ground sweep through War Zone D, north of Phuoc Tuy. 
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By giving us this firsthand knowledge of how they conducted battalion 
level operations, our American hosts were very generous and assisted 
us in every way they could. Operationally our styles differed, but they 
respected the professionalism of the Australian Army; both through their 
association with 1 RAR and from the high reputation of the Australian 
Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV).
US Army assistance continued at Vung Tau where the US Army’s 
68 Assault Helicopter Company provided us with excellent training in 
essential techniques for infantry helicopter-mounted insertions and 
assaults, resupply by helicopter and the rapid aeromedical evacuation of 
casualties. They also flew several of our officers on reconnaissance sweeps 
over Phuoc Tuy Province, the area with which we were soon to become 
intensely familiar. Additionally, 173 Airborne Brigade invited Captains 
Peter Isaacs and Brian Le Dan to accompany the HQ of 1st Battalion, 
503 Airborne Infantry Regiment (1/503), on their forthcoming operation.
Peter Isaacs
The last group of 5  RAR troops to deploy to South Vietnam arrived 
at Saigon’s Tan Son Nhut airport aboard a Qantas charter flight in the 
middle of May 1966. The battalion second in command (2IC), Major 
Stan Maizey, and I were part of that final group. Several hours later I was 
sitting on a box in the tent I was to share with my assistant adjutant, 
Lieutenant Ralph Thompson. He briefed me on happenings over the past 
month as the battalion had arrived by air and sea. Having been the 
battalion’s adjutant for the preceding 16 months and usually at the centre 
of everything, I was a touch bewildered! This lasted no more than 24 hours 
as there was a tremendous amount of work to be accomplished before the 
battalion deployed to its operational area in Phuoc Tuy province. This 
included our ‘baptism of fire’ during an air reconnaissance, when all four 
helicopters in which our four-man reconnaissance party flew were fired 
on. The fire was returned with much enthusiasm!
Ever since being appointed adjutant, I had been determined that my 
role would be predominantly operational and not chiefly concerned 
with personnel management and administration, for which adjutants 
within the army’s former Pentropic infantry battalions had been primarily 
responsible. In this I was helped in having a reliable assistant adjutant, 
an exceptionally capable chief clerk in staff, Sergeant Merv Fridolf, 
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and an experienced orderly room sergeant, Sergeant John Leaman. 
My principal role therefore was assistant operations officer and deputy to 
the operations officer who was also the OC Support Company. My job 
entailed responsibility for running the battalion command post (CP) 
and the organisation of all the battalion’s air support activities, including 
helicopter movements and offensive air support.
In preparation for our roles I and the signals officer, Brian Le Dan, who 
was to be commander of the deployed BHQ Group, were both attached 
to the 173 Airborne Brigade for a two-battalion air assault into the area 
of Phuoc Tuy Province. 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) was to establish 
itself here about a week later. We joined the 1/503 at Bien Hoa airbase 
shortly before dawn, having spent the night before the operation with 
1 RAR, which was soon to return home after its 12-month tour of duty as 
part of 173 Airborne Brigade.
The three-day operation was exhilarating. We flew south in an armada of 
helicopters, landed in an assembly area close to our supporting artillery 
battalion, and then flew with an assaulting rifle company into the objective 
landing zone (LZ), preceded by air strikes, artillery fire and, finally, by 
the machine guns and rockets of our accompanying helicopter gunship 
heavy fire teams. There was no opposition! This was the second time that 
173 Airborne Brigade had carried out ‘search and destroy’ operations in 
the province to prepare for the arrival of 1 ATF; and on this occasion, 
during a series of heavy engagements, had inflicted considerable casualties 
on the Viet Cong (VC). By the time this operation had concluded, our 
friends had incurred a further eight dead and 23 wounded. Brian and 
I spent the whole time at the BHQ of 1/503, and watched closely how 
Lieutenant Colonel Coad and his immediate staff handled operations 
during the several contacts with VC. During one heavy contact, about 
four rounds of friendly artillery fire somehow dropped onto a platoon 
of their B  Company, killing and wounding several American soldiers. 
At no time was there any panicky reaction to whatever was happening, 
especially when, during our first night, VC were reported as being within 
the BHQ perimeter. The next morning, a large Chinese-made, command-
detonated, directional mine was found just outside the perimeter, which 
fortunately for us had failed to detonate. On return to Vung Tau, 




5 RAR’s shooting war started when we were placed under command of 
173  Airborne Brigade on 24  May 1966. The Brigade was involved in 
Operation Hardihood, which was intended to insert 1 ATF into Phuoc 
Tuy Province. The first phase of the operation involved the Vietnamese 
authorities removing all inhabitants from within a 4,000-metre radius of 
Nui Dat, 1 ATF’s selected base area, and resettling them elsewhere in the 
province. This was only partially achieved. The second phase, involving 
173 Airborne Brigade, including us, was to clear the area surrounding 
1  ATF’s proposed base of any enemy forces. The brigade, less 5  RAR, 
conducted a helicopter assault onto LZ Hudson, which was a couple 
of thousand metres north of the Nui Dat hill feature. This took place 
on 17 May 1966, so we, 5 RAR, had a secure LZ for our insertion by 
helicopter. Our American colleagues had not had an easy time before our 
arrival. On the first day of their insertion, 1/503 had a heavy engagement 
and lost 12 killed in action (KIA) and 35 wounded in action (WIA). 
By 21 May 1966 the brigade had sustained a total of 19 KIA and 75 WIA. 
The attrition continued. As we were flying in, while clearing the bitterly 
fought-over village of Long Phuoc, the 2/503 had lost another 19 KIA 
and 90 WIA. It is not widely known what total casualties 173 Airborne 
Brigade sustained to get us lodged; and all before we had fired a shot! 
This was the seldom acknowledged background to 1 ATF’s insertion into 
Phuoc Tuy Province.
At this point in my narrative, I should acknowledge that 5  RAR 
operations  from May to August 1966 are already well documented in 
Bob O’Neill’s Vietnam Task; as are those of both 5  RAR and 6  RAR 
in Ian McNeill’s official history volume 1, To Long Tan. Therefore, I have 
no intention of reprising their excellent coverage, but I hope to provide 
material from a personal experience viewpoint, which will put additional 
flesh onto the bones of their histories of this period.
Our arrival at LZ Hudson went smoothly and our companies rapidly 
deployed into their assigned areas of search. We did not want our people 
tarrying at LZ Hudson as it was congested with the Brigade Headquarters 
and their protective elements, and the operation’s fire support base. 
By early afternoon our Battalion Command Group also moved off to 
a preselected location, from where we could better control our mobile 
companies. During that first day, several fleeting, indecisive contacts with 
VC occurred so all were on full alert. On the evening of 24 May 1966, our 
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first day in operations, we lost our first fatal battle casualty, Private Errol 
Noack. For the next 10 days or so we probed further to the east, with all 
our companies having contacts and killing VC without further loss to 
ourselves. The enemy we encountered were what we termed ‘Local Forces’ 
(district companies); and it appeared that the D445 Provincial Mobile 
Battalion, with which 1/503 and 2/503 had been heavily engaged, had 
withdrawn to sanctuary areas to regroup. Our American colleagues may 
have taken casualties, but they had badly mauled the VC, particularly 
at the villages of Long Tan, which they had levelled to the ground, and 
Long Phuoc.
A further recollection by Peter Isaacs of an incident in this period is of 
interest. Peter recalls that, while we were still with 173 Airborne Brigade, 
one of our companies had a contact shortly before last light and captured 
two badly wounded VC. The company commander decided not to call for 
them to be evacuated, as to do so would compromise his company’s night 
position. Both died during the night. The following day the 173 Brigade 
commander, Brigadier General Smith, visited our BHQ. He took our CO 
Lieutenant Colonel John Warr aside and said that while 5 RAR was under 
his command, we would treat VC wounded in exactly the same way we 
would treat our own wounded. It was an unexpected rebuke by a general 
from an army frequently described as being ruthless in pursuit of body 
count. I must amplify Peter’s account at this point by continuing the story 
and setting the record straight. I made the decision not to evacuate the 
VC casualties. After closely questioning the OC A Company, Major Bert 
Cassidy, I was told the VC were mortally wounded, unconscious and close 
to death. At the time it was dark, so I refused to risk a Dustoff (medical 
evacuation) helicopter and crew with a hazardous night extraction for 
dying VC, although I would have done it for our own people. Another 
important consideration was that the VC did not recognise the sanctity 
of the Red Cross and fired at all low-flying aircraft. A further factor to 
be weighed was that of revealing A  Company’s location, where some 
lights would have to have been displayed to bring in the Dustoff. I told 
Bert to keep the casualties comfortable with morphine until they died. 
I later informed John Warr of what I had done and he reluctantly agreed 
with my decision. He accepted General Smith’s rebuke for my decision! 
I  respected General Smith very much and he was a good commander; 
but I still think, in view of the circumstances at the time, my decision 




















































































Map 3: Operation Hardihood – 
Phase 1: 24–31 May 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 
maps provided by Bruce Davies.
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inserted by helicopter on 24 May 1966
Rifle Company search and clear axis
(with directions)
Eastward limits of operations for Phase 1
Enemy contacts, installations or camps 
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Helicopter Landing Zone
Terminology:  Appendix E
Symbols:        Appendix F
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Peter Isaacs
After his remonstration about enemy casualties, General Smith then 
referred to his map and said, ‘Colonel, there is a VC battalion there! Go get 
’em!’ The commander of 1 ATF, Brigadier David Jackson, was standing 
nearby listening. He took John Warr aside and said, ‘On no account are 
you to tangle with a VC battalion’. Our A Company was close to the 
position indicated by the 173 Brigade commander. Max Carroll swiftly 
gave instructions to OC A Company, Bert Cassidy, to move – rapidly! 
Bert was apparently eating at the time, having just completed a resupply. 
His lunch was abandoned as A Company took off at high speed.
Max Carroll
To add to Peter’s account of this incident, I think it is a good example 
of the chain of command problem for John Warr, which was always 
in the background at that time. While we were part of 173  Airborne 
Brigade, General Smith was our operational commander. However, 
national interests were very much the concern of Brigadier Jackson, the 
commander of 1 ATF, to whose command we were to revert a few days 
later. The recent political concerns following our first fatal battle casualty, 
Private Errol Noack, a national serviceman, would also have been fresh in 
Brigadier Jackson’s mind when he spoke to John Warr.
On 2  June 1966, 5 RAR began to concentrate on what was to be the 
1 ATF Base Area at Nui Dat. On 3 June 1966, the next operational phase 
of Operation Hardihood commenced and we occupied a temporary 
defensive position around Nui Dat. By 5 June we had provided a patrol 
screen to cover the arrival of the remainder of 1 ATF from Vung Tau. 
On 5  June 1966, HQ 1  ATF assumed command of the area from 
HQ 173 Airborne Brigade. We, 5 RAR, were the only Australian infantry 
battalion on the ground as 6 RAR was still assembling at Vung Tau after 
arriving from Australia and, consequently, our companies were rather 
widely spread. Then, on 8 June 1966, 173 Airborne Brigade moved on to 
conduct Operation Hollandia in the Long Hai hills, which stretch from 
10 kilometres south of Nui Dat to the southernmost coast of Phuoc Tuy. 
























































































Map 4: Operation Hardihood – 
Phase 2: 1–3 June 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 
maps provided by Bruce Davies.
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We continued with a heavy program of aggressive patrolling and night 
ambushing in order to dominate our thinly held area. It was a very tense 
time. The departure of 173  Airborne Brigade had been noted by the 
VC and consequently, for several nights, our various dispersed company 
perimeters were probed by their reconnaissance patrols, who tried to 
establish our general dispositions and especially the locations of our 
machine guns. These patrols were very professional in their conduct and 
were obviously carried out by an enemy of higher calibre than we had 
encountered to date. We expected to be hit heavily as allied intelligence 
sources had warned HQ 1  ATF of this VC intention but, for reasons 
unknown to us at that time, the attack did not eventuate.
On a later operation in October 1966, we captured documents which 
confirmed that the VC Main Force 274 Regiment had in fact intended to 
attack us in June. They had moved to a position near the large hill Nui Nghe, 
about 6 kilometres north-west of Nui Dat, while their patrols reconnoitred 
our positions. However, on 9 June 1966, a US light observation aircraft 
which had been supporting us had disappeared on its return flight to 
Bien Hoa. We were tasked to provide a company on standby to go to the 
assistance of the crew, but aerial searches along their flight path found 
no trace of the missing Birddog and our company was not deployed. The 
captured documents also revealed that the VC 274 Regiment had shot 
down this aircraft and the enemy commander decided that there would be 
more advantage in placing an ambush around the wreck and destroying 
the rescue force than in attacking our rapidly developing base. Perhaps 
we were lucky not to locate the crash location until six  months later 
when A Company, which I was then commanding, found the missing 
aircraft and the remains of the crew. In the light of a strengthening enemy 
presence in Phuoc Tuy, which became evident in early June, 6 RAR were 
hastened forward to join us on 14  June, a week  earlier than intended. 
With their arrival, Operation Hardihood concluded.
We were glad to see 6 RAR arrive so that we could regroup our companies 
into our final battalion defensive position in the now-established 1 ATF 
Base, and have them share the patrolling load. Our people were getting 
rather tired from three weeks of constant, hard operations with no respite. 
When they were not out on patrol or ambushing by night, the digging-
in and construction of our base was a high priority for their labours. 
This work had to be done by hand with the field tools we carried, as 
no engineer earth-moving plant support was available at that time. 
Throughout this period the incessant, heavy monsoon rain turned the 
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area into a quagmire of deep, sticky red mud. Everyone was constantly 
wet from rain or sweat, and clothing and boots soon began to rot. The 
hoochies (one-man shelters), which each man carried, provided barely 
adequate protection from rain when trying to sleep. These conditions, 
coupled with monotonous US combat rations, started to take their toll 
and we all became rather lean and mean.
We welcomed the arrival of our administrative echelon from Vung Tau. 
They completed our unit on the ground, and brought a lot of the gear we 
needed to establish ourselves. Essential barbed wire, steel pickets, sandbags 
and other defence stores were followed by marquee tentage to protect 
kitchens and QM (quartermaster)  Stores and, later, accommodation 
tentage followed. To our annoyance, the latter arrived without their 
wooden poles. The army’s initial logistic support for our deployment had 
acute problems which were exacerbated by contemptible trade union 
sabotage on the wharves in Australia.
For the rest of June, 5  RAR clashed with VC and sustained casualties 
as we patrolled the approaches to the Task Force base; but the casualty 
ratio was heavily in our favour. We also continued the development of the 
defences of our own base area. In addition, we had to provide a company 
on standby as 1 ATF’s immediate reserve and another company to secure 
6 RAR’s base area while they were deployed on their Operation Enoggera. 
This task required them to search Long Phuoc village and destroy an 
extensive tunnel system. It was a dangerous village and 6 RAR razed it to 
the ground. Throughout our year of operations there was no respite for 
either of the two battalions. When one was on a battalion operation, the 
other had to remain at Nui Dat in the base protection and construction 
role. A third battalion was obviously needed for 1  ATF, but none 
was available. It was not until December 1967 that a third battalion was 
provided, together with a squadron of Centurion tanks. In the meantime, 
we got on with the job despite being continually stretched.
Another problem, which had not been resolved before we left Australia, 
now arose. This was a shortage of M60 general purpose machine guns. 
The number of guns was adequate when the unit was together as in 
our defensive role in base. However, when we left the base and went on 
battalion-sized operations, the bulk of the M60s went with the combat 
troops, leaving the base denuded of machine guns. A theatre increment of 
additional weapons was needed for base defence and, for some months, 
we had been pressing for this to no avail. Survival demanded that we help 
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ourselves. Our inimitable battalion 2IC, Major Stan Maizey, entrepreneur 
and trader extraordinaire, and his personally selected and talented team, 
designated the ‘Scrounger Platoon’, duly ‘acquired’ a number of .30 calibre 
Browning light machine guns (LMGs) and .50 calibre Browning heavy 
machine guns (HMG) and about 50,000 rounds of ammunition from an 
American source. We sited the latter in key bunkers on our perimeter and 
the smaller weapons were mounted on vehicles. Their significant additional 
firepower made the people who remained in base during operations a lot 
happier and more secure. The theatre increment was eventually approved 
and we received more M60s; but we kept the .50 calibre HMGs and 
passed them on to 7 RAR who relieved us in May 1967. While the army’s 
inadequately prepared logistics system was sorting itself out, Stan and his 
team also ‘found’ many of the items essential for our base security, such 
as telephones, switchboards, radios, and even a US 2.5-ton, 6-wheel-drive 
truck. We left these items for 7 RAR as well.
The remainder of the month was busy for me as I was coordinating our 
patrol and ambushing activities, developing my own Support Company 
base area and working with the CO on plans for our next operation. This 
was to follow 6 RAR’s scheduled return to Nui Dat on 5 July 1966, after 
completing their Operation Enoggera. There was no let-up in the tempo 
of Task Force operations as we departed the base on 6  July to mount 
our Operation Sydney until 17 July 1966. We were tasked to clear and 
extend the 1 ATF-controlled area to the north and north-west, including 
Nui Nghe. This feature, located about 6  kilometres north-west of Nui 
Dat, was a prominent jungle-clad hill with numerous radiating ridges, 
rising about 160 metres above the surrounding flat terrain and covering 
about 1.5 square kilometres. It dominated the surrounding country out to 
several kilometres in all directions but had not been cleared of VC during 
Operation Hardihood. We were going into unknown enemy territory, 
so were prepared for trouble.
Our planning for Operation Sydney had been thorough, as the area we 
had to cover was large and included a variety of terrain, and tracks which 
had to be checked for signs of enemy activity. Although the enemy we 
anticipated encountering were local and district VC units, the appearance 
of the Main Force battalions of 274 and 275 Regiments could not be 
discounted. It was desirable, indeed essential, that our companies could 
assist each other if one struck trouble, but the formidable obstacle of Nui 
Nghe could prevent this. Also, some distances to which we proposed to 
penetrate were at extreme range for our supporting artillery. The CO 
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and I spent a lot of time examining the problems, first by personal aerial 
reconnaissance, followed by tasking ground patrols to reconnoitre the areas 
to be covered. We were looking for possible artillery fire support bases, 
and suitable ground routes for the passage of armoured personnel carriers 
(APC). We then conducted the time-honoured military assessment known 
as ‘an appreciation of the situation’. I found John Warr to be a good and 
easy man to work for. He had a keen intellect and a good tactical brain 
which quickly assessed the value of views and ideas I put to him, before 
he gave me his outline plan.
My job was then to get down to the detail and produce a draft operation 
order, which Warr then cleared. In this instance, we established our BHQ 
with a fire support base (FSB) code-named Tennis. FSB Tennis was located 
a few kilometres north-west of the Task Force base to provide artillery fire 
support to our northernmost elements, who might need to move out of 
range of the 1 ATF guns at Nui Dat. From FSB Tennis our direct support 
artillery, 105 Field Battery, could easily support our companies when they 
were at the planned limits of their assigned search areas. We also had one 
company held in reserve at FSB Tennis, together with the APC troop of 
12 tracked armoured fighting vehicles which was allotted to us, to rapidly 
react should any of the searching companies get into trouble. The Anti-
Tank Platoon and Pioneer Platoon were also at FSB Tennis to protect 
the guns and BHQ, should our reserve company have to be deployed in 
support of the searching companies.
Bob O’Neill gave a good account of this successful operation in his book 
Vietnam Task. There is little to add, except to record the loss of a good 
soldier to friendly fire. Our supporting gunners were excellent; and 
their control and accuracy had always been spot on. On this occasion, 
the target was on the summit of Nui Nghe; and for reasons which can 
only be explained by artillerymen, three rounds in a salvo of six went 
high, just cleared the crest of Nui Nghe, and unfortunately landed among 
C Company’s 7 Platoon who were operating on the north-western side 
of the hill and killed one of their soldiers.
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Map 5: Operation Sydney: 
6–17 July 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 
maps provided by Bruce Davies.
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Nui Nghe Artillery Incident
8 July 1966
Map 5A: Nui Nghe artillery incident: 8 July 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military maps 
provided by Bruce Davies.
We were angered and shocked, our gunners were mortified and an 
investigation followed. Enemy ground fire had been directed at a Sioux 
helicopter from the summit of Nui Nghe and clearance had been given 
for  the target to be engaged by artillery located at the Task Force base 
at Nui Dat. One round ‘fire for effect’ from each of the tasked battery’s 
six guns was fired simultaneously. Three of these rounds cleared the crest 
being targeted and landed in C  Company’s area. One of them struck 
a tree near 7 Platoon scattering lethal shrapnel and killing Lance Corporal 
Marinko ‘Titch’ Tomas.
Roger Wainwright
Artillery fire control procedures required that the locations of nearby 
friendly troops had to be confirmed before clearance to fire was given. 
The location of C Company had been incorrectly decoded at the battery 
headquarters due to misinterpretation of a signaller’s handwriting in a log 
book. The error placed C Company 600 metres further to the east and 
well out of danger from the fire mission. If C Company’s position had 
been accurately interpreted, clearance to fire would not have been given. 
The circumstances of this occurrence are shown in Maps 5 and 5A. In war, 
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such incidents can be the result of one or more of many variables or, as in 
this case, a momentary lapse in a team of highly dedicated professionals 
working under pressure. Fortunately, for 5 RAR these proved to be rare.
Max Carroll
During Operation Sydney it became clear that we would have to do 
something about the village of Duc My, which was on the north-eastern 
flank of our area of search. We knew that most of the village’s inhabitants 
were forcibly resettled indigenes known as Montagnards, gathered 
together from throughout Phuoc Tuy several years earlier in a  badly 
managed South Vietnamese Government attempt at population control. 
These people, originally hill tribes from Central Vietnam, did not like the 
government and were susceptible to VC influence. We also knew that there 
was a village squad of about 15 VC in Duc My to keep the population in 
line, and to extort taxes and food from the already impoverished people. 
A major tenet of counter-insurgency warfare is to separate the civilian 
population from enemy control and influence and open the way for re-
establishment of government control. We now had a good opportunity to 
put this into practice and eliminate the village’s VC squad. With this in 
mind, the CO gained approval from the Commander 1 ATF to extend 
our present operation by several days to conduct a cordon and search 
operation of Duc My on the night of 19/20 July 1966. This extension was 
named Operation Sydney Two.
At that time cordon and search operations had not been conducted at 
battalion level in Vietnam. Indeed, Allied forces of that size rarely moved 
operationally at night, but the VC did! What we were about to undertake 
would break new ground in Vietnam. I had limited knowledge of what 
was involved. When I was at Staff College in 1965, this subject had 
been considered briefly and its many problems discussed. Both directing 
staff and students agreed it was a difficult tactical exercise. John Warr had 
read widely on the subject and knew what his battalion had to do, so it was 
with keen interest we did the preliminary map study, aerial reconnaissance 
and the customary military appreciation of the situation. As a result, 
a  ground reconnaissance was then deemed necessary to confirm the 
suitability of approach routes we had selected for the battalion to move in 
by night and establish the cordon before the village became aware of our 
intentions. This was a complex operation and we endeavoured to keep the 
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final plan as simple as possible. As always seems to happen when getting 
down to the fine detail, we found problems which meant compromises 
had to be made.
There was a stream running through the village from north-east to south-
west, then on towards our location at FSB Tennis. This initially appealed 
as a good directional guide to assist our night approach to the south side of 
the village, and from there our companies could diverge to their assigned 
cordon positions. A night reconnaissance patrol, which included all four 
of the rifle company 2ICs, found this approach unsuitable so we had to 
think again. The village houses were widely scattered on the western side 
of Route  2 within an area about 600  metres square. The allocation of 
troops to each identified task then had to be carefully considered.
At that time 5 RAR could place about 550 men in the field. We decided 
each company forming a side of the cordon would have two platoons 
forward, in line, with men in pairs every 20 metres. The third platoon 
was to be positioned back in depth 70 metres or so for rear security. Each 
company cordon frontage could cover about 450  metres, and even if 
all four companies were placed in the cordon, we could not secure the 
whole village. We therefore decided we would have to exclude some of 
the outer houses. In broad outline, our final plan was that three of the 
companies would move at night to a position to the rear of their intended 
cordon positions, C Company from the west, while B and D Companies 
and the CO’s party came in from the east, with all three companies to 
move forward into their final cordon positions and link with each other 
immediately after first light.
A Company, BHQ, two sections of mortars and the Anti-Tank Platoon, 
all mounted on APCs, were to close from the south at the last possible 
moment. A  Company, while mounted on APCs, acted as the battalion 
reserve during the move-in. They then dismounted and rapidly moved 
to their cordon position on the south flank while the Anti-Tank Platoon 
also dismounted and took over the role of battalion reserve. We then 
had A Company closing off the south with B Company doing the same 
on the east, C Company was on the west and D Company temporarily on 
the north, in open young rubber trees, until relieved by the APC troop. 
D Company then became the search company for the village. In the event 
it worked well, with some exciting moments. During their night approach, 
the leading D Company soldier, Private Fred Clarke, in Stygian darkness, 
fell 10 metres down a disused well. After he was quietly and safely retrieved 
using toggle ropes, D Company’s clandestine insertion resumed.
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Map 6: Operation Sydney Two: 
19–20 July 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 
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When the cordon was closed, several firefights erupted as VC attempted 
to escape. With the enemy who were killed, wounded and captured, we 
had cleaned out the place without loss to ourselves. Good fire discipline 
was essential to safeguard civilians, and our carefully thought-out rules 
of engagement, issued before the operation, were adhered to during its 
execution. After the village was cleared and the population screened, civil 
affairs aid in the form of medical and dental treatment was given to the 
villagers, which favourably impressed them. Our soldiers were firm but 
friendly and courteous, and they were well received. We withdrew from the 
village during the afternoon of 20 July 1966 to mount clearing operations 
in the surrounding areas, where we killed one VC and wounded another 
before harbouring (deploying defensively and adopting night routine) 
in separate company groups. We also set four overnight ambushes on 
likely approaches to the village to engage any VC who tried to re-enter 
it. During company sweeps on 21 and 22 July, we killed another VC and 
wounded two, one of whom escaped and the other was captured. The CO 
then got task force approval for C and D Companies to remain in the area 
for a further day, while the remainder of the battalion withdrew to Nui 
Dat to relieve 6 RAR for their Operation Hobart, due to commence on 
24 July; there still being no let-up in the tempo of 1 ATF operations. We 
were well-satisfied with Operations Sydney and Sydney Two, both having 
been quite successful.
Operation Sydney Two was the first of nine cordon and search operations 
that 5 RAR conducted during our year in Vietnam. We learnt from each one 
and progressively refined our execution. Our methods were subsequently 
adopted as standard procedures in 1 ATF. John Warr wrote an excellent 
article for the Australian Army Journal, published in November 1967 in its 
Edition No 222, entitled ‘Cordon and Search Operations in Phuoc Tuy 
Province’. It can be read in its entirety in Appendix C. His paper became 
a very significant input into the ongoing development of Australian Army 
doctrine on counter-revolutionary warfare.
After our success with Operation Sydney Two, the CO was keen to go 
again, with the much larger complex at Binh Ba as the target. The task 
force commander concurred, but 6 RAR’s next operation had priority. 
From 24 July, we had to provide a company to protect their operational 
fire support base, as well as another to protect 6  RAR’s base area at 
Nui Dat, plus another as 1 ATF’s immediate reserve. We became used 
to this sort of situation. Then the picture changed when 6 RAR struck 
trouble, necessitating a second company of ours joining them. Our people 
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remained under command of 6 RAR until the whole force was recalled 
to base due to reports of a serious enemy threat unfolding to the west. 
Our B  Company, with the Anti-Tank Platoon under command, was 
then dispatched to check out the report of a large enemy build-up. They 
returned late on 31 July having found a two-day-old, company-sized VC 
camp. D Company of 6 RAR conducted a similar patrol to the north-east, 
and returned on 2 August with nothing to report. Assessing the reliability 
of reports of VC movements from Vietnamese and other allies was a real 
problem for our intelligence people at that time. Nevertheless, we could 
not move until the situation clarified, so we did a lot of planning and were 
well prepared to commence our Operation Holsworthy, the cordon and 
search of Binh Ba.
With the lessons we learnt from our dress rehearsal at Duc My, we were 
far better equipped to handle the much larger complex of Binh Ba and the 
adjacent hamlet of Duc Trung, with an all-up population of about 2,000. 
We also were tasked to ‘revisit’ Duc My, so we were faced with a two-
phased operation which went well with only a few minor hitches. We had 
two companies of 6 RAR under command, along with many others from 
various combat arms and combat support services units, both Australian 
and US. These latter included air support, interpreters and Vietnamese 
police. The operational functions of all elements had to be tied together 
and, as the operation’s success indicated, we achieved a satisfying level of 
combined professionalism. Our preliminary reconnaissance commenced 
on 5 August when C Company established a patrol base to the south-west 
of Binh Ba. On the night of 5/6 August, reconnaissance patrols checked 
the suitability of proposed assembly areas, routes and timings. The CO 
issued his orders on 7 August, and at 0800 hours on the following day, 
Captain Peter Isaacs departed with a patrol of company guides to lay out 
and secure the assembly area for the five rifle companies and BHQ who 
would be approaching the cordon area from the west. B Company was 
moving separately and approaching their cordon position from the east.
Peter Isaacs
I was responsible for laying out the battalion’s assembly area to the 
south-west of Binh Ba village. Comprised of platoon guides from each 
of the 5 RAR and 6 RAR cordon companies, this 15-man crew set off 
90 minutes before the rest of the battalion and proceeded north towards 
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our objective. Feeling rather vulnerable, with only my trusty shepherd’s 
crook and a 9 mm pistol, I was less than pleased to be handed an 81 mm 
mortar round to carry as my patrol left our base! Nothing occurred until 
we came to the edge of a track close to the assembly area. The lead scout 
indicated by silent hand signals the presence of what he thought were 
four VC approaching along the track. I gave the silent signal to establish 
an immediate ambush, drew my pistol and cocked it. The battalion was 
by now strung out in a long ‘snake’ not far behind us and contact with 
a small group of VC at this stage would compromise our cordoning and 
searching of the large village of Binh Ba. The VC turned out to be rubber 
tree tappers returning home. Fortunately, they gave no sign of having 
seen us.
Max Carroll
We applied the many lessons learnt from Duc My and had the cordon 
in position and closed by 0530 hours, which was 25 minutes before first 
light. In this we were assisted by having moonlight and a clean rubber 
plantation to move through. The result was that, without having to fire 
a shot, we apprehended and interrogated 169 males of military age, of 
whom 17 were confirmed VCs and 77 were suspects. Route 2 was opened 
to civilian traffic to Ba Ria and the province chief was eventually able to 
establish a Vietnamese military presence in Binh Ba. Until the so-called 
Provincial Reconnaissance Unit became available for this task, we left 
a company at Binh Ba. Subsequently, one of our officers, Captain Ron 
Boxall, acted as commander/adviser with this non-ARVN (Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam) unit. Its replacement, an ARVN unit, was then 
advised by another of our officers, Captain Ron Bade. Boxall’s group were 
armed civilians, all either Montagnards or Nungs (Vietnamese Chinese), 
and were recruited, armed and paid by a CIA agency engaged in irregular 
military activities in Phuoc Tuy province. Their replacements, Bade’s 
group, were an ARVN Regional Force company provided by the Duc 
Thanh district chief, Captain Be. Boxall and Bade relate their experiences 
in Chapter 11. Bade’s functions were eventually taken over by AATTV 
members in late November.
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Map 7: Operation Holsworthy: 
7–8 August 1966. 
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 
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5 RAR remained at Binh Ba for several days after the cordon and search, 
in which time we secured Route 2 for civilian traffic to Ba Ria and carried 
out civil affairs tasks helping the people. We established a good rapport 
with the local Vietnamese Catholic priest and the resident French rubber 
plantation estate managers, whose lives under the VC must have been 
very difficult; and a large stockpile of their treated rubber was able to 
be moved down the road to Ba Ria. We also established liaison with the 
isolated ARVN outpost at Duc Thanh to the north of Binh Ba; and made 
the acquaintance of the very lonely US Army adviser, Major Bill Prescott, 
who was stationed there. Then we visited the large Vietnamese Catholic 
village of Binh Gia further to the north-east of Duc Thanh and established 
valuable liaison with the village leaders. It was a busy, productive time.
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Before we were to return to Nui Dat, we were tasked to investigate an 
intelligence report that a VC HQ was located to the east of Binh Ba. 
We subsequently searched the area for several days and found no trace 
of VC presence. During the search, I made a liaison flight to Duc 
Thanh to brief Bill Prescott on our activities so that he could keep his 
people out of the way. While in his office I saw his battle map on the 
wall showing a big sweeping red arrow, indicating VC troop movements, 
leading from the VC-held May Tao Mountains in the far north-east of 
the province, south then west to Nui Dat. I asked him where he had 
obtained the information and whether it was accurate. He replied that 
it had come from the provincial ARVN HQ in Ba Ria where 1 ATF had 
a liaison officer, and that he believed it to be accurate. I immediately 
returned to our BHQ and contacted 1 ATF. It transpired that they knew 
of the report but believed the source was questionable. In view of the 
numerous false alarms we had been subjected to, this approach is perhaps 
understandable. However, that very night, 16/17 August 1966, the 1 ATF 
Base was subjected to substantial enemy mortar and recoilless rifle fire 
from the east, which caused several casualties. 1 ATF artillery responded 
with counter-fire and the next morning, on 17 August, 6 RAR dispatched 
patrols to locate the enemy firing positions. 5 RAR less C Company, who 
remained at Binh Ba, were recalled to Nui Dat as soon as our search for 
a VC HQ east of Binh Ba was concluded. We arrived back at Nui Dat 
on the afternoon of 18 August at about the time D Company, 6 RAR, 
became heavily engaged at the start of the Battle of Long Tan.
I flew over the battlefield next day in a Sioux light observation helicopter, 
as our OC D Company, Major Paul Greenhalgh, and his men were under 
command of 6 RAR for the clearance of the battlefield. The scene was like 
France in the First World War, with smashed trees, churned-up earth and 
desolation surrounding the small area where D Company, 6 RAR, had 
made their stand. It was a sobering but exhilarating scene, as we knew 
that the VC had suffered a significant defeat despite their greatly superior 
strength at the point of battle.
After Long Tan, immediate pursuit of the retreating enemy was hampered 
by other credible VC Main Force threats to both Nui Dat and Binh Ba. 
We did not have the strength on the ground at that time to both pursue 
and defend, so the Americans mounted a long-running operation, code-
named Toledo, in which 5 RAR later became involved. We named our 
initial involvement Operation Darlinghurst and departed on 26 August 
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for five days of operations in conjunction with US forces who were 
operating to our north. We slowly and carefully searched areas to the 
north then east of the 1 ATF Base, then turned south to Long Tan, then 
home. We did not encounter any VC nor fire a shot, although some VC 
mass graves were discovered, and abandoned equipment and ammunition 
indicated an enemy in hasty withdrawal.
We departed again on 2 September, to continue in Operation Toledo as 
a blocking force to the west of Binh Ba, while US forces swept an area to 
our north. We patrolled extensively around Nui Nghe, an area familiar 
to us, where we killed two VC and captured another, all of whom were 
trying to escape the Americans. We considered this to be a poor result for 
the effort expended and we all were rather tired and frustrated when we 
returned to base on 8 September 1966.
Our return from Operation Toledo allowed 6  RAR to depart on their 
Operation Vaucluse in the Nui Dinh hills; they were out from 8 to 
24  September. We slipped back into the routine of one company on 
standby as task force immediate reserve, one company to secure 6 RAR’s 
base area at Nui Dat, continual patrolling in the 1 ATF Tactical Area of 
Responsibility (TAOR) and, of course, the ongoing development of our 
own base area. During these activities, we did several one-day company-
sized ‘County Fair’ operations in which we provided cordons of selected 
areas while the ARVN searched. We also did a ‘Road Runner’ operation 
(APC-mounted infantry) along Route 44 down to Long Hai, to show the 
VC and the locals that we could still use the road when we wanted to.
There was no let-up and, after 6 RAR returned to Nui Dat, we departed 
on Operation Crow’s Nest on 1 October to follow up on information 
provided by a VC Main Force soldier of 274  Regiment, who had 
surrendered at Binh Gia on 28 September. We were out for three days to 
establish a small command element within the Duc Thanh compound, 
where we were hosted by Captain Be, the district chief, and his US Army 
adviser, Major Bill Prescott. At the same time, two of our companies 
and supporting APCs searched the areas to the north, up to and around 
a village called Ngai Giao. This was outside the northern extremity of 
the 1 ATF TAOR and had not been searched before. We did not strike 
any 274 Regiment elements, although D Company lost Private Graham 
Warburton to a sniper. We discovered a cache of over six tonnes of rice and 
a hoard of meat, which we confiscated. We gave the meat to Captain Be, 
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who distributed it to the needy in his area. We then had to withdraw 
due to our imminent involvement in a major US operation, code-named 
Robin, along Route 15, the main road between Vung Tau and Saigon.
Robert O’Neill and Peter Isaacs
War is one of those human activities which continue by day and night. 
We tend to remember those parts of wars that happen in daylight. Then 
they are so arresting, and often spectacular. Most war films are set in 
daytime. Books, newspapers and magazines also focus on the actions of 
the day rather than those of the night. Yet, warfare continues both by day 
and night. At night, when on operations, our troops left their defended 
positions to patrol intensively, either quietly to gain information, or more 
openly to dominate the battlefield, and push their opponents back and 
demoralise them.
During the Vietnam War, Australian night operations included patrolling, 
ambushing and tactical concealment manoeuvres such as setting cordons 
or moving covertly into a new area. As several of the chapters of this 
book show, physical and mental exhaustion were continuing problems 
that members of the battalion accepted as part of their daily burden. 
When not moving at night, whether in the field or in base, each section 
and platoon would have several men on sentry rotation around the clock. 
Platoons and companies on patrol at night rarely had an opportunity for 
adequate sleep. They were on the alert continuously. When patrolling at 
night, most stood, crouched or moved carefully, listening and peering 
to catch any available hint of enemy movement among trees, rocks or 
over open ground in front of them. When they identified possibly hostile 
movement, they had to choose between remaining concealed or moving 
carefully before taking offensive action against intruders in our area of 
operations. All had to be aware that a night encounter with ill-informed 
friendly forces or innocent civilians, as well as the enemy, was always 
a possibility.
For a small group of us, the three captains on BHQ – Peter Isaacs, the 
adjutant, Brian Le Dan, the signals officer, and myself, the intelligence 
officer – the nights brought another set of responsibilities: we were 
the available pool of BHQ command post (CP) duty officers. So that the 
CO and the operations officer could get some uninterrupted sleep when 
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BHQ was not on the move at night, we divided the period from stand-
down after sunset (around 2030) to stand-to before dawn (around 0500) 
into three ‘watches’ of around three hours each. Any action occurring 
between those hours in the battalion’s area of responsibility was reported 
by radio to whoever of the three of us was on duty, and our first thought 
in response was whether to wake the CO or Max Carroll to take over 
conduct of the action. Most incidents reported to us were minor contacts 
or observation reports, and we could allow our seniors to continue sleeping. 
However, every now and then there were medium or higher-level clashes 
or ambushes in which our soldiers required artillery or mortar support. In 
response we would go first to Max, and he would make the decision on 
whether to handle the situation himself or awaken the CO.
When BHQ deployed on operations outside the Nui Dat base area, the 
actual CP usually occupied two parallel trenches dug into the earth, 
about two metres long and half a metre deep. The ground between the 
two provided a surface for maps, log books and radio sets. At night, 
a rudimentary and supposedly lightproof and waterproof shelter enclosed 
the duty officer and duty signallers. At stand-to periods, the CO and 
Max, plus the operator of the radio link to 1 ATF HQ, would cram into 
this restricted space too. Lighting was by hand torch – usually red-lensed 
to minimise the visibility of scattered light amid the green foliage that 
normally surrounded us. The commander of our direct support artillery 
battery, the mortar platoon commander and their signallers occupied 
a  similar double trench close by. Occasionally, the CP was located 
within a deserted building or an armoured command vehicle and, on one 
occasion, a borrowed US Army air-conditioned caravan!
This system of night-time control worked well, but at the cost of constant 
tiredness during the day for each of the three of us, until we could get 
away for a couple days and catch up on lost sleep. Of course, we were not 
the only members of the battalion affected by daytime tiredness. It was 
a constant problem that all had to learn to manage, for we really needed 
to be sharp both by day and by night. Returning to peacetime routine in 




Peter Isaacs, who had come to the Australian Army from the British 
Army, observed that he considered himself fortunate in working in an 
outstanding battalion; a sentiment shared throughout the whole of 5 RAR. 
Despite the burdens of being in the 1 ATF vanguard from the outset, the 
shortages and oversights noted earlier and the need to conjure solutions to 
unforeseen operational problems, the morale of the battalion was holding 
up well following its first four months of hard service. Without doubt 
John Warr had forged a fine, aggressive fighting battalion of which we 
were all immensely proud.
Editors’ conclusion
This chapter has described 5 RAR’s early forays into the unique mix of 
military and civilian aspects of operations in Vietnam; and how, through 
necessity, this mixture settled quickly into differing types of operation 
and devised its own initiative-driven systems of problem-solving and 
improvisation. This approach inevitably became the dominant mode in 
5 RAR’s deployment in the first wave of 1 ATF’s battalions in Phuoc Tuy. 
The next chapter describes the effects of the expanding presence of 1 ATF 
on the lives of both the VC and the province’s civilian population, and the 
role of intelligence in shaping our relations with these two groups.
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INTELLIGENCE WORK IN 
PHUOC TUY AFTER LONG TAN
Robert O’Neill
As Brigadier Chamberlain has written in Appendix D, the Viet Cong and 
their predecessors, the Viet Minh, had long had a substantial presence in 
Phuoc Tuy. In May 1966, when 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) began 
to arrive and build a substantial and defensible base at Nui Dat, we were at 
a serious disadvantage in terms of local knowledge. The Viet Cong knew 
the country and people of Phuoc Tuy well, they had some political leverage 
over the local people, and they were indigenous. We were newcomers to 
the country and people. Very few of us spoke Vietnamese. And at some 
point we would be withdrawing. The big question was who would we be 
leaving in charge – the Viet Cong or the Saigon-based Government of 
the Republic of Vietnam?
We all thought that to be successful, Australia would have to make 
a long-term military commitment to Vietnam. Therefore, its costs had to 
be acceptable to the Australian public for whatever time it took for this 
effort to become effective. We needed early successes that were judged 
to be significant by the Australian Government and people, and we had to 
complete the process of settling into Phuoc Tuy without suffering heavy 
casualties. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese leadership, having been 
through a long war with the French, ending only 12 years before our arrival 
in Phuoc Tuy, had drawn their own lessons from costly experience. They 
had to deny any appearance of early victory to their enemies and inflict 




The first priority for the Viet Cong forces in Phuoc Tuy after our arrival 
was to reconnoitre our positions. How strong were we at Nui Dat and in 
Vung Tau? How well equipped were we? How well were our defences laid 
out and built? How reliant were we on the Americans? How capable were 
we in operational terms? How well did we understand counter-insurgency 
warfare in South-East Asia? How effective were we in more conventional 
operations? Were we likely to collapse when under direct attack? Could 
we be ambushed and kept confined and ineffective by relatively moderate, 
province-based forces, such as the district companies and D445 Battalion?
These were all compelling questions to which the Viet Cong had to have 
answers fairly quickly. So, we were in for a period of being reconnoitred, 
inspected, tested and assessed by our enemy, beginning on day one of our 
arrival in Phuoc Tuy. We were fortunate in being accompanied by the US 
173 Airborne Brigade, but we saw that local Viet Cong forces were out 
and about, probing and searching from the commencement of Operation 
Hardihood on 24 May 1966. We could tell from their numbers, weapons 
and uniforms that these local units were only light forces. But we also 
knew that heavier forces were available, especially 274 and 275 Regiments, 
over 3,000 troops in all, who were capable of inflicting heavy blows on 
us. Once 173 Airborne Brigade had departed from Phuoc Tuy, the real 
testing would come. As Brigadier Chamberlain has recorded, in June 
274 Regiment, the stronger of the two Main Force Viet Cong regiments 
that we faced, came in close to check us out. They probably would have 
made an attack if they had thought the chances of inflicting a heavy blow 
on us were good. However, perhaps over-cautiously, they chose not to 
make a major attack in June or July but to set an ambush for us, around a 
recently crashed US aircraft. Our perimeter at Nui Dat was tested by small 
Viet Cong patrols at night during June and July, and when they felt that 
they had our measure, they came in on 17 August with a large attacking 
force: 275  Regiment assisted by D445  Provincial Mobile Battalion. 
We were fortunate that the Viet Cong revealed their presence by rather 
premature mortar, light artillery and recoilless rifle fire against the Task 
Force base on 17 August. Next day, 275 Regiment encountered a relatively 
strong Australian reaction force, D Company of 6th Battalion, the Royal 
Australian Regiment (6 RAR), our sister battalion. In a determined action 
fought out on the afternoon of 18 August, just north of the village of 
Long Tan, the Viet Cong attack was contained, D Company of 6 RAR 
was reinforced late in the day, and held its ground and inflicted heavy 
losses on 275 Regiment, 245 confirmed dead and an estimated several 
hundred wounded.
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These losses led their commander to break off the action and withdraw 
his force from the battlefield. Follow-up patrolling by a joint Australian–
US force discovered that the Viet Cong had fully withdrawn from 
the  eastern approaches to Nui Dat. 5  RAR took part in this phase 
of  the clearance of eastern Phuoc Tuy, sweeping 8  kilometres east of 
Binh Ba, then 8 kilometres south, before returning to Nui Dat, another 
8 kilometres to the north-west. In five days, the battalion patrolled over 
40  kilometres on foot, carefully searching the jungle we were passing 
through, digging defences to hold off any night attack by the Viet Cong, 
and sending out small reconnaissance patrols to check whether there was 
continuing enemy movement close to the base. The searching was made 
more difficult because we were still in the wet season. At around 2 pm 
on most afternoons a mass of dark grey clouds would build up overhead, 
soon to send down heavy rain showers, which saturated our clothing and 
equipment and turned the ground into muddy porridge. Several days 
and nights of those conditions created muscular, skin and accumulated 
fatigue problems.
Of course the Viet Cong also had to deal with these challenges. Local 
resources and knowledge may have eased their discomfort relative to ours, 
but nonetheless, everybody, on both sides in this war, had to learn to 
cope with the effects of heavy rain, physical exhaustion and mental stress. 
While 275 Regiment had been concentrating for its mission against Nui 
Dat in mid-August, 274 Regiment had been active in western Phuoc Tuy, 
attempting to deny the use of Route 15 to the Americans by taking over 
some of the defended villages along the highway. Phu My was attacked 
several times in August 1966, and signals intelligence indicated that the 
commander of 274 Regiment, assisted by local Viet Cong companies and 
D445 Battalion, was determined to close the road to South Vietnamese 
Government and allied use.
This knowledge was particularly worrying for General Westmoreland 
and his senior intelligence and operations advisers. To reinforce the US 
position around the major US bases at Bear Cat, Bien Hoa, Long Binh 
and Saigon, they needed to move troops along Route 15. How much the 
Viet Cong knew about this American plan is difficult to say, but their 
increased level of activity in western Phuoc Tuy, especially on and close to 
Route 15, suggests that the Viet Cong had gained relevant intelligence, 




Certainly, Westmoreland knew that the Viet Cong had a heightened 
interest in controlling Route  15, and one of the main purposes in 
deploying 1 ATF into Phuoc Tuy was to be able to prevent the Viet Cong 
from dominating the road. For much of September, the Task Force was 
divided, with 6  RAR conducting clearing operations in the Nui Dinh 
hills, and 5  RAR conducting more clearing and defensive operations 
around and to the north of Binh Ba, including the district headquarters 
at Duc Thanh.
The American reinforcement of their position around Bien Hoa and 
Saigon in early October was planned to commence with the movement 
of a brigade of troops, by road, from Vung Tau to Bear Cat. Therefore, 
General Westmoreland left no doubt in the mind of Brigadier Jackson 
that the Viet Cong had to be driven off the high ground along 
Route 15. Given the Viet Cong strengths and dispositions and General 
Westmoreland’s plans, I, as battalion intelligence officer, had my work 
well cut out for the next three months. Originally, I had been the second 
in command (2IC) of B  Company, but on 6  August our intelligence 
officer, Captain Don Willcox, was moved to fill a vacant position on the 
Task Force headquarters. Colonel Warr then tapped me to take over from 
Don – a major new challenge, but a position which gave me an extremely 
interesting view of the war, of our enemies and allies, and particularly of 
the Vietnamese people for whose support the war was being waged.
The most important source of intelligence for the ‘big picture’ was the 
American corps-sized headquarters, II  Field Force Vietnam (II FFV), 
located at Long Binh, not far from Bien Hoa. They were able to tell us, 
even before we had left Australia, who our principal military opponents 
were and what their record had been. American intelligence staffs were 
also able to provide some information on the level of political support 
that the Viet Cong had built up in the various villages and towns of Phuoc 
Tuy. There were two problems with this information. First, it tended to lag 
well behind events: each week an impressive-looking Intsum (intelligence 
summary), the size of a telephone directory, hit my in-box at Nui Dat, 
but it tended to be one or two weeks out of date by the time it came to 
me. Therefore, it was often not of great use for planning future operations. 
Second, the American-supplied information and analysis was better when 
focused at the higher Viet Cong levels than on the lower ones. They 
could discuss Viet Cong Main Force command issues and personalities, 
but they did not reach down very far into the kinds of forces we faced 
on most occasions, the provincial mobile battalion and district guerrilla 
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companies. This pattern of strengths and deficiencies was dictated in part 
by the heavy dependence of the Americans on signals intelligence. It was 
up to us, away in Phuoc Tuy, to fill in the gaps, particularly to gain some 
insights into the political battlefield in the populated areas.
Nonetheless, the framework provided to us by II  FFV was extremely 
valuable. I could circumvent the problem of slowness in transmission by 
making my own personal visits to HQ II FFV, assisted by the Australian 
liaison officer there, Major Bert Cassidy, formerly commander of 
A Company, 5 RAR. Normally a US battalion intelligence officer would 
not have been allowed inside the building, but because I was Australian, 
the Americans were curious, and in return for my appearance at their 
door, they would tell me things that I would otherwise not have known 
for a week or two, when the official papers reached me at Nui Dat. One 
early lesson I learned in the craft of intelligence was that people will share 
information with you if they like you. A second lesson was that what 
they told you, with the best of intentions, was not always correct: it was 
a caveat emptor situation – let the buyer beware.
We built up our current intelligence picture largely through our own 
activities: patrolling, village searches, my own frequent visits to villages 
of interest, and the stationing of small numbers of our own soldiers in 
villages for a few days at a time, on an occasional basis. One of our best 
assets in this regard was the Anti-Tank Platoon, soon to become the 
Reconnaissance Platoon, led by Second Lieutenant Michael von Berg 
(then known as Mick Deak). Mick had all the right qualities for leading 
this platoon. He was bright, intellectually curious and brave. He won 
a Military Cross in the coming actions on Nui Thi Vai in October 1966, 
and he had a great capacity to relate warmly and good-humouredly with 
others, including Vietnamese villagers, sometimes with and sometimes 
without an interpreter. He was in many ways the ideal counter-insurgent, 
and much of my effectiveness as intelligence officer was based on the 
information he continually brought me from his platoon’s activities.
As Chapter  15 describes, the Reconnaissance Platoon was a 5  RAR 
innovation, introduced by our commanding officer, Colonel Warr, as a way 
of finding more useful employment for our Cold War–derived Anti-Tank 
Platoon. The Viet Cong did not have any tanks in our province, so we 
had a small force available for special tasks, such as intelligence gathering 
and ambushing Viet Cong patrols deep in the jungle. The members of 
this platoon were carefully selected and given specialised training. In fact, 
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all of our platoons and companies, when they were out on patrol, were 
carrying out intelligence-gathering tasks. They relied on stealth and their 
own powers of observation to work effectively.
Another very important source for us was the local people. We had to 
feel our way carefully into developing reliable, secure contacts with the 
Vietnamese villagers. Initially we had little idea as to how strong their 
support was for the Viet Cong. We had to take personal risks in opening 
contact in a friendly, non-threatening way. We had to be careful not 
to identify Viet Cong opponents publicly through paying too much 
observable attention to them. This concern applied particularly to the 
village priests and anyone in the employ of local government agencies. 
They often preferred to come to visit us at Nui Dat – where we were 
accepting another risk, namely that they might be carrying out an 
intelligence mission inside our perimeter for the Viet Cong.
We offset the risks by beginning slowly and testing the quality and 
reliability of what we learned. We soon discovered that many villages 
were divided in their loyalties: some people favoured the Viet Cong, 
others preferred a more liberal regime. Not many were supporters of the 
Saigon government, which they saw as too remote, often corrupt, and not 
concerned with the big issues which affected every peasant farmer, such as 
the reform of land ownership laws. The Saigon government seemed to have 
too many people who were poorly trained and prepared for their tasks. 
The local Vietnamese wanted political leaders who were in touch with 
their supporters, not a group of generals who were more used to governing 
by giving orders than by gaining popular consent. This division within 
local public opinion raised special problems for information gathering. 
We got nothing from the Viet Cong supporters except misinformation. 
And some of the others told us things which, if we believed them, were 
flattering to our egos but misleading, and potentially dangerous to act on.
Eventually, by trial and error, we discovered whom to listen to and 
whom to trust. But we kept talking with everyone who was willing to 
talk in order to protect the security of our most valuable sources. We also 
took note of the willingness of people to talk with us and, as time went 
by, we had a better understanding of where truth lay. There was some 
advantage in being Australian in this process. Many villagers were afraid 
of the Americans because they had heard that they drove tanks across 
the village rice fields and even destroyed houses, storages and other 
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facilities. They knew we were not American because of our uniforms and 
equipment. Some initially thought that we were French, returning to 
re-establish a colonial regime. They were soon disabused of that thought 
when they heard the way we spoke!
We were lucky in establishing good relations with many villages because 
our soldiers were open and friendly, and they exercised their powerful 
sense of humour, which proved able to cross international barriers with 
ease. Most importantly of all, we were fortunate that our company 
commanders and our operations officer, Major Max Carroll, had all 
served in the Malayan Emergency, where they had successfully applied 
the more nuanced approach of the British to a situation which, in its 
early years, had been deteriorating rapidly. They knew how a South-East 
Asian village worked, what the local people’s concerns and desires were, 
and how crucial were their slender resources such as rice fields and fruit 
trees. The adjutant, Captain Peter Isaacs, formerly of the British Army, 
was another key contributor to our planning discussions. A further key 
supporter of our local relations program was our medical officer, Captain 
Tony White, who, with his very small staff, would put in many hours of 
consultation time, trying to help local people with their various illnesses 
and other health issues. And after searching a village, we would offer 
the inhabitants some compensation for the trouble we had caused by 
distributing clothing, sometimes with bizarre results as old men struggled 
into bright floral dresses supplied by donors in Australia, and intended for 
female recipients.
Despite all these gaffes, minor mishaps and sometimes downright 
inconveniences that the village people suffered at our hands, most of them 
could tell that on the whole we meant them well, wanted to be friendly and, 
like them, hoped for a better life for everyone in Phuoc Tuy after we had 
left the scene. From my perspective as the battalion’s intelligence officer, 
it was a significant challenge to sift through all the often contradictory 
information that the villagers provided. Sometimes the information we 
gained was deliberately distorted by Viet Cong supporters, and on other 
occasions it would be out of date or just based on gossip. I had to assess 
what was wrong and what was solid and useful. Again, it helped to be 
able to debate findings with those of our officers and non-commissioned 
officers who had Malayan Emergency experience. They could sometimes 
sort the chaff from the grain better than I could.
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Another major factor in building up our intelligence network was the 
personal interest of our commanding officer, Colonel Warr. He had 
not served in Malaya, but had been badly wounded in the Korean War, 
which had given him other insights into modern warfare. He was highly 
intelligent, liberal in relating to his subordinates, and for me he was like 
a good doctoral supervisor in a university graduate school. He would 
ask to see me on most days for a discussion on the Viet Cong: what 
they were doing, how strong they were, where they were and what their 
commanders might be intending to do over the next week or two. ‘Bob, 
what have you got for me?’ was usually his opening question. I would 
respond with a résumé of my views on the above topics. ‘Yes, you might 
say that but what about  …?’, he would often reply, and the serious 
discussion would begin. My ideas and theses would be tested and pulled 
apart where they lacked strength. He would sometimes send me back to 
obtain more information on this or that topic, and occasionally to do 
a serious detailed analysis of a particular problem relating to our methods 
of operation and their effectiveness. Without his keen personal interest in 
and understanding of intelligence issues in that war, we would probably 
have suffered heavier casualties and achieved less impact on the Viet Cong 
than we did in 1966–67. It was not surprising when the University of 
New South Wales appointed him as deputy registrar a few years later.
Reinforcing my own capacities were the members of the battalion 
Intelligence Section – some five or six soldiers, led by Sergeant Ernie 
Madden, who systematically gathered, recorded and organised all the 
intelligence flowing in from our many sources. They kept me up to date 
with that material, producing marked-up maps showing enemy activity 
which we used for briefing platoons and companies going out on patrol. 
They built accurate three-dimensional models of the terrain that the 
battalion would cover in each future operation, from which I was able 
to brief the company commanders as part of the CO’s orders before we 
set out. When we were out on operations, and I was walking along close 
to the CO and the operations officer, my section back at Nui Dat would 
keep me up to date on any new information that had come in, especially 
from signals analysis, and then devise a way to get it to me securely. 
The Viet Cong listened in to our radio traffic too, so delivery by hard 
copy on foot was usually the best method.
As one of the two battalions making up 1 ATF, 5 RAR’s operations were 
part of a wider operational scheme. The task force commander, Brigadier 
David Jackson, allowed his two battalion commanders a great deal of 
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initiative in planning and conducting their operations. Nonetheless 
they were planned jointly with the Task Force headquarters, and they 
were supported by the full resources of the Task Force, including those 
of its small intelligence staff, under the direction of Major Alex Piper. 
While this group was not able to mount its own intelligence-gathering 
operations, it was an important hub in the system because it received 
the results of analysis of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese radio traffic. 
My own contacts with Alex Piper and his assistant (and my predecessor 
as intelligence officer of 5 RAR), Captain Don Willcox, were particularly 
important, and I was in touch with them nearly every day, both to receive 
and to pass on intelligence information.
Let me give an example from one operation in the Nui Dinh hills in 
October 1966 of how our entire intelligence system worked: Operation 
Queanbeyan, from 17 to 26 October 1966.
First, we had to establish the size and locations of the Viet Cong forces 
in the hills. Our patrols soon encountered groups of up to 40 men, well 
equipped and probably Main Force soldiers, on the slopes of Nui Thi Vai. 
On 8 October Alex Piper flew in by helicopter to brief us. He had just 
learned that an enemy group higher up on Nui Thi Vai was led by the 
deputy commander of 274 Regiment, the better of the two Main Force 
regiments that we faced. They had a strong defensive position in rocks 
and caves above our level, and if we attacked without due preparation, the 
result could have been heavy Australian casualties. We had not expected 
to find as large a Viet Cong force as this, together with all the supporting 
and base facilities which went with a regimental presence in the area. After 
engaging a large number of enemy with airstrikes, helicopter gunships 
and  artillery and mortar fire, we were ordered to withdraw closer to 
Route 15 to prevent the Viet Cong from setting up any ambush positions 
along the road.
Once the American reinforcement convoys had passed through, we 
were able to turn our efforts fully to driving 274 Regiment off the hills. 
Frequent visits by Brigadier Jackson and Major Piper kept us up to date 
with the signals intelligence picture of the Viet Cong activities on and 
around the hills. Over the 10 days from 17 to 26 October, we fought our 
way back up the steep slopes, encountering several Viet Cong delaying 
parties inside caves and tunnels, and among rocks. We discovered extensive 
base facilities and equipment, including a recently made Chinese radio 
transmitter and receiver and the diary of the deputy commander himself, 
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Nguyen Nam Hung. This diary was probably the most important single 
intelligence discovery we made during the whole year. He began each 
day’s entry with his current location, so we could piece together the 
pattern of his movements during the first 10  months of 1966. After 
translation of the diary, it took much of my time over the following three 
months to extract all the available intelligence. The utility of the diary was 
reinforced by another discovery – a marked 1:50,000-scale map of western 
Phuoc Tuy which showed the complete Viet Cong track system and the 
location of base camps and fortified areas. From this map, we could plan 
reconnaissance and ambush missions over the next several months.
In essence this operation had succeeded because we had been able to build 
up a detailed picture of Viet Cong activities on either side of Route 15 
before we began. We had not known the full size of the enemy group 
on Nui Thi Vai, but US and Australian signals intelligence soon gave 
us the essential information. Pressing on with the final wave of clearing 
attacks on the Viet Cong positions yielded further useful discoveries 
which strengthened our intelligence framework for our remaining time 
in Vietnam.
One problem that most intelligence officers must face when dealing with 
operational commanders is that the latter can often have in their minds 
a preferred tactical method of operating, and they look for intelligence 
to justify the use of that method. I learned about this issue in depth 
through a lucky personal coincidence. Not long after 5  RAR’s arrival 
in Vietnam my first book, The German Army and the Nazi Party, was 
published in London by Cassells. Soon afterwards I received a letter 
from my production manager at Cassells, Ken Parker, to say that they 
were also publishing a book on the German bombing offensive against 
Britain in the First World War, The First Battle of Britain, by Raymond 
Fredette. Fredette, Parker wrote, was a major in the US Air Force, and 
was currently serving in Saigon in the headquarters of the US Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam, better known as MACV, the headquarters 
of General Westmoreland. Fredette soon invited me to visit him in 
Saigon. We had a lot of common interests and a friendship developed, 
leading to further visits. This friendship has deepened and Ray and I are 
still in touch by telephone and email – he at the age of 95 and myself 
at 82. Of particular relevance to this chapter was what I learned from Ray 
about the functioning of the highest US headquarters in Vietnam. There 
was a broad spectrum of views among the senior commanders and staff on 
how to win the war, ranging from turning South Vietnam into a car park 
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by physical destruction through to a huge civic action program which put 
public education ahead of military action. Each school of thought looked 
for intelligence information to prove that its approach was the most 
effective, and they suppressed information which favoured the advocates 
of other approaches. This influenced the intelligence staff, the J2 division of 
MACV, who also had their own theories on how to win the war, and these 
ideas could influence what they chose to pass on to their counterparts in 
the J3 (Operations) division. This J2/J3 rivalry did not end at the level of 
MACV, Ray told me. It existed at lower levels throughout the US forces in 
Vietnam. Once Ray had taken me through this analysis, I could see that it 
also had applicability to our much smaller Australian forces in Vietnam. 
Commanders could selectively use intelligence to justify a hasty choice of 
their favourite strategic or tactical idea, rather than making a conscious 
choice among all the available alternative approaches.
These were useful lessons, both for the shaping of our operations in Vietnam 
and for my own understanding of why various notable commanders of the 
past had stuck to unsuccessful strategies, despite intelligence available at 
the time which undermined the logic of their grand design. Fortunately, 
at the level of 5 RAR Battalion Headquarters, we had a commander and 
a group of principal officers who could see the dangers of a rigid strategic 
approach, and they were rigorous in their demands for full intelligence 
briefings rather than brief resumes of what I personally thought was 
important. It was, above all, that expert debating circle which set and 
maintained the standards of our intelligence gathering and analysis system 
during our year in Vietnam. The operations of October 1966 were a great 
schooling experience in how to combine intelligence and operational 
planning. These lessons have continued to be relevant and to shape the 




INTO THE HILLS: 
OPERATIONS CANBERRA 
AND ROBIN – OCTOBER 1966
Max Carroll and Peter Isaacs
Editors’ introduction
The operational narrative resumes, following on from Chapter 4. 
In October 1966, 5th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR), 
was to embark on operations which entailed a host of new challenges 
involving an incursion into the jungle-clad, rocky and cave-riddled Viet 
Cong (VC) stronghold of the Nui Thi Vai hills. The enemy had been 
unmolested in this established sanctuary area for long periods before the 
arrival of 1st  Australian Task Force (1  ATF). Clearing of the Nui Thi 
Vai hills was a necessary precursor to a forthcoming US Army operation 
code-named Robin in which 1 ATF was to participate.
Max Carroll
In the bigger picture, the war was escalating, and a major build-up of 
US forces was taking place. To ease the congestion at the up-river port 
of Saigon, newly arrived troops and stores were to disembark at Vung Tau, 
then move through Phuoc Tuy by road to bases at Bear Cat, Long Binh 
and Bien Hoa. These installations were serviced by Route 15, which was 
regularly interdicted by the VC. 1 ATF was to have the task of securing the 
road within Phuoc Tuy Province from Ba Ria to a hamlet named Phu My, 
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about 22 kilometres distant to the north-west, where there was also an 
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) post. Our old comrades, the 
US 173 Airborne Brigade, would then take over the task north of Phu My, 
through Bien Hoa Province to Bear Cat, some 26 kilometres further up 
the road, which was also the destination of the first formation we were 
providing cover for, the 3 Brigade of the 4 US Infantry Division.
In the 1 ATF sector, Route 15 was dominated by the hill massifs of Nui 
Dinh and Nui Thi Vai, which also had a subsidiary feature – Nui Ong 
Trinh – running south-west towards the road. There was yet a fourth peak, 
Nui Toc Tien, but this was further to the east and not considered to be 
a direct source of VC threat. The route clearance was a 1 ATF operation; 
and the road allotted to 5 RAR was about 15 kilometres in length, while 
6 RAR’s A Company covered the shorter section nearest to Ba Ria. 6 RAR 
had been successful in their recent Operation Vaucluse in the Nui Dinh 
hills, and D Company, 6 RAR, were to patrol that hill area again, as added 
security, while the road convoys were passing.
The task given to 5  RAR was a big one. We had to secure the road 
between  0900 hours and 1600 hours, from 11 to 16  October, during 
which period two 50-truck convoys would pass daily. This was Operation 
Robin, and the timings were inflexible. The 15-kilometre sector of 
Route 15 for which we were responsible dictated that our fire support 
base would have to be located about midway along the road, so we could 
provide artillery coverage for all our dispersed companies. The nature of 
the vegetation along the verges was such that we had to patrol a zone several 
hundred metres wide on either side of the highway. The dominating hill 
features of Nui Thi Vai and Nui Ong Trinh were within VC mortar range 
of the road, which meant these would have to be cleared beforehand. 
We were given five days, 6 to 10 October, to check out the summits and 
the western slopes. This was to be Operation Canberra, which would 
then flow on immediately into Operation Robin. Having returned from 
Operation Crow’s Nest as late as 3  October, our preparations were in 
overdrive again.
For both Operations, Canberra and Robin, we established our fire support 
base close to the road near a hamlet named Ap Ong Trinh Dp. In addition 
to our normal direct support battery, 103  Field Battery, we had two 
155 mm self-propelled guns from Battery A of 2/35 Artillery Regiment in 
support. This latter unit was part of the US artillery allotted to 1 ATF and 
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they were normally deployed in the Task Force base area. Because 6 RAR 
was fully committed to other activities, for Operation Canberra we had 
to use our own troops to protect the guns. 11 Platoon from D Company 
and the Anti-Tank Platoon were given this task under the command of 
Captain Ron Boxall, the second in command (2IC) of D Company. The 
remainder of D Company accompanied Battalion Headquarters (BHQ) 
as ‘Palace Guard’. This deployment left us three companies for searching, 
and we also took two of the three sections of our Mortar Platoon with 
us into the hills. These were to be flown in on 7 October once the BHQ 
objective had been secured.
We moved to our start point by road and, leaving the armoured personnel 
carriers  (APCs) on Route  15 south of Ap Ong Trinh Dp, we rapidly 
deployed to move to our target area to the north. This approach was not 
ideal, but the time available for the operation made it the best option. 
We  proceeded for several thousand metres through thick scrub before 
reaching the foot of the hills, with B Company moving around the western 
side and C Company on the eastern flank of Nui Ong Trinh. A Company 
led the column, followed by BHQ and D  Company, up towards the 
summit of Nui Ong Trinh. We did not reach the top on day one but did 
so on the morning of the second day, 7 October, with the search so far 
being uneventful. An unnecessary drama then occurred when I received 
a  radio call from Captain Ron Boxall advising that the commanding 
officer (CO) of 1  Field Regiment had arrived at our fire support base 
(FSB), didn’t like the location, and was moving the guns; and what should 
he, Boxall, do as he was responsible for protecting them? This was the first 
we knew of this nonsense. Neither John Warr nor Neville Gair, the battery 
commander, had been consulted. This was inexcusable because the guns 
could not adequately support us while they were moving. Some rather 
heated exchanges with HQ 1 ATF followed. Our CO ordered Ron’s gun 
protection group to remain where they were, the Commander 1  ATF 
countermanded the CO 1 Field Regiment’s illogical order; and we duly 






























































































































































































































Ap Ong Trinh Dp
Operation CANBERRA - Phase 1
6–8 October 1966
Map 8: Operation Canberra – 
Phase 1: 6–8 October 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 
maps provided by Bruce Davies.
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The selected objective for BHQ on 7 October was a twin-peaked feature 
which was about 1,500 metres, as the crow flies, north-east from Nui Ong 
Trinh. I had code-named the twin peaks Julie and Jan after two young 
teenaged friends of my family. C Company had crossed from the eastern 
flank of Nui Ong Trinh and had checked out the two peaks while moving 
to their day three search area, which was the southern slope of Nui 
Thi Vai. A Company initially led off from Nui Ong Trinh, descending 
into a steeply sloping, jungle-clad valley. On reaching the valley floor, 
A  Company then left us, branching off further to the north-east and 
skirting Hill Julie, before they commenced their ascent of Nui Thi Vai. 
It had taken A Company some time to pick their way down the slope; 
and we were concerned that the BHQ Group and D Company would 
be hard-pressed to reach our objective before dark. We asked for Iroquois 
helicopter support to be on standby, should we find an extraction landing 
zone (LZ) on Nui Ong Trinh, to fly us to the LZ we knew was in the small 
saddle between the twin peaks. In any event, D Company found a suitable 
LZ on Nui Ong Trinh from which they flew to our destination. However, 
the lead scouts of the BHQ Group missed the track made by D Company 
where they turned off to the LZ from A Company’s path, and we went 
the whole way on foot, cursing the hapless scouts and the hellish slopes 
and vegetation! At least the objective area was secure when we eventually 
arrived. We intended to stay there, so D Company occupied Hill Jan and 
the BHQ Group Hill Julie, while the pioneers enlarged the LZ, on the 
edges of which our two sections of mortars were located once they were 
flown in. We had a strong defensive position from which we could control 
our searching companies with good radio communications and provide 
mortar fire support.
The third day of our search, Saturday 8  October, started quietly; our 
command team was joined by the deputy operations officer, Captain Peter 




By the time I reached BHQ atop Hill Julie, Operation Canberra had been 
underway for 48 hours. I therefore avoided the long haul on foot from 
the flat plain beside Route 15 and the arguments about the FSB being 
moved on the orders of 1 Field Regiment’s CO without prior consultation 
with CO 5 RAR. Captain Bob Supple, who was 2IC Support Company, 
stood in during my absence. I arrived by helicopter on the morning of 
8  October. Early that morning we had received unconfirmed reports 
of a VC mobile battalion near our area of operations. At 1000 hours 
C Company became involved in a contact in which 8 Platoon was fired on 
from several different directions. Initially, Major John Miller, the officer 
commanding C  Company, reported being in contact with a possible 
company-sized force. The VC withdrew but C Company sustained seven 
casualties from booby traps and an eighth man injured with a  twisted 
ankle. All were evacuated by Dustoff, which took about an hour. 
At around 1400 hours, C Company reported that the rudimentary houses 
and livestock enclosures they were among were heavily booby-trapped. 
They had sustained another five wounded and requested further Dustoff. 
C Company was therefore engaged in difficult casualty evacuations from 
their jungle-clad mountainside location for several hours, and their 
strength was depleted by 13 men.
At 1400 hours B  Company reported sighting a group of VC on the 
lower western slopes of Nui Thi Vai. 5 Platoon’s forward scout, Private 
Colin Cogswell (aged  19) and his second scout, Private Doug Hillier, 
had located a booby trap, deloused it and a few minutes later heard 
voices of enemy close by. Covered by Hillier who remained stationary, 
Cogswell moved forward to investigate. He initially sighted 15 VC and, 
a short time later, even more close by. He remained in these positions 
for nearly an hour after Hillier had cautiously withdrawn to report the 
enemy presence. Cogswell moved to within five metres of the enemy, but 
he was not seen as he continued to observe. His performance entailed 
magnificent use of the cover offered by rocks and heavy vegetation and 
his highly developed movement and concealment skills; to say nothing of 
his coolness under pressure.
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Colin Cogswell recalls this episode
I thought I might have trouble remembering everything about what happened 
on 8  October 1966 during Operation Canberra. When I started writing I was 
surprised how clearly memories flooded back. Of course, I have read the citation that 
accompanied the award of my Military Medal and have always felt surprised that 
I was rewarded for just doing my job as a forward scout and that my recollections 
don’t precisely match that of the citation.1
B Company was moving up an east-to-west major ridgeline of Nui Thi Vai mountain. 
My platoon, 5 Platoon, was in the lead with me as first scout and Doug Hillier as 
second. As we got near the top of this ridgeline we crossed over a re-entrant. We were 
about 50 to 60 metres in front of the rest of 5 Platoon when we came across two huts 
about 25 metres to our front. What then attracted our attention was a group of 12 to 
15 Vietnamese in well-fitting green uniforms who seemed to be holding an O Group. 
[Editor’s note: a meeting where orders are distributed and coordinated by officers. 
The Conclusion to this chapter gives more details.]
We had moved too far forward and had lost sight of the rest of our section who were 
following us. We decided that I should remain where I was, and Doug would go back 
and let our section commander, Corporal Jim Hall, know what we had found so he 
could pass the information up the chain of command. My first instinct was to find 
better cover, so I moved very carefully about 10 metres away and behind some large 
rocks among foliage. In doing so I lost sight of the enemy group we had first seen. 
After about a minute I heard Vietnamese voices very close nearby.
I slowly looked over the rock and through the bushes and saw a Vietnamese, well 
dressed in a green uniform and wearing a cap with a red star on its front. I remember 
thinking his shoulder-slung AK47 looked immaculate. Fortunately, he was looking 
down and talking to someone I couldn’t see. He didn’t know that my M16 was 
pointed at the side of his head and I was about to squeeze the trigger.
One part of me wanted to shoot him and another thought that the shot would draw 
attention to the nearby presence of B Company who were probably planning some 
action to get me out and deal with the enemy. So, I slowly got back behind my rock 
and waited for something to happen. The enemy were so close that I could smell 
them and was concerned that they might smell me – or hear my thumping heart. 
They were only 4 or 5 metres from me. I guess they had their slack moments too.
I seemed to be there for ages waiting for the Company to do an attack or something. 
I knew that they were aware that I was still in position close to the enemy. By now 
I had pulled out my two M26 grenades and removed the striker lever safety tapes so 
that when something happened, I could throw one just over my covering rock and 
the other one as hard as I could towards where I’d seen the larger group. I hoped that 
my mates didn’t brass me up – being a forward scout I’d had a few times when I was 
more worried about my mates behind me than any enemy in front of me.
As I waited, I got an uneasy feeling and looked up to my right where the boulders 
were about 6 metres high. I saw another neatly uniformed soldier standing there and 
looking straight out into a clearing in front of my rock. If he had looked down and to 
his left, he would have seen me, but he turned around and disappeared into what we 
found later was a cave in which a radio setup was housed. The same man came out 
again briefly, but still did not see me.
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I don’t know how much time had passed before I realised I couldn’t hear any more 
talking and was no longer sure where the enemy were. I felt it was time to get back to 
5 Platoon one way or the other. I put my grenades back into their pouches and slowly 
backed out around another massive boulder hoping I would not be seen. At the same 
time, I’m looking for my section on the other side of the re-entrant. I saw Jim Hall 
waving me to come back and Joe Devlin, our M60 machine gunner, ready to give 
me covering fire.
I thought ‘it’s now or never’ and ran 30  metres down into the re-entrant and 
scrambled up the other side expecting to be shot at any stage. The moment I got back 
I realised that only my section was there, and Jim had them on their feet and moving 
as fast as they could back down the hill to where B Company had been ordered to 
pull back out of the way of an air strike. I don’t know how Joe held onto that M60 
while scrambling down that steep and rocky jungle slope.
We didn’t seem to have moved far when the first jet came screaming in with its 
Gatling cannon roaring and dropping two canisters of cluster bombs right where 
I had been not very long before. By the time we got back to B Company our artillery 
was getting in on the act. The daylight was fading, and B Company harboured for 
the night. All I wanted was to make a hot brew, but not before Doug and I had to go 
and see Major McQualter for a debrief. When we got back to our section, we were 
told that we were going out for the night to set up a listening post. There was no rest 
for the wicked – nor even for the lucky!
After returning to Australia I was surprised to learn that I had been awarded a Military 
Medal for doing what I thought was my job of detecting the enemy and getting the 
information back. It was presented on my 21st birthday, at Government House in 
Sydney, by Sir Roden Cutler VC.
1 Colin Cogswell’s citation for the Military Medal can be viewed at the 5th Battalion The Royal 
Australian Regiment Association website, Citation accompanying the award of the Military Medal to 
Pte. Cogswell, www.5rar.asn.au/history/cite_cogswell.htm.
Major Bruce McQualter had begun quietly to position B Company for 
an attack. While he was doing so, we were advised by 1 ATF that the 
HQ of VC 274  Regiment was believed to be in our vicinity and that 
a task force intelligence officer was on his way to brief us on the situation. 
B Company was warned to be extremely careful in its movements and 
that if help was needed, A Company would provide it. C Company was 
closer to B Company but still engaged in casualty evacuation.
Major Alex Piper from HQ 1  ATF arrived shortly afterwards and 
confirmed that HQ 274  Regiment was indeed believed to be nearby. 
John Warr stepped away from the command group and considered 
what action to take. Allow the B Company attack to proceed, or order 
B and C Companies to move away and call in artillery and air strikes? 
Nobody knows what thoughts John Warr had in the short time he took to 
decide to order B Company to cancel their impending attack. Maybe he 
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was remembering some advice that he had been given shortly before 
the battalion had commenced deployment for Vietnam. During his 
final inspection visit, the highly regarded General Officer Commanding 
Eastern Command, Major General Tom Daly, had told John that if ever 
he found himself in a position where he felt that by delaying an action he 
could achieve a similar result but would probably save soldiers’ lives, then 
he should delay, as those lives were of paramount importance.
I must admit that, personally, I was disappointed that B Company was 
ordered to abandon its attack plan, but I have no doubt that had it 
proceeded some members of B Company would have died, and others 
could have sustained life-changing injuries. John Warr was correct – his 
soldiers’ lives were of paramount importance in a conflict that was not 
concerned with Australia’s national survival. The chief reason why John 
was held in such high esteem by all ranks of the battalion was because all 
knew of his concerns for us.
Max Carroll
B Company were chagrined at being ordered back to a safe distance to the 
west and C Company were also moved out of the way before both VC 
areas were subjected to heavy artillery fire from our FSB. Our four mortars 
also joined the attack and the clearly identified target areas must have been 
most uncomfortable for the VC. We had a US Army helicopter light fire 
team, consisting of two heavily armed Iroquois, code-named Derringer, 
available to support us, and they were called in during short breaks in 
the artillery and mortar fire to deliver high explosive (HE) rockets and 
high-volume fire from their multi-barrelled machine guns at opportunity 
targets. As they made their low-level passes they drew heavy ground fire, 
which was returned with effect by their side-door gunners. Obviously, the 
target areas were well defended, and it looked as though we were in for 
a long engagement. We requested an air strike to handle any hardened 
targets and in a short time a US forward air controller (FAC), code-named 
Birddog, was overhead in his small Cessna. He was briefed on the situation 
as he circled us, familiarising himself with our locations and the targets 
to be hit. His lazy drawl belied his professionalism for he obviously knew 
his trade. Soon a flight of four F100 Super Sabre fighter-bombers came 
screaming onto the scene and orbited while the FAC briefed them. Then 
the FAC went in low, marking the target area with his white phosphorous 
VIETNAM VANGUARd
102
smoke rockets, before getting out of the way of the jets who followed him 
in. The first passes were from the west across our front and we had a good 
view from Hill Julie. The target was plastered with both 500-pound HE 
bombs and cluster bomb units. These were thin-cased canisters which 
burst above the ground, widely scattering many smaller fragmentation 
bomblets, which, in turn, exploded on impact or lay dormant, to explode 
when disturbed.
The F100s then varied their line of attack and came in low, above Hills 
Jan and Julie, and we were startled by the screaming roar as they passed. 
When they had expended all their heavy ordnance, they again went in 
low, strafing with their 20 mm cannon and firing salvos of HE 70 mm 
Mighty Mouse rockets. It was a most impressive use of ground attack 
air power. I had never seen such an amount of effective destruction in 
such a short time; and when the FAC offered us a second wave, of course 
we accepted. During the short break between sorties, our artillery and 
mortars kept up the bombardment so there was no break for the VC. The 
second wave continued the destruction but added napalm to the mix, 
which was quite sobering to watch as the burning petroleum jelly agent 
penetrated caves and any other apertures it hit or burst over. We thanked 
the FAC for the valuable assistance he and his colleagues had given us as 
he signed off and went home, by which time it was dusk. Regrettably, any 
VC survivors now had darkness to assist their escape.
Earlier in the afternoon the CO had been prescient in ordering 1,000 
81 mm mortar bombs to be flown forward to our mortar line on Julie; 
these fortunately had been delivered. It appeared that this had caused 
some unhappiness along the supply line. These bombs had come from 
Task Force holdings at Nui Dat which, in turn, had to be replaced. Noting 
that most of his mortar bomb holdings at Nui Dat was being flown out 
to us, our brigadier called replacement stocks forward from 1st Australian 
Logistic Support Group (1 ALSG) at Vung Tau. We soon heard that some 
1 ALSG pogos (an informal nickname applied by combat troops to others 
who work in safe billets behind them) were upset because they had to work 
their butts off getting the replacement ammunition forward in a hurry; 
and it was on a Saturday – a weekend! We weren’t worried about what day 
of the week it was, or the preferred working arrangements in base areas – 
we demanded the bombs we needed and were soon to use them.
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Map 9: Operation Canberra – 
Phase 2: 9–10 October 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 
maps provided by Bruce Davies.
LEGEND
Operation CANBERRA - Phases 1 & 2
Perimeter of static elements
Enemy contact / booby traps
Enemy location
Landing Zone                                        OR
Pagoda





Insertion by helicopter (D Company)
Air strikes (numbered in sequence)
Move to Operation ROBIN
● Extraction by helicopter








Inevitably, differences in outlook arose when supporting troops were 
distinctly separated from combat troops both by distance and in 
terms of relative comfort and safety. In Chapter  2 the pros and cons 
of separating 1  ATF from its dedicated logistic support agency were 
discussed. Inevitably, the exigencies and tempo of operations lacked 
immediacy for many members of 1  ALSG, which primarily operated 
on a workaday routine and in much better-developed facilities. These 
were permanently ensconced beside a beach in Vung Tau; a large and 
quite safe urban area which was both remote from 1 ATF operations and 
protected from major enemy ground attack by its location at the end of 
a long, narrow peninsular. Combat soldiers who got to spend infrequent 
two-day breaks from operations at Vung Tau considered the atmosphere 
there to be akin to a seaside holiday resort; this was a bit harsh, but the 
perceived differences were telling and lasting. They felt a strong need 
to clearly distinguish themselves from their counterparts who worked 
in such a setting. Hence, an old British Army tag ‘pogos’ (standing for 
‘personnel on garrison operations’) re-emerged to be applied routinely, 
and sometimes disdainfully when it was deemed deserving. Infantrymen 
laughingly accepted the inevitable comeback, ‘grunts’, which was copied 
from the Americans. Pogo was a far less derogatory term than its expletive 
US equivalent, which Australian combat soldiers peremptorily declined to 
adopt as descriptor for our base soldiers.
Max Carroll
The harassing fire we used to interdict likely VC withdrawal routes 
throughout the night had to be provided by our mortars, as it was not 
logistically possible to get large amounts of heavy artillery ammunition 
forward to our FSB in time. The four mortars we had with us fired about 
960 rounds throughout the night and no one got much sleep. Early next 
morning B and C Companies moved back into the areas they had vacated 
on the previous afternoon and continued their search. The VC had gone 
and taken their casualties with them.
We now had to reassess the situation as we were on the fourth day of 
our five-day operation and had been engaged in a major encounter. This 
indicated a reasonably strong VC presence in the area and there was still 
a lot of ground to cover. It was obvious to us that we would have to 
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return to Nui Thi Vai when we had completed Operation Robin, but 
in the meantime, we had to search and clear the slopes and crest to our 
immediate front.
The search by A  Company of the Nui Thi Vai crest, and then down 
to the pagoda on the north-western spur, was uneventful, except they 
captured a suspect Buddhist monk, whom they passed on to Captain Bob 
O’Neill, our intelligence officer, for interrogation. B Company’s search 
was gratifying. They were continuing carefully to cover the area of the 
airstrikes when they found a large VC camp, spread over several hundred 
metres including 15 huts, caves, a tunnel system, a water supply system, 
a quantity of medical supplies, ammunition, grenades, mines, rockets 
and clothing and equipment. They also recovered a quantity of valuable 
documents, which, among other things, gave details of the company which 
had administered the installation and listed the VC units and numbers 
which had passed through recently. This was a major VC base area. The 
discovery of this installation and its contents no doubt helped ease any 
disappointments that lingered in the company from earlier contacts. 
C Company’s search was also most productive and revealed why the area 
where they had taken casualties had been covered by trail watchers and 
booby traps. They found two company-sized bases, containing a hospital 
and a quantity of medical stores, a booby trap factory, explosives, 
ammunition, general stores and equipment, many valuable documents 
and a large quantity of rice. Probably the most important item found 
was a 1:50,000-scale map, which showed the VC track system for western 
Phuoc Tuy and other bases and fortified areas.
Both companies reported that the airstrikes had been most effective 
with many direct hits making it difficult to count weapon pits and 
other defensive locations. We sent all the documents found and some 
of the medical stores back to Task Force for analysis. All other stores, 
ammunition, equipment and the rice were destroyed as they were too 
difficult to remove. Time was pressing, the destruction work took time 
and we could not complete destroying all installations we had found 
before moving on to meet our deadline for commencing our part in 
Operation Robin.
The final day was uneventful as the search companies moved to their 
extraction point, LZ Michael, at the north-western end of Nui Thi Vai. 
B Company then moved by APCs to their allotted position on Route 15 
in readiness for Operation Robin, due to commence next day, while A, 
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C and D  Companies were airlifted to theirs. BHQ, the mortars and 
pioneers were also airlifted back to the FSB. We were all repositioned on 
the afternoon of 10  October and Operation Canberra was concluded. 
We left Nui Thi Vai with mixed feelings. We had killed VC and wounded 
others during contacts, but C Company had suffered 12 wounded plus 
another man injured; and D  Company had also had a man injured. 
However, the operation was considered highly successful as we had 
seriously disrupted major VC elements, forcing them to rapidly vacate 
a long-occupied sanctuary, as well as finding and destroying three large 
installations and associated stores and equipment. Also, the intelligence 
value of the documents captured was incalculable. The casualties suffered 
by the VC due to the airstrikes and our artillery and mortar fire, all of 
which were highly accurate, must have hurt them but to what degree we 
would never know. We knew we would be going back to Nui Thi Vai; and 
we also knew we would be expected! For the present, Operation Robin 
was about to begin.
The official history volume, To Long Tan, covers Operation Robin in just 
two sentences, which I will quote here:
The clearance of the western side of the Nui Thi Vais ensured the 
smooth conduct of Operation Robin. One security patrol received 
ineffective sniper fire and several mines were detonated harmlessly 
while checking the roadway, but the US troop convoys went 
through unmolested.1
For those of us on the ground there was far more to it.
Our subunits were dispersed over the 15 kilometres of our assigned sector, 
from Phu My in the north, southwards in the order shown at Map 10: 
B Company, C Company, BHQ and Support Company (co-located with 
the FSB), then D Company and A Company, whose southern boundary 
linked with 6 RAR. Each rifle company had a section of APCs to assist 
with rapid redeployments, as well as their attached engineer combat teams 
to clear the road of mines and booby traps each morning. In the event, we 
started work as soon as we moved in on the afternoon of 10 October, and 
the first mines were found. We also lost a sapper wounded by a booby trap 
and an APC had a track blown off by a mine on the road verge. The same 
afternoon there was a further incident when the Sioux helicopter that 
1  McNeill, Ian, To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966, Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney, 1993, p 391.
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was supporting us crashed. The aircraft was flying at low altitude along 
the road between companies, when the rotor blade appeared to strike 
a roadside telegraph pole and disintegrate. A metal fragment struck the 
pilot, Second Lieutenant Bill Davies, in the head, seriously wounding him. 
Fortunately, both Davies and his passenger, the company quartermaster 
sergeant of B Company, Staff Sergeant ‘Sailor’ Mealing, survived, mainly 
because the crash occurred close to the FSB where our regimental medical 
officer, Captain Tony White, was waiting to be picked up by the aircraft. 
As related by Bill Davies in Chapter 14, his immediate presence on the 
scene saved Davies’ life, as Tony recognised the seriousness of his condition 
and directed the Dustoff to take him straight to a specialist hospital in 
Saigon for surgery. Mealing’s injuries were less serious, but he still had to 
return to Australia. I knew him well, having served with him in 3 RAR in 
Malaya. All of this happened on the afternoon before Operation Robin 
officially started!
The danger of sniper fire was ever-present, and our patrols had to clear 
well back from the road, constantly, throughout each day. Map 10 shows 
helicopter pilot reports of locations from which they received enemy small 
arms fire as they flew over Route 15 and the areas to either side, before 
and during the operation. The road and its verges and culverts within each 
sector were checked daily for mines and booby traps before 0900 hours, 
then APC-mounted infantry road patrols throughout the day, between 
convoys, ensured there would be no interference by enemy activities.
There was considerable civilian activity in our area as there were several 
villages and hamlets along the road, together with numerous charcoal-
producing ovens, which were a main source of income for local peasants. 
We took no chances and all movement and activity was carefully watched. 
Most of the locals were Buddhists and there were two villages inhabited 
by Catholic refugees from North Vietnam, Ap Ong Trinh Dp and Long 
Cat, which were well maintained and defended. We took the opportunity 
to establish good relationships with these people as they were anti-VC. 
We also assisted them with the provision of some barbed wire to strengthen 
their defences, and Tony White and one of the dentists from the Task 
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Ap Ong Trinh Dp
Ap Gieng Moi
Map 10: Operation Robin:  
11–16 October 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 
maps provided by Bruce Davies.
LEGEND
Operation ROBIN
Site of Sioux helicopter crash
Perimeter enclosing 5 RAR HQ, 
103 Field Battery gun position 








3. Small arms fire
4. Small arms AA fire
5. Anti-armour fire
Notes:
1. Each company had a section of three APCs under its command.
2. Terminology:      Appendix E
3. Symbols:           Appendix F
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The passage of the convoys was a sight to behold. The nominated limit of 
50 vehicles at a time was often exceeded; and the stream seemed endless. 
I believe something like 1,200 men a day passed up the road during the 
operation. Each convoy was escorted by US Army APCs, while overhead 
was a command and control helicopter with fire teams of helicopter 
gunships constantly prowling the flanks. It was a most impressive display 
of American strength and we hoped that any VC observers who had 
returned to the hills behind us were duly impressed.
Editors’ conclusion
The official history’s passing reference clearly doesn’t do justice to this 
period  of intense activity, with many important facets of inter-allied 
cooperation and interaction with the civilian population living along 
the vital, inter-provincial Route  15. During Operation Robin, 5  RAR 
commenced planning a return to Nui Thi Vai and was able to clear 
a  proposed plan with Brigadier Jackson, the task force commander. 
During one of his regular visits he granted John Warr’s request that no 
time limit be imposed for completion of the operation. It was obvious 
from earlier experience that there was still a lot to be discovered on Nui 
Thi Vai, and flexibility to react to developing situations without time 
constraints was needed. Brigadier David Jackson had an excellent grasp 
of 5 RAR’s approach to operations and, once he had approved a plan, 
he let the battalion get on with the job in hand. Orders for a  new 
operation code-named Queanbeyan were prepared and the CO held his 
Orders Group (the assembly of subordinates to receive verbal orders, 
with hard copy confirmation, and to provide any needed clarification 
of details). On 17 October the battalion was ready to launch a much-




1. February 1966, on exercise at Canungra before departure for Vietnam (left to 
right): WO2 Don McGregor, Corporal Bob Whillas, Major Paul Greenhalgh, Private 
Max Stringer, all of D Company HQ, and 5 RAR’s chaplain, Father John Williams, 
taking a breather.
Source: Ron Boxall.
2. October 1966: Two C Company members, Lance Corporal Ron Shoebridge (left) 
and Lance Corporal David ‘Stretch’ Bryan (right), support Private David Riik 
after 8 Platoon suffered casualties from booby traps during Operation Canberra. 
Private Ian Foran at left monitors the company radio net and Private Robert Birtles 
kneels at right. The dense jungle and rugged terrain are visible in the background 
(see Chapter 8).
Source: Australian War Memorial, COA/66/0877/VN.
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3. May 1966: The Commander US Military Assistance Command Vietnam, General 
William C. Westmoreland, and the Commander Australian Forces Vietnam, Major 
General Ken Mackay, talk with Private Kevin Cavanagh, C  Company, aboard 
HMAS Sydney at Vung Tau.
Source: Australian War Memorial, CUN/66/0369/VN.
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4. April 1966: Brigadier David Jackson, Commander 1 ATF, and Lieutenant Colonel 
John Warr, commanding officer 5 RAR, soon after the latter’s arrival at Tan Son 
Nhut airport.
Source: Australian War Memorial, KEL/66/0362/VN.
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5. July 1966: 5 RAR medical officer, Captain Tony White, sutures a machete gash 
for one of his medical assistants, Corporal Ian McDougall.
Source: Australian War Memorial, FOR/66/0484/VN.
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6. October 1966: Soldiers of C Company, at a landing zone on Nui Thi Vai with 
captured materiel. Operation Canberra.
Source: Bill Parkes.
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7. September 1966: The Australian 
Army Chief of the General Staff, 
Lieutenant General Tom Daly, visits 
D Company during Operation Toledo, 
September 1966. Here he speaks with 
Sergeant Bob Armitage (left) and 
Major Paul Greenhalgh.
Source: Australian War Memorial, 
FOR/66/0785/VN.
8. May 1966: Lieutenant Colonel John 
Warr (centre) discussing helicopter 
training with Lieutenant Charles 
Brinnon of the US Army’s 68  Assault 
Helicopter Company (left) and Major 
Richard Hannigan (right), operations 
officer, 1 ATF, at Vung Tau.
Source: Australian War Memorial, 
FOR/66/0386/VN.
9. October 1966: Private Bruce Mason, 
A Company, makes a brew beside a local 
charcoal burner’s oven during Operation 
Robin.
Source: Australian War Memorial, 
COL/66/0965/VN.
10. December 1966: Members of 
8  Platoon admiring Private Robin 
Lestrange’s Christmas treats sent by his 
former employers. Platoon commander 
Lieutenant Roger Wainwright (right) is 
keeping an eye on (left to right) Sergeant 
Ralph ‘Rowdy’ Hindmarsh, Private 
Dick Criss, unknown, Private Daryl 
McCombe (kneeling), Private Robin 
Lestrange, Private Bill Cavanagh, 
Private Phil Long and Private Alan 
Suckling (later Alan Hunter).
Source: Australian War Memorial, 
COL/66/1010/VN.
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11. October 1966: 5  RAR’s Signals 
Officer, Captain Brian Le Dan, with 
his damaged Owen machine carbine 
which deflected and shattered an enemy 
sniper’s bullet thus saving him from 
serious wounding or death during 
Operation Queanbeyan (see Chapter 7).
Source: Australian War Memorial, 
CUN/66/0945/VN.
12. September 1966: The Commander 
1 ATF, Brigadier David Jackson (left), 
greets the Commander Australian 
Forces Vietnam, Major General Ken 
Mackay, and the Australian Army’s 
Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant 
General Tom Daly, on their arrival at 
his HQ at Nui Dat.
Source: Australian War Memorial, 
FOR/66/0779/VN.
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13. October 1966: A 9 Squadron RAAF Iroquois delivers ammunition, equipment 
and water to a landing zone between hills Jan and Julie during Operation Canberra.
Source: Australian War Memorial, VN/66/0074/13.
14. 5 RAR’s second in command, Major 
Stan Maizey, setting a good example.
Source: 5 RAR Association website, www.5rar.
asn.au.
15. Early October 1966: Men of 
4  Section, 8  Platoon (left to right): 
Privates Bob Box, Dave Annells, Warren 
Pearson, Alan Suckling, Corporal 
Russell Quinn and Private David 
Riik. Russ Quinn is carrying an Owen 
machine carbine and Alan Suckling is 
carrying an M16. This photo was taken 
around the time when the Owen was 
beginning to be phased out.
Source: David Bryan.
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16. Villagers watching a distribution of food aid by 5 RAR soldiers.
Source: David Bryan.
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17. Villagers collecting food aid.
Source: David Bryan.
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18. October 1966: Nui Thi Vai from the west during Operation Robin. The peak 
reaches 467 metres (1,532 feet) above sea level. The road at the foot (Route 15) was 
close to sea level, making the hill a long, steep climb for heavily laden infantry 
attempting to drive the enemy off the heights.
Source: Bill Parkes.
19. October 1966: Second Lieutenant 
John McAloney MC who was awarded 
the Military Cross for leading the 
Assault Pioneer Platoon’s attack on a 
defended enemy cave system during 
Operation Queanbeyan (Chapter 7).
Source: Michael Deak (Michael von Berg).
20. Late 1966: Prime Minister Air 
Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky visited 5 RAR. 
Shortly after this photograph was taken, 
he was flat on the ground, covered by his 
security guards, because the bomb that 
had just been fired from the mortar in 
front of him had a faulty propellant 
charge and landed 50  metres away. 




21. October 1966: A 9 Squadron RAAF Iroquois delivers resupplies to the pagoda 
landing zone during Operation Queanbeyan.
Source: Lloyd Miller.
22. November 1966: 5 RAR’s medical officer, Captain Tony White, examines a dead 
baby in Long Son village. The baby’s distraught grandmother refused to relinquish 





OPERATION QUEANBEYAN – 
OCTOBER 1966: UNFINISHED 
BUSINESS FROM OPERATION 
CANBERRA
Max Carroll, Michael deak (Michael von Berg)  
and Barry Campbell
Editors’ introduction
Clearly, the need for 5th  Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment 
(5 RAR), to leave the Nui Dinh hills to play its part in Operation Robin 
left 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) with many unanswered questions 
about follow-up action to the events of Operation Canberra. As described 
at the end of the previous chapter, Brigadier Jackson understood that 
5  RAR, having mounted the previous operation, was already familiar 
with the terrain and the enemy’s tactics and was best suited to conduct a 
follow-up operation. He quickly endorsed the battalion’s obvious desire 
to attend to what it considered to be unfinished business, and let it get on 
with the job.
Max Carroll
Deception was a major factor in our planning for Operation Queanbeyan. 
We knew that some Viet Cong (VC) were still up on Nui Thi Vai and that 
the passage of the road convoys would have been observed and reported, 
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as would our security activities along Route 15. It was a fair assumption 
that our fire support base (FSB) location would also have been noted and 
the volume of traffic associated with it detected. Once the road convoys 
stopped it would be expected that we would regroup before moving 
again towards Nui Thi Vai. Time was critical, as we needed to be well 
clear of the road and concealed in the jungle before the VC realised we 
were gone. To this end we planned on approaching along four separate 
company routes with Battalion Headquarters (BHQ) and its protective 
Anti-Tank and Assault Pioneer platoons initially following A Company. 
B and C Companies could commence their insertions from their present 
locations on Route 15, but both A and D Companies had to be relocated 
from their southern positions. This was done over the last day of the convoy 
movements, as part of our normal armoured road patrols. D Company 
of 6 RAR, which was to protect our FSB, was inserted among the daily 
resupply convoys, so there was no obvious increase in our normal traffic 
movements. We also left our headquarters tents erected so there was no 
change in the appearance of the base.
Our intelligence assessment was that the best areas for our renewed search 
would be the western and northern sides of Nui Thi Vai. The general plan 
therefore was for two companies to search the north-western spur and the 
uncleared south-western slopes, a third company to cover the northern 
side, and a fourth company to establish ambushes on the track system 
further out to the north (these had been found marked on the VC map 
captured on Operation Canberra).
D Company was to be the furthest north of our subunits, entering the 
jungle from up near Phu My. They were to lay the ambushes on the 
approaches and escape routes to the north. B Company was next down the 
road and tasked to search the northern slopes and area, while A Company 
was responsible for the central north-western spur. The BHQ Group was 
to follow the A Company column before proceeding up the spur to the 
abandoned pagoda, from where it would control the searching companies, 
while protected by the two Support Company platoons. The pagoda 
grounds were big enough for a single Iroquois landing zone (LZ), and 
once secured, a section of our mortars was to be flown in. C Company was 
to the south of A Company and responsible for searching the uncleared 
western slopes.
125
7. OPERATION QUEANBEYAN – OCTOBER 1966
Before, when writing operation orders, I had regularly used female names 
as nicknames for areas and features; these names were often of the wives, 
fiancées, girlfriends, friends or relatives of both myself and other officers 
of the battalion. However, after the gasping and irreverent expletives 
I heard uttered by my colleagues, directed at the hill feature Julie during 
Operation Canberra as we clawed our way up its extreme slopes, I decided 
it was not a good idea! For Operation Queanbeyan, the nicknames I used 
for areas were: A Company, Alvenia; B Company, Blanche; C Company, 
Christine; D  Company, Doda; and our headquarters, Heidi. All these 
names were from Playboy centrefolds adorning many tents at Nui Dat. 
There were no personal connections, so any sensitive feelings we harboured 
were protected.
All our columns moved off from their respective harbours along Route 15 
at 0300 hours on 17  October 1966, heading eastwards towards their 
assigned areas. All made good time and were well inside the jungle 
before halting for a short rest to await the dawn. We, the A Company 
and BHQ Group column, then followed a track which headed towards 
our destination, making best possible speed. It was not long before 
A Company found a large vacated VC camp across our front, which had 
well-constructed trenches with overhead protection. We were lucky it 
was not occupied! While checking this area a booby trap was exploded, 
fortunately without harming anyone, but it could have warned any VC 
further ahead. We continued carefully until we arrived at an unoccupied 
group of well-built houses located at the base of the north-western spur. 
While A Company was securing the area another booby trap was triggered, 
this time wounding four men, who had to be evacuated. It was obvious 
that A Company was going to be busy searching the houses and lower 
slopes for some time after their casualties were evacuated, so the Anti-
Tank Platoon led the BHQ Group up the spur line leading to the pagoda. 
In places steps had been cut into the mountainside. However, for most of 
the climb it was very hard going, as our destination was over 430 metres 


















































































































Map 11: Operation Queanbeyan: 
17–26 October 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 
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7. OPERATION QUEANBEYAN – OCTOBER 1966
The ground was extremely broken, with a steep-sided re-entrant 
(deep gully) full of boulders and jungle on the right flank, and progress 
was slow and careful, with the Anti-Tank Platoon clearing the track in 
tactical bounds until they reached the pagoda. The BHQ Command 
Group and the Assault Pioneer Platoon had halted further down the 
track waiting for the radio call from the Anti-Tank Platoon that the track 
was clear. At this point the BHQ Reconnaissance Party, led by Captain 
Brian Le Dan, moved off to lay out the area ready for the arrival of our 
main body. Shortly after their departure several shots were fired from 
up the track, and their distinctive sounds told us they were not from 
our weapons! A strong volley of friendly fire followed, then we received 
a radio call from Brian Le Dan’s operator that the Reconnaissance Party 
was under fire; Brian had been hit and could not get to the radio. The 
situation had become decidedly unpleasant. At this point it is appropriate 
to pass the narrative over to Second Lieutenant Michael Deak, as he and 
his Anti-Tank Platoon had a very busy afternoon. His graphic account, 
which follows, is a good example of a difficult platoon action.
Michael Deak
I’ve never quite understood why I have always had some sort of an 
attraction for hills and mountains. Was it my time in postwar Austria, 
living in the Alps, or later after immigrating to Australia, the Snowy 
Mountains, or nearer to home, Rocky and Willan’s Hills near Wagga 
Wagga? There was a similar, perhaps naive, attraction for the mountain 
ranges to the west of our defensive position at Nui Dat. After Operation 
Canberra’s first foray onto its rocky, jungle-clad slopes, we were about to 
reconfront Nui Thi Vai, which peaked at 467 metres and rose very steeply 
from the surrounding flat terrain.
On our ascent on 17 October the Anti-Tank Platoon, operating as a rifle 
platoon, was tasked with climbing the north-western spur of Nui Thi Vai 
to clear the area ahead of the BHQ Group, which intended to establish 
a command post at the pagoda located below and to the north-west of 
the summit. After receiving my orders from BHQ, I called my section 
commanders together to brief them on our mission and, most importantly, 
the enemy threat. When in Vietnam, many of us often forgot what day 
of the week it was because we were operating 24/7 and the days’ names 
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seemed unimportant. But I do remember that the day that we stepped off 
to climb this mysterious feature was Monday, the start of a working week 
back in Australia; and what a working week it was to be for the battalion.
I was most fortunate to have very experienced and capable section 
commanders and, once they had briefed their sections, we slowly headed 
up  a small footpad led by Corporal Allan McLean’s section, with my 
platoon headquarters behind him. Then followed the other two sections 
led by Corporals Norman Womal and Bill ‘Sharpie’ Drennan. No more 
than 15  minutes into the ascent at very slow patrol pace, we were 
confronted with a steeper climb with a gradient of 1 in 2. It wasn’t so much 
the gradient that worried us, but the huge outcrops of boulders, rock 
slides and big trees with root systems intertwined through and around the 
footpad. These, with the platoon fully laden in hot, humid conditions, 
made it a very hard climb. It was made more difficult for all of us, with 
adrenaline pumping and super alert, by having the large re-entrant on 
our right with boulders and outcrops able to hide an enemy group of any 
size. Although energy sapping, we managed the climb without incident 
and I called a halt at the flat ground surrounding the pagoda to await the 
remainder of the BHQ Group and Assault Pioneers. Then a burst of fire 
was heard from down the track that we had supposedly cleared. To make 
matters worse, I heard on our radio that our signals officer, Captain Brian 
Le Dan, had been wounded in an exchange of fire between enemy and 
the BHQ Reconnaissance Party. Hearing of Brian’s wound, I felt guilty in 
that we had supposedly cleared the area of enemy where they had been 
ambushed. These thoughts were rushing through my mind when the 
commanding officer (CO) ordered me to come back down the track and 
clear the enemy from above. This I was determined to do!
We were somewhat fatigued from the climb, but I ordered the platoon 
to drop our heavy backpacks in a pile, which we camouflaged, and took 
all spare ammunition with us. Corporal Norm Womal’s section then 
led the platoon back down the track with the rest of us following, our 
descent being a lot faster and easier than the climb up. We approached 
the area where Brian had been wounded and I got a quick situation report 
from Warrant Officer Bruce ‘Hughie’ Hughson, the company sergeant 
major (CSM) of Support Company, who was close to where Brian was 
being treated by Captain Tony White, our battalion’s medical officer. The 
information I received was somewhat sketchy as nobody could indicate 
from where the enemy fire was coming. It was continuing spasmodically 
from different directions and locations on the opposite side of the 
re-entrant which had concerned me on the way up.
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Close fire support from artillery or mortars was impractical due to the 
enemy being so close to us and the nature of the target area, with its many 
large boulders and trees. We had to resort to covering fire from within 
the platoon, trying to clear the enemy by conducting fire and movement 
drills in very difficult terrain down through the re-entrant. In a situation 
like this there was no opportunity to get the section commanders 
together for some form of coordination briefing on how we were going to 
tackle this situation. We were all under fire and any movement without 
covering fire was very dangerous. I simply had to convey my orders to 
everyone by shouting what I required to be done, using my loudest 
parade ground voice; which, thankfully, was clearly understood, even over 
the continual sound of small arms gunfire. In this sort of situation as 
a platoon commander you need to shout your orders very clearly. There 
can’t be any misunderstanding or ambiguity. You tell your men what 
you want and, thankfully, all my men on the mountain that day reacted 
fearlessly and fought magnificently.
I ordered Corporal Allan McLean’s section to be the supporting fire team 
back up the track where there was a rock projecting out from the footpad, 
and which had a good view and field of fire down along the re-entrant 
where we thought some of the enemy were located. Norm Womal’s 
section was to clear the re-entrant, moving by fire and movement from the 
north-east to the south-west, accompanied by myself, my signaller and our 
stretcher bearer (medic). My platoon sergeant, Ray ‘Skinny’ Calvert, was 
with Sharpie Drennan’s section behind us, acting both as my reserve and 
a covering fire team across the top of the re-entrant as we descended into 
it. I thought this combination of direct and enfilade fire would give the 
clearing section enough covering fire. I would call for it when, with each 
fusillade, Norm Womal and his section, using fire and movement, would 
advance from cover to cover to try and clear the re-entrant and up its 
steep other side where we thought the enemy was located. Suddenly there 
was a burst of enemy fire and Norm shouted ‘Skip, I’ve been hit’. This 
immediately changed the dynamics of the situation. I had always briefed 
my men that if they were wounded or dead, we would do everything to 
get them out. This was now a primary task but, because of the nature of 
the terrain, none of us knew where Norm was located. Although seriously 
wounded, he was still shouting orders to his machine gun group and we 
began to fight our way towards where we had heard him but, soon after, 
he fell silent. We eventually found that he was lying on a large flat rock. 
However, we knew the enemy were using Norm as bait because every time 
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I or my stretcher bearer, Private Peter Fraser, tried to get to him there was 
a burst of fire hitting the flat rock where he lay. I simply could not risk 
anyone crawling out to assist Norm until we had been able to suppress 
the enemy fire. Not knowing where they were located made this extremely 
difficult. The enemy fire seemed to be coming from different directions 
and locations, indicating that it came from more than just a random 
track watcher. Of concern to me was the obvious fact that the enemy had 
identified my voice as that of the leader. Every time I shouted an order, 
fire would come my way, necessitating intuitive and rapid decisions about 
where to take cover before shouting orders.
This made the recovery of Norm extremely difficult and, contrary to my 
orders, I saw Peter Fraser, our stretcher bearer, crawling out to Norm to 
try and treat his wounds. My heart stopped at the thought of needing to 
extract two wounded soldiers, and the increasing possibility of running 
short of ammunition really concerned me. The platoon’s covering fire 
somewhat suppressed that of the enemy but there were still bullets 
hitting the flat rock where both Norm and Peter lay. Then I saw an act of 
incredible courage, as Peter crawled to place his body between Norm and 
the enemy to protect him from further wounding. While communicating 
with Peter, I ordered a maximum amount of covering fire to give Skinny 
Calvert a chance to work his way to the edge of the rock with a stretcher 
party to drag Norm up the friendly side of the re-entrant to safety. There 
a makeshift helicopter landing pad had been organised by BHQ away 
from enemy fire. It took us almost two hours to extract Norm but, sadly, 
he died from a gunshot wound to the neck before he could be evacuated 
to hospital.
The next problem was to extract Norm’s section, myself and my signaller 
from the killing ground. Again using our own platoon’s covering fire, 
we  managed to do so while the enemy were still spasmodically firing. 
It was now growing late in the day and our ammunition was becoming 
critically low and we were no further advanced. I had lost a good non-
commissioned officer and the enemy were still in place and shooting 
at us, with relative impunity, from the opposite side of the re-entrant. 
The whole of the BHQ Group were held up on a steep mountain track 
and I was feeling somewhat desperate and frustrated. So much so that 
I grabbed an M60 machine gun from one of my gunners and fired a belt 
of ammunition into the trees on the other side of the re-entrant, thinking 
the snipers were up in the trees where we couldn’t see them. This made 
me feel better to the point that my head cleared, and I set about making 
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‘an appreciation of the situation’ as I was taught to do in my officer training 
at the Officer Cadet School just one year ago. How would I get out of this 
mess? Then over the radio, Major Peter Cole, commanding A Company 
which was located at the base of a spur some 800 metres away, said that 
he could see where he thought the enemy were located and could try to 
neutralise them using some of the M60 machine guns in his company. 
I had a pretty good idea of the characteristics of the M60 and its beaten 
zone (size and shape of the area of fall of its multiple projectiles) at a range 
of 800 metres and, with my platoon still being very close to the enemy, 
I was not totally enthusiastic, but, being short of ammunition, I agreed, 
and we marked our locations using coloured smoke grenades. When we 
were all prepared, A Company opened fire and as soon as I heard rounds 
cracking over our heads and all around us I gave the order to STOP! My 
fears about the beaten zone had been correct but in no way was my order 
to halt A Company’s supporting fire a reflection on the help offered by 
Peter Cole and his company. Serious problems need serious solutions, 
but this one was not the answer. As the enemy were still taking pot shots, 
making movement along the track impossible, I received a radio message 
that the ‘cavalry’ in the form of a US Army helicopter light fire team 
was being called in to assist us to clear out the enemy position. This was 
the best news I had had all afternoon; and the sounds of the two UH1 
Iroquois gunships off in the distance ready to support us boosted the 
morale of everyone on that mountainside.
We again marked our positions using coloured smoke grenades and the 
choppers came in one after the other to a point where the pilots could see 
some tunnel openings we had not located and launch their rockets right 
into the mouths of those tunnels. This went on until all their ammunition 
and rockets had been expended. Although aware of the devastation 
that this firepower could cause, I was not sure what results this lot had 
achieved, if anything at all. I was dreading having to go back down and 
across that re-entrant where we were ambushed, but an assessment had 
to be made to establish whether there were any enemy casualties and 
whether there were more to be dealt with. We noticed that the enemy 
firing had stopped, and this encouraged us to get on with the job we had 
been given three and a half hours earlier. I left Allan McLean’s section 
where they had been providing support throughout and, with a small 
group, slowly cleared from boulder to boulder and other forms of cover 
that could be used by the enemy. We made our way up the opposite side 
of the re-entrant without further enemy resistance. After the previous 
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three hours this was quite a relief, and what we discovered confirmed 
why we had no idea of how many and from exactly where the enemy had 
been shooting at us. We found numerous interconnected tunnels in the 
rocks, blood-soaked bandages and pieces of equipment. But the area was 
booby-trapped and, therefore, not within my ‘pay scale’. This was a major 
job for assault pioneers and combat engineers, so I withdrew my platoon 
and we were ordered to make our way back up to where we had left our 
heavy packs. We carefully made sure that they had not been discovered 
and booby-trapped. With that done successfully, we went into a harbour 
position around the pagoda with the rest of the BHQ Group and the 
Pioneer Platoon.
Once I had been debriefed I settled down to make a small meal and 
called my section commanders in to congratulate them on a job well 
done. I then quietly sat on my own to reflect and consider what had 
happened that afternoon. I was devastated at losing Norm Womal, an 
outstanding soldier and human being, married with four children. I did 
much soul searching then, and still do today, about what I might have 
done differently. That night I curled myself up in my hutchie and quietly 
wept. I needed to do that to mourn his loss and enable me to continue 
in my role with confidence and clarity. Everyone in the platoon on that 
day fought like men possessed. The way that Norm Womal fought to 
the end and Peter Fraser’s astonishing courage on that rock will stay with 
me forever. Norm was subsequently awarded a Mentioned in Dispatches 
posthumously and Peter a Military Medal (MM), one of the few stretcher 
bearers so recognised. Years later Peter sadly succumbed to motor neurone 
disease. Before he died, he asked me to deliver the eulogy at his funeral 
in Perth, where I was honoured to applaud Peter’s bravery for the benefit 
of his many civilian mates. Although recognised by the award of an MM, 
I still feel that his actions deserved a higher award.
Max Carroll
I shall backtrack to fill in the activities which occurred while the Anti-
Tank Platoon was engaged. The BHQ Reconnaissance Party included 
the regimental sergeant major, first warrant officer (WO1) Les Foale, and 
the CSM Support Company, WO2 Hughie Hughson. When fired on, 
they immediately deployed defensively and, under cover of their own 
fire at suspected VC positions, recovered the wounded Brian Le Dan to 
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a  safe position from where he could radio the situation to us. He had 
been very lucky in that the enemy round had struck the safety slide of 
his Owen gun. The bullet had shattered, with fragments tearing into the 
right side of his chest inflicting nasty flesh wounds. When we learnt of 
Brian’s wounding, the CO ordered Tony White, our doctor, and an escort 
to proceed up the track to provide medical treatment and evacuate him. 
I also called for a Dustoff helicopter to move to our FSB on Route 15 to 
standby, as there was nowhere at our present location suitable for the large 
helicopter to extract a casualty.
The prospect of a possible stretcher-carry down the horrendous track 
between us and A Company prompted a search of our area for a place 
nearby where it might be possible to land a Sioux light observation 
helicopter, so that he could be quickly extracted and transferred to the 
waiting Dustoff. Fortunately, there was a large flat rock overhang close 
by and the Pioneers rapidly removed some trees to enlarge the clear area. 
Even then there was only one line of approach for the Sioux and the pilot 
would need to reverse out as there was no room for him to turn the aircraft 
around on the rock. The flying skills needed to execute this extraction are 
difficult to describe. Second Lieutenant Bob Askew, who was well known 
to us, performed this extremely difficult feat of flying with amazing skill.
The serious firefight was still going on a short distance up the spur line 
and the possibility of enemy fire being directed at the Sioux was very real. 
Captain Bob Supple from our BHQ Group guided the Sioux’s approach 
while kneeling, as the slope of the ground was such that he could have 
been decapitated by the rotor blades if standing. Bob Askew gently 
brought his aircraft in with doubtful clearance for his rotor blades on 
each side (his account is in Chapter 14). As Brian was ‘walking wounded’, 
he was strapped inside the cockpit next to Askew who very carefully lifted 
off from the rock shelf, reversed his aircraft until he had room to turn, 
then flew down the mountain to the waiting Iroquois Dustoff. Later in the 
afternoon, when we needed to extract Norm Womal’s body, Askew was 
called back to do it all again. The Australian Army’s 161 (Independent) 
Reconnaissance Flight pilots who supported us in operations were 
excellent, often demonstrating a combination of superb flying skills and 
fearless commitment.
It was late afternoon before the BHQ Group was able to proceed uphill to 
the pagoda, and ours was very careful movement, with everyone supremely 
alert. I was feeling uncomfortable, as this was the first operation where 
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I had been without my rifle. I had always carried an SLR (self-loading 
rifle) as well as my 9 mm pistol, much to the amusement of the CO, 
who had often teased me saying that we were well protected, and our job 
was to control the battalion. But now BHQ had been ambushed! Second 
Lieutenant John McAloney, the Assault Pioneer Platoon commander, 
had earlier damaged his SLR and it was with our armourer for repair, 
so I had loaned him mine. Now, here I was travelling up a narrow track 
between two clearly recognisable radio operators, with a map in my hand 
and armed with a useless pistol. Anyhow, we duly arrived at the pagoda 
and established our defensive position just on last light. It had been a long 
hard day for us, but I was told later that there were some jokers in the rifle 
companies who found delight in BHQ’s discomfiture. On the plus side, 
it seemed we were no longer regarded as pogos!
After a tense night – the VC were certainly aware of our location – on 
the morning of 18 October 1966 we dispatched an Anti-Tank Platoon 
patrol to check out the peak of Nui Thi Vai, which was about 500 metres 
further uphill from the pagoda. On their return with nothing to report, 
a section of our mortars was flown in from the FSB on Route 15, and 
the assault pioneers were warned to be ready to move back down the 
track to clear booby traps from the tunnels and caves from which we 
had been ambushed. This was necessary before more detailed searching 
could be undertaken. From our recent experiences, we anticipated that 
more combat engineer support would be needed, in addition to their two-
man mini-teams that were already attached to each rifle company. To this 
end, three combat engineer officers flew in as observers to accompany our 
assault pioneers on their initial cave clearance to assess the requirement for 
additional men and equipment. By the time this activity was completed 
it was early afternoon.
While the Support Company platoons were busy, the rifle companies 
were also proceeding carefully with their allotted tasks. A Company was 
searching the lower slopes of the north-west spur, B Company was doing 
the same to the north and D Company was in ambush positions on the 
northern tracks. Meanwhile, C Company’s activities on the south-western 
slopes made for an interesting day.
On the morning of 18  October 1966, C  Company needed combat 
engineer assistance to complete the demolition of installations started 
during Operation Canberra. A Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 
Iroquois was therefore tasked to fly in two combat engineers and 
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a quantity of explosives to the LZ, which C Company had successfully 
used twice before on 8  October 1966 when a US Army Iroquois had 
evacuated their casualties without any problems. C  Company were 
securing the LZ for the RAAF aircraft and some of its members witnessed 
the disaster which followed. The RAAF Iroquois crashed while trying to 
land. The RAAF version of the incident and accounts by army witnesses 
differ. George Odgers, in his book Mission Vietnam, Royal Australian Air 
Force Operations 1964–1972, states:
When the helicopter reached the 5th Battalion position and 
hovered over the landing zone, Flight Lieutenant Cliff Dohle 
decided that the area was too small to land safely so he commenced 
an overshoot. A few seconds later the aircraft crashed into the 
jungle and caught fire. Flight Lieutenant Cliff Dohle had managed 
to warn the crew before the aircraft entered the trees, enabling 
them to brace themselves to a reasonable extent.1
Another account attributed the crash to engine failure, but the 
C Company witnesses believe that, while hovering, the tail rotor might 
have clipped a tree. The aircraft came down some 70 metres past the LZ, 
which seemed like the pilot was having difficulty in controlling a damaged 
aircraft. Cliff Dohle was a good and courageous pilot, known in the Task 
Force as the captain of one of the two RAAF 9 Squadron choppers which 
executed the hazardous ammunition resupply of D Company, 6 RAR, at 
the Battle of Long Tan. Thankfully, there were no fatalities in this crash. 
Lieutenant Roger Wainwright, whose 8 Platoon soldiers were nearby and 
appeared rapidly on the scene to assist, describes the rescue of the aircraft’s 
occupants in Chapter 8.
Before leaving this accident, a couple of observations are warranted. 
First, I cast no aspersions on RAAF aircrew, having flown with them 
often during my tour of duty. Having experienced the aggressive, get-
the-job-done approach of US Army helicopter support, we naturally 
felt that RAAF policies on aircraft safety were unrealistic in Vietnam 
operations and might have influenced Cliff Dohle’s decision to abort 
the landing. There had been much debate with RAAF commanders 
in the early months of 1 ATF’s deployment about helicopter support in 
ground operations. We had no concerns about the aircrews, who were 
obliged to abide by RAAF policy constraints and were as frustrated as 
1  George Odgers, Mission Vietnam, Royal Australian Air Force Operations 1964–1972, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1974, p 34.
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we were. The LZ had been successfully used twice on 8 October 1966 
for evacuation of C Company casualties by a US Army Dustoff Iroquois, 
so we naturally opted to use it again. Also, we considered it unusual that 
the RAAF crash investigators never interviewed Roger Wainwright, who 
was present and witnessed the crash, or his soldiers who played a major 
role in rescuing the copilot and helping others at the crash site. Inability 
at higher levels to resolve differences between the army and the RAAF on 
inter-operational matters inevitably led to comparisons between RAAF 
and US Army helicopter support, and caused unneeded, unnecessary and 
regrettable tensions between battlefield partners.
The two 8  Platoon soldiers Bill Cavanagh and Syd Shore had saved 
the copilot, Flight Lieutenant Peter Middleton, at significant risk to 
themselves. Their actions had been witnessed by Roger Wainwright and 
his recommendations for awards were successful, with them both being 
Mentioned in Dispatches. The RAAF crewman, Sergeant Gordon Buttriss, 
was cited by the RAAF and received the higher award of the George 
Medal. His citation describes how, after being involved in the crash and 
getting clear of the wreckage, he twice re-entered the burning aircraft to 
extricate the two injured army combat engineers, Sapper Dennis Schubert 
and Sapper Colin Hopper.2
To return to the demolition of the VC installations: at 1400 hours on 
18 October, Second Lieutenant John McAloney and his party departed 
the pagoda for the caves and tunnels they were to investigate and clear of 
any booby traps. The patrol numbered 24 and consisted of McAloney, 
his signaller, a medic, two understrength sections of assault pioneers, two 
guides from the Anti-Tank Platoon and three engineer officer observers 
and their signaller.
They arrived at the cave area at 1440 hours after a careful approach, being 
very aware that a day had elapsed since the ambush and the VC might 
have reoccupied the site. Having posted sentries along the track and the 
remainder of the patrol in covering fire positions, McAloney, his signaller 
and a single Pioneer cover-man were led up to the cave site by the two Anti-
Tank Platoon guides. He then posted the two guides as sentries above the 
first cave. He positioned his cover-man, Private Gordon D’Antoine, just 
2  RAAF personnel records are stored in ‘RAAF Personnel files – All Ranks’, National Archives 
of Australia, A12372. In addition, see ‘News of the award of the George Medal to A21702 Sergeant 
(Sgt) Gordon Dudley Buttriss, of Sefton  …’, 1967, Australian War Memorial, VN/67/0020/04, 
available at: www.awm.gov.au/collection/VN/67/0020/04/.
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forward and downhill of the cave so that he could overlook the immediate 
area. The signaller remained under cover close by his platoon commander. 
John then commenced his search for booby traps and discovered the first 
one, just to the side of a cave entrance below a large rock. He was lowering 
himself down to look at it when a shot was fired. D’Antoine shouted that 
the round, which had passed close to him, had come from below and 
behind him from another cave entrance. John’s signaller also reported that 
the shot had come from below the rock on which he was positioned. John 
then ordered his fire support group to cover the suspect area, but another 
shot fired from the same area below hit D’Antoine in the back, apparently 
from a range of only several metres.
The time between the two shots was about 45 seconds. John then ordered 
his M60 machine guns to fire into the area below D’Antoine’s position, 
which was also just below his and his signaller’s positions. After the first 
few bursts he had to call for the fire to cease as ricochets off the rocks 
were passing too close to him. Corporal Brian Burge, commanding the 
fire support group, fired a snap shot with his SLR from 20  metres at 
a VC face he saw peering out of a rock hole below McAloney. Burge was 
certain he hit his target and McAloney and his signaller heard tumbling 
sounds coming from the rocks beneath them. John then ordered fire into 
all caves and holes while he and the medic, who had moved forward with 
difficulty, recovered D’Antoine who had been very badly wounded and 
died shortly afterwards. At BHQ we had been monitoring the action and 
organised a platoon from A Company to secure an extraction LZ some 
way downhill and John sent a stretcher party of four and a protection 
party of six to evacuate Gordon D’Antoine’s body.
About mid-afternoon John and the remainder of his patrol were able to 
go after the VC. Their first step was to get gas grenades into all tunnels 
and holes and into the entrance of the main cave. The uphill anti-tank 
sentries reported no resulting sounds or movement from potential rear 
exits, so 40 mm M79 grenades were fired into the cave mouth. John then 
requested flame-throwers be brought forward; but this entailed a delay 
of 30 minutes. The A Company platoon securing the extraction LZ was 
ordered to hold the Assault Pioneer party escorting D’Antoine’s body at 
the LZ, in order to wait and return to John with the flame equipment 
when it was air delivered. This they did, arriving back at the cave site as 
it was growing dark. In the meantime, John had been slightly wounded 
while he was recovering D’Antoine’s M16 rifle. He had been unable to 
reach it earlier when he and his medic were dragging the wounded man 
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to  safety. The flame-thrower equipment included eight gallons of fuel, 
some of which was used to saturate suspect holes around the main cave. 
With covering fire from his support section, John then led a frontal assault 
at the cave in which the flame-thrower was used to good effect. Flame and 
smoke were seen billowing out of some probable rear exits. By then fading 
light prevented any immediate follow-up action, so the patrol reassembled 
on the track and made good time moving back to the pagoda.
On the next day, 19 October, the assault pioneers returned to the cave area 
and found that the flame had been effective on the top level. However, this 
complex consisted of three levels, was overall about 16 metres deep and 
was large in volume, having some sections with wooden flooring. Seven 
backpacks which contained good information about the enemy were 
found and it was clear that the VC had been using this area for some time. 
The Pioneers continued their search in other caves, finding 60 kilograms 
of TNT and some grenades, both of Chinese origin, some small anti-
tank rockets and a quantity of documents. During the search they lost 
two soldiers, Privates Trevor Lynch and David Goodman, wounded by 
a Chinese directional mine rigged as a booby trap. Trevor Lynch was 
shockingly wounded, losing both eyes as well as sustaining multiple 
fragmentation wounds to his head, body and limbs. It was surprising that 
he survived. After lengthy treatment in Vietnam until well enough, he 
was evacuated to Australia. The medic Corporal Ian McDougall’s gripping 
account of the incident in which Trevor Lynch suffered his wounds is in 
Chapter 13.
The whole area that 5  RAR was searching was honeycombed with 
booby trapped caves and tunnels; and dealing with this situation required 
very steady nerves and extreme care. All soldiers, both those of the 
battalion and our supporting sappers (combat engineers), displayed both 
qualities together with exemplary courage. On this day, B Company on 
the northern slopes also encountered a group of five VC local guerrillas, 
wounding two before the group broke contact and fled. C Company on 
the western slopes later found and destroyed a cache of two tons of rice.
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Map 12: Anti-Tank and Assault 
Pioneer Platoons enemy contacts:  
17–18 October 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 
maps provided by Bruce Davies.
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Map 12A: Anti-Tank and Assault Pioneer Platoons enemy contacts: 
17–18 October 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military maps 
provided by Bruce Davies.
Over the following days, further engineer elements and stores were 
flown in to support us and our successes increased. A Company found, 
searched and destroyed some booby-trapped cave and tunnel complexes, 
recovering a variety of documents, training pamphlets and medical 
supplies including 200 phials of morphine and other drugs. There were 
also medical certificates from a doctor located in Ba Ria. Undoubtedly, 
he soon received a nasty visit from the provincial authorities. Apart from 
this, also found were various kinds of ammunition, stores and equipment, 
including some anti-tank mines and detonators, webbing and helmets, 
cooking oils, fish, rice, some paper money and, interestingly, some sets 
of clean and well-pressed civilian clothes. The most important find was 
a Chinese military radio transmitter/receiver, complete with its power 
plant, aerials, Morse key, operating instructions book, log books and other 
documents. With the radio was a diary belonging to Colonel Nguyen 
Nam Hung, the deputy commander of 274 Regiment, which provided 
invaluable intelligence material. The VC must have been in desperate haste 
to escape to abandon such essential items, even though they were well 
hidden. B Company discovered and destroyed a well-constructed water 
point, which had been hollowed out of the rock, and several multiple-
company installations spread over large areas including a facility that had 
been used as a hospital. C Company found another large camp containing 
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some huts, another cache of two tons of rice and a pen holding a sow and 
her litter of piglets. D  Company was relieved of their ambush role by 
B Company and, on 21 October 1966, redeployed to search the eastern 
slopes of Nui Thi Vai.
On the afternoon of 21  October 1966, 10  Platoon of D  Company, 
commanded by Second Lieutenant Dennis Rainer, was tasked to 
investigate any tracks in the saddle area between Nui Thi Vai and Nui Toc 
Tien, the hill complex further to the east. They found a well-used track 
leading uphill towards the Nui Thi Vai peak and followed it. They passed 
through an area that had been napalmed. Rainer halted his leading section 
to secure against any enemy movement down the main track while he 
investigated a small side track. This search revealed a sizeable rice cache 
and he was in the process of quietly destroying it when, by silent signal 
from his leading section on the main track, he was summoned forward. 
Initially Lieutenant Barry Campbell, the artillery forward observer with 
D  Company, who was accompanying 10  Platoon on this patrol, went 
forward to investigate. Barry now takes up the narrative to give a firsthand 
account of the events that followed.
Barry Campbell
On 20 October 1966, D Company, to which I was attached as the artillery 
forward observer, ascended to the summit of Nui Thi Vai and occupied 
its rock-strewn crest. On the following day 10 Platoon, commanded by 
Second Lieutenant Dennis Rainer, was tasked to descend the eastern 
side of the feature to search the area of the pass separating Nui Thi Vai 
and Nui Toc Tien. I suggested that I should accompany the platoon to 
ensure that, if needed, they could be provided with fire support; and the 
OC D Company, Major Paul Greenhalgh, gave me the OK.
We descended several hundred metres to the east and proceeded parallel 
to a track while contouring the eastern face of Nui Thi Vai in a northerly 
direction. This route enabled us to cross the lower reaches of any 
re-entrants  (gullies) on the eastern slopes of the mountain. At around 
1400 hours, the platoon’s leading section found a distinct track leading 
into a  steep and narrow re-entrant. As we followed it uphill into the 
fissure we detected the distinct smell of smoke, scented with the aroma of 

































































































































































Map 13: 10 Platoon attack: 
21 October 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 
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As we silently and carefully followed the track uphill, we came across 
a large, dry cavern which contained a substantial cache of equipment, food 
and ammunition. Dennis busied himself with a search of the cache and 
we received the urgent hand signal message ‘fetch officer’ from our leading 
section. Passing the message to Dennis, I moved further forward and 
came across what was clearly an unoccupied sentry post. Within a short 
distance I met Corporal Dave Babbage and his great mate and 2IC, Lance 
Corporal Gary Leslie. They led me to the edge of what was obviously an 
area cleared of foliage to provide a defensive arc of observed fire. On the 
other side of this cleared area was a perimeter fence with a sign-posted 
gate to our left front. The gate’s sign had a large skull and cross bones and 
a depiction of exploding mines or booby traps indicating their presence 
in the barrier obstacle which extended across the re-entrant. Beside the 
sign was a makeshift gong comprised of an artillery shell case and a metal 
striker, presumably for visitors to announce their arrival. We elected to 
forego such social niceties! Both ends of this barrier abutted the steep 
rock-faced sides of the re-entrant. The left rock face (to the south) was 
fronted by a fast-flowing mountain stream. Beside the stream a path led 
uphill to two huts from which smoke was issuing and dispersing under 
the heavy overhead tree canopy.
As we took in details of the scene before us, a monsoonal downpour 
started and under the cover of its noise I examined the mined barrier and 
found it to be heavily sewn with punji stakes, which were more numerous 
against the right (northern) side of the re-entrant (punji stakes were short 
wooden or metal stakes which had been pointed at one end and the other 
pushed into the ground so that an unwary foot could be impaled). Clearly 
there was not a second to lose and, on the shaky assumption that the area 
of thickest punji stakes probably contained fewer mines, I indicated to 
Babbage and Leslie that I should be followed by each man stepping into 
my footprints as we traversed the barrier.
It only took a few minutes to cross because the punjis were now set in 
deluge-softened soil and were easily pushed aside with a foot. Thus, in 
single file, we passed through the barrier, clambered up the right-hand 
escarpment and debouched onto the northern side of the encampment. 
A  higher, rocky platform lay above us, so we deployed onto it and 
awaited Dennis’s arrival. So far, so good! Dennis joined us and, with his 
wonderful eye for ground, indicated that he wished to get further into the 
re-entrant. For my part, I quickly recognised that the encampment was 
almost impervious to artillery and mortar fire from the south-west where 
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our guns were sited. Two Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 
105  mm guns were located to the north-west but were an unknown 
quantity in terms of their proficiency and familiarity with our procedures. 
My assessment of  the encampment’s difficulty as an artillery target was 
subsequently borne out.
The area higher up into the re-entrant was still unknown to us but, with 
the benefit of surprise, Dennis thought that initiating an attack from that 
flank would stand a good chance of flushing the occupants downhill into 
the fire of the two sections he had deployed on the north side of the 
re-entrant, overlooking the two huts so far detected. He accepted my 
offer to lead this activity and with my loyal signaller, Gunner ‘Midge’ 
Rogers and Corporal Bob Ziemski’s section we proceeded further up 
the re-entrant. As we carefully climbed up along the re-entrant’s rocky 
northern side it became steeper and we shortly came upon a third hut 
which was brilliantly sited under almost complete protection by a huge 
projecting rock slab and backed hard up against a 4-metre-high rock face. 
The hut was open-sided and from our right a clearly defined track crossed 
our front and entered the northern end of the structure. Moving carefully, 
we became aware of  one and then a second trip-wired US .30 calibre 
Garand rifle, both of which were loaded and set to warn of any approach 
along this track from the north. This hut was clearly the ‘command post’ 
of the encampment.
Bob Ziemski and I were crouched about 2 metres from the north end 
of the open-sided hut and concealed by quite thick foliage. Through the 
downpour we could see three VC sitting and standing at benches arranged 
inside the structure. At the southern side of this hut was an exit path 
which turned sharp left before a 4-metre cliff face and, by means of two 
small wooden bridges, crossed the stream which, by now, was noisily in 
full spate due to the continual downpour. Paralleling the stream, the path 
continued down to the sign-posted entry gate. Taking great care to avoid 
the booby-trapped rifles, we positioned Bob Ziemski’s M60 machine gun 
team and most of his section on higher ground to our right, so they could 
cover us from above by firing into the lower two huts.
While this was occurring, Dennis deployed his second and third sections 
under Dave Babbage and Corporal Bob Bunting, together with his 
platoon headquarters, to cover the encampment from above and to 
the north of it. Here they would wait for the attack to be initiated by 
Bob Ziemski’s section, which Midge Rogers and I were accompanying. 
Bob and I addressed ourselves to dealing with the three occupants of the 
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‘command post’ hut, which we agreed would be the best way to trigger 
the attack. The nearest occupant appeared to be the senior of the three and 
was seated with a US .30 calibre M1 carbine on the bench by his right 
hand. The next VC was towards the middle of the hut and standing while 
he carefully wiped a rag over a US M3A1 45 calibre ‘grease gun’ mounted 
with a long, 30-round magazine. The third man was at the far end of the 
hut working on some poster artwork, with his rifle to his right leaning 
against the hut exit. By silent hand signals Bob and I agreed that I would 
deal with the two closest men and he would handle the third.
Time was racing on, so we both stood upright and, in accordance with the 
current ‘rules of engagement’, I called three times for the VC to ‘chieu hoi’ 
(surrender)! Such was my nervous tension that the first challenge came out 
as a girlish squeak. No matter – my sounds were enough to warn Dennis 
that the assault he was commanding was commencing! To their great credit 
the three VC we confronted reacted with boldness and defiance; it was 
only the element of surprise that gave Bob and me the crucial advantage 
that we needed. I dealt with the middle man first because he was holding 
a weapon. However, he still managed to fire two rounds, which went 
through the thatched roof and into the rock overhang above the hut. 
The closest VC reacted instantly but the need to reach for and aim his rifle 
proved fatal. His movement obscured Bob’s view of the furthest man who 
fled out of the far end of the hut but, when he turned left to cross the first 
bridge, Bob and I fired at him simultaneously. In seeking his target, Bob 
had moved to my left side and I expected a shower of hot ejected cartridge 
cases from his M16 on my shoulder. Instead I felt a small object strike me 
as his weapon suffered a stoppage caused by a separated case, where the 
base of the fired cartridge case detaches and is ejected, leaving most of the 
case jammed in the weapon’s breech and halting the weapon’s functioning. 
Fortunately, either Bob’s single shot or my burst killed the escaping man.
The M60 machine gun, manned by Private Robbie Arnold, and the small 
group above us brilliantly added their weight of fire to ours, particularly 
into the two lower huts containing we knew not what. One VC tried to 
exit to our lower left but was quickly dealt with by Midge, my signaller. 
After this we had no further targets as the occupants of the two lower huts 
decamped to the north and downhill in what must have been a practised 
drill. Unfortunately for them, they immediately entered Dennis’s killing 
ground at short range. A sustained fusillade by the two M60s and rifles of 
his group quickly sealed their fate. In the shortest time, their quiet rain-
soaked haven had become a charnel house. The engagement had unfolded 
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exactly as Dennis had planned. Every member had played his part with 
the patient stealth, iron nerve and ruthless discipline and confidence 
needed for success in this kind of very close combat.
The nervous tension and silence that followed the deafening noise gave 
way to the need to report the contact to 5 RAR HQ. Dennis reported 
the initial details of the contact on his radio net to Paul Greenhalgh 
and, turning the volume up on my radio, Midge provided our battery 
commander, Major Neville Gair, with an update of our location and a brief 
report on the situation. Since we were unsure what lay above us, Dennis 
agreed that Bob Ziemski’s section should neutralise the booby-trapped 
rifles protecting the track leading uphill from the encampment and 
secure the approach from that direction. He then reorganised his whole 
platoon on the high ground on the northern side of the encampment and 
completed his detailed radio report of the action. At 1630 hours, because 
of our distance from the rest of D Company, the difficult terrain and the 
short amount of remaining daylight, we were ordered to secure all enemy 
weapons, ammunition and documents and return to D Company. A full 
search of the installation and burial of enemy dead would be conducted 
the next day. During this pause I busied myself by plotting the route we 
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Map 13A: 10 Platoon attack: 21 October 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military maps 
provided by Bruce Davies.
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In the interest of mobility in very difficult terrain we were patrolling 
without our full load-carrying equipment. We had to use toggle ropes 
to tie enemy weapons into small bundles to enable them to be carried 
with minimal hindrance. The light was already beginning to fade, 
as indeed was the sustained adrenaline rush and elation we had just 
experienced, as we clambered from escarpment to escarpment while 
trying to stick to the return route we had planned. Just after last light, 
and with waning confidence in our map reading, the welcome ‘thumbs 
up’ signal was passed back from our forward section and we passed into 
D Company’s perimeter.
During that night the enemy encampment was engaged with artillery in 
case other VC elements tried to recover materiel from the site. The next 
day the whole of D Company returned to the encampment to search it 
thoroughly, bury the enemy dead and destroy the installation. My initial 
assessment of the difficulty of getting artillery fire into the encampment 
proved correct – overnight, rounds had fallen all around the narrow 
re-entrant, but none fell onto the installation itself. Ten enemy had died at 
our hands. We later heard that another had escaped but shortly afterwards 
surrendered at Duc Thanh, many kilometres away to the north-east.
Max Carroll
The single VC who escaped from this contact surrendered himself several 
days later to the ARVN at Duc Thanh and confirmed, under interrogation, 
that the group which 10 Platoon had attacked was part of the Chau Duc 
District Company. The subsequent D Company search of the area of the 
10 Platoon attack discovered a quantity of clothing, a further cache of rice, 
packs of documents, medical supplies and several unserviceable weapons.
B Company’s time in the ambush role had been as unproductive as that 
of D Company, so on 23 October 1966 they lifted their ambushes and, 
together with C Company, proceeded to allotted search areas on Nui Toc 
Tien. While moving, B  Company sighted three VC at a considerable 
distance and engaged them with artillery fire with unknown results. The 
search of Nui Toc Tien over the next two days yielded little except for 
B Company’s find of a platoon-sized camp, several weeks old, with some 
shallow graves close by.
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While this Nui Toc Tien search was proceeding, D  Company was 
continuing their similar task on the eastern slopes of Nui Thi Vai, again 
with little further result. At the same time, the north-west spur of Nui 
Thi Vai was being searched by A Company, the assault pioneers and our 
supporting sappers, with some useful finds being made. By 25 October 
1966 we considered that the whole area of operations had been very 
thoroughly worked over and it was decided to terminate Operation 
Queanbeyan on the next day. The battalion had been continuously in the 
field for 21 hard days, spread over three consecutive operations. Our men, 
while still alert and effective, were tired.
It was expected that, at some time after our departure, the VC would 
move back to Nui Thi Vai, which had been an important base and 
sanctuary for them for a very long time. It was impossible to destroy the 
rocky structure of the mountain and its caves. However, we did what we 
could and made what was left of the caves, tunnels and the surrounding 
areas uninhabitable by seeding them with long-lasting tear gas crystals. 
We destroyed all surface installations with explosives.
A and D  Companies linked up with BHQ at the pagoda during  the 
afternoon of 25  October 1966 ready to fly out next morning. 
The helicopter lift of A Company and BHQ, less the Tactical Command 
Group, took place between 0645 and 0945 hours. The pagoda LZ was 
small and could only take one Iroquois at a time. B and C Companies 
swept south from their overnight harbours near Nui Toc Tien, to link 
up with armoured personnel carriers at an assembly area near Route 15, 
which had been secured by a 6 RAR platoon from the FSB. On their way 
to the assembly area, B Company apprehended a VC suspect, who had 
some explaining to do back at 1 ATF about why he had been where he was 
when captured. He was lucky he had not been shot. B and C Companies 
then moved back to Nui Dat between 1430 and 1530 hours, while the 
airlift of D Company and BHQ Tac (Tactical Headquarters) took place 
simultaneously. The FSB then moved back to Nui Dat between 1600 and 
1700 hours.
What had we achieved? The operation was considered successful. 
We had discovered a large, occupied VC base area, with numerous above 
ground installations and caches, and an extensive multi-layered cave and 
tunnel system used for accommodation, storage of valuable documents, 
explosives, ammunition and equipment, as well as concealing many 
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effective fire positions. All that we found had been destroyed or rendered 
untenable. We had also killed, wounded and dispersed VC elements 
occupying the hills, and found items of high intelligence value. We had 
hurt and disrupted the VC and it would take them much time and effort 
to recover, which gave us hard-earned satisfaction. We mourned our 
dead and felt for the seriously wounded who were evacuated to Australia. 
The other wounded recovered in-country and then rejoined us. We all 
appreciated that we were only halfway through our tour of duty and had 
another six months to go with many more operations to come, and it 
was a case of just getting on with the job. While there was little time for 
personal reflection, the essential post-operational analyses were carefully 
done, as after each operation, to evaluate our actions and procedures, 
always with the intent of improving our performance.
Editors’ conclusion
It is appropriate to note that several gallantry awards were made for 
actions in the clearing of Nui Thi Vai and they appear among those listed 
in Appendix A. In those days, the British Honours and Awards system was 
used by Australia and it was normal for awards not cited as ‘Immediate’ to 
be promulgated several months after the event. When finally announced, 
they were received with much satisfaction and approval by the battalion. 
5 RAR’s determined incursions into the enemy’s long-held sanctuary of 
Nui Thi Vai, soon after the Battle of Long Tan, served notice that the 
arrival of 1 ATF confronted him with a new opponent in Phuoc Tuy who 
was able to detect and contest his tenure of any piece of terrain. For the 
battalion, Operation Queanbeyan marked the point when it had found 
its measure as an Australian infantry battalion, liked what it found and 




A PLATOON COMMANDER’S 
WAR – PART 1
Roger wainwright and Terry O’Hanlon
Editors’ introduction
The saying that the Vietnam War was ‘a platoon commander’s war’ 
derives, in part from the fact that our infantry platoon commanders were 
the peripheral nodes in a radio communication web which extended 
from the action happening at the point of battle, upwards and sideways, 
throughout a widespread network. Thus, command and support 
hierarchies were kept instantly informed of events and conditions faced 
by the soldiers entrusted with implementing their orders. In addition, the 
platoon commander’s radio link and his professional knowledge, skills 
and cool-headed judgement enabled the risks of employing close artillery 
and air support to be accepted, as well as the rapid calling of life-saving 
aeromedical evacuation whenever his platoon suffered a casualty.
At the same time, platoon commanders were the infantry officers most 
personally enmeshed with their battalion’s fighting soldiers – the diggers 
for whom they had the responsibilities of training, guiding and care. They 
were simultaneously boss, teacher and counsellor to their diggers. 
They were also their soldiers’ champion, who maintained a close interest 
in their backgrounds, interests, talents and personalities. This relationship 
between the junior officer and his men was the lynchpin of success in 
Vietnam, as it has always been throughout Australia’s lengthening military 
history. These things are evident throughout this book. Our Vietnam 
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platoon commanders ranged in age from their early to mid-20s. Only 
in the warrior’s field of life-and-death toil are such weighty expectations 
confidently heaped upon such young shoulders.
Roger Wainwright
As Field Marshal Viscount Slim of Yarralumla and Bishopston observed 
in the first paragraph of Defeat into Victory, his account of the Burma 
Campaign of World War II:
the four best commands in the Service are a platoon, a battalion, 
a division and an army  …  A platoon, because it is your first 
command, because you are young, and because, if you are any 
good, you know the men in it better than their mothers do and 
love them as much.1
I had a military career spanning more than 35  years including service 
in four infantry battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) and 
holding key roles in army training establishments and appointments in 
Defence operational and intelligence communities. The most satisfying 
and rewarding of these postings was the privilege of commanding a platoon 
of the Tiger Battalion on active service. Lamentably, the subsequent 
commands enjoyed by Viscount Slim passed me by!
I trust my recollections will give a reasonably clear description of the 
challenges facing the platoons of the 5th  Battalion (5  RAR) in 1966. 
All  12  rifle platoons and the four platoons of Support Company had 
different experiences, but there was a common base for us all, including 
a depth of camaraderie that embodied strong support for each other. 
We were all required to work to the same standard operating procedures 
(SOP) of the battalion but there was still scope through our individual 
command and leadership traits to help each platoon to develop its own 
identity and character.
After graduating from the Royal Military College (RMC) Duntroon on 
14 December 1965, I joined 5 RAR on 5 January 1966. I was allocated 
to command 8 Platoon, a position I proudly held for the next 17 months. 
Five infantry graduates of our RMC class had spent a two-week attachment 
with 5 RAR in August 1965 as part of our corps familiarisation training 
1  Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory, Cassell, London, 1956, p 3.
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prior to graduation. The founding commanding officer (CO), Lieutenant 
Colonel Peter Oxley, gave us a warm welcome with a few appreciated 
fatherly pearls of wisdom and we were then placed under the guidance of 
the ‘in place’ platoon commanders. I recall that the battalion second in 
command (2IC), Major John Warr, was soon to assume command and 
the more junior company commanders were already calling him ‘Sir’. 
At that stage in 1965 there was little talk that the battalion would soon 
have a pivotal role in the establishment of the 1st Australian Task Force 
(1 ATF) in Phuoc Tuy Province, Vietnam. John Warr assumed command 
of 5 RAR on promotion to lieutenant colonel on 1 September.
The very early days of 1966 were spent getting to know my platoon, 
receiving reinforcements, both regular and national service, supervising 
individual and section-level training, and assembling my platoon 
commander’s notebook. This, after a time, seemed to be of limited value; 
although it was held to be a mandatory measure of a platoon commander’s 
knowledge of his soldiers’ qualifications, capabilities and personal details. 
We faced a very steep learning curve because we platoon commanders were 
recent graduates of RMC, the Officer Cadet School Portsea or the Officer 
Training Unit (OTU) Scheyville. Our OTU colleagues comprised five of 
the first class of national service officers to graduate from Scheyville. Two 
of them, John Deane-Butcher and Harry Neesham, joined C Company 
as my fellow platoon commanders.
The rumours of 5 RAR being sent to Vietnam were now rife but until we 
received formal notice, we were instructed to say in outside conversation 
‘If we go to Vietnam’, not ‘when we go to Vietnam’. During February 
and early March, all companies had rotated through the Jungle Training 
Centre at Canungra for some harsh but extremely valuable training. 
We also undertook mine warfare training at the School of Military 
Engineering at Casula. This involved daily forced marches in battle order 
from Holsworthy to Casula (7 km) to keep our fitness at a high level. 
By this time the platoons were generally settled and up to full strength, 
although I had two new section commanders join my platoon about this 
time to replace two who were just not up to the mark.
There is no doubt that junior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are the 
backbone of a battalion, particularly in counter-insurgency operations. 
I was fortunate to have excellent stability with my section commanders, 
and we were together for almost our entire tour of duty in Vietnam. 
Whenever hard yards had to be covered, I had no hesitation in putting 
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any of them forward as my point section. They were Corporals Russell 
Quinn of 4  Section, Leslie ‘Doc’ Urquhart of 5  Section and Holger 
‘Curly’ Koblitz of 6 Section. Doc has since died but I am still in contact 
with Russ and Curly.
I had two platoon sergeants over this period: Keith ‘Shorty’ Mavin and, 
from September 1966, Ralph ‘Rowdy’ Hindmarsh. They were different 
personalities and both very good at their job. Shorty did not endear 
himself to some members of the platoon, but a platoon sergeant is not 
required to win in any popularity contest. Rowdy was a strong and 
supportive sergeant who went on to be a company sergeant major (CSM) 
on the battalion’s second tour of Vietnam and later became a regimental 
sergeant major (RSM).
The battalion was formally warned for service in Vietnam on 9 March 
1966. This was the official commencement of our involvement in 
Operation Hardihood, the deployment of 1  ATF to Vietnam and the 
establishment of the base at Nui Dat. Many people think that Operation 
Hardihood started on 24 May 1966 when the battalion deployed from 
Vung Tau into landing zone (LZ) Hudson to secure the area surrounding 
the nearby Nui Dat, but that was just the initial tactical phase. Hardihood 
was a sequential operation comprising the deployment of 1 ATF from 
Australia through to seizing and securing the site of the intended base 
at Nui Dat.
The very first entry in the 5 RAR Commander’s Diary, the official record 
that all units are required to maintain after being warned for active service, 
states: ‘0900 hrs. CO (Lieutenant Colonel Warr) attended conference 
at  1TF. Unit warned for service in South Vietnam as part of 1ATF. 
Operation codenamed Hardihood’. Although our early training had been 
very busy it certainly picked up in intensity, with greater priority now 
being given to both our operational and administrative readiness.
On 11 March the battalion departed by air from the Holsworthy ‘aero 
paddock’ by Caribou aircraft for Exercises Ben Tiger and Iron Lady, to be 
held at Gospers Mountain in the Colo-Putty Field Training Area. These 
exercises provided the final opportunity for platoons to put the finishing 
touches on teamwork and tactics including an introduction to helicopter 
operations. The battalion returned to Gallipoli Barracks on 24 March and 
commenced pre-embarkation leave on 7 April.
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The deployment to Vietnam began on 19  April with the departure of 
the advance party commanded by Major John Miller. Every platoon was 
represented on the advance party by either the platoon commander or 
the platoon sergeant so that they could feed off the experiences of their 
1 RAR counterparts who were the third battalion of the US 173 Airborne 
Brigade at Bien Hoa. There were still formalities to complete at home 
and on 20 April a battalion ceremonial parade, including a  traditional 
‘Beating the Retreat’ ceremony, was held at Holsworthy and reviewed 
by the Minister for the Army, Malcolm Fraser. The following day the 
battalion marched through Sydney in a ticker tape farewell with the salute 
being taken by the Governor of NSW, Sir Roden Cutler VC, KCMG, 
CBE.
Lieutenant Colonel Warr and his party departed the Royal Australian 
Air Force (RAAF) Base Richmond by Qantas charter on 28  April. 
He was accompanied by elements of Battalion Headquarters (BHQ) and 
36  members of 8  Platoon. We travelled via Townsville and Manila to 
Saigon. HMAS Sydney had departed on 22 April with 130 men of 5 RAR, 
comprising C Company less 8 Platoon, the Transport Platoon with their 
vehicles, and unit stores. HMAS Sydney anchored off Vung Tau on 4 May. 
The remaining subunits departed by air on alternate days from 30 April 
with the whole battalion being complete at Vung Tau on 13 May.
Our knowledge of the situation on arrival was tenuous and we had little 
awareness of the enemy’s strength, locations or activities. The arrival of 
C  Company became folklore as its officer commanding, Major Noel 
Granter, ordered all members to disembark from the landing craft at 
Vung Tau port with bayonets fixed, although the area was designated 
as secure. This event caused much merriment to the bystanders at the 
wharf, particularly the Americans, and became the subject of a cartoon 
in an Australian newspaper. Our company quartermaster sergeant, Staff 
Sergeant Bob Trenear, could not join the ‘assault’ as his bayonet was safely 
buried at the bottom of his kit bag.
Having travelled by air with my platoon and the CO’s party to Saigon’s 
Tan Son Nhut airport, John Warr took the opportunity to talk to me 
about the battalion’s dearth of knowledge about our new situation. Before 
he went to visit the battalion’s advance party, who were attached to 1 RAR 
at Bien Hoa, he reminded me that I was commanding the first platoon of 
the battalion to arrive in Vietnam and to ensure that, on arrival at Vung 
Tau, I took all security precautions including mounting clearing patrols at 
VIETNAM VANGUARd
156
first and last light. Yes sir! My platoon flew to Vung Tau in a US Air Force 
C123 Provider and were then piled into a large US Army truck – a cattle 
truck. The route from Vung Tau airfield to our staging area at ‘Back Beach’ 
took us through sand dunes and scrub which to me seemed a likely place 
to be ambushed. Not being certain of the enemy situation, I  ordered 
my machine gunners to load their weapons and mount positions on the 
corners of the truck.
As we moved into a clear area near the beach, I saw a makeshift camp 
comprising a large tent, some one-man shelters (hutchies) and some very 
basic facilities. I had my machine gunners unload and we were welcomed 
by a happy assistant adjutant, Lieutenant Ralph Thompson, who was 
clad only in shorts, boots and a hat and wearing a holstered pistol. He 
pointed us in the direction of some cold ‘goffas’ (canned soft drink) and 
showed us where we could pitch our hutchies. No clearing patrols were 
deployed although we did mount a sentry post. Over the next few days 
in the heat and humidity, with the sun beating down and reflecting off 
the white sand, 8 Platoon erected steel pickets and ridge wires for the 
following companies to erect their hutchies. On 1 May we also helped to 
develop four key sentry and observation posts that were being established 
on the outer perimeter of the Tigers’ temporary home. It was a quick 
acclimatisation.
5 RAR Training Directive of 2 May 1966 aimed at finalising the training 
of the battalion in readiness for operations. Ralph Thompson had been 
given responsibility for coordinating this training with each company as 
they progressively arrived at Vung Tau. The program included helicopter 
operations, clearing operations, armoured personnel carrier training, 
small arms training including weapon live-firing out to sea, vehicle 
counter-ambush drills and house clearing. A communications exercise 
was also conducted for all officers which was aimed at overcoming the 
difficulties arising from differences between Australian and US radio 
voice procedures.
To relieve the intense activity and to reinforce bonding with our American 
allies, preparations were made in the form of an officers’ formal dining-in 
night, with appropriate security. It was held at the Pacific Hotel, Vung Tau, 
on 20 May. Officers of the US Army’s 68 Assault Helicopter Company, 
which was to support us during Operation Hardihood, were invited to 
attend. I had fallen foul of my company commander for some obscure 
reason so was appointed as duty officer and remained at Back Beach. It 
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was an interesting sight to see my fellow officers return well lubricated 
from the dinner to the battalion’s secure area. Several had a last swim in 
the balmy waters of the South China Sea, resplendent in their summer 
formal mess dress. It was the ‘last supper’ before insertion into operations.
5  RAR Operation Order Number 4 was issued on 22  May with 
the mission  ‘5RAR is to destroy the enemy in the Tactical Area of 
Responsibility allotted as a preliminary to the establishment of 1ATF in 
the area’. Orders were passed down the command chain to platoon and 
section level and, while there was a nervous expectation in the air, there 
prevailed a quiet confidence that our training would hold us in good 
stead in the days to come. To give us a spiritual boost, a battalion church 
parade was held, the service being conducted by Father John Williams 
and Chaplain Ed Bennett.
My notes of the orders I gave to 8  Platoon for 24  May, the day the 
operation began, show reveille was at 0400 hours and, following breakfast 
and other final administrative preparations, we departed at 0610 hours 
for LZ Snakepit (Vung Tau airfield). Our company lift-off was scheduled 
for 0703 hours with an 0718 insertion into LZ Hudson which was secured 
by elements of the US 173 Airborne Brigade. The order of fly-in was: 
A Company, C Company with the CO and his tactical party, B Company 
and D Company. Seven hundred and seventy troops were airlifted using 
30 UH-1D Iroquois helicopters, comprising four lifts of these aircraft 
with each chalk (passenger load) comprising either six or seven men. 
The men of both A  Company and C  Company carried a 5-kilogram 
81-millimetre mortar bomb in addition to their normal combat load as 
the initial ammunition supply for the mortar platoon.
After the manoeuvre, with elements of the battalion deployed to 
LZ Hudson, the rifle companies commenced deployment into their 
designated areas of operations from 1200 hours. It was a day that I will 
always remember. At 1400 hours 8 Platoon had the first enemy contact 
of 5 RAR, when we were fired upon by one or two enemy who then fled. 
A short while later we again sighted two VC but, on both occasions despite 
having employed our well-rehearsed contact drills, we had no results.
The location of these two contacts was the small ground rise that became 
the home for 5 RAR’s BHQ and those of subsequent battalions located 
on the northern side of the Nui Dat base during the next six years. 
C Company harboured a few hundred metres to the east of this location 
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and commenced digging shell scrapes (shallow protective fighting pits for 
each soldier). Late that afternoon we heard small arms fire from about 
500 metres away followed later by the sad news that Private Errol Noack 
of B Company’s 5 Platoon had become the battalion’s first casualty. This 
was sad news for several members of my platoon as they knew Errol well, 
having undergone recruit and early infantry training with him. Although 
he was a member of another company, such a loss hit hard particularly on 
our first day in operations. After two contacts and the loss of a mate the 
reality had well and truly sunk in that we were at war.
We stood-to (armed, fully equipped and alert) and sentries were posted for 
the night hoping that a night’s rest would prepare us for the second day. 
This was not to be. The wet season was in full swing and we were drenched, 
with our shell scrapes becoming small swimming pools. At about 2150 
hours we heard artillery rounds land close to our position, so close that 
shrapnel whipped through the trees above us. Regardless of discomfort, 
our water-filled shell scrapes were then a welcome refuge. It appeared that 
this fire came from US artillery, located near the province capital Ba Ria, 
as part of an H&I (harassing and interdiction) fire program about which 
we were not aware. At 2226 hours 5 RAR BHQ sent the following terse 
message to 173 Airborne Brigade: ‘Please ensure no further unrequested 
H&I fire is put into my area without reference to this HQ. Fire received 
approximately 2150 was uncomfortable’. Our operations officer, Max 
Carroll, assured us later that the remonstration over the radio was far 
more explicit than that recorded in the battalion’s operations log.
So ended our first day of operations. I recall thinking that we will need to 
get used to such activity and briefed my platoon accordingly the following 
morning – only ‘363 days and a wakey!’ (363 days and one night’s sleep to 
go before we can go home). I was a little more than 21 years and marginally 
older than the men of my platoon who were a mix of regular soldiers 
and national servicemen who were mostly from the first call-up. The only 
platoon members older than me were my three section commanders and 
my platoon sergeant.
When service in Vietnam was looming, I started to think about how 
I would perform as a young platoon commander with direct responsibility 
for training, commanding and leading my men and attending to their 
ongoing training and welfare. I still have some self-analysis notes that 
I  wrote at the time and they address three fundamental questions. 
First,  how would I react when giving orders to kill enemy soldiers? 
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Second, how would I react when members of my own platoon were killed 
or wounded in action? Third, how well would I react when we were in 
a particularly dire situation? There was to be only one way I would find 
the answers.
The construction of the base at Nui Dat while maintaining security was 
extremely difficult. Digging-in and coordinating defensive positions at 
section, platoon and company level was frustrating as it had to be combined 
with ongoing operations including some village cordon and search 
activities. In between the battalion’s operations, all platoons undertook 
fighting and ambush patrols in our tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) 
as well as manning sentry positions on a 24-hour daily basis, along with 
the digging of bunkers with overhead protection and erecting defensive 
barbed wire obstacles. All these activities were conducted at the height of 
the wet season and there was no escape from the red mud churned up by 
vehicles and the digging-in process.
My platoon, where it was sited in C Company’s area, occupied the most 
northern platoon position in the Task Force base. It felt like being the 
proverbial pimple on the pumpkin as the most likely enemy assaults were 
anticipated to come from the north. Our defences were boosted with 
the allocation of a .50 calibre heavy machine gun located in my platoon 
area, primarily to provide mutual support between us and B Company 
who were on our right flank. We constructed a fortified bunker for this 
gun. It became the major strong point for our position and continuously 
manned, 24 hours per day. It also housed the control mechanism for 
banks of M18A1 Claymore mines (aimed mines, each of which projected 
700 steel balls in a 60° arc in front of the device at an initial velocity of 
1,218 metres per second) which we laid in front of our perimeter.
The Nui Dat facilities for ablutions, messing (meals) and recreation were 
very basic until hard-standing (solid flooring) was provided as the tour 
progressed. Black-out conditions were in place but there was no electric 
lighting until much later. For months, the only light available was from 
flashlights, locally sourced candles or by wiring small fluorescent tubes to 
the part-expired batteries of our ANPRC 25 radio sets.
I will always admire the persistence of our soldiers and NCOs, who 
faced these circumstances with determination, humour and resilience. 
We were pioneers who, together with 6 RAR, established bases for follow-




The pressure on platoons was great and after returning from Operation 
Sydney Two, the cordon and search of Duc My, and a quick shower my 
platoon was ordered out on a 48-hour patrol. On return to Nui Dat 
and before I went to BHQ for a debrief, I directed my platoon to rest, 
have a clean-up, write a letter home and, apart from the sentries on our 
.50  calibre machine gun, to generally unwind. On return from being 
debriefed I found about eight members of my platoon had been diverted 
to digging the large underground command post for Company HQ. 
I ordered them back to our platoon lines which led to a confrontation with 
our CSM, Warrant Officer Ross Wormald, about who was commanding 
8 Platoon. I stood up for my men and won the point.
The second member of 5 RAR killed in action was Private John Sweetnam, 
a 19-year-old regular soldier of my 8 Platoon. Sadly, John died on 9 June 
when he moved while in an ambush position and was mistakenly shot by 
a member who had not long joined the platoon. He fired at unexpected 
movement within the ambush area. This incident also occurred during 
Operation Hardihood. It was the first occasion that a US Army helicopter 
had conducted a night Dustoff of an Australian soldier of 1 ATF. We used 
hexamine tablet (field cooking fuel) fires to illuminate the boundaries 
of a rice paddy field for an LZ with Corporal Russ Quinn guiding the 
helicopter in by torch and being fully illuminated by the landing-lights 
of the aircraft. A few hours later we received the news by radio that 
John had not survived. This incident hit the platoon hard as John was 
well respected, a fine soldier and a good mate of all in his section and 
8 Platoon. I still have a copy of the letter I wrote to his mother at the 
time and tried to contact her when we returned home. The circuit road 
in C Company’s area in Nui Dat base was named ‘Sweetnam Crescent’ 
in his memory and the name was retained by all following battalions that 
occupied the position.
Years later when I was an instructor at various army schools and had 
the benefit of hindsight, I concluded that the defences at Nui Dat were 
lacking, particularly in relation to those vital principles of defence – mutual 
support, depth, all-round defence and interlocking arcs of fire. This was 
exacerbated by the fact that 1  ATF had only two infantry battalions 
throughout 1966–67 instead of the three that were needed. Nor were the 
mobility and firepower of tanks available in the early and most vulnerable 
days of 1 ATF’s seizure and occupation of its Nui Dat base.
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The early difficulties in protecting the Nui Dat base can be illustrated 
by the  dearth of defensive capability during the Battle of Long Tan. 
On 17 and 18 August all 5 RAR rifle companies were deployed to the 
north or north-east of Nui Dat. The SITREP (situation report) for the 
period 1600–2000 hours on 18 August, at the time when the battle was at 
its most intense, lists the locations assigned to 5 RAR elements after most 
were quickly ordered back to Nui Dat. This was a very sparse, skeletal 
manning of those 1 ATF unit areas that had been denuded of men and 
weapons used to mount a reaction force to support 6 RAR’s D Company 
at Long Tan. To make it worse, C Company was still deployed to the north 
at Binh Ba following the battalion’s cordon and search of that village.
5  RAR’s platoons were defending unfamiliar company positions. They 
were a thin red line with virtually nothing in reserve. No doubt this 
became an urgent consideration in 1  ATF eventually being bolstered 
by an additional infantry battalion and a squadron of tanks. These were 
considered necessary from the outset; but the third battalion was not 
added until December 1967 and the tank squadron did not arrive until 
early 1968. Questions remain in many minds about the likely outcome 
of the threat to 1 ATF in the early days if D Company of 6 RAR had not 
encountered the large enemy force at Long Tan on 18 August.
The constantly high tempo of our operations – patrolling, ambushing 
and building defences – during the early months led to the refinement 
of many of our procedures. We had also absorbed and proved many of 
the lessons learnt by 1 RAR, which had been a permanent part of the US 
173 Airborne Brigade throughout 1965–66. These factors led to a major 
revision of our SOPs, which were reissued in early October 1966 prior to 
deployment on Operation Canberra.
It became common, particularly in very thick vegetation, for sections 
to use just one scout. This facilitated navigation by allowing closer 
communication between the leading section commander and his scout. 
It  also became necessary when our sections were often reduced from 
10 men to about seven or eight, and sometimes even fewer. Otherwise, 
there was no effective rifle group in each section. Eventually, I gave up 
employing a batman (orderly) as I felt he would be better used in one of 
the sections as a rifleman.
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Harbour drills (moving into a stationary, defensive posture for an extended 
halt) at platoon level were automatic, ordered by hand signals alone and 
the layout quickly coordinated after all sections were in position. Similarly, 
drills for deploying a reactive quick ambush were refined so that the position 
could be rapidly and quietly occupied after a quick reconnaissance by 
myself. Conversely, a deliberate ambush was pre-planned and deployed 
in response to intelligence about known, anticipated or suspected enemy 
activity. Ambushing was a key tactic in maintaining the initiative in our 
TAOR. While deliberate ambushes were laid at selected locations based on 
intelligence and map reconnaissance, the final siting of any ambush was 
the prerogative of the ambush commander who assessed the site’s features, 
likely enemy approaches and the ability to concentrate maximum fire into 
a selected killing ground.
A triangular ambush concept was developed which was not in accordance 
with current operational doctrine. A harbour is not an ambush nor is 
an ambush a harbour. This combination of a night-time ambush and 
a  harbour was brought about by increasing fatigue caused both by 
constant daytime patrolling and diminishing platoon strengths. Platoons 
had to release men to attend courses, contribute to essential non-combat 
manpower needs, for rest and leave, illness or injury and numerous other 
reasons. In retrospect, we can only envy the rotational reinforcement 
concept that enables platoons deployed in present-day operations to be 
maintained at optimal strength during operations.
A strong relationship with my radio operator was paramount. A signaller 
with long whip-like aerials showing above him was a sure sign to the 
enemy that a ‘boss’ was nearby, so there prevailed a firm arrangement 
between us that he was far enough away so as not to attract unwanted 
attention, but near enough to provide me with quick access to the radio 
when needed. My first signaller was Private Ian Foran, a very capable 
first-intake national serviceman whom I had trained in Australia. Ian was 
a reluctant soldier who did not want to be in Vietnam but nevertheless 
did his duty. After a few months in Vietnam, Ian was poached by my 
company commander who had recognised his skills and made him his 
own signaller on the company command net. Rank hath its privileges! 
Private David Sharp then volunteered to become my signaller. He was 
another first-intake national serviceman who had been the forward scout 
for 4 Section. He learnt quickly and was an excellent signaller.
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In training my NCOs, I placed a lot of emphasis on indirect fire support 
from artillery and mortars and made sure that their supporting fire was 
always available. I did this by showing them how artillery or mortar 
defensive fire tasks could be planned on the four key points of the 
compass at a safe distance from our location, so fire could be called for 
and adjusted at night without reference to maps, which needed the use of 
torchlight. It was a bit like an insurance policy – in place but, hopefully, 
not needed. By day, I would sometimes call for unplanned fire support 
during independent platoon TAOR patrols, when not in contact with the 
enemy. I knew it was a confidence booster to the platoon to know that 
this vital support was on hand if needed, and to see that all members of 
our leadership group were competent in its use.
After several months on operations, it was fair to say that we were at the 
top of our game. Confidence was high, our teamwork was excellent and 
we were winning in our contacts with the enemy.
And now to Operations Canberra, Robin and Queanbeyan. The background 
and effect of these operations have been covered in other chapters, so I will 
confine myself to some incidents involving my platoon. On the morning 
of 8 October, 8 Platoon was leading C Company up a  steep ridgeline 
covered in very thick vegetation which afforded limited observation. The 
only option was to move carefully in single file. Doc Urquhart’s 5 Section 
was leading, with his scout Terry ‘Harry’ Harris in front. In making his 
way through undergrowth, he badly cut his wrist, which later required 
stitches. I moved the other two sections forward with Curly Koblitz’s 
6 Section now in the lead, followed by me and Dave Sharp, then Russ 
Quinn’s 4  Section with my platoon sergeant Rowdy Hindmarsh and 
Doc’s section in the rear. At about 1030 hours we came across a recently 
used track and heard voices. I told C Company headquarters that I would 
investigate. Artillery fire was laid to the north and placed on call, ready to 
be fired at my request.
VIETNAM VANGUARd
164
Private Daryl McCombe, forward scout, recalls this episode:
On 8 October our platoon was leading C Company in single file. ‘Doc’s’ section was 
leading with ‘Harry’ Harris as the forward scout. Our section followed with Russ 
Quinn’s section last with Bobby Box the scout. Word came back up the line that 
Harry had cut his hand badly and that our section was to move up front and take 
the lead. This placed Russ Quinn’s section next after platoon headquarters and Doc’s 
section, with the injured man, in the rear.
I led the company down on to relatively level ground but still patrolling through 
thick jungle. I walked into a slightly cleared area and saw a freshly dug trench with 
some digging implements strewn about it. This was directly in front of me and about 
10 metres away. I turned to signal to ‘Curly’ Koblitz but he was out of sight. I had 
developed a bad habit of getting too far out in front of the man behind me. I turned 
my back on the trench and took a couple of steps back from where I had paused when 
‘Curly’ came in to view. I gave him the hand signal to indicate enemy up ahead and 
then went down on one knee facing the trench to wait for him to come up to me. 
Before he got to me a voice called out ‘Uc Dai Loi’ [Vietnamese for Australian] and so 
they knew we were there. The voice came from my front but to my right at about the 
2 o’clock direction. This was followed immediately by a couple of rifle shots. I believe 
it was the same person who yelled out, ‘Uc Dai Loi!’ who fired the two shots.1
1 Daryl McCombe, email correspondence with the author, 30 May 2017.
Several more shots were fired from another direction. I radioed this 
information back to my company commander, Major John Miller, who 
told me to clear the area. Curly’s section was already positioned to provide 
fire support, so I moved forward and did a quick reconnaissance to the 
right flank which fell away steeply and was thickly covered by vegetation. 
The left was a better option, so I decided to take the other two sections 
with me on this flank and assault downhill through the position with 
Curly’s section providing fire support. After we moved past the fire 
support section a booby trap exploded, which we later discovered was 
initiated by a tripwire.
We suffered seven casualties, two of which were serious. The immediate 
area was made secure and we started the difficult task of withdrawing the 
casualties about 300 metres back to C Company headquarters where there 
was a potential LZ. This took considerable time to clear of tall vegetation 
and was still a tight LZ, but large enough for a Dustoff helicopter to land. 
It was still relatively tight because of a large tree stump in the landing area. 
The evacuation involved two lifts by US Army Iroquois Dustoff helicopters 
and was not complete until after 1300 hours.
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The two serious casualties were Private Bobby Box and Private David 
Riik, respectively the forward scout and a rifleman with Russ Quinn’s 
section. Both were returned to Australia because of the seriousness of their 
wounds. Private Doug Bishop had also received leg wounds but returned 
to the platoon after 29  days convalescence at the US 36  Evacuation 
Hospital, Vung Tau. The policy was that any casualty requiring 30 days 
or more to recover would be returned to Australia. Doug was delighted 
to make it back to the platoon with a day to spare so he could participate 
in more adventures. Dave Sharp was not wounded but shrapnel did hit 
his radio which remained operable. I also received some minor shrapnel 
wounds to my left side which I didn’t report until later, with John Miller 
insisting that I be evacuated to have the shrapnel plucked out. The main 
impact was worn by my ammunition pouch with shrapnel penetrating 
my M16 rifle’s spare magazines.
Next day at about 1400 hours in the same area, 7 Platoon encountered 
more booby traps, suffering four casualties. It was clear that the area was 
laced with booby traps, many of which had been attached to vines and 
sited to create a channelling affect. The same LZ was used to evacuate 
these casualties.
During the next 24  hours C  Company located some of the enemy’s 
prepared but unoccupied positions within what appeared to be a large 
base camp area. It included training facilities, a hospital, ammunition, 
medical stores, a workplace for making booby traps, items of personal 
equipment, weapons registers, written reports of vehicle movement along 
Route 15 and an important map of foot track systems in the western part 
of Phuoc Tuy province.
On the early morning of 9  October with a few stitches inserted, 
I flew into an LZ being secured by B Company to await the arrival of 
C  Company and rejoin my platoon. After a resupply of ammunition, 
explosives and rations, we continued the search of the western slopes of 
Nui Thi Vai, finding more enemy facilities, tunnels, ammunition and 
surgical equipment. The sappers (combat engineers) were kept very busy, 
destroying as many of these as they could and undertook the onerous task 
of delousing many of the booby traps and mines that were discovered. 
In addition to these enemy munitions, we also encountered very touchy 




The Combat Engineer Teams of 1 Field Squadron that joined us were all 
extremely brave and skilful and a very welcome addition to any infantry 
company. We can only admire the skills and tenacity they showed in 
climbing into tunnels, searching for and delousing mines and booby 
traps, and using high explosives to destroy enemy facilities. They were 
a vital part of our operations and held in very high regard.
This pattern of searching continued into the next day but could not be 
completed as we had to move quickly to the north-western edge of Nui 
Thi Vai to LZ Michael for extraction by helicopter to Route 15 for the 
commencement of Operation Robin. We knew we were to return to Nui 
Thi Vai several days later, to continue with the clearing of enemy from it 
in another operation.
Details of Operation Robin to secure Route 15 for the arrival of 3 Brigade 
of 4  Infantry Division (US) have been recounted in Chapter  6. This 
operation passed relatively routinely for C  Company except for the 
crash of a Sioux helicopter flying south along Route 15 as it approached 
C  Company. We witnessed the helicopter’s destruction as it bounced 
down the road before coming to stop about 30 metres from our perimeter.
Orders for Operation Queanbeyan, our return to Nui Thi Vai, were issued 
during Operation Robin and, to gain surprise, we departed from the 
roadside of Route 15 on foot at 0300 hours on 17 October. We harboured 
in the thick undergrowth to avoid detection prior to moving into our 
designated area of operations at first light. Essentially, this was the same 
area where we had suffered casualties and discovered numerous enemy 
facilities in the preceding week. Expectations were quite high that the 
battalion would be in for an interesting time.
It was hard going in the thick vegetation and steep rocky slopes and, in 
the afternoon, we heard continual gunfire and fire support from a US 
helicopter light fire team. We found out later this came from a major 
contact involving the Anti-Tank Platoon. The following morning, we 
reached the area where we’d had the enemy contact 10 days before and, 
after searching the area, we realised that we needed far more explosives to 
destroy the enemy facilities than we were carrying. Consequently, these 
were flown into us, along with two additional combat engineers.
The LZ to be used was the one that had been used to evacuate our earlier 
casualties. We were watching the approaching RAAF Iroquois when it 
appeared that the rear rotor clipped a tree during its descent. The helicopter 
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then crashed nearby but just outside the area we had secured. It lost power, 
its nose collided with a tree and it slid down the tree crunching heavily 
onto the ground.
My platoon was closest to the crash, so I moved a section to the far 
side of the wreckage to provide additional security. Two members of 
5 Section, Private Syd Shore and Private Bill Cavanagh, ran forward to 
assist. At  this  stage a small fire was burning inside the aircraft, on the 
right-hand side.
Syd Shore describes the incident:
Just as the helicopter was arriving, we had noticed another booby trap near the track 
we were on. I ran towards the helicopter just as it hit the ground after sliding down 
a tree. Some crew and passengers who were able were exiting the fuselage and I told 
them to move down the track but not to move off it. There was small fire which I would 
have been able to put out but couldn’t work the fire extinguisher. Bill Cavanagh had 
now arrived. We noticed that one of the pilots could not get out as his right foot was 
pinned by the tree. Bill and I then worked together with a RAAF crewman, who was 
on the inside, to pull away the Perspex under the damaged nose of the chopper to 
free the trapped right foot of the unconscious co-pilot. We eventually got him free 
but by this time the chopper was well and truly alight. Thankfully everyone was clear 
from the site before its machine gun ammunition started to explode.1
1 Syd Shore, email correspondence with the author, 16 August 2017.
The TNT on board burned fiercely and destroyed the helicopter. Syd 
and Bill were both recommended for awards and some months later we 
were advised that they were Mentioned in Dispatches for their prompt 
and courageous actions. If they had not intervened, as their citations 
state, the crash ‘would most certainly have resulted in the incineration 
of the helpless second pilot in the ensuing fire in the nose section of 
the aircraft’.2 Years later while researching this operation, I came across 
the official ‘Recommendation for an Honour or Award’ for Syd and 
Bill. Both Lieutenant Colonel Warr and Brigadier Jackson, the task 
force commander, had recommended them for the George Medal. The 
subsequent reduction in their awards occurred higher up the approval 
chain. The RAAF helicopter crewman involved in the incident was 
subsequently awarded the George Medal.
2  See 5th Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment Association website, Citation accompanying the 
award of Mentioned in Dispatches to Pte. Shore, www.5rar.asn.au/history/cite_shore.htm.
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Maintaining alertness, efficiency and ongoing battle hardness was 
a challenge for all platoon and section commanders, particularly as our 
tour of duty progressed. My platoon was most proficient when it was in 
regular contact with the enemy or there was convincing intelligence to 
suggest that enemy were nearby. We went through some extended periods 
of little contact with the enemy. Slackness could creep in with inattention 
on sentry duty, laxity on patrol, weapon cleanliness dropping off and an 
element of boredom creeping in along with repetitive routines. All this 
was nipped in the bud by section and platoon commanders. Doug Bishop 
remembers, ‘the mind-deadening tedium and discomfort of click-after-
click [kilometre-after-kilometre] of patrolling the TAOR, and the ever-
present tiredness’. On the positive side, it was strongly evident that we 
were gaining control of Phuoc Tuy Province and that the enemy was now 
very much on the back foot.
A small historical note associated with 5 RAR’s Operation Queanbeyan 
is that it was possibly the last time that Australia’s famous Second World 
War weapon, the Owen machine carbine (OMC), was used on active 
service by the rifle companies of an Australian infantry battalion. Many 
members had already transitioned to the US M16 5.56 mm rifle with 
very basic familiarisation lessons in the days prior to these operations. The 
OMC had little hitting power mainly due to old ammunition being fired 
from a weapon which used low velocity pistol ammunition.
The typical digger of the Tiger Battalion showed all the traits we have come 
to expect since the original Anzacs. He was brave, loyal and innovative. 
He could be outspoken and a straight shooter, but tolerant with a sense 
of humour. He was reliable on operations and always watched his mate’s 
back. He would wind down and play hard whenever he could. He 
expected his leaders to face the same hardships as he did and respected 
them for doing so.
While I have focused on aspects encountered by the platoons of the 
rifle companies and Support Company, we were totally reliant on the 
timely support and commitment of the often-unheralded platoons of 
Administration Company. They provided the rations, both at Nui Dat 
and by putting together some nice surprises to send into the field via 
resupply helicopters. Our company cook, Sergeant ‘Paddy’ Cahill, and his 
small team were unstinting in providing the best culinary offerings they 
could, and he was famous for his bread rolls. Sergeant Mick Henrys and 
his armourers kept our weapons in a healthy state. The Medical Platoon 
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gave us our devoted stretcher bearers who were infantrymen first but also 
had medical skills training. They were also morale-lifters as members 
of the Battalion Band. The Transport Platoon reliably maintained 
the battalion’s fleet of vehicles under very difficult and rudimentary 
conditions. Successful operations would have been much more difficult to 
mount without the indefatigable support of the seldom-applauded men 
of Administration Company.
Terry O’Hanlon
In 1964 I was working for Australian Mercantile Land & Finance, a rural 
stock and station agency in the town of Charleville in south-western 
Queensland, when I was called up for two years of national service. 
I had no interest in joining the army. I thought it was a bloody nuisance, 
completely upsetting what I wanted to do with my life. Cattle and horse 
work, rodeo and camp-drafting, and life in the bush was where I was 
going. Work, parties and rugby league football were the go at Charleville 
in south-western Queensland and I was enjoying them all.
Upon being called up I was sent to 1 Recruit Training Battalion at Kapooka, 
near Wagga Wagga in south-central NSW. I arrived in the middle of 
winter still very unimpressed with the whole army thing. After a short 
time, national servicemen were asked if they wanted to apply for entry to 
an officer training course at the newly established OTU at Scheyville, just 
west of Sydney. I applied thinking that, as an officer, I would have at least 
some say in my destiny. This also gave me a goal, something to aim for and 
I really enjoyed what faced me in the next hectic, pressurised six months 
– the mates I made, the discipline, the personal standards demanded, 
the sense of challenge and achievement, the burgeoning self-confidence 
and the spirit of the first, ground-breaking class of OTU officer cadets – 
the whole tightly compressed challenge which was so different from the 
comfortable pace of my former life. On occasions I captained the OTU 
Rugby Team; I graduated third in my class and was awarded the Staff Prize 
for Tactics.
Five of our first OTU class were posted to 5  RAR which was a great 
honour, and I was one of them; posted to the first Australian Army unit 
chosen to take national servicemen into war operations. My fellow OTU 
graduates posted to 5  RAR were Melford Roe, Harry Neesham, John 
Deane-Butcher and Ted Pott. I had played rugby union at school and, 
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interestingly, two fellows I played against and who became my friends 
when I played with them in a Combined Schools First Fifteen in 1962, 
were John Deane-Butcher and John Fraser. As mentioned, John Deane-
Butcher and I became fellow platoon commanders in 5 RAR. John Fraser 
was a member of the second OTU class to graduate and he had nearly 
completed his two years of compulsory national service when he extended 
his service on learning that his battalion, 3 RAR, was to go to Vietnam. 
He died leading his platoon in the Long Hai Hills on 28 March 1968, 
when he stepped on an enemy mine.
On joining the battalion, I was assigned to 5 Platoon, B Company. This 
was a fortunate development for many reasons. Our CO, Lieutenant 
Colonel John Warr, was a man who cared deeply for his men and he had 
a band of very experienced company commanders and senior NCOs in 
his battalion. Most importantly for me, I had an outstanding platoon 
sergeant as my deputy, Sergeant Sam Hassall; and a great group of junior 
NCOs and soldiers. Sam’s guidance and support were invaluable to a new 
and very raw second lieutenant given his first command in a battalion that 
had been warned for active service.
The officer commanding (OC) B  Company, Major Bruce McQualter, 
was a very good leader in operations and was supported by his calm 
and thoughtful 2IC, Captain Bob O’Neill, who was a source of sage 
advice to us. Bruce and I didn’t really hit it off, which was irrelevant as 
I respected his ability and authority. Bruce died of wounds late in the tour 
and Bob  left B Company early in the tour, transferred to BHQ as the 
intelligence officer.
I was a volunteer for the battalion’s advance party which preceded the main 
body into Vietnam. I volunteered because our adjutant, Captain Peter 
Isaacs, had awarded me 30 days as battalion duty officer and I wanted to 
escape the tedium of being virtually confined to barracks. Adjutants are 
the supervisors of the behavioural standards and social graces of junior 
officers; and Peter had taken a very dim view of my being late to our 
farewell, mixed (ladies attending), formal dining-in night. Volunteering 
was a clever move because it also gave me valuable experience of patrolling 
with 1 RAR who had preceded us to Vietnam and were part of the US 
Army’s 173 Airborne Brigade, based in Bien Hoa Province.
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The battalion was inserted, by air assault, into Phuoc Tuy Province and 
secured the area around the hill called Nui Dat, which was to become 
the 1 ATF base. Our war had begun with Operation Hardihood. Late 
on the first day B Company stopped for a water resupply from a stream. 
My 5 Platoon was in the lead on the eastern slope of a low rise just north 
of Nui Dat. Sam Hassall led our water party, which had just returned 
from a nearby stream in the fading light, when some shots rang out 
followed by a large volume of fire, both incoming and outgoing. One of 
our water party, Private Errol Noack, was hit in the first exchange of shots. 
Corporal George Gilbert was quick to realise that the incoming fire was 
from another company and was instrumental in stopping the firing from 
both sources. Errol, a national serviceman, was an exuberant soldier, keen 
and well-liked by his mates. I spoke with him before he was evacuated 
by Dustoff helicopter to a US Army hospital in Vung Tau, but he died on 
the way. Thus, as if underlining the perpetual controversy about sending 
conscripted men to war, the first national serviceman to be killed in action 
died on his first day in action.
The whole event had many parts. B Company was stationary. A Company 
was close by. One of the companies was not where it thought it was and 
there were VC between them. One of our machine gunners, Private Joe 
Devlin, who was positioned on our left, saw what he was sure were two 
VC moving from right to left across his front. He did not fire because he 
was unsure of where our water party was. I have always believed the VC 
were moving away from A Company after initiating the contact. The loss 
of Errol had a very profound effect on my men, but they soon rallied and 
pressed on with their tasks. The lessons from this incident resulted in the 
devising of procedures to be strictly followed when friendly elements were 
close to each other, or there was a danger of navigation errors in jungle 
which might lead to a clash between them.
For years, speculation endured about whether VC were involved at the 
scene or how difficulties of navigation in fading light and featureless, 
thickly wooded terrain might have combined to result in two companies 
being unaware of each other’s proximity while on their first day in 
operations, and whether this might have triggered the incident. Such 
speculation conveniently ignores the overriding fact that war is a dangerous 
and unforgiving business in which innumerable factors are at play.
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The men of 5 Platoon were smart, and it was my responsibility to keep 
them as fully informed as I could. I knew they would follow if I was 
straight with them. To us, our platoon was everything. Our first operation 
was difficult. We were inexperienced and had contacts with the enemy, 
including a platoon attack which is well described in Bob O’Neill’s 1968 
book Vietnam Task:
Five  Platoon was separated from the remainder of the 
company … They encountered a Viet Cong defensive position, 
which was occupied by five men. The platoon commander, 
Second Lieutenant O’Hanlon, ordered an attack which drove 
out the Viet Cong, who left a considerable trail of blood. On 
following this blood trail, voices were heard. One wounded Viet 
Cong attracted attention to himself and surrendered. Our chaps 
bandaged his wounded leg and splinted it in case it had been 
broken. He  accepted a cigarette and a drink of water. Within 
twenty minutes of receiving his wound he was flying to the same 
hospital which we used at Vung Tau. Near the huts of the base 
Five Platoon discovered a cache containing 1,300 pounds [600 kg] 
of rice. Disposal of captured rice was always a problem when it 
is found in such large quantities as it was seldom possible to lift 
it out by helicopter or by road. Often the only expedient which 
could be used for denying the rice to the Viet Cong was to blow 
it up. Five  Platoon were forced to do this because  …  no more 
helicopters were available.3
All operations were important, but Operation Hardihood was our 
baptism of fire and it fixed in our minds a clear idea of what the following 
12 months were likely to encompass, very likely at an increasing tempo. 
Its experiences were invaluable; we really got to know and value each 
other and developed faith in our systems and our ability to adapt our 
techniques and procedures to meet any situation that arose. Our bonding 
began a journey that is yet to end.
In the first week we had lost one of our own men, killed four VC, captured 
one and destroyed a large quantity of enemy rations. After about two 
weeks of the battalion’s clearing of Nui Dat and its surrounding areas, 
5 Platoon was relieved to move into what was to become 1 ATF’s base. 
3  Robert J O’Neill, Vietnam Task: The 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, Cassell Australia, 
Melbourne, 1968, p 41.
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Although it was far from secure at that time, at least the whole battalion 
was concentrated to commence construction of our part of the Task 
Force base.
In this chapter and Chapters 10 and 15, fellow junior officers have 
described  the tests which confronted platoon commanders during 
the earlier part of 5  RAR’s first tour of war service. Their narratives 
describe the heavy responsibilities which we shouldered as young 
men and the accompanying pressures of leadership while in continual 
danger, a situation which faced the army’s infantry platoon commanders 
throughout the Vietnam War and other earlier wars. I have confined my 
narrative to  the very earliest of our experiences to avoid the unneeded 
repetitiveness of a blow-by-blow description of many more incidents, the 
types of which are clearly described elsewhere.
In action, and sometimes while waiting for action, I believe all men 
experience some sort of fear. This is where training, mateship and 
a determination not to let down one’s comrades or oneself all come into 
play and bestow an ability to suppress fear. With Australians, humour 
and a communal sense of bravado and aggressiveness spread confidence. 
It was noticeable how many more men attended church parades before 
each operation – for some, the doubters, the prudent precaution of an 
‘each-way’ bet might have been at play or, more likely, comfort derived 
from another reassuring gathering of mates was the spur.
It was my honour to have served with such men who became, and remain, 
my brothers. I never considered myself as a national service officer, rather, 
I thought of myself as just another platoon commander. When, later in 
the tour, I seriously injured my knee and was returned to Australia, it was 
one of the worst times in my life – I’d had to leave my men.




CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY – 
THROUGH SOLDIERS’ EYES
Bob kearney, Ted Harrison, dan Riley  
and John O’Callaghan
Introduction by Ron Boxall
The Nui Dinh hills and the adjacent Nui Thi Vai hills soon acquired the 
nickname of ‘the Warburton mountains’, then ‘the Warbies’, when spoken 
of by soldiers of 5 RAR (5th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment). 
A popular American song of the day told of the dangers of venturing 
into wild country, its first line being, ‘They say don’t go on Wolverton 
Mountain’. A soldier of D  Company, Private Colin Illman, teased his 
mate Private Graham ‘Nugget’ Warburton with the amended line, ‘They 
say don’t go on Warburton Mountain’. The Australian diggers’ liking for 
diminutives soon saw ‘the Warbies’ routinely applied to the looming 
hill complexes to the west of Nui Dat. This nickname quickly became 
widespread throughout the battalion and beyond. Its origins were later 
authenticated by D Company’s commander Major Paul Greenhalgh and 
Second Lieutenant Dennis Rainer, the two soldiers’ platoon commander. 
Alas, Graham Warburton was killed in action a few days before the 
battalion first set foot into ‘the Warbies’ to conduct Operation Canberra.
The Nui Thi Vai hills were the battleground for our three major operations 
in October 1966, and two of our junior non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) and two privates have contributed vignettes of what it was like 
for them as individuals to engage in combat with the Viet Cong (VC) 
in our first six months in Vietnam. They are but four of the hundreds of 
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5 RAR’s rank and file who thus shouldered the Australian infantryman’s 
eternal burden of adding to the enviable reputation of the long line of 
those who had gone before them. Earlier generations had subscribed to 
that ancient military mantra, learned at Mother Army’s knee:
The role of the infantry is to seek out and close with the enemy, to 
kill or capture him, to seize and hold ground and to repel attack, 
by day or night, regardless of season, weather or terrain.1
It was now their turn.
Corporal Bob Kearney, section commander
Now, more than 50 years after returning from my tour of duty in South 
Vietnam with 5 RAR (1966–67), some of my memories of the war have 
been distorted or forgotten. The moments I would like to remember are 
now hazy and yet those I would like to forget are crystal clear. Among 
those I recall vividly are the tired young faces of the men I served alongside 
and the officers and senior NCOs who trained and led us into and out 
of situations on the dark foreboding range of steep hills later collectively 
referred to as the ‘Warburton mountains’. On 24 May 1966 during the 
battalion’s helicopter lift from Back Beach at Vung Tau to landing zone 
(LZ) Hudson, near the remains of a village named Ap An Phu in Phuoc 
Tuy Province, I saw the ‘Warbies’ for the first time and somehow knew the 
day would come when we would have to go there.
With increased enemy operations occurring in and around the villages 
along the road between Vung Tau, Bien Hoa, Long Binh and Saigon 
(Route  15), as well as charging a tax on all who dared use the road, 
a combined American and Australian operation was planned to make the 
road safe for the coming transportation of troops, materiel and equipment. 
In early October, our young national service platoon commander, Second 
Lieutenant John Deane-Butcher, informed us that on 6  October we 
were to climb up and clear the western edge of the range that dominated 
Route 15. As a corporal, I was only interested in what part our company 
(C  Company) and platoon (9  Platoon) would play in this massive 
1  Australian Military Board, The division in battle, nos 1–11, Pamphlet No 1: Organisation and 
tactics, Army Headquarters, Canberra, 1966, p 14.
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operation. Soon after our briefing I thought of the words to a song that 
had been sung or hummed in the lines after the completion of our first 
operation (Hardihood): ‘They say don’t go on Wolverton Mountain …’.
Knowing we now had to climb part of the steep black range of hills to 
the west of Nui Dat reminded me of an earlier operation during which 
we climbed a much smaller hill, Nui Nghe, and my section second in 
command (2IC) ‘Titch’ Tomas was fatally wounded. We had learned from 
Operation Hardihood – and all the operations since – to lighten our load 
so now, for the hard slog up and into the ‘Warbies’, the bins in the tents 
were full of discarded ration packaging and other items deemed too heavy 
for the work ahead.
My section was made up of young regular and national service soldiers, 
all of whom were good at their jobs. Each man was a character in his 
own right and, even now, I can see their faces as if it were only yesterday. 
Second Lieutenant John Deane-Butcher, our platoon commander, and 
Harry Neesham, the commander of 7 Platoon, and many of the NCOs 
and men they led, were ‘nashos’, whose lives had been put on hold or in 
some cases ended in Vietnam. Lieutenant Roger Wainwright, the only 
regular army platoon commander in the company, was their mentor and 
his leadership style and advice had a huge influence on both John and 
Harry. Whereas the platoon commanders were all about the same age, the 
standout among our officers was the company commander, Major John 
Miller. John, although older and far more experienced than his platoon 
commanders and anyone else in the company, was a calm, kind man who 
took every opportunity to improve the conditions of his men. John, our 
company sergeant major (CSM), senior NCOs and two of the corporals 
had previously served in Malaya and their knowledge and experience of 
living and patrolling in jungle was of great benefit to all.
Our intelligence officer, Captain (now Professor) Robert O’Neill, has 
covered the major contacts and incidents that occurred during Operation 
Canberra in his book Vietnam Task, written during the battalion’s tour of 
duty. It was from Vietnam Task that I learned much about the detail of 
why each of our major operations was conducted and the parts the other 
platoons and companies played in them. Junior NCOs and soldiers have 
a very small circle of influence and if they, like me, concerned themselves 
only with what involved their section, platoon and company directly, 
they would have little understanding of the purposes of each operation. 
Notwithstanding the ‘big picture’ briefings before, during and after an 
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operation, all these years later the incidents in which I had no direct 
involvement have been almost erased from my memory. It is only the 
events in which I was directly involved and the little things of which one 
takes mental snapshots that remain as clear in my mind today as they 
would be if they had happened last week.
During Operation Queanbeyan, one such mental snapshot I clearly recall 
is that of our CSM, Warrant Officer Ross Wormald, and myself standing 
together on 18  October as we watched a Royal Australian Air Force 
resupply helicopter steadily approach the LZ that had earlier been cut out 
of the jungle to evacuate the wounded men of 8 Platoon on 8 October 
during Operation Canberra. Of necessity, the LZ had been hastily cut 
and, in addition to being strewn with felled trees and foliage, still had, on 
the upper side, some tall trees which looked more like poles. The problem, 
as I recall it, was that the chopper carrying two combat engineers and 
loaded with their explosives had to approach the LZ from the lower end, 
meaning that all the pilots could see in front of them was the jungle-
covered face of the mountain.
As the chopper hovered over the LZ, I asked the CSM and the others 
nearby ‘do you reckon his blades are a bit too close to that large tree?’ 
They all agreed and suddenly the chopper lifted and flew forward 
towards the face of the mountain, banking away to the right in what 
appeared to be an attempt to go around and come in again. Suddenly the 
helicopter appeared to lose power and, in what seemed like slow motion, 
it dropped into the trees where it immediately began tearing itself apart. 
The noise it made as it smashed through the heavy jungle sounded like 
that which I imagine would have been made by a wounded and dying 
dinosaur. The CSM yelled ‘get back to your platoons!’ Upon reaching my 
section area, I could see the flames and shortly thereafter, when I heard 
exploding ammunition, I imagined the crew and all aboard the chopper 
had been killed. Miraculously, as I learned later, none of the men were 
killed, however they were all badly injured and one of the pilots was 
trapped in the burning chopper. Had it not been for the courage and 
determination of the 9  Squadron crewman, Sergeant Gordon Buttriss, 
and Privates Bill Cavanagh and Syd Shore of 8 Platoon, the copilot would 
have undoubtedly suffered an excruciating death. For their actions during 
this perilous rescue, Sergeant Buttriss was later awarded the George Medal 
and both 8 Platoon diggers were Mentioned in Dispatches (MID).
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Clearly, the next problem for Major Miller was the extraction of the 
injured men, so he quickly implemented a plan to get them out as soon as 
possible. It was not long before I saw above us an American army Dustoff 
chopper, marked on both doors with a red cross on a white background. 
The pilots who flew these specialist medical evacuation choppers and their 
crewmen were renowned for their skills and courage, and the crew of this 
chopper demonstrated the reasons behind their legendary status. As the 
chopper approached the LZ, the pilot was obviously not pleased by the 
tight, rough area he had to put his aircraft down onto, so he simply turned 
his chopper around and, guided by his crewman, slowly backed it safely 
onto a rocky outcrop not far from the original LZ. Once the patients 
were on board, the pilot lifted the chopper a few feet and flew off the 
mountainside towards the hospital at Vung Tau. That crew could not have 
known it, but that day they received a standing ovation from the diggers 
of C Company, 5 RAR.
The ‘silence of soldiers’
Over the 50 years since we left Vietnam in 1967, I have been frequently 
asked ‘what was it like in Vietnam?’ For most of that half-century I lacked 
a suitable answer so would simply say something like ‘not good’ or 
‘sometimes boring, sometimes too exciting’, or just change the subject. 
After seeing the film Forrest Gump starring Tom Hanks, I finally had the 
answer and now say as Forrest Gump did, ‘well we walked a lot and it 
rained a lot’.
In October 1966, our battalion conducted four operations: Operations 
Crow’s Nest, 1–3  October; Canberra, 6–10  October; Robin, 11–16 
October; and Queanbeyan, 17–26 October. These were productive but 
costly and tiring operations, from which I, like all the blokes, retain 
numerous mental pictures of certain aspects; but others, like those of 
the diggers who, only 49  years before we left Vietnam in 1967, were 
fighting the Battle of Passchendaele, have faded over time. When asked 
by their children and grandchildren, ‘What was it like in the war?’, like 
all who have been to war since, they would find a way to change the 
subject. Recently when I was asked about the ‘silence of soldiers’ by some 
descendants of those heroes of the Great War and Second World War, 
I used the following analogy:
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Trying to explain what it is like to be in a war is akin to a blind 
person trying to explain to a sighted person what it is like to be 
blind. Your relatives were not being secretive; they simply find it 
is just too hard.
Some of my many mental snapshots of sights, smells and sounds in the 
‘Warbies’ include:
• A well-established and highly organised enemy camp, trenches and 
huts covered by hand-sewn quilts of leaves.
• Russian and VC flags, stick grenades, ammunition and weapons.
• Milky (soapy) water in the streams.
• The dank wet smell of rotting vegetation and the continually moving 
shadows created by speckled sunlight through the ever-shifting dense 
leaf canopy.
• Massive bald, bullet and shell-scarred granite boulders that offered the 
enemy complete protection from the air.
• Ancient moss-covered rocks, lichen-covered trees and vines of all 
descriptions, large and small, that sometimes acted like a tripwire.
• A tree in an enemy camp that was lit up at night by iridescent fungi 
or insects.
• Fireflies, pigs, monkeys and unexploded butterfly bombs.
• Small sharp punji stakes embedded in both sides of a track leading 
up to a rock sangar (firing position) overlooking Nui Dat. An enemy 
machine gunner in the sangar would have forced all who were not 
immediately killed on the track to jump onto the punjis.
• The observers on the rock could have used binoculars to observe our 
every move as we built Nui Dat base from day one.
• Dried napalm residue on the rocks that reminded me of honeycomb.
• Huge rice caches and how we and our attached combat engineers 
destroyed them.
• The roar of close air support jet aircraft, the crack of artillery shells and 
mortar bombs impacting and, at night, the sound of wind through 
bamboo.
• The distant sound of a contact with the enemy in which we knew our 
mates could either be killed or wounded.
• The sweat-drenched, tired and haggard red faces of the great men in 
my section.
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• The sounds and sight of the Bell Sioux helicopter as it crashed and 
bounced along Route  15, right in front of our company during 
Operation Robin.
These are some of the sights and sounds that I cannot forget from just one 
month during our tour of duty.
Lance Corporal Ted Harrison, section 
commander, 1 Platoon, A Company
My 10-man section was a good mix of regulars and national servicemen. 
As  I remember, there was some disgruntlement at being conscripted, 
but over time and with training the discontent faded as we developed 
into a tightly knit platoon. My role, initially, was second in command of 
1 Section, 1 Platoon, A Company, in control of the M60 machine gun 
team. We were very fortunate to be led by Lieutenant John Hartley, in my 
view a natural leader of men and a bloody good map-reader, which was 
very important in navigating heavily forested and jungle environments 
where accurate navigation was vital. Our section commander was 
Corporal Jim Mavromatis, and Douglas ‘Douggy’ Moles was our forward 
scout. Doug, a national serviceman from Tasmania, was a natural bush 
scout and we relied on his keen senses on many occasions.
The vital role of machine gunner was given to ‘the big bloke’, Private Bill 
Winkel, a regular soldier and a timber cutter from Queensland. Bill had 
a sardonic sense of humour and could always be relied on. Of course, all 
roles needed to be interchangeable due to attrition caused by illness and 
casualties and made worse by an occasional shortage of reinforcements. 
On one operation our section was down to four men. At this time Jim 
Mavromatis had been struck down with a serious and mysterious illness and 
returned to Australia, and I was acting section commander and machine 
gunner rolled into one. But like many of the understrength platoons, after 
a day’s patrolling, sometimes including enemy contacts, our platoon was 
often tasked with setting up night ambushes on rice paddies and trails, 
when we were very fatigued. In my view, sleep deprivation was a major 
problem during operations and patrols.
Vietnam’s wet season caused problems with feet and chafed skin, mould, 
rust and a level of weapon maintenance not experienced in training 
in Australia. The need to be able to move quickly at any time dictated 
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that you kept your socks and boots on for the duration of the patrol or 
operation. Once, during the wet season, my feet were continually wet 
for several days and soon developed an intense itch. During a rest break, 
I removed my boots to examine my feet and discovered my toenails had 
loosened and turned dark yellow with the skin peeling away from my 
soles and heels. Modifications were necessary and many in the platoon did 
away with socks and underpants and drilled holes in the back of the heels 
of their boots to allow the water to drain. Back at Nui Dat, the downpours 
would fill our weapon pits and deep drains had to be dug around tents to 
prevent flooding. The roads and tracks through the battalion area turned 
to slush.
Vietnam’s fauna is quite diverse, and we dealt regularly with spiders, 
scorpions, snakes and monkeys. On one occasion I was tasked with 
conducting a reconnaissance forward of our position, and Doug Moles 
accompanied me. We came across a clearing approximately 150 metres 
wide by 60  metres long, covered with waist-high grass. Normally we 
would skirt around the clearing but, being behind time, I decided to cover 
Doug while he crossed and cleared the far treeline. I saw his ‘all clear’ sign 
and commenced to cross when I noticed something moving parallel to 
me and parting the grass at speed. Then it turned and came straight at 
me, slamming into my leg and turning me around through 180 degrees. 
I looked back to what seemed to be a huge pig. I limped over to Doug 
and examined my leg to find no real damage. On returning we skirted the 
clearing in a very proper tactical fashion.
Cordon and search operations were opportunities to witness village life, 
and for a naive 19-year-old it was a real experience. We found the villagers 
to be unassuming and compliant. The CO developed a code of conduct 
for dealing with the locals and a cornerstone of that policy was to treat 
the villagers with respect and courtesy. I felt a deep compassion for the 
villagers, and especially the children caught up in the turmoil of war. 
We found the amount of cruelty the VC were capable of inflicting upon 
their own people to be incredible. Once, A Company was stationed in the 
village of Binh Ba to protect the village from VC incursions and, when 
possible, we would play soccer with the kids. We made friends with many 
of the children and adults and we would be invited into their homes for 
tea. I found their friendship warm and genuine.
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In early October, the battalion was to mount Operation Canberra. John 
Hartley called together his O Group (Orders Group) and announced that 
the battalion was required to protect a lengthy stretch of Route 15. It was 
explained that an American army infantry brigade would travel in truck 
convoys from Vung Tau along Route  15 to Bien Hoa. Sections of the 
highway were still under threat and the VC were able to attack or mine 
many sections of the road. Prior to the convoy, we were ordered to clear 
a high hill complex called Nui Thi Vai, including a foothill called Nui 
Ong Trinh, as this was one of the areas thought to be a possible firing 
point for enemy mortars to attack Route 15. During this period, we were 
witness to an air strike on the western face of Nui Thi Vai. I was later to 
learn that B Company had spotted a large group of VC and an air strike 
had been called in to attack them. C  Company also had clashes with 
the VC and took some casualties. We of A Company finally crossed the 
summit of Nui Thi Vai and then commenced the steep descent of its 
north-western face. We were then positioned strategically along Route 15 
for the next few days as the American convoys proceeded north to Bien 
Hoa with few incidents.
On 16 October, A Company mounted armoured personnel carriers (APCs) 
and moved north-west along Route 15 to an area opposite the western face 
of Nui Thi Vai. We dismounted from the APCs and moved west, across 
and away from Route 15, into the treeline where we set up our company 
harbour. No cooking was allowed. A final O Group was conducted, and 
we were informed that we would be commencing Operation Queanbeyan 
in the early hours of next morning. We were informed that the aim of 
this operation was to kill or capture any VC remaining on Nui Thi Vai, 
destroy their bases and seize any documents, equipment or supplies they 
had left behind after the airstrikes of Operation Canberra.
By this stage of our tour, we were heading into the dry season and the 
nights were often rain-free. Many of us, when not on gun piquet, would 
simply lay down on a ground sheet with our backpack for a pillow, our 
weapon next to us and sleep. When on operations or patrols you never 
allowed your weapon to be further than arm’s reach away. The only time 
you were separated from your ‘best mate’ was when you went on rest and 
recreation leave outside of Vietnam.
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At 0300 hours, A Company broke harbour and we commenced the move 
east towards the western approaches of Nui Thi Vai. We were able to 
cross Route 15 and enter the treeline before first light. Just after dawn we 
harboured so that the company could bolt down a cold breakfast. We had 
climbed over the summit of Nui Thi Vai previously, so the thought of doing 
it again, humping a 30-kilogram load, caused me to shudder. 1 Platoon 
was given the task of leading the company with 1 Section in the lead. 
About mid-morning we were following a track when Doug, our forward 
scout, sighted a small concrete installation to the rear of what was first 
thought to be a disused garden. Our skipper, Lieutenant John Hartley, 
was called forward and he decided that 1  Section would cover both 
flanks while 2 Section would move forward and search the installation. 
After I  had positioned the machine gun team, I turned to head back 
when almost immediately, there was a loud explosion. I  felt a burning 
sensation down my left side as I was lifted off my feet and slammed into 
the ground. Lying on my side I began to pant like a dog, with a hole in 
my chest and with searing pain in my abdomen. The abdominal pain 
was so intense that all I could do was crawl into a foetal position to try 
to ease the pain. Big Bill Winkel and ‘Nifty’ Neville Thompson had also 
been wounded. Our attached combat engineers cleared a safe path to us 
and the battalion’s medical officer, Captain Tony ‘Doc’ White arrived 
to ease the pain. Makeshift stretchers were made, and I was carried to 
a clearing, lifted into the bay of a Dustoff helicopter and flown to the 
American 36 Evacuation Hospital at Vung Tau. There I started to recover 
from a perforated oesophagus, multiple perforations of the left lung and 
multiple perforations of the small intestine. For me, the war against the 
VC was over. I returned to Australia in November 1966 but would have 
given my right arm to have seen it through and returned with the battalion 
in May 1967.
Dan Riley, machine gunner, Anti-Tank 
Platoon, Support Company
From 17 to 26 October 5 RAR was committed to Operation Queanbeyan. 
The CO had decided to move the battalion around the northern and 
western sides of Nui Thi Vai so that two companies could move up the 
western side. A third company could clear the ground immediately to 
the north of the hill and a fourth company could lie in ambush positions 
on the approach routes to the north of the hill, a little further out. 
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This  company would hamper VC movement both towards and away 
from Nui Thi Vai by use of the track systems that had been shown on 
a captured enemy map. This task was assigned to D Company; B Company 
was to be its neighbour on the north, A  Company was to search the 
central north section of the western slope, while Battalion Headquarters 
(BHQ), protected by the Assault Pioneer and Anti-Tank platoons, was to 
advance up the track to a pagoda and install itself in an area where good 
radio communications with the companies could be ensured. Our sister 
battalion, 6 RAR, assisted by providing its D Company to protect the gun 
position sited beside Route 15. We had no idea that the day would change 
us for the rest of our lives.
As the Anti-Tank Platoon moved up into position to begin the ascent, 
a message was passed that a booby trap had been tripped and the VC 
would know where we were or, at least, be aware of movement in the area. 
Our primary task was to move ahead of BHQ up a very steep and narrow 
track to a pagoda near the summit. The climb was exhausting, made 
worse by the heat and weight of the M60 machine gun, ammunition, 
equipment, rations and water. At one point when we paused for a breath, 
I took a salt tablet that stuck in my throat, but a quick drink cleared it and 
we continued to climb. It was obvious that all were feeling the physical 
stress. The probability that the VC were nearby heightened our alertness 
so there was no talking. Messages were passed by hand signals. The track 
was just wide enough for one man to walk along. Some boulders near the 
track were huge, well over 10 metres in length and several metres high. 
The vegetation was thick and provided shade from the hot sun and the 
rain, but it limited vision to a few metres. Our section finally reached the 
pagoda, checked for booby traps, cleared the immediate area and realised 
we were some distance from the top of Nui Thi Vai. However, the fellas 
were grateful to pause with the expectation that the worst was behind us. 
Then it all went sideways!
‘Contact!’ was shouted, and shots were fired at a VC soldier who 
disappeared behind one of the many rocks beside the track. Others were 
sighted higher up the slope. Messages followed in quick succession that 
BHQ, which was following us, had been ambushed, a captain was hit in 
the chest and the Anti-Tank Platoon was to move back down the track 
to clear out the VC. After a steep climb, the platoon was exhausted so 
the skipper, Second Lieutenant Mick Deak, ordered all backpacks to be 
dropped and the descent began with extreme vigilance. As we reached the 
ambush site, the realisation hit home that we had all walked through 
the enemy’s location only minutes before!
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The skipper ordered Corporal Norm Womal’s section to move from the 
track across a steep gully to where the VC were located, while the other 
sections were to provide fire support. I was located near a large rock on the 
topside of the ambush site and positioned the M60 ready to fire. As I did 
this, a shot rang out and Norm fell! He had been shot through the throat 
but managed to give directions to the skipper. The skipper called several 
of us to him to see if there was any way to reach Norm. His extraction to 
a safe area presented problems for the platoon and the battalion. The VC 
knew where Norm lay and could fire at anyone moving to his assistance. 
Although the platoon could neutralise the VC with covering fire for 
a short time, it was doubtful we could keep the fire up long enough to 
extract Norm. Despite the skipper’s orders to the contrary, our medic, 
Private Peter ‘Doc’ Fraser, crawled under enemy fire to Norm. He reached 
him and proceeded to dress his wound, placing his own body between 
Norm and the enemy in order to shield him from further fire. The enemy 
continued firing, missing Fraser by inches. In the meantime, a stretcher 
party moved forward under the control of our platoon sergeant, Ray 
‘Skinny’ Calvert, while protected by covering fire from the remainder of 
the platoon.
During this time, I had managed to return to my position, and prepared 
to provide fire support. Peering out from the rock it was obvious I could 
not clearly distinguish where Norm, Doc Fraser and the stretcher 
party were located. The last thing needed was for me to blaze away at 
a target I could not see and hit mates with friendly fire. This frustration 
continued until I decided to move to where I could have a clearer shot. 
As I moved forward, the barrel lock of my M60 machine gun was caught 
and disengaged by the vines. The result was sheer desperation because the 
M60 was temporarily out of action, I was exposed and there was incoming 
fire while I scrambled for cover.
Skinny called for covering fire and the stretcher party managed to cross 
the killing ground in both directions without being hit, although the 
volume of enemy fire made movement extremely slow. Despite the odds, 
the extraction was successful, and the stretcher party struggled back to the 
cover of the rocks behind the remainder of the platoon.
Captain Tony White, the battalion’s medical officer, moved forward to 
our position and was waiting to dress Norm’s wound when the stretcher 
party met him. A few moments later our highly respected Pacific Islander 
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mate died, and we had lost a very fine man and an outstanding section 
commander. The stretcher party clambered down the wet rocks to place 
Norm’s body into a chopper.
The challenge was how to get a chopper into a very difficult area with 
limited places from which to extract Norm. Fortunately, efforts to extract 
the wounded captain from BHQ had earlier been successful and now the 
process was repeated. Despite the difficulties, the pilot managed to land 
the helicopter and collect Norm’s body. Shrouded by a ground sheet, he 
was placed on the aircraft and flown out to Vung Tau. The impact of 
his death settled on those left behind on the hillside. The stretcher party 
laboured back over the rocks with tremendous weariness and dejection to 
rejoin the platoon.
After Norm had been extracted from where he was wounded, the skipper 
ordered the sections to move towards him and into a protected area. This 
was because helicopter gunships were to deliver suppressing rocket and 
gunfire onto the tunnel entrances where the VC were located. As  I  sat 
there with others, out of the line of fire, a crushing weight dropped onto 
my shoulders. We were not in the Land of Oz! These few hours had 
been lethal and there was no way to deflect the possibility that anyone in 
the platoon could have been killed. All the near misses, contacts or the 
loss of men in other parts of the battalion did not match the loss of our 
close mate.
The shock of these events was suppressed as the gunships blasted the tunnel 
system with rockets, followed by fire from their multi-barrelled machine 
guns, all within a stone’s throw of our position. After the shooting had 
stopped and the dust settled, a section swept through the area and found 
that the VC were gone but had left booby traps. The thought that they 
could be waiting in deeper tunnels for nightfall to escape ensured that 
everyone’s alertness remained on a razor edge.
Later that afternoon the Anti-Tank Platoon climbed back to the pagoda, 
checked for booby traps, picked up our packs and prepared to settle in 
for a disturbed night. One final task for the day was to escort, in the 
falling light, a section of combat engineers to the summit to record the 
location of the VC tunnel systems. It soon became impossible to see 
your hand in front of your face. When a soldier behind me slipped and 
became entangled in vines, I could hear him only a metre away. After 
a blunt exchange of suggestions on what to do, I tried to cut the vines 
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with my machete and narrowly missed slashing him. Again, a message was 
hammered home to me; it was not about what you want to do: rather, it 
is about what has to be done to solve the problem. Finally, with greater 
care, the vines were severed, and we moved forward to the summit and 
said ‘goodbye’ to the engineers. The section then moved silently back to 
the pagoda, careful not to startle the sentries lying in wait for our return. 
The sentries were also on a knife edge and they all had fingers on triggers. 
Through experience, or just dumb luck, no one started shooting as we 
re-entered the platoon’s position within the perimeter. Later that night as 
I lay next to the M60, I gave thanks for being alive.
In the following days, we learned a soldier of the Assault Pioneer Platoon 
had been killed and an officer wounded just 50 metres from our position. 
A few days later, D Company’s 10 Platoon attacked 11 VC in a small, 
cleverly concealed installation and killed 10. Several weeks later many of 
us were to return as the newly formed Reconnaissance Platoon in another 
operation to check these same VC tunnel systems.
For their bravery and leadership in the operation, three members of the 
Anti-Tank Platoon were decorated. The Military Cross was awarded 
to Second Lieutenant Mick Deak, the Military Medal to Private Peter 
Fraser, and Corporal Norm Womal was posthumously MID. The national 
origins of these three soldiers were, respectively, German, Scottish and 
Pacific Islander.
John O’Callaghan, machine gunner, 5 Platoon
It was the beginning of Operation Holsworthy on 7  August 1966. 
Surrounding us was silence, except for the falling rain. It was hard to 
believe sometimes that there were many dozen riflemen, including myself, 
sliding through the jungle on the way to Binh Ba, a village we were to 
search the next day after surrounding it that night. This was a technique 
that 5 RAR helped to develop.
Since at this stage we were travelling in daylight, it was necessary to restrict 
any movement of villagers in the area, and various cover stories were used 
to accomplish this. If memory serves me, one was that our artillery would 
be firing into this area throughout the day and so it was declared a ‘free fire 
zone’ – that is, aside from ourselves, anyone out here would be assumed to 
be enemy. This had been widely notified to the surrounding population.
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We were proceeding through low scrub with a thin forest of young rubber 
trees extending away to our left and hard on our right was thick, high grass 
between overgrown banana trees whose fronds drooped to the ground like 
green tattered curtains. The rain was near-torrential. I was the machine 
gunner in our section and during training it was impressed on us that ‘the 
M60 is the life or death of the section’ – very true, and I never forgot it.
Something in that green mess drew my attention, the tip of a conical 
bamboo hat and maybe something black. It was not one of us – and 
therefore, probably, enemy! I gave the hand signal for ‘enemy’ and we hit 
the ground, but the rest of the platoon being in front and in the downpour, 
didn’t realise what was happening behind them. Things were developing 
in seconds, if not microseconds, and I feared they were walking into an 
ambush. ‘The gun is the life or death …’ – I dared not wait longer and 
fired several bursts, the silence was shattered and then – nothing.
Our platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Terry O’Hanlon, took 
a party forward to investigate the results of our firing and returned to 
tell me there were two villagers, a young boy, dead, and a woman dying. 
So much for the effectiveness of the ‘free fire zone’ notification. I collapsed 
and cried to rival the rain and told the skipper I would never be able to use 
the gun again. Softly but firmly and with compassion he assured me that 
when the time came, I would do my duty.
So, the war dragged on and in November we came to Operation Hayman, 
one which saw us in the good old American Hueys (Iroquois helicopters) 
doing an airborne assault on to Long Son Island, a VC haven, training 
and rest area. The island was not far off the coast and was surrounded by 
swamps and vast areas of thick mangroves – nature’s little fortress.
During the operation, we of B Company wound our way up to the top 
of a high ridge overlooking a village and a wide waterway opening out to 
the South China Sea through the mangroves. Suddenly, from the right-
hand side and in the distance, a squad of about 10 enemy dashed from the 
mangroves and headed for the other side slowed by the height of the tide.
Our 5 Platoon, being best positioned, was given the ‘go’ to engage them 
and the other two gunners and myself did so. I was very fortunate to 
have a large flat rock nearby, which was handy to use as a gun platform, 
so I made full use of it. Although at long range, we brought effective fire 
to bear. Some of the enemy squad made it to the other side, some did not.
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I recalled what Lieutenant O’Hanlon had said. You were right Terry, 
thank you. Sometimes the ‘fog of war’ becomes very foggy indeed.
Conclusion by Robert O’Neill
These accounts of what it was like for individual Australian soldiers to face 
a well-armed, skilful enemy, on ground over which they had operated for 
several years, show how serious the battle for ‘the Warbies’ was. Our men, 
the privates, NCOs and officers of the battalion, met their challenges well. 
However, in November everyone had to keep in mind that there was still 
a further six months of our commitment to run. The war was becoming 
a strain on all of us, physically and mentally. But at the same time, we 
were gaining in knowledge and confidence, and we knew from our first 
six months’ experience that we would make the grade as a battalion at 
war. But all members still had their own individual challenges to face, 
stimulated by the awareness that death could come rapidly with a single 
bullet, a mine blast or a shrapnel fragment.
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A PLATOON COMMANDER’S 
WAR – PART 2
John Hartley and Harry Neesham
Editors’ introduction
Two further narratives by platoon commanders continue after Chapter 9’s 
interlude of recollections by a few of the diggers, who were typical of 
the hundreds who made up the men who served with the battalion’s 
young officers.
John Hartley
I graduated from the Royal Military College (RMC) at Duntroon in 
December 1965. Australia’s contribution to the war in Vietnam had 
increased significantly with the deployment of 1 RAR (1st Battalion, the 
Royal Australian Regiment) earlier that year. I think most of us hoped to 
see active service; I certainly did. At least half of the infantrymen in my 
class were off to the exotic Pacific Islands Regiment while the rest of us 
were rationed out to our nine infantry battalions.
Some weeks before graduation, I was summoned to see Captain Paul 
Greenhalgh, the adjutant. I think I enjoyed his confidence but, as the 
senior cadet of Sovereign’s Company, most of our discussions had revolved 
around my company’s and my own inability to satisfy his high expectations 
of us. I therefore approached his office with some trepidation. His first 
words were: ‘What can I tell you that would make you happiest?’ Without 
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consideration, I immediately replied, ‘You could tell me that I am going 
to Vietnam’. ‘Congratulations’, he said, ‘you are posted to 5 RAR’. 5 RAR 
was to go to Vietnam in April to replace 1 RAR. Paul also told me that he, 
too, was posted to 5 RAR as a company commander.
I knew of no one who had been to Vietnam. We had, of course, studied 
the origins of conflict and our understanding of revolutionary warfare 
was, I think, quite comprehensive. Many of our instructors had served in 
the Malayan Emergency. We certainly understood the military/political 
nature of revolutionary warfare, the stages of a communist insurgency, 
Maoist doctrine and the concept of People’s War. We had also studied the 
French experience in Indo-China. I received some prizes on graduation 
which included Bernard Fall’s Street Without Joy and Jean Larteguy’s Yellow 
Fever. So, I guess, at least psychologically, I was ready and most desirous 
of a posting to Vietnam.
In early January, after three weeks leave, I marched into 5 RAR. I was 
posted to A  Company and, to my delight, appointed to command 
1 Platoon. I went through the rare but memorable baptism of meeting my 
first platoon. My platoon sergeant, John Healy, was an experienced soldier 
who was the quintessential senior non-commissioned officer (NCO): 
demanding of standards, intolerant of any form of slackness, exemplary in 
his own personal performance, firm but extremely fair; he was also highly 
respected. To me he was a marvellous blend of coach, confidante and 
critic. I learnt from him every day. The company sergeant major (CSM), 
Warrant Officer Jock Stewart, was another old soldier and a rarity – he 
had seen service in the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam. Indeed, 
at that time he was the only man in the battalion who had seen service in 
Vietnam. I enjoyed his company immensely. He would regale us endlessly 
with stories of punji stakes (for more explanation about punji stakes, 
see Chapter 7). The CSM also talked about booby traps, mines and the 
cunning Viet Cong (VC) who appeared to have suborned most of the 
population. It was a land of snakes, aggressive ants, scorpions and bar girls 
who charged much, promised more but gave little. To me it all seemed 
remarkably exciting and extraordinarily exotic. And much of it was.
The soldiers were first rate. Three quarters of my platoon of about 35 were 
national servicemen – men of the first intake. They had been in the army 
for about nine months. All were about 21, they appeared to accept their 
lot as national servicemen, had shared recruit and early infantry training 
and, generally, were great friends. None were married; few had girlfriends. 
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They largely came from Victoria and Tasmania. I believe their age (about 
two to three years older than many of their Australian Regular Army 
colleagues who had to be 19 years old to be sent on operational service) 
was a telling factor; the difference made by this couple of years was quite 
remarkable. They were generally well educated; with most appearing to 
have completed Year 12. My three section commanders were an interesting 
mix. The oldest was 38 and the other two also had long service, much of it 
in a peacetime, garrison environment.
For the next four months training was intense. About half the time 
was spent at Holsworthy where we were based. Typically, we trained 
from six in the morning until six at night. Many evenings were taken 
up with administration: drafting wills, inoculations, receiving new dog 
tags (identity discs) and so on. Training involved much field-craft and 
shooting. Physical training was an everyday feature. We received lectures 
on the origin of the war, the history and customs of the people of Vietnam, 
the Geneva Convention and a lengthy session from a group of chaplains on 
character guidance. Soldiers were required to attend but not the officers. 
I thought this odd. I attended throughout not because I was particularly 
convinced of much of what I heard, but because I wanted to share my 
troops’ experiences.
New weapons were introduced. The American M16 Armalite – 
lightweight,  firing 5.56  mm ammunition and a vast improvement 
on the Second World War Owen gun, which I carried for the first few 
months in Vietnam. The M79 grenade launcher also made its appearance. 
We were intrigued by this weapon which looked a bit like a very large-
bore shotgun and fired a 40  mm grenade to ranges up to 400  metres 
with little recoil. For those of us who had fired the much heavier Energa 
grenade from a projector fitted to the L1A1 self-loading rifle, the M79 
was indeed a revelation. We were also introduced to the M18 Claymore 
anti-personnel mine and a new type of trip flare, the proper combination 
of which would prove highly lethal and effective when used in ambushes. 
The American VHF ANPRC 25 radio set made its appearance and 
replaced the cantankerous Korean War–era 9 and 9A sets which seemed 
forever to require tuning. We trained with M113 armoured personnel 
carriers (APCs), did much first aid work and, for a week, jogged to the 
School of Military Engineering and back where we were introduced to 
the vagaries of mines and booby traps. And all this time, I learnt more 
about my NCOs and soldiers.
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We went to the Jungle Training Centre, which had a reputation for us 
to live up to. I had been there before as an RMC cadet and jungle-clad 
country held little in the way of surprises. But many soldiers had no 
experience of such tropical places and the sound and smell, the rain and 
heat, and the constant proximity to trees and scrub, frequently dense and 
almost impenetrable, needed to be mastered. Here we learned that the 
jungle was not a threat; it was at least neutral and, ideally, an ally.
Our last exercise at Canungra was held at Wiangaree State Forest in 
northern NSW. This was tropical rainforest at its best. We entered the 
long valley with dozens of ridge lines and smaller re-entrants running off 
them. Company headquarters and two of the platoons moved along the 
northern edge; my platoon was about 500 metres south and we moved 
along the southern side. For the next five days, I was seldom confident 
about where I was, and it was only when we finally emerged at the top of 
the valley to be met by our transport that I recognised my location.
Before going to Vietnam, we had a week’s pre-embarkation leave. It was 
a time for some personal assessments. National service was a new reality 
and Australia had yet to suffer a national service battle casualty. Street 
marches were unknown. The Vietnam Moratorium protests had yet to 
emerge but the mother and girlfriend of one of my soldiers were part of 
the ‘Save Our Sons’ protest movement. I liked the soldier, but I thought 
he was being overly influenced by his mother and girlfriend. To keep an 
eye on him, I made him my batman; he was competent and cheerful 
from Tuesday to Friday. On Monday he appeared somewhat confused 
and concerned. I remember parading on the A Company parade ground 
on a Friday evening after a week’s exercise, prior to going on weekend 
leave. I heard a shrill female voice shouting, ‘Hey Batman, it’s Robin here, 
I hope you poisoned the bastard!’. A day before we embarked, my batman 
declared himself a conscientious objector and was taken off the draft for 
Vietnam. We followed his court case with interest. He subsequently was 
declared not to be a conscientious objector, ordered to Vietnam but went 
AWOL (absent without leave), served a prison sentence and had not 
completed his national service until some 18 months after the soldiers in 
his intake had finished theirs.
It is difficult to describe our arrival in Vietnam. We flew via Manila on 
a Qantas charter flight. From the air, Saigon looked tropical and exotic. 
I noted, however, the numerous small waterholes which seemed to be 
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everywhere. Subsequently, I recognised these were shell craters. We arrived 
at Tan Son Nhut airport, spent about two hours there and then flew by 
US Air Force transport aircraft to Vung Tau.
Vung Tau had been a seaside resort for wealthy French and Vietnamese 
families. Any sense of insecurity was more than compensated for by 
the sun, the beach and the very fine sand. We were introduced to the 
UH-1H, a larger version of the Iroquois helicopter than the UH-1B 
used by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF): the Huey, the mighty 
sky workhorse, and surely one of the icons of the Vietnam War. We did 
some short training operations. Platoons vied with each other to be the 
quickest at deplaning from helicopters. This resulted in our standing on 
the skids prior to landing and even jumping off before the helicopter had 
touched down. Battalion Headquarters (BHQ) soon put a stop to this 
unsafe practice.
Our time next to the South China Sea in Vung Tau was short. We rapidly 
acclimatised and gained some sense of the terrain – wading through 
delta mangroves in water up to the waist and clinging mud, open paddy 
fields with only low bunds for cover, bamboo scrub with thorns which 
gripped equipment and clothing, and flat, featureless scrub where 
navigation could only be conducted by ‘dead reckoning’; sticking closely 
to a compass bearing and using cumbersome pace-counting to estimate 
distance travelled. With practice, experience and proficient map reading, 
the system proved surprisingly accurate. We also worked in sand dunes 
and quickly appreciated the importance of keeping our weapons clean.
There was little likelihood of contact with the VC in this area, but we 
saw signs of war all around us. Shortly, we were to be launched on a real 
operation. We worked with keen anticipation and listened with increasing 
focus to the lengthy artillery and air bombardment to our north in the 
general direction of our impending air assault. The night sky was lit with 
flashes, not dissimilar to a tropical storm, with a rumble of explosions 
which has long been the hallmark of armies on the eve of battle. Next 
morning, after repeatedly checking our webbing and weapons, we 
emplaned in about 40 helicopters and flew in tight formation to Landing 
Zone (LZ) Hudson, beside a rubber plantation which was secured by 
American soldiers of 173 Airborne Brigade. Although we had practised 
with helicopters, we had never experienced such a concentrated landing 
with so many at once. We moved off the helicopters, lay on the ground 
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until they had flown off and then moved to our allotted position in 
the battalion assembly area near the edge of the LZ in anticipation of the 
remainder of the battalion arriving.
As I recall, 24 May 1966 was a stiflingly hot day. The wet season, with its 
monsoonal rain and soaring humidity, had started. We were constantly in 
a lather of sweat, and low scrub and tall grass added to our discomfort. 
My platoon led the move to the east along the small Song Cau River. 
The plan was for us to cross two re-entrants, move north along the second 
re-entrant and then lay a series of ambushes. The battalion’s mission was 
to secure a small hill called Nui Dat and the surrounding countryside, 
ideally out to about 5  kilometres, to enable the establishment of the 
1st  Australian Task Force (1  ATF) base. I do not think anyone in my 
platoon knew this – it may have been kept from us because of operational 
security. We  thought that Operation Hardihood was to be a five-day 
operation – it turned out to be nearly three times that long.
Some 20 minutes into the move, the forward scout of my forward section 
sighted and fired at an armed man. ‘Contact front!’ was shouted. I dashed 
forward while the forward section deployed with the machine gun group 
to the right and the rifle group to the left. It was as if we had done it 
a thousand times before: Canungra, Holsworthy, Wiangaree and Colo-
Putty training areas all revisited. We were to have several more fleeting 
contacts with one or two armed men; I doubt that more than one or two 
of us caught a glimpse of any enemy, but they were there, and we saw 
enough evidence of their presence to be extremely alert.
We eventually reached the second re-entrant. 3 Platoon passed through 
us and headed north. The A  Company platoon commanders gathered 
with our company commander to decide our next move. We were to do 
a series of ambushes. We were to return to the junction of the river and 
the re-entrant and to ambush the track we had made moving into the 
area. This was always a problem for us: wherever we moved, we left tracks.
Suddenly, some shots were fired. 3 Platoon was in contact. The volume of 
fire rapidly increased; heavy automatic fire started; bullets zipped through 
the trees overhead. We quickly dispersed. I ran back to my platoon. 
Without orders, or letting anyone know, I moved my platoon up to 
the firefight. We deployed into an extended formation, fixed bayonets 
and approached one flank of the firing. Some 10 metres from the flank, 
I heard Australian voices shouting to each other and I realised that the 
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contact was between two groups of Australians. Just as I was to radio this 
information, the word came through the A Company radio net: ‘Cease 
fire, cease fire, in contact with friendlies’. I backed off my platoon quietly 
and returned to our start point some 150 metres away.
Much controversy surrounded this incident which resulted in the death of 
Private Errol Noack, a South Australian and the first national serviceman 
to be killed in Vietnam. Some of us believe he was killed by friendly fire. 
The official version is that he was probably shot by a VC group which 
had interposed itself between A Company’s 3 Platoon and B Company’s 
5 Platoon. The whole incident gave me much to think about. I believe 
that B Company, which was to come down the first re-entrant after my 
company had cleared the area, missed the first re-entrant and mistook the 
second re-entrant for the first. Certainly, navigation was difficult. What 
appeared on a map as a re-entrant very often was a very small depression. 
If you did not pace the distance accurately, then there was little confidence 
in knowing where you were with certainty.
I also thought seriously about my independent action. Had I been 
30  seconds sooner, I should have opened fire from a few metres onto 
5 Platoon with the likelihood that many casualties would have ensued. 
Clearly, I was too aggressive and was prone to act independently. 
I  determined not to do this again. Decisive action was fine; but the 
consequences needed to be considered, and I thought how lucky I was to 
learn this lesson so early in the tour.
Operation Hardihood was a fascinating start to our Vietnam experience. 
The battalion quickly became frustrated. Small groups of VC were 
everywhere. We had numerous contacts with the enemy, but it was not 
until the third day that my platoon killed and recovered the first VC in 
the 1 ATF area of operations.
We’d had three contacts that morning; all were at long range. By now 
we were extremely alert and tense. We moved very quietly. Suddenly the 
forward section stopped. As always, when this happened I moved forward, 
trailed by my radio operator. The section commander and forward scout 
said they had heard voices to our front. We moved forward very cautiously 
to the edge of a small clearing. About 20 metres ahead, on the other side 
of the clearing, were four armed men in black, pyjama-type clothes. They 
were urgently packing and clearly about to move. I immediately opened 
fire and shouted to those around me to do the same. The VC disappeared, 
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we quickly deployed into an extended line and swept the area. One body 
was recovered with a handful of ammunition, a Chinese grenade and 
some webbing.
We searched the body; he had an ID card. He was about 35 and clearly 
was a local VC. We buried him in situ. We were elated. 1 Platoon had 
done it. We were the envy of the battalion, or so we thought. I am now 
much older and have seen too much not to recognise that we were equally 
happy because we had survived. It is also a contemplative business to 
recognise that you have taken a life – an enemy, certainly, and someone 
who would have no compunction about killing us – but another human 
being, a friend or relative to someone, perhaps a father or husband.
We found a large rice cache (several tonnes I should think, bagged and 
stacked under a black tarpaulin); it was rice donated by the United States, 
as was identified by the branding on the bags. We were ordered to destroy 
it, and we simply split the bags and tipped their contents into a nearby 
river. It was hard work in the humid, overcast day. I fired my first artillery 
mission and called down mortar fire, both against fleeing groups of VCs 
who were some distance off.
Operation Hardihood was our baptism. There would be many similar 
operations – large, multi-unit sweeps, with a mix of supporting arms. 
But much of our time was spent on endless platoon-sized patrols, usually 
within 10  kilometres of the Task Force base. This was where platoon 
commanders learnt their trade – days on end of independent action, 
moving silently and alertly, constantly listening and watching, evaluating 
signs – all done patiently, but employing great speed and aggression 
when required.
There were several types of operation. The large-scale search and destroy 
operations I have partly described – in many ways, these were the most 
interesting. We invariably moved into new territory, usually in the areas 
where the VC was well established. Sometimes we even clashed with 
North Vietnamese Army Main Force or regular units. I recall very clearly 
our first contact with the latter. They were clearly several degrees better 
than the VC and prepared to stand and fight far more aggressively.
Another type of operation was the cordon and search. We would surround 
a village or hamlet, at night, isolating it before dawn, and searching it for 
arms, or caches of food or any signs of VC presence. These operations 
required great coordination, involvement of Vietnamese authorities, 
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psychological operations (psyops) and civil affairs support. There is an 
apocryphal story of the psyops loud-speaker aircraft flying overhead and 
telling the people they are about to have their village searched. People 
were to report to the village square with their ID cards. They were to 
take food and water, as they may need to be there for some hours. The 
only problem was that the aircraft was a day early. I wonder how long 
the people might have waited patiently in the square.
An often-used tactic was ambushing, which could be employed as part 
of any of the operations. Ambushes could be quick, simply by moving 
off to the side of a track, or deliberate. The latter could involve extensive 
use of mines and flares, registration of artillery fire and even digging into 
defensive positions. As the year moved on, we found ourselves increasingly 
conducting ambushes. Some were overnight; others for several days. 
Soldiers would be sited in the ambush in groups of three with one fully 
alert the whole time. When we first went to Vietnam we tended to deploy 
in pairs, but as the year wore on and people became continually fatigued, 
we found that we needed to use groups of three to ensure that one person 
was fully alert the whole time, thus allowing the overall rest time for each 
soldier to be increased. Sometimes we would even relieve soldiers in an 
ambush site.
One of my platoon’s notable incidents was at night, sitting on our packs 
while waiting to cross a wide paddy field. We were just inside the treeline 
which was parallel to a path. A group of about 20 VC, with weapons slung, 
making no attempt to be quiet or secure, walked past at about 4 metres 
distance. We could hardly believe what was happening. A wild firefight 
ensued. While we suffered no casualties, next morning while searching the 
area, we noted numerous blood trails. Major Max Carroll, our company 
commander, directed the company into several ambush positions, which 
resulted in some contacts and further VC casualties. On another occasion, 
the VC were obviously aware of our presence and initiated the contact by 
firing into the rear of the ambush position. We could clearly smell VC 
camps, particularly if they had been occupied for more than a couple of 
days. I dare say they could do the same with us. On the other hand, we 
were never ambushed. It was a golden rule never to move along tracks.
We flew initially with the US Army who impressed us as they were quite 
prepared to accept all manner of risks to evacuate casualties. They were 
also quite prepared to press home their fire support. Occasionally we had 
US Air Force strike aircraft in support and their forward air controllers in 
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light aircraft were clearly very skilled. We also deployed on occasion, using 
their large twin-rotor Chinook helicopters. In hindsight, I suspect we 
equated their risk-taking and daring with professionalism. I am not nearly 
so sure that was always the case. I do not think they achieved quite the 
level of combined skill and professionalism that our Australian helicopter 
crews did in later years.
So, we quickly grew to admire and like our US Army helicopter people. 
On  Operation Hardihood, for instance, it was not unusual in late 
afternoon to have a helicopter deliver our mail, another to bring us cold, 
chocolate-flavoured milk, another to deliver a hot box dinner and still 
another to take away the empty hot boxes. Of course, there were attendant 
security problems with all this air traffic. We wanted to find the VC and 
not frighten them off. When our own air force commenced helicopter 
operations we were disappointed. In our ignorance, we thought the RAAF 
pilots were extraordinarily cautious. They even wanted us to fly with closed 
doors. No self-respecting fighting soldier ever wants to fly in a helicopter 
with closed doors. On one occasion a door gunner carelessly discharged 
a belt of ammunition just as we were to be lifted from an LZ. Of course, 
we conveniently forgot the dozen or so similar incidents that we had had 
in our first three months. We never quite developed the same rapport with 
the RAAF as we did with the US Army aviation units, but later battalions 
certainly did. Our reluctance was something of a pity because I saw the 
RAAF in action some years later, during my second tour in Vietnam, 
and they were a very professional, fighting organisation. Indeed, after 
receiving a serious gunshot wound, I would not have survived if they had 
not successfully medically evacuated me.
I remember one incident which did not end happily, and which could 
have completely soured relations between our battalion and 9 Squadron 
RAAF. For nearly 40 days we had been in the field during the dry season, 
so we were not constantly wet. But we slept on the ground, never fully 
washed, ate hard rations the whole time, lost several kilograms in the 
process and had some casualties resulting from numerous contacts. We had 
been combing booby-trapped tunnels and it was all extraordinarily tiring 
and intense.
The operation finished on the top of Nui Thi Vai, a mountain 470 metres 
in height, with a pagoda on a ridgeline slightly below the summit. Most 
of the battalion were airlifted from the only available pad which could 
accommodate just one Iroquois at a time. The helicopters lined up, one 
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behind the other, way off into the distance; each to land, load and depart 
in turn. This part of the operation required several hours. We were the 
last platoon to depart. Our job just before we were to be extracted was 
to protect a small combat engineer party which was to detonate some 
charges to release large amounts of CS (tear gas) powder in the caves near 
the top of the mountain. I had carefully rehearsed this with the engineer 
officer. I deployed my platoon to cover the area. The sapper would enter 
the cave, shout ‘fire on’ and come out through the entrance where I stood. 
We would then move smartly to an area some distance from the cave in 
case the CS powder spread out of the caves.
The engineer officer entered and a few minutes later I heard an explosion. 
My first thought was that he had prematurely set off the charge. I turned 
to move into the cave only to be overwhelmed by a cloud of CS powder. 
I could not breathe; my lungs were on fire. I fell to the ground and 
slowly the CS lifted. My radio operator was equally affected. My platoon 
sergeant, ‘Shorty’ Mavin, dragged us clear. The engineer officer and his 
offsider then appeared; they had become confused and exited safely by 
another tunnel. We then moved to the LZ and were extracted from the 
470-metre high hill. The RAAF pilot complained of being gassed at an 
altitude of 500 metres! Instead of flying to Nui Dat, we flew to Vung Tau.
I asked why this was so and was told that the crew was going to afternoon 
tea and would return us to Nui Dat in 30 minutes. I protested with some 
passion. It was just as well I did because my six soldiers were furious. We duly 
flew on to Nui Dat in a very sombre mood. As we left the helicopter, I did 
not thank them or wave as I would usually do. Instead I walked away only 
to hear the noise of the rotor change dramatically. I looked back and saw 
a plume of purple smoke billowing from the helicopter. I knew who had 
discharged the smoke grenade as he exited the aircraft and grabbed the 
culprit. ‘Why did you do that?’ ‘Because I had no bloody CS grenades left!’ 
was the answer. It was something that all of us needed to forget. There is 
much more I could say about Vietnam. It was the high adventure of my 
youth. I am conscious of the aphorism that says we all refight the wars of 
our youth and that no two wars are ever the same.
A third of my platoon became casualties and about half did not finish 
their tour. Many suffered for years after with poor health and emotional 
discomfort. It was a long year. Of the first 100 days, we spent 92 on hard 
rations, we all lost considerable body weight and we were constantly wet. 
We had limited opportunity to develop an affinity with the local people 
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and were intolerant of anybody else’s war. I developed an enormous 
respect for the Vietnamese people, but it required another tour of duty in 
a different setting for it to happen.
I was very fortunate; I stayed on as a full-time soldier. The experience 
certainly coloured my attitudes to soldiering. Overwhelmingly, I was 
imbued with a sense of responsibility towards my soldiers; this required 
me to be fair and compassionate but also to demand high standards. 
I also respected the enemy. His was a very difficult life. For him there 
was no respite, no rest and recreation leave, no close air support or 
rapid evacuation of casualties to sophisticated medical facilities; he was 
a proficient, skilled, patient and committed foe.
It was a hard year. But I would not have missed it for anything. It was 
certainly the greatest privilege I have had – to command Australian 
infantrymen in war.
Harry Neesham
My journey to Vietnam began when prime minister Robert Menzies 
announced in November 1964 the introduction of national service 
for 20-year-old men, commencing on 1  July 1965. At the time, the 
announcement caused barely a ripple in my life. I was a Western Australian 
government auditor, had just completed the first year of my Diploma 
in Accountancy and had been voted the best first-year footballer in the 
Western Australian Football League (WAFL). It could not happen to me!
A letter from the Department of Labour and National Service in March 
1965 advising of my call-up dramatically changed my circumstances. 
I was directed to present for a medical examination and then report to 
Irwin Barracks in Perth on 30 June for transfer to Puckapunyal in Victoria 
to commence my service. My first thoughts were not of my impending 
military training. This was a unique opportunity to further my football 
career in Victoria during my two years of army service. I contacted a few 
Victorian Football League clubs before signing a contract to play for the 
Geelong club.
Along with about 240 other Western Australians, I was transported by air 
and bus to Puckapunyal, arriving at 0700 hours on 1 July 1965. We were 
immediately introduced to army routine. Uniforms and weapons were 
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issued, followed by inoculations and then a haircut, whether it was needed 
or not. While I had not experienced army cadet training at school, being 
the second eldest of 12 children, the concept of structure and discipline 
came naturally to me. I fell quite easily into army routine and enjoyed 
the  following days that were filled with drill and sport. My first week 
in the army passed quickly.
At the end of the week, our platoon sergeant advised us that the army was 
seeking volunteers for officer training. He pointed out it would be a real 
challenge, but those chosen would be paid at corporal’s rate during the 
officer training. Influenced both by the challenge and financial incentive, 
I applied, was subjected to a rigorous assessment process and accepted 
as one of the 97 national servicemen and eight army aviation cadets 
who comprised the first course at the newly raised Officer Training Unit 
(OTU) at Scheyville in NSW. The course began on 18 July 1965.
The army assembled its most experienced instructors, all with extensive 
active overseas service, to transform civilians into infantry platoon 
commanders in an intense 22 weeks of unrelenting activity. The training 
was both physically and mentally demanding and the attrition rate was 
high. I thrived on the physical challenges but found military history 
classes at the end of a 14-hour day very challenging. Few concessions were 
afforded to officer cadets; however, I was fortunate to be granted leave on 
three occasions to fly back to Perth on a Saturday morning to participate 
in the WAFL final series and helped to achieve a premiership for my club 
East Fremantle.
On 18 December 1965, 76 of the 107 officer cadets who began the course 
graduated as second lieutenants. I ranked sixth in graduation order and 
received the OTU Athletics Prize. Five members of this inaugural class, 
Melford Roe, Terry O’Hanlon, Ted Pott, John Deane-Butcher and myself 
were posted to 5 RAR. We became members of the first fully integrated 
unit of regular army and national service soldiers to undertake active 
service overseas and so became part of Australian military history.
I assumed my posting as the commander of 7 Platoon, C Company, in 
early January 1966 and immediately experienced a situation not covered 
in my training. Three members of my platoon were Western Australian 
national servicemen who had shared a hut with me at Puckapunyal before 
I was selected for officer training. One of these, Private John McShane, 
had worked with me in the Western Australia Department of Lands and 
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we had spent the previous two years doing mid-week fitness training 
together. The potential for this familiarity to impact on discipline was real, 
but the situation was adroitly addressed by my deputy, Sergeant Ralph 
‘Rowdy’ Hindmarsh. He called the men to attention, announced with 
a salute, ‘The platoon is ready for inspection Sir!’ By this simple action 
he firmly implanted in the minds of all platoon members the burden of 
authority which had been heaped upon me and signalled the need for 
them to respect it or, at least, to give me a fair go to show my wares.
Training at section, platoon and company level was intense and exhausting 
over the next three months. The men were subjected to regular rifle range 
practice, route marches and battle-runs to the School of Military Engineers 
to be trained in mine warfare. Pleasingly, all members of the platoon 
soon met the required battle-readiness fitness standard. Our training at 
the Jungle Training Centre at Canungra in south-east Queensland was 
challenging, as its tropical jungle conditions were like those we could 
expect in Vietnam. Competition between the 5  RAR rifle companies 
was fierce and a race over the notorious obstacle course was organised. 
I won the event for C Company and in the process set a course record 
which, I’m told, stood for quite a long time. At the completion of this 
closely assessed training, C Company was deemed to be fully prepared for 
overseas service.
I departed Australia by Qantas Boeing 707 from RAAF Base Richmond 
on 19 April 1966 as part of the 5 RAR advance party, which also included 
two other national service platoon commanders, John Deane-Butcher and 
Melford Roe. We arrived at the Bien Hoa US military base on 20 April 
and were attached to our 1 RAR counterparts. I joined Second Lieutenant 
John Dwyer on three 48-hour tactical area of responsibility patrols around 
the base area. The casual efficiency of his men in preparation for and 
execution of these patrols greatly impressed me. I wondered whether my 
platoon would develop this confidence and was subsequently delighted 
at the completion of our first combat experience, during Operation 
Hardihood, to see it on display so soon.
While most of the advance party returned by air to Vung Tau as their 
companies arrived in country, John Deane-Butcher and I were afforded 
additional time at Bien Hoa while our C  Company mates travelled 
to Vietnam aboard HMAS Sydney and were the last 5  RAR troops to 
arrive. We were scheduled to fly on an American army UH-1D Iroquois 
helicopter to Vung Tau on 4 May. The helicopter was clearly overloaded 
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at take-off and struggled to gain altitude. As we were approaching the 
Bear Cat US Army base, we lost power and altitude and the pilot made 
a forced landing, fortunately in a new base being constructed for a US 
Army infantry brigade. This event could well have prematurely ended our 
Vietnam tour. The pilot stated that two people would have to remain with 
the construction engineers until another chopper could pick them up. 
Being the most junior officers on board we were certain we would have 
to deplane. I can only assume our brass shoulder pips inferred a higher 
rank than second lieutenant because a US Army major and captain were 
directed to stay.
On rejoining my platoon, I was advised my platoon sergeant, Rowdy 
Hindmarsh, had contracted glandular fever just prior to the departure 
of HMAS Sydney. He had not made the trip and it was six weeks before 
I received a replacement platoon sergeant. As a result, I carried out the 
additional responsibilities of platoon sergeant during this period, with 
the help of my three section commanders. This added to the load on me 
and my men as we commenced operations.
Preparation for Operation Hardihood occurred from 5  May, with all 
troops warned about security and the need for vigilance. Amazingly, prior 
to the operation commencing, a photo of the 5  RAR camp on ‘Back 
Beach’ at Vung Tau, including the sentry post showing Corporal Leslie 
‘Doc’ Urquhart of 8 Platoon, appeared in the Australian magazine Pix. 
Many diggers received copies from home requesting advice as to which 
was their tent.
During our time at Back Beach I was approached by an American who 
wore US Army greens but without insignia of any kind. He said he was part 
of a training team for Nungs, who were Chinese/Vietnamese operatives, 
but not of the South Vietnamese Army. He asked if I would like to see 
their training camp which was situated a few kilometres from Vung Tau. 
I sought and received permission to accompany him. The camp had two 
Nissen igloo huts that were chock-full of weapons from every part of 
the world and I suspected it might have been part of a CIA operation. 
The facility was impressive and as we were leaving he asked if there was 
any weapon I would particularly like to have. I indicated that the US 
.30 calibre M1 carbine had always impressed me. He laughed, saying he 
would bring a real weapon for me the next day. When he arrived next 
morning, he handed me a brand-new Armalite rifle and 5,000 rounds of 
ammunition for it. I thanked him and proceeded to advise my company 
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commander. He said I should keep it and when we were established at 
Nui Dat the platoon could practice with it in anticipation of our Second 
World War–era Owen machine carbines possibly being replaced by similar 
weapons. The weapon was an early AR15 version of the lightweight US 
5.56 mm M16 rifle, which was less unwieldy than our log 7.62 mm L1A1 
rifle and could be fired as a fully automatic weapon. About 10 weeks later, 
during weapons test firing, I tried the weapon and allowed my sergeant 
and corporals to fire it. The weapon had good hitting power and was light 
and compact, but the gas cylinder caked with carbon and seized up due to 
excessive oil in the working parts of the weapon. I had my sergeant take it 
to the battalion’s armourer and leave it with him. Sometime later we were 
issued with a newer, more effective version of this rifle which we soon 
learned not to over-lubricate.
The battalion commenced Operation Hardihood on the 24  May and 
C Company was airlifted to LZ Hudson. We were greeted by members 
of the US 173 Airborne Brigade who, despite their significant casualties 
in the weeks prior to our arrival, claimed there were no VC within 
miles. As we proceeded over the Song Cau River, we heard rifle fire from 
a  contact involving B Company and proceeded cautiously into the rubber 
plantation surrounding Nui Dat. We travelled for about 2 kilometres as 
a company, with two platoons forward in a reverse-arrowhead formation, 
before harbouring and having an early meal.
My 7 Platoon was tasked that night with setting a half-platoon ambush on 
a track junction at the edge of the rubber plantation, about 1 kilometre 
from the rest of C Company. After a night lying in soaking rain, adjusting 
to the noises of the jungle, with no sleep and not seeing any VC, I sent 
out clearing patrols at first light and then set out to rejoin C Company 
after advising by radio that we were returning to their position. This was 
acknowledged by company headquarters, and 8 and 9 Platoons who then 
alerted their troops. We proceeded in staggered file towards our platoon 
position and what followed could have been disastrous. As we approached 
our position with 3 Section leading, we were fired on. We hit the ground 
with Corporal Ray Orchard yelling out ‘contact front!’ A couple of seconds 
later someone called out, ‘It’s Orch’, and both groups called urgently for 
firing to stop. This incident highlighted a problem when a platoon was 
split for either patrolling or ambushing and the platoon radio was with 
the patrol or ambush group. As no provision had been made for a radio 
for the other element of my platoon, its members were unaware of our 
approach. In the early morning light our wet jungle green clothes appeared 
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black. It being our second day on operations, it was only reasonable the 
uninformed sentry would expect the worst and open fire. The positive 
outcome from this experience was the immediate requirement for an extra 
radio to be provided in any situation where one element of a platoon was 
on patrol while the other element remained with the company main body.
My platoon suffered its first casualties on 17 June when Corporal Graham 
McCray and Private Uri Wolk were wounded by a booby trap. We were 
on the first day of a three-day patrol west of Nui Dat. Conditions 
were very hot, and we were travelling in tall, thick grass without shade. 
We were on a tight schedule to clear this area and didn’t pause until 1330 
hours. I tried to radio our location to Company HQ but was unable to 
make contact, so advised BHQ instead. We recommenced the patrol and 
discovered a VC camp comprising a series of weapon pits camouflaged 
with overhead protection from artillery fire. These showed no evidence of 
being recently used so we destroyed them and recorded the site as a future 
artillery fire task; then we commenced the 4-kilometre trek to our night 
harbour position. We were travelling in 150-centimetre-high kunai grass 
when the forward scout struck a tripwire, detonating a grenade.
This caused severe shrapnel wounds to Graham McCray’s torso and Uri 
Wolk’s legs. The platoon reacted in practised fashion, adopting an all-
round defence stance. We were fortunate to have our stretcher bearer 
Private Ron Shoebridge with us and he immediately attended to the 
wounded. This incident occurred at 1430 hours and I tried to radio for 
a Dustoff helicopter, but the ANPRC 25 radio set, as we had experienced 
earlier on the patrol, was unreliable in thick country and contact could not 
be established with either C Company or BHQ. A rudimentary stretcher 
and a relay system were used to carry Graham while Uri walked assisted by 
Ron Shoebridge. We could only proceed at a rate that the forward scout 
determined was safe, and that the bearer party could manage.
It took three  hours in stifling heat to reach the edge of LZ Hudson. 
We finally established radio communications at 1740 hours with BHQ 
and arranged a Dustoff chopper. When the chopper arrived at 1757 hours 
the pilot asked us to indicate our position with a coloured smoke grenade. 
We activated yellow smoke but again our radio failed and the pilot, unable 
to verify with us the colour used, requested we throw smoke again. This 
time we threw red smoke, the radio came good, we were able to confirm 
the smoke was ours and the chopper landed and took the wounded to the 
US Army 36 Evacuation Hospital in Vung Tau, a flight of 20 minutes. 
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Graham McCray’s injuries were so severe he had to return to Australia. 
Uri Wolk rejoined the platoon after three weeks of recovering from 
his wounds.
After the Dustoff, we headed back into the jungle and harboured for the 
night, as we had insufficient daylight to rejoin the company position 
until next morning. I realised as we settled into night routine that my 
platoon had displayed, over the preceding five hours, a level of calmness 
and confidence that spoke well of their training and confidence in one 
another. We had experienced the shock of a booby trap exploding in our 
midst. The platoon had reacted well, going immediately into all-round 
defence. The men had then carried and assisted two injured mates and 
their weapons, ammunition and equipment for three hours in blistering 
heat through thick vegetation, with very little water, to place them on 
a  Dustoff chopper. We were all aware Graham McCray’s injuries were 
severe and hoped and prayed he would be OK. He had led 2 Section for 
our first month on operations as we continuously patrolled our designated 
search areas. He, like us, had grown used to living in wet clothes, spending 
hours staring into the black nothingness of the jungle while in ambush 
or on sentry picquet and dealing with mosquitoes, leeches and scorpions, 
but his short tour of duty was over.
We returned to base next morning where I was debriefed on the incident. 
I then received a briefing on my next patrol mission, was told to replenish 
rations and ammunition and ordered to move out after 8 and 9 Platoons 
returned from similar 48-hour patrols. We left base two days later, to 
return to the area where we had encountered the booby trap, with Private 
Don ‘Tubby’ Treloar stepping up from rifleman to machine gunner and 
Corporal Ted West becoming the commander of 2 Section. We were back 
to full fighting strength.
On 22  June we had covered over 8  kilometres within our designated 
search area before harbouring for an early evening meal at 1730 hours. 
This was to allow ample time for moving into an ambush position for 
the night. As we settled in, three VC moved across the front of 1 Section, 
about 200 metres away. Shots were exchanged before the VC escaped into 
the jungle. 1  Section moved out to sweep the area where the VC had 
been sighted but found no sign of casualties. A quantity of small arms 
ammunition was located during the sweep. Next morning, I was directed 
by company headquarters to provide an accurate grid reference for our 
contact to facilitate future artillery fire missions. This was done by taking 
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compass bearings on two clearly identifiable geographic features. Where 
the reciprocal bearings from the two features intersected on the map 
would be an accurate indication of our location. (Oh, how we could have 
used a modern hand-held GPS!) The area we were in was covered in thick 
foliage, so I took my radio operator, Private Bill Parkes, and proceeded 
to a point 100 metres to the north of the platoon position where I was 
able to observe two peaks of the Nui Thi Via mountains. I stood on a rice 
paddy bund to take the compass bearings and, as I did, four shots rang 
out. I heard the first crack over my head as I dropped to the ground, 
rolled into a firing position and bumped into Bill Parkes who had the 
same immediate reaction to the shots. The shooter was in a creek bed and 
I believe this accounted for the shots going high. I learnt some lessons 
from this encounter, like the effectiveness of hours of training leading to 
an instant response to being shot at and, more importantly, the perils of 
standing in the open engrossed in a navigation problem with my platoon 
some distance away with the platoon’s radio.
In early July the battalion commenced Operation Sydney to search the 
area around Nui Nghe, a prominent feature a few kilometres north-west 
of Nui Dat. C Company was tasked with searching the area north of this 
feature before sweeping over the hill to deal with any VC on the hill. 
During two days of patrolling in very thick jungle, many enemy camps 
and facilities were found and destroyed. The company was to move into 
position on the north-west slopes to advance on the hill summit, with 
8 and 9 Platoons to lead, and my platoon to move behind them in reserve. 
We were returning at about 1700 hours from a patrol prior to moving 
my platoon into position when an artillery barrage was called onto the 
top of the hill from where shots were being fired at our spotter plane. 
Three rounds overshot the hill and one exploded in the tree canopy near 
my platoon.
Lance Corporal Marinko ‘Titch’ Tomas received severe shrapnel wounds 
to his back from the tree burst. An urgent Dustoff was called and, as I had 
identified a suitable LZ about 150 metres from our position, I was directed 
to escort the stretcher party and secure the LZ with my platoon. As Titch 
was being placed on the chopper I patted his shoulder and told him he 
would be OK, but he died shortly after arriving at the hospital. He was 
the first Western Australian national serviceman killed in Vietnam. I knew 
him well, as we usually assisted Father John Williams, our battalion’s 
chaplain, when he said mass prior to us going out on operations. Titch 
was a good bloke and his death deeply affected me. On my return to 
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Australia, I visited his family who had been targeted with hate mail. They 
were relieved I was with him when he was wounded, and the family and 
I have remained friends.
The battalion continued saturation patrolling of all areas adjacent to 
Nui Dat and conducted cordon and search operations on some villages 
throughout July. These resulted in regular contacts with the VC and finding 
and destroying their installations. As August approached, I considered 
how we had measured up to the challenges that had confronted us to date, 
and appreciated the human endeavour involved in carrying out infantry 
operations in jungle terrain with the physical and mental strain involved.
Soon after we first arrived at Nui Dat, stress and fatigue became our 
constant companions. C Company had lost men killed and wounded but, 
throughout these early months, I witnessed a subtle change in my men’s 
demeanour. Every patrol deepened their solidarity. The skill of the forward 
scout or the alertness of the night picquet could mean the difference 
between life and death. My men uncomplainingly carried a 30-kilogram 
backpack plus a rifle, machine gun or radio set for kilometres in tropical 
heat, pressing quietly through thorny ‘wait-a-while’ vines and bamboo 
thickets with two-inch thorns, wading through streams, swamps and mud, 
all while staying alert and ready to react instantly; and then, at night, sat 
in inky blackness staring at nothingness during a tropical downpour while 
taking their turn at manning a machine gun. Such daily routines are but 
a few of the many parts of each man’s slice of a shared burden. His mates 
know they can rely on him and he gains their total trust. Mutual trust and 
dependence increased as the process was repeated day after day; and the 
resulting deep bonds were evident in the cohesion, confidence and easy 
camaraderie that pervaded the whole platoon.
In early August prior to a cordon and search of Binh Ba, most of 
the  battalion  were in base. Various games were organised between the 
companies, tug-of-war and volleyball being the easiest to organise. 
However, on this occasion as a follow-up to an earlier contest in Australia, 
C Company participated in a game of Australian rules football. The venue 
was the red, laterite clay of the under-construction airstrip on the northern 
side of Nui Dat hill, later to be known as Luscombe Field. The goal posts 
were two stacked aviation gasoline drums with single drums for the behind 
posts. The game was played in jungle greens and boots, with C Company 
shirtless. The competition was played in earnest with many a bump and 
spill, but in the end C  Company prevailed comfortably. While Roger 
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Wainwright and I  did well, the man of the match was C  Company’s 
centre half-back Private Syd Shore of 8 Platoon. This was possibly the first 
Aussie rules football game played in Vietnam and, sadly, not recorded in 
the official war history.
Binh Ba was the most significant village in our area of operations. 
On 7 August the battalion, reinforced by two companies from 6 RAR, 
commenced Operation Holsworthy to cordon and search the village. 
This was the most significant task undertaken by the battalion to date. 
Precise planning and efficient execution were essential to the success of 
this complex operation. After a long march to company assembly areas 
and a night insertion march through an old-growth rubber plantation, we 
waited in total darkness for the order to move into our respective blocking 
positions. There was no moon and inside the plantation was as black as 
pitch. To aid movement through the inky darkness we foraged in the leaf 
litter and found luminous lichen that we attached to each man’s backpack. 
I moved forward to get the forward section to do this and while returning 
stepped into a depression and twisted my ankle. My concern was not for 
my ankle but for the noise I made when falling. As there was no reaction 
from the direction of the village, I quickly returned to my position.
The effectiveness of the tactical planning by the battalion and its precise 
implementation produced an outstanding result. Some VC village cadre 
and ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) draft dodgers were 
apprehended without casualties to the battalion, a most outstanding 
result for such a complex operation. However, a far greater victory was 
achieved by this operation. The local villagers were aware of our presence 
in Phuoc Tuy province but had no real understanding of us or our purpose. 
At  various times individual villagers had been detained by platoon or 
company patrols as they tried to carry out their normal activities, which 
had in many instances been curtailed by our presence. The restriction on 
wood gathering and collection of fruit from gardens in some areas, along 
with the grazing of cattle, had all been a significant impost on the locals. 
We now had the village surrounded and the reaction we experienced as 
the people awoke was extraordinary. In our location an old woman came 
out of her house at daybreak to be confronted by four heavily armed 
Australians. She re-entered her house and reappeared 15  minutes later 
with a large kettle of lemongrass tea and proceeded to offer this to the 
men. I thought at the time, how would my or any Australian mother 
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have reacted to this situation. Clearly, we had made a good impression to 
reinforce a reputation which had probably preceded us; and our presence 
was welcomed by many of the villagers.
Our indication that the battalion would have an ongoing association with 
the village was also appreciated. I was impressed when, after searching 
the village and during our distributing of rice and spare rations, the large 
number of villagers who lined up to receive food did so in a polite manner 
with genuine appreciation for our kindness. An action that positively 
impacted our goal of winning the hearts and minds of these people, and 
those of the locally deployed Vietnamese 1 Commando Company, who 
were under the control of Captain Ron Boxall and his small team, was 
a game of soccer. We were much bigger and stronger than our opponents 
but were instructed to ensure the match ended in a draw. A few heated 
moments occurred during the game as enthusiastic players from both 
sides clashed vigorously in attacking the ball; however, all parties were 
happy with the result and our standing in the village was enhanced.
After the village search was completed, Captain Tony White, the battalion 
medical officer, provided a clinic service to locals during his regular visits 
to our troops. I took the opportunity on one of these visits to have my 
ankle examined as it was quite sore. My leg was black from the knee down 
and swollen. A severely sprained ankle was diagnosed, and Tony indicated 
he would arrange for me to be restricted to light duties when we returned 
to base. True to his word, when I returned to Nui Dat base three weeks 
later, I was appointed commander of a 12-man squad to provide security 
for the headquarters, Australian Force Vietnam, in Saigon. On my return 
to Australia, I was found to have snapped my lateral ligament in this 
incident. While much of our issued equipment was substandard, the 
fact that I was able to continue with operational duties in the jungle and 
mountains for a further eight months confirms this was not the case with 
our excellent calf-length boots, known as boots GP (general purpose).
The VC mortaring of the Task Force base on 17 August resulted in the 
whole battalion, except for C Company, returning to base next morning. 
We were to provide support for Binh Ba village as promised. When 
the Battle of Long Tan commenced early that afternoon, we followed 
its progress on the radio network, seriously concerned for the men of 
D  Company, 6  RAR, who, just 10  days before, had assisted us in the 
cordon and search of Binh Ba. We could hear the continuous roar of the 
artillery supporting D Company, 6 RAR, and then, at about 1600 hours, 
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the APC troop supporting us was recalled to rejoin the relieving force. 
We  were within artillery 105  mm gun range from Nui Dat and were 
directed to dig-in with overhead cover and expect an attack. We were 
on our own; however, I was proud of the quiet determination the men 
displayed as they set about preparing our defensive positions for an 
impending enemy attack. We spent a sleepless night on full alert, but no 
enemy came our way. I was pleased to greet the sun next day.
Following the Battle of Long Tan, all elements of the battalion were 
involved in intensive patrolling in the areas between Binh Ba and Nui 
Dat during the next four weeks to keep the VC off balance. As a result, 
we lived in filthy clothes for two weeks. This resulted in most of the men 
developing rashes and foot tinea due to the constant dampness. Our 
CO, John Warr, visited us regularly and introduced a rotation system for 
platoons to spend a day in Vung Tau swimming in the ocean. While the 
medical benefit may have been small, the impact on the men’s morale 
was significant.
On 6  October, Operation Canberra was undertaken to commence 
securing Route 15 through Phuoc Tuy Province to allow newly arrived 
elements of the US 4 Infantry Division to move from their port of entry, 
Vung Tau, to their Bear Cat base in Bien Hoa Province to the north. 
To achieve this, we had to first clear the Nui Thi Vai hills which overlooked 
the road. My platoon led C Company from Route 15 for two days before 
8 Platoon assumed the lead on the morning of 8 October. Just after 1030 
hours, 8 Platoon was fired on and encountered booby traps. Eight men 
were wounded and because of the denseness of the jungle it took over 
two hours for us to hand-clear an LZ for the Dustoff chopper. Once the 
wounded were safely away, I was directed to clear an enemy installation 
100 metres north of the LZ. This was a moment of truth. I was unsure 
of the extent of the installation to be cleared, the number of defenders, 
if any, and the layout of any fighting pits. It was my call, so I determined, 
after a brief reconnaissance, to have one section in a fire support position 
and to move through using one section up and the other behind in close 
support. 3 Section was to provide fire support and, as they moved into 
position, the section commander, Corporal Ray Orchard, screamed out, 
‘Stop’ to Private Alex Bernotas, who was wriggling into place. Ray had 
seen the booby trap, but his warning was too late. Shrapnel struck Alex in 
the lower back and wounded another three men. I was standing next to 
Ray who was wounded with a piece of shrapnel the size of five cent coin 
embedded in his forehead. Ray was the first person in our company to 
VIETNAM VANGUARd
214
spot a booby trap before it was detonated. A Dustoff helicopter was called 
and my wounded were taken to hospital. Alex Bernotas’s wounds were so 
severe he was returned to Australia. After this incident we were withdrawn 
500 metres while an airstrike and an artillery bombardment were brought 
to bear on the area in response to B Company contacting a large VC force 
on the Nui Thi Vai feature, further to our north.
Ray Orchard’s bushcraft was exceptional. Later in our tour of duty, 
when we were moving through very dense jungle with 1 Section leading, 
because of the thickness of the foliage, I was forward with the lead section 
check-navigating for Corporal Allan McNulty. Suddenly, shots were fired 
directly behind by Ray Orchard who shouted, ‘Contact left!’. The platoon 
went into a counter-ambush drill and Sergeant John Lee-Smith swept 
through the VC camp with 2  Section. The camp comprised about 50 
weapon pits, a sandal factory and a kitchen with rice cooking. The VC 
had bolted into the thick scrub and we were unable to locate any sign of 
their having taken casualties. I quizzed Ray on how he had seen the VC 
sentry. He said, ‘I just looked through the leaves.’ Given that 10 people 
had stared into that area, it was his observation skills which certainly saved 
our lives. Ray Orchard was a special soldier who inspired men by his 
actions and leadership, he was a natural leader and he was Aboriginal. His 
section comprised a blend of older regular soldiers and young national 
servicemen; but Ray saw no difference between them. They were his 
boys and they respected his authority. His bushcraft was without peer 
in the company and some of us owed their lives to his skills. Respect 
and admiration for Ray extended throughout the whole battalion. I kept 
contact with Ray after we returned to Australia and saw both his anger 
when refused entry to a Queensland RSL (Returned and Services League) 
club and his joy at the 1987 national Welcome Home march. I was 
honoured to present his eulogy when he died in February 2013. Ray was 
an Australian soldier, which says it all. He was a man of courage, honesty 
and integrity and we loved and respected him as a brother.
Later that day we moved towards B Company’s position to harbour for 
the night. We were located on the side of a very steep hill with only 
a small area of flat ground, which company headquarters occupied. It was 
impossible to set a perimeter due to the terrain, so the men were grouped 
in proximity to the gun positions to enable the night picquet to operate. 
I slept that night with my feet against a tree almost in the vertical position 
due to the steepness of the hill. Next day my platoon was leading the 
company as we moved back to the VC base complex where we had taken 
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casualties. As we approached the installation, I observed a broken branch, 
a VC sign for a tripwire ahead. I called a halt just as my forward scout, 
Private Ken Warren, sent hand signals to indicate an obstacle and for me 
to come forward to see for myself. The tripwire was attached to a Chicom 
grenade and, as we looked for a place to get off the track, we realised both 
sides were heavily booby-trapped with vines attached to grenades. Our 
attached combat engineers were called forward. They disarmed a tripwire 
stretched across the track and we moved cautiously into the complex.
The enemy base contained a hospital, large quantities of drugs, 10 tonnes 
of rice and a booby trap workshop. With little time available we did our 
best to destroy the camp, but we were required to secure Route 15 the 
following day, so we left late in the afternoon for our new position along 
the road. It must have seemed strange to the incoming Americans to see 
us waving them on, in floppy bush hats and often shirtless. The American 
units moving along Route 15 wore flak jackets and steel helmets and the 
floors of their vehicles were sandbagged to protect against mines A major 
general stopped his jeep and expressed his thanks to me, saying how happy 
he was to be working with professionals. I looked at my men and realised 
that, while they did not match the fresh look of the new-to-country 
Americans, I’m sure there was something about their easy confidence and 
the way they carried themselves which attracted the compliment.
We did not completely leave the Nui Thi Vai hills to the VC, for we 
returned to the area after securing the road as part of the US Army 
Operation Robin. This new thrust into the same hills was called 
Operation Queanbeyan. It involved a lot of scrub-bashing as we searched 
further into the hills without any contact with the enemy, although other 
companies and BHQ had significant enemy contacts which are described 
in Chapters 7 and 15.
November 1966 saw the battalion just halfway into our 12-month tour of 
duty in Vietnam. There was much more to follow but such events extend 
beyond the period covered by this book. To round out my narrative as 
one of the first five national service officers to lead Australian soldiers in 
combat operations I shall close my tale with a brief description of my 
departure from 5 RAR and the men who remain my brothers to this day.
My tour of Vietnam ended on 12  April 1967 and the manner of its 
occurring deserves mention. At 1000 hours on that day, our CO, John 
Warr, flew from Nui Dat to the Horseshoe Hill feature in a Sioux 
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helicopter and asked for me to join him. As kindly as it is possible, he 
told me my younger brother had been killed in a road accident and my 
parents had asked for my return to Australia. He said, ‘Your tour here 
is completed, if you wish to go home I will make it happen.’ He agreed 
that I should speak to my men as there was still one week of operations 
to go before our relief by 7 RAR. My men expressed sorrow at my losing 
a brother and told me to go.
I left the Horseshoe in the CO’s Sioux at 1030 hours, returned to Nui 
Dat, changed into civilian clothes which had been 12 months in a tin 
trunk and was driven to the airstrip where I boarded an RAAF Caribou 
aircraft for Saigon. I was met at Tan Son Nhut airport by a consular 
official and handed a passport which included a signature copied from 
my pay book. I travelled by Air Vietnam to Singapore, boarded a BOAC 
(British Overseas Airways Corporation) aircraft and arrived in Perth at 
midnight. My total journey had taken 13  hours. To put this journey 
into perspective, John Warr, who at times had responsibility for almost 
1,000 troops in combat, had taken the time to arrange my rapid return 
to Australia. He was compassionate and always showed empathy for his 
men. He was on outstanding CO and the results achieved by our battalion 
during its tour of duty attest to this.
Editors’ conclusion
Chapters 8, 9, 10 and 15 provide comprehensive insights into the day-to-
day experiences of 5 RAR’s junior officers and their men in the operational 
environment which prevailed in the first six months of 1 ATF’s deployment 
into Phuoc Tuy Province. Their narratives have been included in this 
book to convey an idea of the diverse hardships that confronted some 
of the nation’s young men when they were among the first Australians 
to be committed into that challenging environment; and to show how 
they coped and settled into operations. For this reason, their stories have 
concentrated on the first six months of our battalion’s first tour of duty in 
Vietnam. They are but a few of innumerable personal stories that can be 





Ron Boxall and Ron Bade
Introduction by Robert O’Neill
In taking part in the Vietnam War we were aware that once again 
Australia was providing a small contingent in a major conflict which our 
principal allies regarded as very important. We had played a similar role 
in the Second World War and the Korean War. We thought it very likely 
that Australia would be called upon to give similar service and support 
in future conflicts in this region, under US leadership. Therefore, we, as 
soldiers, wanted to test the effectiveness of our alliance partnership at the 
ground force level. We were keen to have direct personal experience of 
how it worked, and to draw our own conclusions for the future from 
a year of operating together.
Soon after 5th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR), had 
settled into its final perimeter within the newly established 1st Australian 
Task Force (1  ATF) base at Nui Dat, the battalion was required to 
provide personnel for tasks which were well beyond our normal range 
of responsibilities. One of our officers was detached to work with 
a CIA-sponsored activity and, later, another was detached to be an adviser 
to a South Vietnamese Army Regional Force company transferred from 
the Saigon area. The activities of both elements were confined to Phuoc 
Tuy Province, within 10 kilometres of 1 ATF’s base at Nui Dat. Captains 
Boxall and Bade each describe their experiences and thoughts on these 




In mid-to-late July 1966 I was going about my chores as second in 
command (2IC) of D Company, 5 RAR. Our company base within the 
1 ATF perimeter at Nui Dat was on the upper eastern slopes of the Nui 
Dat hill feature. We were geographically separated from the rest of the 
battalion and in the enviable position of not being sited on the more 
vulnerable parts of the 1  ATF base perimeter. I suppose this was how 
I  came to be selected as more readily available than others for a job 
detached from 1 ATF.
For a young temporary captain, the experiences I was about to have 
would prove intriguing, eye-opening and quite instructive. Despite any 
seemingly sour notes in the following paragraphs, I would not have missed 
the sojourn at any price. Its many lessons were pure gold.
My recall of dates throughout the period I describe is clouded 
because I  didn’t  keep a diary, and second, the day-to-day activity of 
the group to which I was assigned wasn’t required to be reported to 
Headquarters  1  ATF  (HQ 1  ATF). From the start of my detachment 
from 5 RAR I maintained a radio on 1 ATF’s command radio net, but 
I was never fed any information by it or required to furnish details of my 
day-to-day activities. On the few occasions when I offered information 
I thought was pertinent, my efforts drew what I took to be a mixture 
of confusion and indifference. So, I desisted, resolving to maintain 
radio communications to report only incidents of pressing operational 
importance and to ensure that I had a means of calling for artillery fire 
support. I seemed to be regarded as something of a wild card who was 
monitoring the 1 ATF command net to keep myself in the picture about 
what was going on around me. Thus, most details of my activities were 
not recorded either by myself or in the 1 ATF radio log. In retrospect 
I think that I was considered as working for an obscure foreign agency to 
whom my activities were of immediate importance and from which any 
relevant intelligence and other information would filter to 1 ATF through 
the US Phuoc Tuy provincial headquarters. Crazily, I had no means of 
communicating with my American civilian ‘boss’ in Ba Ria other than 
by visiting him; a one-way arrangement in that my visits were never 
reciprocated.
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The events that followed gave me an insight into the pseudo-military 
shenanigans which some of our American allies seemed to hold in great 
store. I accept that there were probably some ‘sneaky-Pete’ triumphs they 
could claim, but my experiences of them left me with the conclusion that 
the results of such activities in Phuoc Tuy in the early days of 1 ATF’s 
operations were quantifiable only in the negative. I have since concluded 
that, apart from insisting that a 1  ATF officer be assigned to a CIA 
intelligence operation in Phuoc Tuy, the commander of 1 ATF probably 
had no say in the presence or activities of a ‘Combined Studies Group’ 
(CSG) operation within his bailiwick; CSG being one of the flimsy noms 
de guerre used by the CIA during the Vietnam War. Additionally, it soon 
became clear to me that those directing the CSG were not happy with 
the arrangement which inserted an outsider into their cabal. Inevitably, 
I developed the view that its ongoing activities in the province had more 
to do with the preservation of US intelligence agency fiefdoms than being 
a seriously considered part of prosecuting the local shooting war. The 
concept of CSG efforts in Phuoc Tuy Province was arcane and its hard-to-
glimpse rationale seemed little more than delusive chicanery – less macabre, 
but similar in mentality to the US military’s lamentable predilection for 
inflating enemy body counts throughout the Vietnam War.
I left 5 RAR to report to HQ 1 ATF, awash with confidence that I would 
receive a detailed briefing and accompanying orders but was simply 
told that I was to replace another 1  ATF officer currently ‘running’ 
a Vietnamese ‘outfit’ presently located in the large village of Hoa Long, 
which was noted for the mixed loyalties of its inhabitants. It was the 
capital of Long Le district and located astride Route 2 between 1 ATF’s 
base at Nui Dat and the provincial capital, Ba Ria. I was to contact this 
officer and he would brief me. I soon located him and his small team of 
three Australians, whom I will describe shortly.
Meeting him and seeing his ‘headquarters’, located in a disused schoolhouse 
roughly in the centre of Hoa Long, did little for my enthusiasm for what 
might lie ahead. The man I was to relieve was also a 1 ATF infantry captain 
who appeared slightly older than me. Surprisingly I did not know him, 
nor had I ever heard of him. He was a thin, sallow-complexioned man 
with a narrow, Hollywood-hero moustache. He sported a standard army 
bush hat which had been starched and carefully shaped into a version of 
a civilian pork-pie hat, which he wore perched squarely and set low on 
his brow. He had the appearance of a minor Damon Runyon character – 
rather like a fugitive from a race course betting ring. His general manner 
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and lack of enthusiasm conveyed that he was not impressed with his 
current circumstances and was much looking forward to putting them 
behind him.
His ‘briefing’, though reasonably comprehensive, was unstructured and 
delivered mostly by responding to my queries or prompts by his team 
members. He thus conveyed that the non-ARVN (Army of the Republic 
of Vietnam) company-sized unit was recruited, equipped and paid by the 
CSG’s chief agent in Phuoc Tuy Province who operated from Ba Ria. 
In effect they were civilians; a mixture of Nungs (Vietnamese Chinese) and 
Montagnards (aboriginal people from Vietnam’s mountainous regions). 
Allegedly both groups had a deep-seated dislike of the Vietnamese. By 
joining this CSG program they were absolved from service in the ARVN 
and were paid more than their ARVN counterparts, but there was no rank 
structure as such. Their leaders at company, platoon and squad levels were 
described as having been elected by their peers and received a pay-loading 
for the honour. There were no apparent disciplinary arrangements or 
clear means of enforcing rules or orders other than the threat of dismissal. 
For the most part they were dressed in elaborately patterned camouflage 
uniforms and armed with a variety of weapons, many of which were of 
non-US origin. They sported berets with a badge depicting a rearing cobra 
and most wore M26 hand grenades on the chest straps of their equipment, 
while carrying about them a range of other military and civilian items 
which gave the appearance of an armed flock of itinerant hoarders. They 
were currently scattered in small groups among Hoa Long’s many houses, 
supposedly as a deterrent to Viet Cong movement in and out of the very 
large village. There being no radio communications within the group, the 
only method of internal communication was by gatherings of platoon 
and squad ‘leaders’. The senior member or ‘company commander’ was 
described as a mere figurehead who nodded wisely as instructions, all 
devised and coordinated by the ‘advisers’, were imparted.
The group went by two names. Depending on the speaker’s preference, 
they were variously referred to as 1 Commando Company (1 Cdo Coy) 
or the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit. In other words, whichever took 
your fancy would do. In this narrative I will stick to 1 Cdo Coy which 
seemed to be the 1 ATF preference. At the completion of his ‘briefing’ my 
predecessor departed with a flippant farewell to me and his former team 
members, which we returned in kind. My new colleagues soon made it 
clear that they regarded his replacement as a relief in more than one sense 
of the word.
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The small team of ‘advisers’ I was to head consisted of two Australian 
Army Training Team (AATTV) warrant officers (WO), Alan Seale and 
‘Squizzy’ Taylor, and a Vietnamese linguist from HQ 1 ATF, Corporal 
‘Bondi’ Bailey. Alan proved to be a crusty, no-nonsense Englishman 
with  many years of service as an Australian infantryman. Squizzy was 
a steady ordnance WO having his first experience of more warrior-
like duties. Both became great backstops for me and relieved many 
uncertainties with their wise counsel, versatility and remarkable 
adaptability. Bondi Bailey was another great operator; steady, reliable and 
a very accomplished interpreter.
The district chief, Dai Uy (Captain) Kim, had his district headquarters 
in Hoa Long but it proved hard to arrange a meeting with him until an 
incident occurred which caused our paths to cross, when he demonstrated 
that he was both perceptive and a man of action. He was very unhappy 
with the presence of 1 Cdo Coy in his district capital and had been so 
since they were first thrust into his domain. He claimed to have no say in 
their presence or their activities which were disruptive and resented by all 
villagers, irrespective of their political loyalties. By the time I met Kim this 
resentment had already become apparent to me through observing the 
clearly poor relations between the villagers and 1 Cdo Coy personnel. This 
seemed largely related to the pestering of village women, boozy behaviour 
and chicken rustling. I’m sure that the villagers’ resentment included 
a strong element of fear of these interlopers.
A week or so after my arrival in Hoa Long a short succession of shots came 
from the village market place not far from our schoolhouse. Grabbing our 
weapons, we moved around the intervening houses to the market place 
where we found a relatively calm gathering of villagers milling around 
something which was holding their attention. Moving cautiously through 
the throng we met Kim and his adviser, a US Army captain. Both were 
armed with M16 rifles and before them lay the body of one of 1 Cdo 
Coy’s members. Kim explained that the dead man had been drunk and 
threatening villagers with his weapons. He had been summoned to the 
scene and, after assessing the problem, applied his long-held policy of 
never arguing with a heavily armed drunk and promptly shot him. After 
we recovered the man’s weapons and ammunition, Kim arranged the 
disposal of his body. The man’s demise didn’t seem to affect his comrades 
unduly; the villagers remained impassive. Clearly all had become 
inured to witnessing the swift justice which often went with the overt 
authoritarianism commonly practised at the lower levels of the South 
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Vietnamese government. When I reported the loss of this man to my 
CSG ‘boss’ it was dismissed with a verbal shrug and the conversation 
moved on to other matters.
This brings me to a description of how my interaction with the CSG in 
Phuoc Tuy Province played out. Immediately following the departure of 
my predecessor, I visited my ‘boss’ in his villa headquarters in Ba Ria. His 
name was Mathews and he claimed to be a former corporal in the US 
Marine Corps. He basically confirmed what my predecessor had told me. 
Throughout our conversation he was either unsure of the rationale behind 
the presence of 1 Cdo Coy in Phuoc Tuy or was being clumsily guarded 
about it. When I asked what type of operations they had been trained for, 
he became quite vague and spoke in circles about infiltration of Viet Cong 
village infrastructure and its subsequent elimination. Experience and events 
soon revealed that, apart from some basic weapons training, evidence of 
realistic training to those ends was not to be found. Apparently connected 
with his headquarters were three AATTV members, one captain and two 
WOs, who were unmistakeably reticent about conversing with me. It was 
never revealed to me exactly what they did, and I was left to speculate 
about their role. Their combined attitude and attire excited mild disdain. 
They were dressed in civilian clothes, with shirts tantalisingly unfastened 
at the top few buttons, and at hip level they wore low-slung leather 
holsters emblazoned with the bold letters ‘US’ and containing ubiquitous 
Colt .45 calibre automatic pistols. One of the WOs was overweight and 
looked particularly comical.
A short time afterwards I was advised that Mathews had been replaced so 
I went to Ba Ria to meet my new ‘boss’. To the best of my memory his 
name was Buckley and he claimed to be a former US Army lieutenant 
colonel. He was a taciturn man who gave the impression that he had 
been sent in as a new broom to tidy up the local CSG operation. His first 
task for me was to fire a third of the 1 Cdo Coy’s members and recover 
their weapons. On my return to Hoa Long our small team burned the 
midnight oil to devise a scheme for what might prove to be a very delicate 
administrative manoeuvre.
Our plan was simple and worked smoothly. We were to kick things off 
on the next pay day, beginning with an assembly parade in front of the 
school house which contained a few separate but interconnected rooms. 
The members were told that all weapons, ammunition and equipment 
were to be checked for serviceability or replacement on pay day. They 
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were told to deposit their present weapons, ammunition and equipment 
in a large room at the end of the building via an external door and return 
to the ‘pay parade’ in front of the school house, and that payment would 
commence when this was completed. When all had complied, the large 
room was made secure and payment was commenced with individuals 
entering the pay room one at a time. The pay room was connected by 
doors to two other large rooms. After being paid, each of those who had 
been selected for retention were directed into one of the adjoining rooms 
and the ‘discards’ were directed to the other. Both groups were to remain 
in these rooms until pay was completed.
When all had been paid, the discards were released into the custody of 
Kim’s ARVN soldiers who arranged their rapid removal from Hoa Long. 
The ‘keepers’ were then reissued with their weapons, ammunition and 
equipment, and organisational adjustments and reassignments to tasks 
were made. The operation was completed by returning most of the 
recovered weapons to CSG. Recovered ammunition and equipment items 
were retained as an immediate resupply pool. The reaction of the ‘keepers’ 
to dismissal of the ‘discards’ seemed to be one of general indifference – but, 
after all, they still had their jobs. I later heard that such rationalisations 
were an occasional feature of life in the employ of CSG in Phuoc Tuy 
Province. This must have been an ongoing depletion of the certitude and 
morale of 1 Cdo Coy’s members, not to mention their loyalty.
After a few weeks at Hoa Long, 1 Cdo Coy was redeployed to the village 
of Binh Ba which was located on Route 2, some 7 kilometres north of the 
1 ATF base at Nui Dat. No reason was given for the change of location, 
but their task remained to deter Viet Cong movement in and out of Binh 
Ba village, which was quite a different situation from Hoa Long. It was 
the location of a French-owned rubber plantation and processing factory. 
The operation’s business name was Don Dien de Gallia. The village 
was adjacent to the factory and consisted of well-arranged, substantial 
dwellings for housing the factory employees and plantation workers. 
A  fine Roman Catholic Church was a part of the village and it was 
served by a very canny, diminutive, French-educated priest called Pere 
Joseph. Slightly apart from the village and near the factory were a pair of 
large two-storeyed villas which housed two Frenchmen, the operation’s 
manager, Jean-Jacques Pernes, and its engineer, Monsieur Moreau. 
A couple of hundred metres to the north of the village a large grass airfield 
extended 2,000 metres westwards from a satellite hamlet, Ap Ngai Giao, 
also located on Route 2. About a third of the way along its length, on its 
northern side, there was another villa which was unoccupied. Pernes and 
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Moreau both spoke Vietnamese and I communicated with them in that 
language through Bondi Bailey. A short time later, a French-born soldier 
from 5 RAR, Private Ron ‘Frenchy’ Delaurey-Simpson, joined our team 
to provide another avenue of communication.
It was clear that Pernes and Moreau did not want 1 Cdo Coy personnel 
living around the village houses as they had done in Hoa Long. Their 
reputation had probably preceded them. Instead, I had the use of the villa 
beside the airstrip and the 1 Cdo Coy ‘troops’ were deployed to its north in 
the adjacent rubber plantation. From there they went about various minor 
tasks associated with being a ‘deterring presence’. Determining their tasks 
was complicated by the certainty that most of them couldn’t be trusted 
out of sight; and it was not long before problems like those experienced 
at Hoa Long re-emerged. I had been told that the sudden redeployment 
from the Long Le district capital to this commercial operation’s workers’ 
village in Duc Thanh district was done at the request of the Phuoc Tuy 
province chief, Colonel Dat. In response to my queries, the upbeat yet 
slightly evasive way in which this information was confirmed by my 
usually taciturn CSG ‘boss’, Buckley, led me to suspect that there was 
more to the story. Subsequent events were to reinforce my suspicions.
One day a light aircraft landed on the village airstrip and taxied to the 
western end of Binh Ba, opposite ‘my’ villa. With some flying experience 
and a keen interest in light aircraft I recognised it as a Helio Courier, 
a relatively rare and highly capable American short take-off and landing 
aircraft. As I drove towards where the aircraft was parked I noted that it 
was unpainted and had no markings apart from a black serial number 
on the tail fin. As I got closer I saw that it had ‘AIR AMERICA’ in quite 
small letters on the side of the fuselage, just behind the wings. As I arrived 
near where it had parked, Pernes and Moreau also arrived in their small 
Citroen CV2. Two civilians wearing sidearms emerged from the aircraft 
and, after cursory nods to me, one of them engaged Pernes and Moreau 
in conversation in Vietnamese. Bondi Bailey wasn’t with me and I could 
not follow what was said. After a short time, a tightly packed bundle, 
approximately 30x30x30 centimetres in size and neatly tied with some 
sort of binding wire or cord, was transferred from the aircraft to the 
Citroen. From about six or seven metres it looked to me like paper money. 
With nothing further said, and nods all round to me, the Frenchmen 
and the Americans departed in their respective machines. Assuming CSG 
would be aware of their Air America confreres’ activities I thought no 
more about it until two days later when Pernes approached me. He asked 
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whether I knew of any artillery tasks that might be fired during the next 
day or so to the north along Route  2 towards the Courtenay rubber 
plantation. I replied that I was not permitted give him any details of 
operational matters. He readily accepted my reply and I asked why he 
wanted to know such things. He replied, quite matter-of-factly, that he 
needed to go north along Route 2 to a rendezvous (with the Viet Cong) 
where he would ‘pay the next of his company’s “tax” instalments’ which 
allowed its operations to continue unmolested. I knew it would be 
pointless to ask him to provide more details as it would be inviting him 
to possibly compromise himself and his workers. It was left for me to 
ponder why the CIA was delivering money to be paid to the Viet Cong 
via a French rubber plantation operation. I suspect the real answer would 
have been both mind-boggling in its complexity and deliciously absurd 
in its rationale.
At one point a jeep with three US Army communications specialists 
arrived unannounced to stay for a few days. They described themselves 
as a ‘radio research team’ whose equipment was used to obtain fixes on 
enemy radio locations. They were emphatic about removing their signals 
equipment, documentation and weapons from their vehicle and securely 
stowing them inside the villa but left numerous items in the unattended 
jeep. Some of these were promptly liberated by untraceable elements 
of 1 Cdo Coy. The new arrivals were particularly upset about the loss of 
some bourbon whisky, their other missing items being of comparatively 
small concern. Their marked attention to the security of their radio 
equipment seemed curious considering they were tasked to swan about 
the countryside in their lone-runner jeep, obviously prone to ambush and 
loss to the enemy of their sensitive equipment, not to mention their lives. 
Their parent organisation was obviously comprised of deep thinkers.
Around this time, I received a message from 1 ATF that Land Rover spare 
parts were in short supply. I was to return my Australian Army vehicle as 
soon as possible and should approach my CSG ‘boss’ about supplying me 
with another vehicle before I relinquished the Land Rover. I did so, and 
he gave me a completed US Army requisition form and told me to submit 
it to the US Army cannibalisation point at Cat Lo near Vung Tau where 
I was told to come back in a week’s time and a jeep would be put together 
for me. When I returned, the non-commissioned officer (NCO) attending 
to me required a receipt for the ‘bitzer’ M38 A1 jeep. I was unsure of all 
the implications but, being an admirer of Major Stan Maizey’s dubious 
but effective acquisition techniques, I supplied a signature; not my own, 
VIETNAM VANGUARd
226
but a signature indeed. The NCO didn’t care – he had a signature and was 
not interested in my bona fides. On the way back to Binh Ba I dropped off 
the Land Rover at 1 ATF, where I had its .30 calibre Browning machine 
gun and its mounting transferred to the jeep, before making my way back 
to Binh Ba.
Phase 1 of 5 RAR’s Operation Holsworthy was a very successful cordon 
and search of Binh Ba on the night of 7/8 August 1966. Following the 
cordon and search, as I described earlier, 1 Cdo Coy was moved from 
Hoa Long to the area of the villa by the airfield at Binh Ba, while 5 RAR 
continued with Operation Holsworthy in and around Binh Ba. In his 
Commander’s Diary for August, Brigadier Jackson ‘propose[d] to maintain 
a [5 RAR] rifle company with sections of mortars and APCs [armoured 
personnel carriers] at Binh Ba until [he was] satisfied that the Province 
Chief can assure the security of the place’.
On 17 August the 1 ATF base at Nui Dat was mortared and Operation 
Holsworthy was terminated, with all elements of 5 RAR except C Company 
returning to Nui Dat. On the following day, 18 August, the Battle of Long 
Tan took place some 8 kilometres to our south-east. I and my small team 
listened intently to the 1  ATF command net throughout these events. 
Should the Viet Cong elements involved at Long Tan have moved in our 
direction, our survival plan was based on the reasonable belief that 1 Cdo 
Coy would decamp at the first hint of trouble. Fortunately, the enemy 
survivors of Long Tan retired in other directions and our self-extraction 
plan was shelved.
Over 50 years later I became aware of a 5  RAR operation order for 
Operation Woolloomooloo which is dated 17 August 1966, the day before 
the Battle of Long Tan. It was clearly prepared in haste as it was signed 
by Major Bert Cassidy and not 5 RAR’s operations officer Major Max 
Carroll, who would have been flat out with other very pressing priorities 
as the first major Australian engagement of the war was unfolding. The 
purpose of Operation Woolloomooloo was to fulfil the Commander 
1 ATF’s diarised intention to maintain a rifle company with mortars and 
APCs (armoured personnel carriers) at Binh Ba on a rotation of seven to 
10 days until the province chief could provide a suitable ARVN presence 
there. The operation order’s mission paragraph reads, ‘The 5RAR rifle 
company is to provide support to 1Cdo Coy at Binh Ba’. In its ‘friendly 
forces’ paragraphs it details 1 Cdo Coy’s tasks at Binh Ba, none of which 
I had heard either formally or fully expressed 50 years earlier from any 
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source. It also stated that ‘1 Cdo Coy operates through an Australian 
adviser and is under the tactical control of 5RAR’. These and many other 
revelations were contained in this operation order which I saw for the 
first time in late 2017 while checking facts for this narrative. With some 
bemusement and annoyance, I looked at its Distribution List and found 
that neither CSG, 1 Cdo Coy nor I appeared as recipients of any of its 
70 copies.
5  RAR’s operational files show that, following Operation Holsworthy, 
C Company remained in the vicinity. It was listed as the first of 5 RAR’s 
rifle companies undertaking the rotation at Binh Ba from 23 August to 
14 September, followed by A, B and D Companies until 4 October, when 
Operation Woolloomooloo concluded prior to the commencement of 
Operation Canberra in the Nui Thi Vai hills on 6 October. At no stage 
of my sojourn at Binh Ba was there any mention of an operation code-
named Woolloomooloo. It is interesting to note that it is not mentioned 
in the official history nor in Bob O’Neill’s Vietnam Task. Understandably, 
the operation order was probably prepared in haste then de-prioritised 
and somewhat forgotten in the turbulence of Long Tan and its aftermath. 
It was to remain unmentioned by any recorder of 1 ATF’s early history 
in Phuoc Tuy Province.
Shortly before Operation Woolloomooloo concluded, I was advised that 
1 Cdo Coy was to be removed from Binh Ba and returned to CSG’s fold 
for employment elsewhere. I was not given any reason for its withdrawal, 
but it was obvious to all that its effectiveness was non-existent, and its 
presence was disruptive. On the day before its withdrawal I was recalled 
to 5  RAR to be involved in Operation Canberra, commanding the 
defence component of a 103 Field Battery gun position beside Route 15 
near Ap Ong Trinh Dp. My obvious means of movement was the jeep 
in my possession, so I drove it to Nui Dat, accepting that I might have 
to surrender it subsequently.
On my return to 5 RAR I made the mistake of driving through battalion 
headquarters on my way to D Company when I caught the eagle eye of 
Stan Maizey. Obeying his firm indication to pull up beside him I was 
confronted by his best quizzical and covetous scowl. ‘Where did you get 
this?’ was his opening gambit. I gave him the details. His response was, 
‘Well, I’ll be having it!’ I said, ‘No sir!’ He said, ‘What? Come again!’ 
I said, ‘No sir – I scrounged it fair and square!’ His frown softened, the 
corners of his mouth curved into a wisp of a smile and, with the merest 
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hint of admiration, he conspiratorially asked, ‘Can you get any more?’ 
To his clear disappointment the gist of my reply was, ‘Unlikely’. Next day 
he sent a message to D Company, ‘In view of the scarcity of spare parts, 
and with the advent of Jack 1 [the jeep’s new nickname], D Company is 
to return one of its two Land Rovers to the Battalion vehicle pool’. Stan 
was a hard man to beat – but he did like a trier. The jeep postscript is that 
I was never asked to surrender it and, when D Company left Nui Dat to 
occupy the Horseshoe hill feature 7  kilometres south-east of Nui Dat, 
it was bequeathed to the chaplains who usually had to cadge lifts to go 
about their ministrations.
Although the term was never used, I later presumed that 1  Cdo Coy 
may have been an experimental part of the so-called ‘Phoenix Program’ 
which was supposed to target and eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure 
(VCI) at village level. In the American television series The Vietnam War, 
made in 2017, Tran Ngoc Chau, the South Vietnamese progenitor of 
the Phoenix (Phung Hoang) Program, spoke briefly. He disappointedly 
described it as ‘his teenager who went astray and was lost to his foster 
parents’ (the CIA?).
The Phoenix Program was rated poorly in the television series, with only 
a brief negative mention of it as an ‘assassination and torture program’. 
Brigadier Chamberlain, the author of Appendix D, noted in January 2018:
My experience of Phoenix when working in the Phuoc Tuy 
Provincial Intelligence Operations Centre in 1969, was that it was 
ineffectual due partly to distrust and little cooperation between 
the ‘competing’ agencies.
He also noted that, as late as June 1970, 1 ATF reports assessed that the 
Phoenix Program:
achieved very few results  …  there had been a reduction in the 
VCI (Viet Cong Infrastructure) resulting from 1ATF ambushes, 
contacts, air strikes and Hoi Chan (defectors), but remarkably 
little that can be attributed to the Phung Hoang (Phoenix) 
Program … Most VCI eliminations are a direct result of 1ATF 
operations, identification of VCI personnel from captured 
documents, defectors and prisoner of war interrogations … Few 
of those eliminated have been important cadres at village level, 
most being low level supply organizers … The (Allied) intelligence 
community is fragmented and uncoordinated.
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Towards the end of Chapter  5, Bob O’Neill gives an insight into the 
jealousies and rivalries at play among and between the intelligence and 
operations staff of US military headquarters at various levels. One can 
only imagine, with some incredulity, what the relationships between the 
military intelligence communities and the US ‘spook’ agencies must have 
been like – somewhere between feigned and non-existent? In their military 
doctrine the Americans subscribe to nine principles of war. One of them, 
unity of command, is described as having the purpose of ‘ensuring unity 
of effort under one responsible commander for every objective’.
Why then did the commander of 1 ATF, who had the overall objective 
of defeating the Viet Cong in his assigned area of operations, need to 
endure quasi-military activities by non-military US agencies, together 
with the presence of loosely controlled ARVN elements within areas in 
which he was conducting operations without having at least temporary 
control over them? An ARVN artillery incident during Operation Robin, 
which is described by George Bindley towards the end of Chapter 12, 
illustrates both the perils and diseconomies of not addressing this need. 
Such issues raise obvious questions about why peripheral CIA intelligence 
activity with its associated quasi-military operations needed to be 
sequestered from the primary military effort, and why inability or failure 
to coordinate effectively all contributions to warfighting at the operational 
and tactical levels seemed to pervade the way in which the Vietnam War 
was conducted.
The resulting confusion was exacerbated by the cynical obfuscation that 
the Government of South Vietnam was in command of the war, supported 
by allies, principally the United States. No amount of window dressing 
could conceal that it was America’s chosen war and that her military were 
directing its operations, albeit alongside an apparently separate battlefield 
involvement of the CIA.
Our American friends might say that poor ARVN reliability imposed an 
imperative need for strict adherence to other US principles of war, like 
security and surprise, which outweighed need for unity of command. 
Perhaps so, but the routine, continual sidelining of any fundamental 
principle is a form of fraudulent self-deception. It is often held that fraud 
is a virtue in war; but only when it is practised against the enemy and not 
allowed to become a delusory and energy-consuming internal malady.
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While reflecting on the broader Vietnam War during the many months of 
this book’s gestation, I came across a commentary in the Time magazine 
issue for 9 April 2018. It was written by Admiral James Stavritis, US Navy, 
a former supreme allied commander of NATO. He drew attention to 
a book, Dereliction of Duty, by Lieutenant General HR McMaster, US 
Army. Published in 1997, it was based on a very highly rated doctoral 
thesis which McMaster had prepared as a major and graduate student at 
the University of North Carolina. Dereliction of Duty became a bestseller 
and has been studied in many US military colleges and research institutes. 
In his comments, Admiral Stavritis opined that:
Dereliction of Duty is in many ways a stinging indictment of the 
Washington culture of deceit, hidden agendas and backstabbing 
that helped pull the US into a quagmire in Vietnam. It tells the 
story of the malfeasance of the uniformed senior military in 
misleading the nation and the President about the true state of 
affairs as the war spiralled down to defeat.1
The propagation and scattering of ‘private armies’, inimically discrete 
intelligence operations and loosely controlled ARVN elements among 
overarching military operations without responsibility for overall 
command, control and coordination being vested in one military 
commander at each appropriate level was bound to become nugatory. 
There is much to question about why the CIA was not confined to 
clandestine activity elsewhere than on the battlefield, and denied any right 
to meddle thereon. Mine was only a brief exposure to one of the CIA’s 
widespread, tacked-on warfighting schemes; one which seemed to lack 
definition, credible reputation or incisiveness. During a second tour of 
duty five years later, again with an RAR battalion, I perceived no changes 
to what by then had become a stalled formulaic prosecution of the broader 
war. Thus, the Vietnam War stands as a beacon of political and military 
failure to adapt and revise failing strategy.
Before concluding, I should not forebear from rating the peripheral and 
puny 1966 contributions to warfighting within Phuoc Tuy province by 
1 Cdo Coy and its parent organisation. In the interests of brevity and 
clarity I borrow the incomparable pragmatism of the Australian digger 
to say, ‘The whole idea was about as much use as tits on bacon – zero out 
of ten!’
1  James Stavridis, ‘H.R. McMaster worked for me: His retirement from the military reveals a lot 
about President Trump’, Time, 9 April 2018, available at: time.com/5212570/hr-mcmaster-trump/.
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I was to be followed later at Binh Ba by a fellow 5 RAR officer, Captain 
Ron Bade, whose experiences are related in the following section of this 
chapter. His circumstances were different to mine and neither of us 
became aware of each other’s time at Binh Ba until many months had 
passed. Nonetheless, both of us drew conclusions early in our separate 
experiences that there was a need for astute caution when working at the 
lower level of US – South Vietnamese relations in Phuoc Tuy Province.
Ron Bade
My one big regret about my time in Vietnam was that I did not keep 
a diary. For some reason I thought that keeping a diary with reference 
to operations would be a security risk. Now, as I sit and attempt to recall 
the events of more than 50 years ago, my one thought is, ‘If only!’ This 
means that some of my recollections about date/time details and names 
may not be precise; but I trust that I may be allowed some leeway. When 
I consider my time at Binh Ba as a temporary adviser to a Regional Force 
(RF) company, my only substantive date reference point is that I was 
there when I received news of my son’s birth. He was born on 10 October 
1966 and a day or so afterwards a Royal Australian Air Force Iroquois 
landed on the airfield beside the compound and our CO, John Warr, 
accompanied by Tony White, Peter Isaacs and Bob O’Neill, jumped out 
of the helicopter, shook my hand, congratulated me, gave me a copy of 
the telegram and promptly departed. It was a shame they couldn’t have 
stayed that night as the birth of my son was celebrated with great gusto 
by the Vietnamese troops. Having a son as first-born is considered very 
auspicious in Vietnamese culture. The troops expended short air-bursts of 
small arms fire and coloured flares in lieu of fireworks. My concern that 
night was that the celebrations would have been a beacon for any enemy 
operating in the vicinity. Fortunately, nothing happened.
How and when did I get to Binh Ba? I have trawled through the 
battalion’s operations logs as they appear on the Australian War Memorial 
website and I can find little that indicates dates or the events preceding 
my moving to Binh Ba. However, looking through the battalion’s list of 
operations, the dates of Operation Darlinghurst or Operation Toledo are 
the most likely. I was operating the administration cell located forward 
with battalion HQ, which was harboured in the rubber plantation to the 
south of Binh Ba. As officer on watch in the APC-mounted command 
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post during the night, my signaller received a call from Task Force HQ 
to ‘Fetch Sunray’ (John Warr). After speaking with Task Force HQ, John 
Warr told us of the impending arrival of an ARVN RF company at Binh 
Ba the following day. He also said that as advisers from the AATTV were 
not immediately available, the battalion was to provide a liaison officer 
(LO) for 48 hours. When I asked who was to be the LO, I was not 
surprised that it was to be me. At that stage I did not know that my 48 
hours was to extend to more than two months!
The next day it struck me that there was a singular lack of communication 
between the various parties involved in the move of the RF company. 
What was the mission of the company? If I recall correctly, no formal 
operation order existed or, if it did, it had not percolated to my level. 
It seemed that, although Task Force HQ had requested 5 RAR to provide 
an LO, command of the RF company was to be exercised by the local 
district chief, Dai Uy (Captain) Nguyen Van Be, based at subsector HQ 
in Duc Thanh. Also in Duc Thanh was a US Army adviser, Major Bill 
Prescott, and his team which included US enlisted men and Australian 
WOs. However, Major Prescott was obviously confined to an advisory 
role. My team consisted of Warrant Officer ‘Sooty’ Smith from the 
Task Force Civil Affairs Unit, a 5 RAR signaller, Private Ron ‘Frenchy’ 
Delaurey-Simpson, my batman, a Land Rover with driver and an 
interpreter, Sergeant Mick Henry (not to be confused with the 5 RAR 
armourer Sergeant Mick Henrys). My role as an LO was somewhat 
unclear. Was I simply there for liaison or was I to assume an advisory role? 
Sooty Smith and I quickly determined that self-preservation dictated that 
we needed to act as advisers – welcome or not!
When the RF company arrived, I was surprised to see that the soldiers 
were a pretty rag-tag bunch and that many had arrived with accompanying 
wives and children. What on earth does one do with wives and children 
in a defence compound? The company commander, Second Lieutenant 
Truong, told me that the company had been based not far from Saigon 
and, being a RF company, it had not expected to be moved out of the 
district in which it had been raised. Consequently, many of the troops and 
their families were very upset at moving to Binh Ba. The extent of their 
upset became very evident during the next couple of days!
The site chosen for the RF company was the vacant villa on the north side 
of the Gallia plantation airfield on the northern edge of Binh Ba. The site 
comprised a two-storey masonry villa with a long single-storey building 
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behind. I decided that my team would occupy the villa and that the RF 
company could utilise the other building. This was reluctantly agreed 
to by Truong. The immediate task was to determine how the company 
would occupy the site. I discussed the defensive position with Truong 
and talked about all-round defence and mutual support. However, he was 
committed to the old, discredited French concept of a triangular redoubt. 
Despite my remonstrations about his decision, a triangle it was. I thought 
to myself ‘Thank goodness I will only be here for 48 hours!’ How wrong 
was I.
Next morning, I discovered that some of the troops had deserted during 
the night. I reported this to John Warr and said that the company 
commander had told me that it would be difficult to prevent further 
desertions as the troops were very unhappy about the move. Next day, 
a few more had deserted so John came to the villa in an APC and had me 
parade the company before him. He spoke through my interpreter telling 
the RF personnel that anyone else who deserted would be shot. As he 
spoke, Lieutenant Ross Guymer, in the cupola of his APC, traversed his 
.50 calibre machine gun back and forth across the assembled company. 
We had no further desertions!
Forty-eight hours had elapsed and there was no sign of advisers arriving 
to relieve my team. It was time to discuss roles and routines with Truong. 
The placement of the company in Binh Ba was obviously designed 
to deter Viet Cong activity in the village and to provide a measure of 
protection for the inhabitants. Our first task was to develop the defensive 
position. Digging weapon pits and a perimeter communication trench 
commenced, but progress was extremely slow. When we discussed the 
lack of progress with individuals, the response was always that they were 
very tired from their move. Of more concern for troops with families was 
the erection of some form of shelter for their families behind the weapon 
pits – a novel concept. When it came to daily routine in the position, 
Truong had little idea of morning or evening stand-to (changing between 
day and night routines) or the need for clearing patrols to clear the area 
outside the perimeter. He did agree that he would give this a try, but it 
was a dismal failure. The chatter from the compound during stand-to was 
non-stop and the clearing patrols would not venture further than keeping 
in sight of the compound.
VIETNAM VANGUARd
234
If our activity extended beyond the compound there was obvious potential 
for conflict between the RF company and elements of 5 RAR operating 
at the same time in the Binh Ba area. Consequently, Task Force HQ gave 
the RF company a mini-TAOR (tactical area of responsibility) within the 
Task Force TAOR. This was a large part of the Gallia plantation area 
north of the airfield. Now, with a defined TAOR, it was my task to get 
the company out on operations. This turned out to be far more difficult 
than I expected.
One of the first operations was a cordon and search of a part of Binh Ba 
village. Truong and I agreed that we would leave our compound and be in 
place before daybreak. When the day came, the troops milled around the 
gate of the compound and it was obvious that they had no desire to move 
out of the compound in the dark. We eventually left the compound as 
dawn broke. Inevitably, the troops were seen moving into the cordon, so 
the operation was fruitless. However, Truong was quite excited that they 
had completed the operation and invited Sooty Smith and me to join his 
officers and NCOs for a belated breakfast in one of the village food stalls. 
I can still remember the portions of duck hacked with a cleaver and the 
splinters of bone therein.
Patrols of our mini-TAOR were pretty much as disappointing as the 
cordon and search. I had the feeling that the troops had no desire to 
be outside the compound and they invariably made lots of noise. One 
wonders if the noise was just ill-discipline or made in the hope that any 
enemy would hear them and avoid contact. My concern, when I was with 
them, was that their noise would attract enemy that they were not capable 
of engaging effectively.
Once I was told that the AATTV advisers would not be coming for some 
time, we decided to make the old villa as liveable as possible. Our first task 
was to clear the villa floors of an accumulated ten-centimetre layer of dead 
black beetles. Happily, we discovered that the toilet on the upper floor 
would flush by using a bucket of water. The original wooden ‘thunder 
box’ latrine that we had purloined from somewhere was no longer useable 
after troops and their families had ‘kangarooed’ on the seat with muddy 
feet! With US steel fence pickets that we obtained from Major Prescott’s 
team, and the help of a welder from the Gallia plantation workshop, we 
fashioned a frame from which we could suspend a canvas shower bucket. 
The frame had a base made from pickets that allowed us to shower above 
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the mud. We slept on breath-inflated mattresses on the tiled floor. This 
was quite comfortable, but we did bounce around somewhat when there 
was a B-52 bombing raid anywhere nearby.
While we were settling in, the company continued to develop our 
compound. Beyond their original concertina wire obstacle, they built 
barbed wire fences and then proceeded to lay a minefield of M16 ‘jumping 
jack’ anti-personnel mines. These were armed and connected to tripwires 
which would be the undoing of a couple of the troops a short time later. 
One afternoon I heard several shots from within the compound. They 
turned out not to be accidental discharges, as had occurred several times 
already, but were attempts to kill one of the dogs which had strayed in 
from the Gallia plantation. Two soldiers ran out the front gate of the 
compound and around the minefield perimeter fence to where an 
apparently dead dog was laying. As one of them picked up the dog it 
latched on to one of the men – it was only stunned by the bullet! To 
get away from the dog, the men ran headlong towards the compound – 
straight into the minefield! Some mines were triggered but, miraculously, 
both men escaped unhurt. As we watched from the upstairs balcony of the 
villa, we were dumbfounded.
We were visited quite often by the district chief, Dai Uy (Captain) Be, 
usually accompanied by some of Major Prescott’s team from Duc Thanh. 
However, information on what was going on around the district was 
generally scarce. Sooty Smith and I made periodic visits to Messieurs 
Pernes and Moreau, the manager and engineer at the Gallia plantation, 
but, although these visits were always cordial, they were of little intelligence 
value. One got the impression that both men were intent on appearing 
‘neutral’ to be able to carry on business at the plant. As far as information 
from the Task Force HQ or 5 RAR was concerned, I was kept informed 
of any plans that might impact my TAOR, but otherwise we were on our 
own and we felt a bit like the forgotten few. We also visited Father Joseph, 
the Catholic priest at Binh Ba. He was able to provide limited helpful 
information on what had been going on in the village, but he was always 
concerned that he would be branded an informer by local Viet Cong.
Working through an interpreter is always difficult so I knew that I was 
lucky to have Mick Henry with me. I knew I could guarantee he would 
tell me what he understood of Be’s or Truong’s statements, not what a local 
interpreter might be inclined to pass on – probably what they thought 
I wanted to hear. Unfortunately, one day Mick said something to Dai Uy 
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Be that Be felt was an insult, so he declined to communicate any further 
through Sergeant Henry. Fortunately, my French-speaking signaller, Ron 
Simpson, was able to communicate with both Be and Truong in French. 
This also forced me to resurrect my Year 12 schoolboy French when Be 
insisted in addressing me in French. Mick Henry, being of no further use, 
returned to Task Force HQ.
Administrative support from 5  RAR was quite minimal. I resorted to 
doing a run back to 5 RAR down Route 2 about once a week in my Land 
Rover, hoping to not run into an ambush. Doing this was a little scary 
but we were lucky and encountered no problems. We were able to collect 
clean clothes, pick up our mail and, with the help of the caterer, Warrant 
Officer Peter Roby, we were able to scrounge rations to keep us alive for 
another week. It is interesting to note that, during the year after 5 RAR 
returned home, the AATTV advisers at Binh Ba were ambushed doing 
the same run as I had done, and I understand that at least two were killed.
Another aspect of the RF company came to light one evening when 
I was moving around the weapon pits during stand-to. Several families 
stated that they were very hungry and that they had little or no food. 
This surprised me as I had seen sacks of rice arriving in the compound 
and I had seen troops supplementing the rice with fish and greens from 
the local market as well as plants foraged outside the compound. I raised 
the issue of hunger with Truong and he informed me that he received 
the salaries and rice ration for all members of the company and he then 
distributed both as he saw fit. It was obvious that if any member dissented 
they were punished with reduced salary or rice ration or both. I said that 
I felt that restricting rice ration was hardly fair, but my comments fell 
on deaf ears. Perhaps this was the only real sanction available to him to 
maintain discipline over his coterie of soldiers and their dependants, but 
one unlikely to reinforce either his popularity or his personal safety.
Later, I was invited to travel to Sector HQ at Ba Ria with Truong and 
some of his officers. We braved Route 2 once more with arms bristling out 
of several vehicles. The conference at Sector HQ gave me the impression 
that the US advisory staff there were not really interested in the RF and 
that little was expected of my RF company other than to be a presence at 
Binh Ba. Following the conference, Truong invited me to his home in Ba 
Ria for lunch. I hadn’t expected that he would have had a house in Ba Ria 
– maybe the real reason to visit Sector HQ was to be able to see his wife 
and family! His home was a modest house, but it was nicely furnished and 
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extremely well kept. Lunch was an extremely tasty Vietnamese banquet 
served by his domestic staff while his troops kept guard outside. On the 
run back to Binh Ba, I started to wonder about how much of the salary 
and sustenance moneys entrusted to him went to his troops.
It would be remiss of me to conclude this story without mentioning the 
disciplinary regime in the company. One day in a corner of the compound 
some troops built a strange structure. It was a collection of short steel 
pickets driven into the ground and then interlaced with barbed wire to 
form a box shape about 2 metres square and 30 centimetres high. This 
was the lockup for troops being punished. They were made to crawl into 
the structure and the entrance sealed. They could do no more than lie on 
the grass and were often left there overnight or for several days. Often, 
when they were released, they were subjected to a beating with a long cane 
wielded by a couple of burly troops. Those notables gave the impression 
of being Truong’s bodyguard. This was not a form of justice found in the 
Australian Army!
In my opinion the establishment of the RF compound at Binh Ba did 
little to assist the effort to engage and destroy the Viet Cong. In many 
ways it was just a waste of valuable resources. I suspect that enemy activity 
in Binh Ba continued unhindered despite the arrival of the RF company. 
My tenure at Binh Ba ended when a team of AATTV advisers finally 
arrived unannounced with a truckload of home comforts and told us 
that we could return to 5 RAR. My 48 hours there had extended to over 
two months!
Many years later, in 2008, my wife and I toured Vietnam. We went to 
Vung Tau for two nights and engaged a local guide to take us to Nui Dat. 
Our female guide was quite knowledgeable but when we got to Binh Ba 
she was not familiar with the old village as it now nestles west of the new 
town. We eventually got a couple of local boys to guide us through the old 
village and through a cashew plantation to where our RF compound had 
been. It looked totally different. The villa had been demolished and the 
building materials used by the locals. The airstrip had gone and the whole 
area had been replanted with small rubber plants. A very bright blue shack 
had been erected on the base of the old villa by an old couple who were 
replanting the rubber. As we spoke with them, he took me around the 
base of the villa describing the columns of the porch and where the stairs 
to the upper floor had been. It was without doubt the site of my villa.
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As we posed for a photo with the couple, he declared that he had been 
a Viet Cong supporter, and his wife then added, ‘Me too’. We shook 
hands and agreed that we were enemies no more. When I asked what had 
happened to the minefield, one of the many onlookers who had gathered 
around us raced off and came back with an unbelievably rusty M16 
mine. After suggesting he take it well away I asked how the minefield 
had been cleared. The wife straightaway grabbed a stick, got down on her 
knees and demonstrated how she and others had prodded for the mines 
and neutralised the firing mechanisms – a very dicey undertaking but, 
perhaps, a demonstration of the futility of laying mines! However, it was 
great to have gone back 40 years later and reminisced about a significant 
chapter in my army career.
Conclusion by Robert O’Neill
Although they produced little of measurable effect on warfighting 
efforts in Phuoc Tuy province, the sojourns of Captains Boxall and Bade 
early in 5  RAR’s tour were useful in that they provided the battalion 
with a close insight into life at the village level as well as better awareness 
of the machinations of disparate military and civil authorities in and 
around 1 ATF’s bailiwick. It was a complex war, particularly at the level 
of South Vietnamese – US relations. Australia was a clear step down from 
this top layer of interaction, so it was important for us to have the direct 
assessments that could be derived only from the personal experience of 
two young officers inserted into this structure – particularly as it was 
a  structure that did not fit together anywhere near as smoothly as its 
makers had intended.
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24. A platoon of C Company filling water bottles from a jungle stream while the 
surrounding area is secured by the rest of the company. Each platoon would take it 
in turns to resupply with water while protected by the others.
Source: Neil Ordner.
25. November 1966: Helicopter insertion into Long Son Island on Operation 
Hayman. A US Army UH Iroquois helicopter is carrying 5 RAR soldiers who are 
not strapped in, some sitting on the floor. This was to effect quick emplaning, 
maximum passenger loading, and quick exiting at destinations. The rearmost 
passenger (facing outwards) is one of the aircraft’s two door gunners. The altitude 
of the aircraft indicates that these aircraft were transiting above the range of 
effective small arms ground fire.
Source: Neil Ordner.
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26. Lance Corporal Gordon Meredith leading 9  Platoon in the shake-out after 
dismounting from Armoured Personnel Carriers into open terrain during the dry 
season. The battlefield was not all dark, dank and wet. The hills in the distance are 
the rocky, jungle-clad Nui Thi Vai and Nui Dinh complexes.
Source: Neil Ordner.
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27. October 1966: Preparing for the evacuation by Sioux helicopter of Captain 
Brian Le Dan who was wounded during Operation Queanbeyan (see Chapter 7). 
The aircraft later returned to the same difficult landing site to recover the body 
of Corporal Norm Womal. The picture shows (left to right) the pilot Second 
Lieutenant Bob Askew, Captain Bob Supple and Captain Brian Le Dan holding 
a fresh wound dressing to his chest.
Source: Unknown.
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29. Second Lieutenant Bob Askew and 
Captain Jim Campbell DFC. Two of 
161  (Independent) Reconnaissance 
Flight’s Sioux pilots who gave 
outstanding service to 5 RAR throughout 
1966–67 (see Chapters 7 and 14).
Source: Bob Askew.
30. November 1966: D  Company’s 
artillery forward observer, Lieutenant 
Barry Campbell, and 10  Platoon’s 
commander, Second Lieutenant Dennis 
Rainer MC, who had worked closely 
together during 10 Platoon’s attack on 
21 October (see Chapter 7).
Source: Ron Boxall.
31. Second Lieutenant Michael Deak MC at work.
Source: Darryl Henry.
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32. This photograph of the Reconnaissance Platoon typifies the fighting soldiers 
of 5  RAR’s first tour of Vietnam in 1966–67. The list of absentee names shows 
that platoons were usually deployed understrength. Rearmost man: Daniel ‘Bluey’ 
Riley; Fourth Row: Dave Western, Robert ‘Bobby’ Godfrey, John ‘Macca’ McLaren, 
Darryl ‘Butch’ Moroney; Third Row: Walter ‘Jock’ Brannan, Robert ‘Dogs’ 
Kearney, Robert ‘Bob’ Searl, Barney Gambold, David ‘Maxy’ Campbell, Glen 
‘Moose’ Benham; Second Row: Ken ‘Scaisey’ Scaysbrook, John ‘Scalesy’ Scales, 
Wayne ‘Pagey’ Page, Denis ‘Millsey’ Mills, William ‘Suave Harve’ Harvey, Gary 
‘BG’ Nottage; Front Row: John ‘Blah’ Williams, John ‘Blue’ Edwards, David ‘Blue’ 
Wollner, Mick ‘Skip’ Deak MC, Raymond ‘Ferret’ Ferrier, John  ‘Blue’ Mulby, 
Robert ‘Bobby’ Egan (Brandt), Bruce ‘Jacka’ Aitken; Absent: John Lea-Smith, 
Bernie Smith, Peter ‘Doc’ Fraser MM, Ray ‘Skinny’ Calvert, Trevor ‘Taffy’ 
Cheeseman, Anthony ‘Bluey’ Twaits, William ‘Billy’ Evans.
Source: Mick Deak (Michael von Berg).
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33. January 1967: The officers of 5 RAR at Nui Dat: Rear: 2Lt L O’Dea, 2Lt MJ Roe, 
Lt DJF Rowe, Capt. RB Milligan, Capt. WJ Molloy, Capt. JE Taske (on exchange 
with Capt. HAD  White), Lt TJ  Sheehan, Capt. RW  Bade, Capt. RJ  O’Neill, 
Lt  GR  Wainwright, 2Lt RR  Gunning, 2Lt DG  Lovell, 2Lt HT  Neesham, 2Lt 
AE Pott; Standing: Capt. RT Shambrook, Lt J Carruthers, 2Lt MGJ Deak, Chap 
JF  Williams, Mr J  Bentley (Salvation Army), Capt. RW  Supple, Lt GN  Negus, 
2Lt JD  Mcaloney, Capt. KG  Mallinson, Capt. RG  Thompson, Capt. BG  Le 
Dan, 2Lt  DC  Rainer, Capt. RE  Boxall; Seated: Maj. PG  Cole, Maj. JF  Miller, 
Maj. OM Carroll, Maj. IRJ Hodgkinson, Lt Col. JA Warr, Capt. PJ Isaacs, Maj. 
MB Mcqualter, Maj. PN Greenhalgh, Maj. RD Hamlyn. Absent: Capt. HAD White, 
Lt JC Hartley, 2Lt JH Deane-Butcher, 2Lt RJ Davis.
Source: The 5 RAR Association website, www.5rar.asn.au.
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34. November 1966: Dai Uy (Captain) Nguyen Van Be and Captain Ron Bade at 
Binh Ba. Private Ron ‘Frenchy’ Delaurey-Simpson is standing between the two 
bare-chested soldiers on the left (see Chapter 11).
Source: Ron Bade.
35. Late 1966: Second Lieutenant John Deane-Butcher on patrol with his platoon. 
They had just located an enemy cache of new shovels which they are retrieving. 
The men are carrying outdated 1937 pattern backpacks.
Source: Terry Tomassi.
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36. October 1966: Battalion Headquarters on operations on Nui Thi Vai. Major 
Max Carroll is on the radio in the front trench (right) with the battalion’s senior 
command post signaller, Corporal Dave Western, recording his conversation. 
Assisting in the rear trench are Captain Bob Supple (left) and a 1 ATF signaller.
Source: Bob O’Neill.
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37. February 1967: Major Ivor ‘Blue’ 
Hodgkinson (5  RAR’s second in 
command from December 1966), 
Captain Bob O’Neill (intelligence 
officer), Captain Peter Isaacs (adjutant) 
and Major Ron Hamlyn (officer 
commanding Administration Company) 
after a conference with the Commanding 
Officer, Lieutenant Colonel John Warr.
Source: Bob O’Neill.
38. 5 RAR’s Operations Officer, Major 
Max Carroll, and the commander of 
103 Field Battery, Major Neville Gair, at 
a time when that battery was allocated 
in direct support of the battalion.
Source: Bob O’Neill.
39. July 1966: Wet season conditions were experienced for several weeks during 
construction of 5 RAR’s base at Nui Dat.
Source: Terry Tomassi.
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40. Intelligence Officer Captain Bob O’Neill briefing soldiers in 5 RAR’s open-air 
theatre, ‘The Mayfair’.
Source: Terry Tomassi.
41. October 1966: Pilot Second Lieutenant Bill Davies, being stretchered to a 
waiting aeromedical evacuation helicopter for transportation to a US neurosurgical 
facility in Saigon after being shot down in his Sioux Helicopter, the wreckage of 
which is strewn along Route 15 (see Chapter 14).
Source: Terry Tomassi.
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42. ‘The Rat Pack’, a group of 9  Platoon members: 
(left to right) Private John Reynolds, Private Neil 
Selleck, Private Bob Antonio, Private Roger Sinclair, 
Lance Corporal Gordon Meredith, Private Danny 
Cross and Lance Corporal Peter Blanch.
Source: Terry Tomassi.
43. Late 1966: Corporal 
Bob ‘Dogs’ Kearney, 
reflecting while on a 
break from patrolling in 
the jungle.
Source: Unknown.
44. December 1966: The Commanding Officer serving Christmas dinner to men 
of C Company. Lieutenant Colonel John Warr is discussing the menu (designed 
by Lance Corporal Brian Budden) with Lance Corporal Warren Burns. Sitting 
directly opposite is Private Danny Cross, and at bottom right is Private Barry 
Delsar. At left of Burns is Corporal Terry Tueno. On his left, with glasses, is Private 
John Buhagiar. Standing behind the Commanding Officer is Private Tom Brand. 
The men at the left foreground are Privates Roger Sinclair and John Fitzgerald.




FIRE SUPPORT: 103 FIELD 
BATTERY ROYAL AUSTRALIAN 
ARTILLERY IN ACTION
George Bindley, John Griggs, Peter Aspinall, 
doug Heazlewood and Brian Mortimer
Editors’ introduction
This chapter is an integration of five contributions by members of 
the artillery battery which directly supported 5th  Battalion, the Royal 
Australian Regiment (5  RAR), operations in October and November 
1966, 103 Field Battery of 1 Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery 
(RAA). The Vietnam War relationship between an Australian infantry 
battalion and its directly supporting artillery (usually a battery in support 
of each battalion) was extremely important for both. For the infantry, 
the artillery was a powerful mobile defence against an attacking enemy 
and an aggressive multiplier of combat power. For the artillery, their 
security depended partially on protective infantry, both located with 
their gun positions and in maintaining control of the battlefield more 
widely. It was very important for both sides of this partnership that they 
had high confidence in each other. Lives hinged on how well this mutual 
dependence was accepted, valued and practised.
We, 5 RAR, had had four months of working with 103 Field Battery, 
and they had our fullest confidence. The battery was equipped with six 
Italian-designed OTO Melara L5 105 mm pack howitzers. These guns 
were compact and could be disassembled for transportation by Iroquois 
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helicopter. They could be relied upon to deliver accurate fire over ranges 
up to 10,000 metres. They were capable of firing in the upper register 
(i.e. at barrel elevations of over 45 degrees), which made them particularly 
useful for giving support in hilly or mountainous country. They could be 
fired against enemy positions and his attacking or reconnoitring forces, 
by day or by night. One defect was that their sights could mist up in 
rainy weather. Another was their relative lightness of construction, which 
made the gun trails liable to fracture when rounds were fired at maximum 
charge of propellant.
Within each of our companies, 103 Battery embedded forward observer 
(FO) officers, each with a bombardier assistant (FO Ack), two artillery 
signallers and a batman – collectively known as an FO Party. The FO 
Parties became an integral part of each company headquarters and shared 
every danger and hardship, trod every weary kilometre and were, in the 
deepest sense, our brothers-in-arms. When the battalion was not deployed 
on operations they lived with our companies in the 1st Australian Task 
Force (1 ATF) base at Nui Dat, and not with their own battery – they 
were absolutely of our ilk.
The FO Parties, moving with each of our companies when we were out 
on operations, kept themselves fully in the picture with every aspect of 
our tactics and procedures, and learned about their many nuances – to 
the extent that they were able to instinctively anticipate our needs and 
be instantly ready to call for supporting fire from their battery’s guns. 
The FOs also had access to more powerful firepower, delivered by US 
heavy artillery (155 mm and 8-inch guns), and even to naval gunfire from 
warships within range. Through coordination with US Air Force (USAF) 
airborne forward air controllers, the full orchestra of integrated close 
air support and artillery and mortar fire could play under their batons, 
should this level of firepower be needed. FOs were appropriately skilled 
and conveniently positioned – at the side of the infantry commanders in 
the forefront of battle.
Another integral element of our fire support was the battalion’s own 
Mortar Platoon. The 81 mm mortars fired a less powerful round than 
the 105 mm guns, but they were man-portable and could be deployed 
in action close to the troops they were supporting. On these operations 
up in the hills, our Mortar Platoon rendered great service because of their 
high angle of fire. This meant they were not as limited as some artillery 
guns which required a flatter trajectory for their shells and could have 
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their fire masked by some of the steep, high ridges that our infantry had 
to fight over. Mortars have been lobbing their bombs over crests into 
masked terrain for hundreds of years. Nonetheless, they could not match 
the destructive power of our ‘nine-mile snipers’.
With that age-old, infantry-conferred and affectionate sobriquet, let us 
now look at the problems of fighting from the gunners’ perspective. First 
is the view of a young lieutenant who was initially a gun position officer 
(GPO), in charge of the guns at the point of firing, and, later, an FO.
Overview: Lieutenant John Griggs
In subsequent paragraphs, my colleagues add touches to an artillery 
collage of which I apply the first layer. For our esteemed infantry brothers 
of 5 RAR, who so often sought our wares, we hope that our group effort 
will reveal much about the dark art of what is now rather ancient gunnery. 
Some facets may have had them wondering for more than 50 years!
To start the composition, I briefly look at activity in five different gun 
positions, including those we used in Operations Canberra, Robin and 
Queanbeyan (gun positions 3, 4 and 5), to show how we operated in each 
of them.
Gun position 1 – Duc Thanh
I remember this village as it was the most northerly area we occupied 
during my time as GPO. From Duc Thanh we could cover the northern, 
eastern and western approaches to Nui Dat, and give support to the 
individual company positions occupied during patrolling operations and 
village cordon and search operations through the northern half of Phuoc 
Tuy. From memory, Duc Thanh was occupied by people resettled from 
North Vietnam. It wasn’t a busy time firing close support missions, but 
I spent a considerable time in the command post (CP), getting target 
records up to date. Thank heavens CP lighting, via small battery-powered 
fluoro tubes, had improved by the time we arrived, as all target records 
were written in HB  pencil into target record books and much of that 
work was done at night. These included defensive fire tasks (nicknamed 
tin trunks) for the troops we were supporting, and counter-mortar target 
records. The call for the latter fire was ‘Bombard’ and employed six rounds 
per gun FFE (fire for effect) on each suspected enemy mortar position. 
VIETNAM VANGUARd
256
‘Bombard’ was used powerfully during the night before the Battle of Long 
Tan by the whole of 1 Field Regiment, when the 1 ATF base at Nui Dat 
was attacked by enemy mortar fire. Each application delivered 108 rounds 
of HE (high explosive) 105 mm artillery shells onto each suspect location.
During each night, harassing and interdiction (H&I) missions were fired, 
generally being one or two guns firing one or two rounds at predetermined 
times on tracks or targets selected by the intelligence staff. Viet Cong (VC) 
prisoners stated during interrogation that they feared our unpredictable 
H&I fire. This was welcome feedback because the tasks were very tiring 
and disruptive at night for gun detachments (crews) which generally were 
under-manned by tired and weary gunners.
Gun position 2 – Nui Dat Base
After deployments to remote gun positions, reoccupying the 1  ATF 
base gun position was a time-consuming procedure. Here the battery 
was occupying and defending an unprotected and open approach to the 
Task Force headquarters (HQ) across a vast paddy field. When deployed 
to a gun position elsewhere, we needed to leave behind a sizeable rear 
detachment, thus reducing the numbers serving the guns on operations. 
We also did three other things: (1) set up dummy (make-believe) guns to 
give the impression that our base position was occupied; (2) maintained 
a  standing patrol forward of our sector of the base’s defensive wire 
obstacles; (3) readied the gun position for the returning guns. There were 
also a myriad of other tasks including preparing ammunition, unloading 
stores and personal gear and being ready to respond to calls for fire at 
all times.
Gun position 3 – Ap Ong Trinh Dc
From memory, we occupied this position during the afternoon after a road 
trip from Nui Dat. As I recall, the regiment’s 2IC (second in command) 
selected the area after an air reconnaissance. Imagine my reaction later, 
when I found he had allocated an area for six gun platforms and a CP 
which was under water. From the air the water was hidden by long grass. 
I never forgot that episode and later as an instructor in gunnery and a 
battery commander I drove the lesson home to others: reconnaissance for 
gun positions MUST always be conducted on foot. We were quite busy in 
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this position, but it was not suitable for a long stay and the commanding 
officer (CO), Lieutenant Colonel Richmond ‘Dick’ Cubis, had us move 
further along Route 15 a couple of days later.
Actually, on the day we moved, Cubis flew in around 1000 and chipped 
me for not having shaved. I told him how I had been busy and was yet to 
arrive at the shaving point in my morning routine. (The CO wasn’t noted 
for his sense of humour.) My mornings were hectic from stand-to (the 
time each day, before first light, when all personnel come to an armed and 
fully alert status) until around 1000. My duties in changing from night 
to day routine included checking gun parallelism (a detailed procedure 
involving a theodolite to ensure that guns were aligned exactly parallel to 
each other), changing CP staff, giving briefings, maintaining gun records 
and so on. So, around 1000 was my ‘birdie-bath’ time, when a section 
commander stood in for me in the CP.
Gun position 4 – Ap Ong Trinh Dp
We moved 2 kilometres south-east into an area where we stayed for some 
time, in company with some larger 155 mm guns from Battery A, 2/35 
US Artillery Battalion. Their H&I tasks at night were purgatory for us, as 
we felt the full force of the blast across our gun position when they fired. 
The shock wave and noise would wake the dead.
While 5 RAR was busy up in the hills, we were worried somewhat by 
crests (simply put, where targets might not be able to be engaged because 
there was a hill or ridgeline in the way). However, our howitzers were able 
to fire at high angle (like a mortar) so, generally, we were able to answer 
any call for fire. The steep hilly ground did affect the fall of shot, but that’s 
what FOs were trained to handle.
Being alongside Route 15, we inevitably attracted local vendors selling 
food and drinks. We also set up showers through which our soldiers were 
rotated, much to the delight of locals passing by in crowded buses, which 
slowed down to allow passengers a good look. Incoming US troops were 
trucked past in convoys every day for hours at a time during daylight, but 
it was at night when things got a bit tricky.
For whatever reason, some South Vietnamese gunners in the village of 
Phu My took a dislike to the area surrounding us and the area in which 
5  RAR was operating. They sent more than a few rounds our way, 
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apparently once too often. On one occasion Lieutenant Colonel Cubis 
ordered my guns to load and lay on the village. Receiving this fire mission 
from my CO made the hairs on the back of my neck stand. I knew the 
location was designated as a ‘no fire zone’, occupied by friendly troops and 
civilians. I contacted our battery captain, George Bindley, and our battery 
commander, Major Neville Gair, for clarification. We had our signallers 
try to contact the US Army advisers in the Phu My area by radio to no 
avail. I had two signallers carefully record all fire orders and conversations, 
for evidence purposes, as there would have been quite an inquiry had 
we fired.
We did not fire, and the circumstances in which a potential catastrophe 
was averted are explained later in this chapter by George Bindley. A lot 
can go wrong in war when coordination and liaison are not up to required 
standards; and a hasty, unhelpful interference in operational events by 
a senior commander rears its head.
The return to Nui Dat after Operation Queanbeyan saw my time as GPO 
of 103 Field Battery come to an end. I handed over to Lieutenant Mike 
Langley and joined C  Company, 5  RAR, (under Major John Miller) 
as their FO, replacing Lieutenant Kerry Mellor.
Gun position 5 – Lang Phuoc Hoa
This was my first operation as an FO. My assistant was Bombardier Dave 
Rose who later worked for me as a warrant officer at the School of Artillery 
and rose to the rank of major. Dave and I learnt a very salutary lesson while 
searching the village on the edge of the Rung Sat (Special Zone) before 
we assaulted the island of Long Son. There were calls for illumination 
rounds to be fired in order to light up an area offshore. Major Miller and 
I were standing next to an armoured personnel carrier (APC) observing 
over the water, which was being lit up, when we heard a strange buzzing 
noise. It got louder and suddenly there was a great CLANG on the APC. 
The noise was made by the steel inserts or sleeves which were carried 
in the illumination shells, to assist in ejecting the flares and parachute 
without damaging them. The inserts simply fell to the ground while the 
empty carrier shell continued in its trajectory. The firing tables would 
tell where the empty carriers would fall, but there was no mention of 




On that gun position the guns used a very effective deception plan to 
convince the enemy that 5 RAR was going to assault north into the hills 
rather than south onto the island. Just before H hour (the time at which 
an operation commences) the guns, which had been pointing north and 
firing H&I in that direction during the night, suddenly turned around to 
face the island just as the first wave of the air-mounted assault was landing.
Life as a gun section commander: Lieutenant 
Doug Heazlewood
I joined 103 Field Battery after a period as assistant adjutant for the first 
two months of 1 Field Regiment’s tour of duty in Vietnam, a role for 
which I felt untrained and comparatively lacking in motivation. But as 
a  section commander in 103 Battery, I felt like Brer Rabbit safe in the 
briar patch – happy and comfortable in the only role for which I had in 
any way been fully trained.
On reflection, I may have had more reason to be daunted. 103 Battery 
was a team in every sense of the word, being possessed of a very dedicated 
group of competent and professional officers and a leavening of some 
of the finest non-commissioned officers (NCOs) I would ever know. 
Many already had a grounding in active service and went on to achieve 
distinguished careers. The complement of gunners included many we 
considered to be the pick of the regular soldiers of the regiment and about 
30 or more men of the first intakes of conscripted national servicemen. 
Their readiness training in Australia had made them into the best-
performing team that I encountered, before or since. By the time I joined 
them, I could not discern any differences between regular and national 
service soldiers – I always had to ask whether a soldier was the one or the 
other. One of the ‘nashos’, Bombardier Graeme Sutherland, had already 
developed the competence and confidence to serve as a gun detachment 
commander during the most challenging task of our entire tour, the Battle 
of Long Tan.
Although I was their officer, and they ultimately would have to do what 
I said, I needed to be accepted into their team before my opinion was 
thought to matter. A vivid memory is that my first ever deployment with 
an artillery battery, operational or otherwise, was motoring up the ‘black’ 
route to Binh Ba as the battery leader!
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I was also very pleased to learn that we were to become the direct support 
(DS) battery for 5 RAR, where I knew some of the officers. My belief then, 
borne out by the experience, was that they were a formidable team and we 
would have to perform very well to match them. I was greatly heartened, 
when it came time for us to ‘rotate’ from being their DS battery back to 
the general support role, that 5 RAR had made the very generous gesture 
of requesting that we be allowed to remain their DS battery until the end 
of their tour. I shared the pride, felt by everyone on the gun line, in the 
knowledge that we had earned their trust and gratitude.
With the help of our HQ battery comrades, we had played a leading role 
in fire support for the Battle of Long Tan, all on the gun line gaining 
some salutary lessons to be applied later in our tour. 5 RAR’s first major 
excursion into the long-term task of clearing and establishing control 
over Phuoc Tuy Province came about in October. It was the series of 
operations described in this book that forced us to extend our capacity 
to overcome the unique problems of effective fire support for infantry 
offensive operations in very difficult terrain and at the further reaches of 
our allotted area of operations.
From the perspective of the gun line, the special problems brought about 
by the nature of these operations that we needed to meet and overcome 
included:
Optical sights
Constant, unpredictable instances of gunsights ‘fogging up’ had to be 
managed. Being called for a fire mission, only to find your sight suddenly 
fogged up, thus rendering the gun useless until it cleared, was not to 
be countenanced. This problem was accentuated during prolonged 
operations far away from the replacement or repair readily available at 
Nui Dat. Sergeant Reg Matheson’s remedy was the preventive measure of 
making sure that his sight, when not on the gun, was in his bed, whether 
he was there or not.
Unstable gun platforms
This was especially a problem in the gun position first occupied for 
Operation Canberra, where the ground was so wet that we had to enlist 
the aid of APCs to get some guns into position. Once settled, they became 
very difficult to traverse through the large switches in bearing we needed 
261
12. fIRE SUPPORT
to accommodate, with the trails burying and needing to be dug out. 
(The trails are the rearmost parts of the gun by which it is towed and, when 
in action, they ‘anchor’ the gun to the ground and prevent it being driven 
backwards when fired.) Foresight, anticipation and cooperation between 
gun detachments were the key elements in dealing with this problem.
Gun aiming points
The restricted size of a gun position’s defensive perimeter would make it 
difficult to deploy gun aiming posts far enough from the gun to maintain 
accurate laying of the gun onto the target. We were often reduced to 
using paralleloscopes as the primary method of laying the guns on target, 
and this brought other difficulties. Innovative ways of illuminating the 
gunsights had to be found to accommodate the amount of night firing 
that was called for, and large traverses of the gun would bring the ‘scope’ 
to the ‘wrong’ side of the gun – very slick drills for changing and recording 
aiming points at night had to be perfected. The gun moving about on 
a soggy ‘platform’ added to this difficulty.
Fatigue
Gun position defensive perimeters were not fully occupied in daytime 
and this required the gun crews to man double sentry shifts during the day. 
Work required to establish and develop the gun position, the strenuous 
nature of engaging planned and opportunity targets and the requirement 
to engage in very active H&I programs during the night combined to 
restrict us to about four hours sleep per day for the duration of these 
operations.
Other hazards
In the first gun position occupied to support Operation Canberra, 
we  were the unhappy recipients of two incoming rounds, travelling 
straight towards us at high velocity, and landing as close as 200 metres 
outside our perimeter. This happened at regular intervals for a few days. 
We were slightly, but not entirely, relieved to eventually learn that they 
were ‘friendly’ – coming in error from two Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN) 105 mm guns located in their military compound at 
the village of Phu My, a few kilometres north on Route 15. They were 
a powerful nuisance and communication difficulties led to a predicament 
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which could have had calamitous results, but for the calmness of John 
Griggs and the initiative of George Bindley. They recount their respective 
dilemmas, and the actions they took, elsewhere in this chapter.
These were not the only hazards encountered in providing safe and 
effective  fire support to 5  RAR. The possibilities for error are ever-
present in the application of artillery fire anywhere. They assumed an 
extra dimension in the very intimate support we were usually required 
to provide to our infantry comrades. Knowing the accurate location of 
the target, as well as those of the observer and the guns, was affected 
by the uncertain quality of the maps. Also, we had no way of knowing 
whether the meteorological information we were given to allow for wind, 
humidity and temperature was accurate. The steep slopes encountered in 
the Nui Thi Vai hills, exacerbated by the variety and height of the timber 
covering, added to the challenges of the laws of physics. It seemed that any 
error arising from factors beyond our control (as opposed to ‘mistakes’) 
was magnified and had the propensity to detract from the mutual 
trust and confidence we strove to achieve with our infantry comrades. 
Inevitably, there were instances of people being wounded, killed and 
frightened by our fire. In my memory, on no occasion during our whole 
tour was anyone injured by a round from our guns through a mistake 
in calculating firing data or in applying sight settings to the guns. The 
causes of such casualties were inherent hazards of the dangerous game 
of war; a fact that in no way diminished the devastated feelings of all 
involved. 103 Battery was able to maintain a good record. This was not 
only due to the depth of knowledge and training of all ranks, but also the 
dedication that I witnessed, time and again. These traits were manifested 
by a determination not to risk applying expedient solutions to difficult 
issues. The problems were there to be solved and we worked through them 
by applying ourselves to solutions based on application and adaption of 
the long-established orthodox practice which had been developed into 
our doctrine over generations.
Sustaining the effort
I lived on the gun position for 10 months of my tour. The unique fact of 
gun position life was that you were ‘in action’ for every hour and day of the 
tour. If Long Tan had taught us anything, it was that our state of readiness 
needed to be just as high at all times in the Nui Dat base as it was when 
deployed elsewhere. While the psychological pressure of being a gunner 
on the gun line was not the same level of that of a rifleman on patrol, 
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it was constant – without relief. The only true rest for gun line soldiers 
was to get away from the gun position altogether – opportunities were 
rare. We lived cheek-by-jowl, night and day, and natural tensions could 
and did arise. That these were never allowed to impinge on required group 
performance is great tribute to the ‘level-headedness’ of all the NCOs and 
soldiers in the battery. I came to know and respect their profound talent 
to defuse occasions of raised tension. I well remember, on our penultimate 
day, when a ‘stand-down’ of four hours was declared so that we could 
relax as a total group. Within a few minutes of the call to take posts again, 
a three-battery ‘fire mission regiment’ was called and we were able to be 
first to report ‘ready’ one more time. They were truly a great team, and 
I will remember them always.
Reflections by our medical assistant: Lance 
Corporal Brian ‘Doc’ Mortimer
As the 103 Battery medic, one of my monthly duties was to participate 
in the medical civil aid program, or MEDCAP. A helicopter flew us to 
a village for a working session of around four hours, after which the 
helicopter would return us to base. For these village calls, I would take my 
basic medical pannier with me, enabling me to conduct an army-type sick 
parade for the villagers.
I would see around 30 people, treating basic health problems such as cuts, 
sore throats and minor local infections. Children would sometimes feign 
a sore throat so they could get lozenges. Those I determined needed to 
be reviewed by a medical officer would be seen later by the regimental 
medical officer (RMO), Captain John Taske, or his replacement, Captain 
Ted Heffernan.
On one of these MEDCAP visits, an old Vietnamese gentleman had a cyst 
the size of a tennis ball on his chest excised by the RMO, Captain Ted 
(‘When-in-doubt, Cut-it-out’) Heffernan without any local anaesthetic. 
Sutures were not available, so the village tailor provided cotton to close 
the wound. On subsequent visits, I found the patient to have healed very 
well. On another visit, some of us had the pleasure of being guests at 
a Vietnamese wedding. The wedding feast included plenty of meat, but as 
it was probably dog, routinely consumed in villages throughout Vietnam, 
I stuck with the rice and ‘risky’ salad.
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I recall our battery being deployed in support of 5  RAR in October 
1966. We were located on Route  15, the main road to Saigon. It was 
a busy road and the guns were only metres from the traffic. Many buses 
would travel past, loaded with people, some strapped to the roof, along 
with produce and luggage. The traffic was nonstop until last light when 
a curfew came into effect. At stand-to one morning, I remember seeing in 
the half-light a lone figure on a bicycle. He was a local food vendor and 
his basket was loaded with the omnipresent, locally produced and ever-
popular fresh bread rolls. We affectionately called them ‘heppo [hepatitis] 
rolls’. I can’t recall how we paid for them as we never took money with us 
on operations.
I had been with the battery for nearly 12 months before I observed the 
guns firing on charge one (the lowest propellant charge) with the barrels 
almost vertical as the guns engaged a relatively nearby target which was 
masked by terrain. In this case the muzzle velocity of the round was so low 
I could see the blurred shape of the projectile leaving the gun.
Finally, a gruesome sight I will never forget was when we came upon 
makeshift shallow graves of about six VC soldiers. Due to the heat and 
build-up of decomposition gases, two of the corpses were observed sitting 
up in their graves.
Operation Canberra, 6–10 October 1966: 
Captain Peter Aspinall
When 103 Field Battery was allotted in direct support of 5 RAR, my FO 
Party and I were attached to B Company. We arrived in the B Company 
tent lines at Nui Dat on Sunday 28 August 1966, immediately following 
the completion of Operation Smithfield, the battlefield clearance operation 
after the Battle of Long Tan. I had been involved in both actions as the 
FO for A Company, 6 RAR.
On arrival in B Company lines, I met the officer commanding (OC), Major 
Bruce McQualter, with whom I was to form a close working relationship. 
This was key to ensuring the most effective use of close artillery support 
on operations. Initially, while in the Nui Dat lines, I shared a tent with 
his 2IC, Captain Bob O’Neill. During the company patrols that followed, 
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I came to know the OC’s patterns of thought, including what Bruce might 
want of close fire support by both artillery and strike aircraft. By the time 
of Operation Canberra, the understanding between us was instinctive.
In Operation Canberra, B Company was tasked to clear the western side 
of the Nui Thi Vai hill. A major feature of this hill was a steep spur line, or 
ridge, running from west to east up to the crest of the hill to a height of 
467 metres. This spur was very steep in places, at times with a gradient 
of 1 in 2 or 1 in 3, and it was thickly covered by trees, vines and bushes. 
C Company was similarly tasked to clear an area further east of us.
On 6 October, B Company was transported by APCs along Route 15 to 
a point north of the village of Ap Ong Trinh Dp where we dismounted 
to commence our advance north to the western side of Nui Thi Vai. Initial 
progress was slow as we were moving through very marshy ground, at 
times wading in waist-deep water. My artillery task in this early phase 
was limited to map-registering potential defensive fire targets along our 
planned track and to our east, the anticipated direction from which we 
might be contacted by the enemy.
By mid to late morning on 8  October, C  Company to our east had 
advanced to the southern slopes of Nui Thi Vai and contacted the enemy, 
resulting in a number of casualties requiring evacuation. This action 
heightened the expectation of Major McQualter that B  Company was 
likely to make contact as we moved around the south-western spur of Nui 
Thi Vai and approached the main west-to-east spur line from the south.
Not only did this spur rise steeply from west to east, it had steep slopes 
either side of the ridgeline. This posed a major difficulty in planning 
defensive fire targets, as the minor variations in the trajectory of each 
round fired, inherent in all artillery fire, could result in rounds impacting 
below the crest, or carrying over the spur’s crest, well into the next gully 
or re-entrant. This problem was exacerbated by our west–east spur lying 
almost at right angles to the bearing from the gun position. A graphic 
demonstration of this situation occurred during a later operation when 
the FO attached to another company endeavoured to engage a target on 
a similarly placed spur line. When he ordered ‘fire for effect’, some rounds 
cleared the top of the spur line, only to fall into another company’s area.
By mid-afternoon B Company was climbing the southern slope of the 
spur with the intention of crossing to the northern side. Major McQualter 
halted the company and called me forward and told me that the leading 
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platoon had detected a group of VC estimated to be around 30 strong. 
He  was sending reconnaissance groups to confirm the location and 
strength of the VC and, as it appeared that they might be preparing to 
depart, he was also anxious to deploy the company as quickly as possible 
to attack and prevent them escaping.
He gave orders to his platoons for a company attack and, although I was 
extremely concerned about the likely fall of shot for the reasons outlined, 
I rapidly created a comprehensive fire plan and sent it to the gun position. 
As the platoons deployed, the company headquarters moved to a more 
advantageous location. However, in doing so we found ourselves among 
booby trap tripwires that the VC had set. It was remarkable that none were 
tripped. When Bruce was comfortable with his company’s dispositions, he 
radioed his CO, Lt Col John Warr, that he was about to commence the 
attack. But the CO ordered him to hold his position. After a delay the CO 
called off the attack. While I was located close to Bruce, I could not hear 
the CO’s instructions; but the look of disbelief on Bruce’s face was clear.
Though nothing was said, based on our close relationship, I was certain 
he was on the verge of ordering his platoons to attack anyway; and then 
advising the CO that it was too late to comply with his order to desist. 
McQualter’s discipline prevailed and he ordered his platoons to withdraw. 
For a considerable time, his demeanour betrayed his frustration and 
disappointment, which he later conveyed to me after the company had 
harboured for the night.
The company headquarters had difficulty extricating itself from among the 
tripwires; however, it did so without incident. Once clear of the immediate 
vicinity of the enemy the area was comprehensively engaged with mortar 
and artillery fire, then with USAF airstrikes as described in Chapters 7 
and 13. After these engagements, it was too late in the day for any follow-
up action by B Company. The next day it was confirmed that any VC who 
might have survived the bombardment had left the area. Much damage 
had been done and important information, equipment and other materiel 
was recovered, along with evidence of significant enemy casualties.
5 RAR’s task of securing a part of Route 15 by clearing the Nui Thi Vai 
hill feature had been successful. However, it was not the success that 
might have been achieved had Bruce McQualter bowed to what I think 
was his first instinct, to disobey his CO. On the other hand, very recent 
intelligence from credible sources had been hand delivered to CO 5 RAR, 
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by the Task Force HQ’s intelligence officer. It revealed that the enemy 
strength was probably more than the 30 that B Company estimated to 
have been present. If this information was correct, the task was too big 
for a company attack in terrain where it would be extremely difficult for 
5 RAR’s other companies to move rapidly to B Company’s assistance if it 
was needed.
Operation Hayman: Captain George Bindley
While Operation Hayman took place shortly after 5 RAR’s operations 
in the Nui Thi Vai hills, the following narrative is included as a sequel 
to illustrate the tensions that can develop between commanders who are 
each intent on doing their job, often under considerable pressure and 
amid a host of complexities. These tensions, sometimes exacerbated 
by personality conflicts extending over a series of incidents, can result 
in a senior officer being relieved of his command in battle – as was the 
outcome here.
Operation Hayman started on 8 November with 5 RAR flying in to Long 
Son Island from a landing zone close to Lang Phuoc Hoa village on the 
mainland. Crucially for some, this was the first time 1 ATF Tactical HQ 
deployed away from Nui Dat. I was battery captain, 103 Field Battery 
RAA. We were located on the mainland, close to Lang Phuoc Hoa, in 
direct support of 5 RAR. Two days later I flew to the island to join 5 RAR’s 
HQ and take over as acting battery commander.
I arrived at 5 RAR’s HQ, located adjacent to the Task Force HQ, where 
I joined the CO, Lieutenant Colonel John Warr, and Major Stan Maizey, 
his operations officer. C Company, 6 RAR, commanded by Major Brian 
McFarlane, was deployed to provide local defence for the Task Force 
HQ complex. The Task Force HQ’s Defence and Employment (D&E) 
Platoon was also placed under McFarlane’s command. 1 Field Regiment’s 
Tactical HQ, under Lieutenant Colonel Cubis, was also making its first 
operational deployment, and was located with the Task Force HQ group.
During the night 10/11 November, the D&E Platoon sergeant reported 
that there was a largish number of enemy to his front moving towards 
his position. Brian McFarlane decided to use guns rather than mortars to 
engage them. His FO, Captain Tony Wales of 161 Field Battery RNZA 
(Royal New Zealand Artillery), opened fire adjustment a safe distance 
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away on a point previously recorded by US Army medium artillery 
that afternoon. I switched my set onto the battery radio net to monitor 
progress with the fire mission. With overhead fire, artillery rounds 
at the end of their trajectory are moving away from the force they are 
supporting. By contrast, if a target is between our own troops and the 
guns, as it was in this case, the noise of rounds heading straight for you 
can be unnerving. The sky was overcast with a low cloud base amplifying 
the roar of rounds approaching the target. An idea of the experience is 
provided by Brian McFarlane in his book We Band of Brothers – A True 
Australian Adventure Story:
The Sergeant gave me a clear indication of how much to drop 
the fire towards him and we did it, and again, and again. He told 
me that the fire was approaching the area where the enemy 
troops were and we agreed on a small drop in range and to ‘Fire 
for Effect’ … by this time all those in the various headquarters 
and in my company were wishing they had dug deeper trenches 
as the noise of the rounds exploding on the rocky ground was 
horrendous and some shrapnel and bits of rock were whistling 
through the air but not too desperately for those of us who were 
used to such things.1
Soon after the fire mission started, I received a call from 1 Field Regiment’s 
Tactical HQ duty officer. He said the CO was unhappy with how the 
mission was being controlled. I explained that it was normal observed 
fire, and control was the FO’s responsibility. And, although the sound 
of incoming shells might be a bit uncomfortable, that too was normal. 
The mission continued with, of course, drop corrections for range, which 
took the point of impact further away from the HQ complex.
Then, shortly afterwards Lieutenant Colonel Cubis called me by field 
telephone: ‘What net are you on?’ ‘Battery sir.’ ‘You bloody idiot, MET 
– Mike Echo Tango!’ ‘Oh, you mean met [meteorological data]. We are 
not using any. None is available.’ ‘Apply a drop correction of 200 metres 
[to the range between guns and target] and tell the FO I want to see him 
in the morning.’ Still fuming, he hung up. I did not relay this message 
to Tony Wales. He had enough on his plate. I passed the ‘meteorology’ 
correction to the GPO, Lieutenant Mike Langley, and ordered clinometer 
laying to improve accuracy.




Because the OT line (from the location of the observer, Tony Wales, 
calling for the fire to the target) was east to west and the guns were firing 
from the north, the ‘met’ correction effectively reduced the guns’ range by 
200 metres but had little effect on the real culprit which was the bearing 
the guns were laid on. The fire was still coming almost directly towards 
the headquarters agglomeration, and each OT drop correction made by 
Tony swung the line of fire east and closer to those headquarters. When 
satisfied with his fire adjustments, Tony Wales then ordered, ‘fire for 
effect’ and nothing happened ! Then, on the battery radio net, the GPO 
reported, ‘End of mission’. Tony had not ordered it, and I certainly didn’t. 
I asked the GPO who had terminated the fire mission. He said that it was 
ordered by Colonel Cubis on the regimental radio net.
I told Colonel Warr, who was furious. Stan Maizey offered the battalion 
mortars, but Brian McFarlane declined, preferring the more accurate guns 
with such a close target. Being a mere bearer of bad news did not stop me 
getting a good ribbing from John Warr and Stan Maizey. Again, from his 
book, Brian McFarlane takes up the story from his end:
As soon as Tony Wales gave the order, ‘Fire for Effect’ on the 
artillery regimental net, another call was broadcast:
‘This is 95 Alpha [Cubis]. STOP.’ The guns did not fire.
Tony replied, ‘My Foxhound Sunray [My infantry commander, 
Major McFarlane] wants to know why.’
‘Because my Sunray says so.’ replied Cubis’s operator.2
Brian McFarlane’s question had been ignored. He wondered how the CO 
of the regiment located at Task Force HQ could veto an order for fire 
from a forward company commander in contact with the enemy and, 
when asked to explain, refused to do so. The D&E Platoon reported 
there was still enemy movement between where the last shell had fallen 
and themselves. McFarlane called Brigadier Jackson, whose HQ he was 
defending, and explained what was happening. He was told he would get 
his fire. His book records:
Again, Captain Wales ordered ‘Fire.’
Again, 95 Alpha ordered ‘STOP.’
2  McFarlane, We Band of Brothers, pp 309–310. Emphasis added.
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Again, McFarlane called the Brigadier and received the same 
assurance.
Again, Captain Wales ordered ‘Fire.’
Nothing was heard from 95Alpha; and the guns fired.3
The reality of who was running the battle had apparently eluded 
Lieutenant  Colonel Cubis. His intervention clearly implied a lack 
of confidence in the professional competence of his officers and 
an  unwillingness to state it. He had a reputation for intervening in 
matters simply because he could. Others felt that, because he had been 
acknowledged for a good effort commanding the artillery support for 
the Battle of Long Tan, he believed that his pronouncements on artillery 
matters were incontestable, irrespective of their context, timing or effect – 
perhaps a sad case of incipient egomania. Whatever the cause, his actions 
were both faulty and dangerous.
Next morning Brigadier Jackson asked Brian McFarlane to come and see 
him. The brigadier apologised for what had happened and said that Cubis 
had been relieved of his command and when asked by Brigadier Jackson 
why he had intervened, he argued that, in his professional opinion, the 
fire was unsafe. The brigadier was not persuaded. This was not the first 
time that Brigadier Jackson had intervened to stop Cubis from doing 
something strange.
Earlier, during Operation Canberra, Cubis visited the gun position and 
found its siting unsuitable. He ordered a move to a better site. However, 
he neglected to inform or liaise with the battery commander located with 
HQ 5 RAR so that the move could be coordinated with the battalion’s 
operational needs. This naturally upset the CO of 5 RAR. At the time the 
battalion was in sporadic contact with the enemy in the hills, and the move 
left them without their dedicated fire support for the significant amount 
of time needed to relocate the guns. Leaving aside technical reasons for 
relocating the guns to a better site, Cubis’s arbitrary and precipitate order 
caused immediate concern and anger, and ongoing doubts in the minds 
of 5 RAR. When questioned about his intervention without consulting 
5  RAR, Cubis insisted the movement/deployment of the guns was his 
prerogative. He would not retreat from this belief and the disputation 
inevitably involved Brigadier Jackson.
3  Ibid. Emphasis added.
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A short time later, during Operation Robin, there had been an incident 
that could have been catastrophic. The ARVN had two M2A2 105 mm 
howitzers in their compound at Phu My. During the night they were 
firing H&I into the Nui Thi Via hills to their south-east, uncomfortably 
close to 5 RAR. Despite attempts to stop it, the fire continued. Cubis 
decided the solution was for 103 Battery to fire a few warning rounds at 
the Vietnamese gunners in their compound.
I was called to the battery CP and briefed by the GPO, Lieutenant 
John Griggs. The guns were laid on the target ready to fire, but the Phu 
My area had been declared a ‘no fire zone’. The implications were very 
serious. A series of questions sprang to mind in rapid succession: What 
if we received counter-battery fire in return? What if we, the ARVN or 
local civilians took casualties? Would we be headline news? How could we 
explain to an investigation that, despite being given an order we knew to 
be a serious violation of rules by which we were bound, we had fired on 
friendly troops and civilians? How could I stop it happening?
It came to me that I had seen a similar situation before. The film Paths of 
Glory (1957), Stanley Kubrick’s antiwar epic, has a scene where an angry 
general gives an order to an artillery battery commander to fire on his own 
trenches. The battery commander refuses to fire unless given a written 
order. The general, fearing the consequences of his action and being 
unable to deny responsibility, backs down. This was worth a try. I spoke 
to the 1 Field Regiment duty officer at Nui Dat and said that I would not 
fire unless I received a written order. As it was the middle of the night and 
I was in an unsecured, remote area, my request was clearly impossible to 
satisfy. The alarm was raised. Brigadier Jackson was called, stepped in and 
stopped the rot. Thank heavens.
Now, in Operation Hayman on Long Son Island and with such 
recollections in mind, I called Artillery Tactical HQ next morning to ask 
when Cubis wanted to see Tony Wales. I was told that he had returned 
to the mainland and was not available. Stan Maizey then handed me 
a message addressed to all 1 ATF units written in longhand and signed 
by Major Dick Hannigan, the task force operations officer. It concluded, 
‘Major McDermott, 2IC of 1st Field Regiment, has assumed administrative 
command of the Regiment.’




THE MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF 
OPERATIONS IN THE HILLS
Tony white and Ian Mcdougall
Introduction by Ron Boxall
The aesthete Morihei Ueshiba, a veteran of the Russo–Japanese war of 
1904–05 and who later became famous as an enlightened martial artist, 
once said, ‘Loyalty and devotion lead to bravery. Bravery leads to the 
spirit of self-sacrifice. The spirit of self-sacrifice creates trust in the power 
of brotherly love’.1 No more needs to be said to introduce a chapter which 
showcases men who were routinely called upon to put the welfare of 
mates before all else – the reader will find threads of Morihei’s sentiments 
as a recurring theme among the following paragraphs, and in other parts 
of this book.
Tony White
By October 1966 – after five months in Vietnam – the battalion’s physical 
and mental health was at its peak. The soldiers were now well acclimatised. 
The wet season, with its endless mud, mould and misery, was over. The 
incidence of fever and skin disease and the rates of non-casualty hospital 
admissions had fallen. Hygiene practices, including malaria prophylaxis, 




were accepted and practised. Conditions back in the battalion lines 
at Nui Dat were more comfortable with amenities such as company 
canteens, the outdoor cinema and the Task Force concert area (the ‘Dust 
Bowl’) providing welcome distractions from relentless duty. The troops 
were getting used to the rhythm of one or two weeks out on operations 
followed by a week or two of physically demanding base development 
tasks and defensive patrolling. During their 12-month tour of duty, they 
were able to look forward to a two-day break of rest and convalescence on 
the beach at Vung Tau as well as one spell of five days rest and recreation 
elsewhere in Asia.
Medical cover for the battalion was provided by the Medical Platoon. 
This comprised the regimental medical officer (RMO), two staff sergeants 
(Mick Seats (medical) and Ayb Brown (hygiene inspector)), five corporal 
medical assistants (trained to basic nursing level) and the stretcher bearer/
bandsmen. The RMO, staff sergeants and one corporal constituted the 
regimental aid post (the medical centre) at Battalion Headquarters (BHQ) 
when in the base area. The other corporals were distributed one for each 
of the four rifle companies, taking care of day-to-day medical problems. 
By this stage of the year, medical personnel at every level were becoming 
more confident in handling both casualties and sickness. Pharmaceutical 
resupply when out on operations was working well, ably handled by Mick 
Seats who remained in the regimental aid post at our Nui Dat base. Above 
all – for both the troops and their medical attendants – was the peace of 
mind from having a superb and timely helicopter aeromedical evacuation 
Dustoff system. This could enable casualties to be in hospital care within 
an hour of an incident, service far superior to what was available for the 
general population in Australia at the time.
By any measure, I was grossly under-prepared for the role of RMO of 
an infantry battalion on active service. At the age of 25, I had only just 
completed my intern year, where my surgical experience had been limited 
to suturing drunks in the Emergency Department and to serving as a very 
junior assistant in surgical operations at Sydney Hospital. I had no first 
aid training. A teaching hospital is no place to learn the bread-and-butter 
medicine that constitutes the bulk of an RMO’s work; such experience is 
gained over a couple of years in a general practice setting. My knowledge 
of tropical medicine was a textbook on the subject plus a hazy recollection 
of one term’s lectures during the medical course at Sydney University. 
My  posting to the battalion was as a rushed, last-minute replacement, 
two months before our deployment to Vietnam. This meant that I was 
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plucked out of the six-week Indoctrination Course at the School of Army 
Health at Week  2. The course was designed to ease the transition of 
young civilian doctors into the army system. Here one was taught not 
only aspects of military medicine, kit, uniforms and the rank structure, 
but also basic tactics, living in the bush, handling of weapons and so on. 
Missing out on this part of my education was a major handicap. I had been 
in my school Sea Cadets in Kenya and a pilot officer in the Cambridge 
University Air Squadron, but there were huge gaps in my knowledge of 
the military culture at the time I joined the battalion. For example, I was 
unsure whether it was I who was to salute the regimental sergeant major 
or the other way around. Fortunately, I was generously supported by my 
fellow officers throughout.
The life of a battalion RMO on active service is one of unremitting 
humdrum toil punctuated by episodes of intense, sometimes extremely 
stressful, activity. But I was never idle. When in the Nui Dat base area 
between battalion operations, the day began with a sick parade which 
could last all morning. The most common disorder seen was skin disease, 
particularly fungal and bacterial infections. This was not surprising 
considering the relentless heat and humidity, friction from clothing and 
webbing equipment, and minor cuts and scratches. The troops often 
went days without an opportunity for showering and a change of clothes. 
Other common conditions included respiratory infections, orthopaedic 
problems (knees, backs, ankles), sexually transmitted diseases and fevers. 
Malaria was held in check by rigorous application of preventive measures.
My other routine duties in the base area included inspections of the 
battalion area with the hygiene staff sergeant. Attention to proper 
standards of food-handling, garbage disposal, latrines and so on may 
sound unglamorous but, if neglected, has often resulted in outbreaks of 
disease which can impact more on manpower than battle casualties. Other 
duties included reporting on the health situation in the battalion and 
among the civilians attending village clinics. There were debriefing and 
training sessions with medical assistants and stretcher bearers, discussions 
with the commanding officer and company commanders and – transport 
permitting – trips to the hospitals in Vung Tau to visit battalion members 
and liaise with the doctors. As RMO, I understood the importance of 
getting out of the regimental aid post as much as possible and taking 
every opportunity to visit companies to discuss medical problems, debrief 
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after incidents and get to know – and be known by – the soldiers. A large 
commitment of time and effort was the Medical Civic Action Program in 
which I ran clinics for civilians in neighbouring villages.
This relatively routine schedule back in the base area could be shattered 
on occasion, calling for an adrenaline-filled sprint. One such instance was 
early one morning when two grenades were accidentally discarded into 
a pit in which a fire was burning. There was an impressively loud explosion 
but fortunately the injuries to bystanders were slight. At the other extreme 
was a horrific accidental shooting. I was engaged in paperwork at the 
regimental aid post one afternoon when I was summoned by an out-of-
breath runner. I  ran flat out up to a tent in B Company lines to find 
a soldier with a massive gaping wound in his chest. He was beyond help. 
Close by on the floor lay his mate, pounding the ground with his fist and 
howling with grief. They had been handling a non-issue shotgun when 
it discharged, with a disastrous consequence. The two were close friends 
and the dead soldier had been the other’s best man at his wedding before 
they embarked for Vietnam. On return to Australia the dead man was to 
have married his mate’s sister-in-law. There was a sequel to compound 
this tragic event. Three months later, the survivor of the shooting was 
himself to lose his life when the patrol of armoured personnel carriers in 
which he was travelling ran into a minefield. Six other soldiers were also 
killed and 27 wounded. Two of these – the company commander and 
platoon commander – were to die of their wounds over the following 
week. It was an utterly harrowing scene, with the casualties spread over 
an area the size of a tennis court. Assisted by the one surviving medic 
– himself wounded – I found myself almost overwhelmed by the needs 
of the casualties and their sheer number. Of course, the knowledge that 
we were walking and working in a minefield made for an hour of terror 
pending the arrival of Dustoff casualty evacuation helicopters and sappers 
to clear the remaining mines. This catastrophe – the biggest minefield 
incident in Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam war – was certainly the 
worst incident of my army service. I found all encounters with casualties 
extremely distressing. A summons to ‘fetch Starlight’ (the radio call sign of 
the RMO and medics) would fill me with dread. There was no knowing 
what lay in wait except the certainty that it would be awful.
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In any discussion of the Medical Platoon, the Battalion Band merits 
special mention. Numbering 25 and under the command of bandmaster 
Warrant  Officer Bob Taylor, they were a disparate group. Eight had 
served an apprenticeship at the army School of Music; others had 
musical experience at school, church or in community bands. Their 
instruments were cornets, horns, trombone, euphonium, tuba, saxophone 
and percussion. When not out on operations the band was in constant 
demand,  playing at ceremonial parades, church services, memorials, 
hospitals and, on visits to villages, as part of the civic action program.
As well as their infantry and musical duties, bandsmen also had basic 
first aid training to provide care for casualties when out on operations. 
Allocated one per platoon (30 men), they were officially known as 
stretcher bearers, a hangover from the 19th century when the retrieval 
of casualties from the battlefield was becoming formalised. At that time 
any non-combatant, including bandsmen, would be mustered to the task 
of clearing the dead and wounded from the battlefield.
The practice was taken up by the fledgling Australian Commonwealth 
Military Force and a General Order in 1902 ordained that ‘all bandsmen, 
in addition to their duties as such, should be trained as stretcher bearers 
and should be allocated to companies in time of war’.
In past wars – and even to some extent within the battalion in the early 
days – there was an initial widespread belief that bandsmen/stretcher 
bearers were shirkers, not real soldiers. The fact that they were musicians 
may have further contributed to this attitude. Such disdain was soon 
banished once their dedication and courage became common knowledge. 
They were fully armed to protect themselves and the casualties in their 
care. During our year of service in Vietnam, two of the battalion’s stretcher 
bearers received bravery awards, one was killed and four were wounded. 
In the trying conditions of the October 1966 operations in the hills they 
again acquitted themselves with honour.
The skills of the medical assistants and stretcher bearers were soon to be 
put to work. It was on Day 3 of Operation Canberra that two platoons 
were hit in separate booby trap incidents, wounding eleven soldiers, three 
of them seriously. First aid was administered and helicopter evacuation 
effected after a minimal landing zone had been cleared. One disappointing 
defect in the medical system was that first responders did not receive any 
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follow-up on the casualties they had cared for until the RMO, in the days 
or weeks ahead, was able to find an opportunity to visit the hospitals to 
which they had been evacuated.
The five-day road-holding task (Operation Robin) that immediately 
followed Operation Canberra was an opportunity to carry out Medical 
Civic Action Program clinics (MEDCAPs) at villages on Route 15 along 
which the battalion was strung. MEDCAPs were staged during operations 
whenever time and the tactical situation permitted. The team consisted 
of the RMO, a Royal Australian Army Medical Corps (RAAMC) non-
commissioned officer, one or two stretcher bearers and an Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam interpreter. Clinics were conducted in any suitable 
building or under a marquee. In wartime Vietnam, the civilian population 
had very limited access to medical care. Road travel to clinics and hospitals 
was perilous. The last time the inhabitants of Long Cat village had seen 
a  doctor was three years previously, when an American army unit had 
passed through. Consequently, MEDCAPs were invariably extremely 
popular with villagers. Sometimes as many as 75 patients would be seen 
in three hours.
If the situation was suitable the bandmaster assembled the stretcher 
bearer/bandsmen and arranged for their instruments to be brought out 
by truck from Nui Dat. A brass band concert – a rare experience for the 
locals – ensued, greatly lightening the atmosphere.
The MEDCAPs had immense public relations value and were recognised 
as a useful contribution to counter-insurgency. For the battalion medics, 
they provided welcome contact with Vietnamese civilians and an 
understanding of their health problems. However, their medical utility 
was extremely limited. The main problems were the language barrier – 
even with interpreters – and the lack of privacy to permit an effective 
physical examination. These factors, as well as a total absence of laboratory 
help, rendered accurate diagnosis almost impossible. When a confident 
diagnosis could be made, the range of medications available for their 
treatment was limited. Above all was the huge burden of chronic disease – 
malaria, tuberculosis and hookworm – prevalent in the population. These 
diseases require long-term treatment under close supervision; a flying 
visit by a well-intentioned team was utterly ineffective and could only 
engender false hope.
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Even though the MEDCAPs could be tiring, I always found them 
interesting and the civilian contact a lively counterpoint to military life. 
Sometimes this could be a challenge. The priest at Long Cat village kindly 
invited me to lunch. The main dish was smashed duck in a bowl of blood 
with spicules of bone for consistency. Not wishing to offend, I managed 
to get through it with the aid of rice whisky which was somewhat redolent 
of aviation gasoline.
One afternoon I was standing at the roadside at the C Company position, 
having done a ‘house call’ and awaiting a ride with the Sioux reconnaissance 
helicopter to take me back to BHQ. The chopper sped towards us, flying 
just a metre above the road surface, when it suddenly hit the ground, 
cartwheeling down the bitumen, pieces of the aircraft flying off, until 
the shattered wreck came to rest metres from where we were standing. 
The pilot, Second Lieutenant Bill Davies, had a head injury and was 
unconscious. We stunned onlookers had no idea as to what had caused 
the crash, although the possibility of sniper fire was raised. His passenger 
was Staff Sergeant ‘Sailor’ Mealing, a Korean War veteran and colourful 
battalion identity. He had several fractures and his evacuation to hospital 
in Vung Tau was expedited. Because of Davies’ head injury, I decided 
to call for a second Dustoff helicopter and escorted him to a hospital 
with neurosurgical facilities in Saigon. Both casualties survived and were 
evacuated to Australia in the weeks ahead. Bill Davies relates the story of 
his crash and his evacuation and recovery in Chapter 14.
Leaving the roadside for the second excursion into the hills (Operation 
Queanbeyan) meant a return to the toughest terrain most of us had ever 
encountered. The going was steep with an average gradient of 1  in  3, 
on a track slippery from the tail end of the wet season. The troops were 
carrying kit, ammunition and rations totalling some 30  kilograms. 
The  hillside was littered with giant granite boulders, some as big as 
shipping containers, riven by clefts and caves, and overlain with tall trees 
and dense undergrowth, perfect for snipers. This setting and our awareness 
of the presence of the enemy and booby traps along the track raised the 
level of tension considerably.
On the morning of the first day of Operation Queanbeyan (17 October), 
four soldiers of A Company were wounded by one such booby trap. That 
same afternoon the Reconnaissance Group, 100 metres or so uphill from 
where BHQ had paused, had come under fire and its leader, Captain 
Brian Le Dan, was reported as wounded. I took off up the track to join 
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him. He was a lucky man: the bullet had struck his Owen gun and he 
received only a flesh wound on the chest wall from fragments. Bleeding 
was readily controlled with a shell dressing. We settled down in the shelter 
of a large rock until he felt confident enough to walk back down the track 
with me to where it was possible for him to be extracted in a remarkable 
piece of helicopter piloting (Chapter  14) and conveyed to hospital. 
Shortly afterwards, Corporal Norm Womal was shot leading his section 
to clear the area. He lay in a very exposed position. In the time-honoured 
tradition, stretcher bearer Private Peter Fraser – against orders – crawled 
forward under fire, dressed the wound, shielded Womal from enemy fire 
and assisted a carrying party to bring him to me further down the slope. 
Womal had a bullet entry wound above the collarbone and it was obvious 
that he was bleeding freely from a major vessel within the chest. There 
was no way to stop the bleeding. The small amount of albumin that I was 
carrying and administered intravenously could not keep pace with his 
blood loss and he died within 20 minutes. (Details of this engagement are 
described in Chapter 7.)
The next two days were taken up with assaults on caves along the track. 
These actions were costly, with the death of Private Gordon D’Antoine 
on 18  October and the serious wounding of two soldiers by a booby 
trap grenade the following day (Chapter  7). One of the wounded was 
Private Trevor Lynch. Non-medical people often think that medics are 
quite unfeeling and able to go about their duties focusing only on the 
technical task that lies before them. Corporal Ian McDougall RAAMC 
was attached to the Pioneer Platoon that afternoon and had to deal 
with the two casualties. Ian was the only national service corporal in 
the Medical Platoon. His account gives some insight into the toll that 
casualty management can impose on those charged with tending to those 
in their care.
Ian McDougall
Trevor Lynch and another soldier had been detailed to make the actual 
assault with the backpack flame-throwers. We did not see their initial 
approach, but suddenly there was the almighty crack of a mine detonation, 
followed by loud screaming. With clearance from the section commander 
I was with, I made my way back to the track and down then out to where 
the wounded lay.
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To say I was scared stiff would be a gross understatement. The two men 
lay immediately in front of the caves which had numerous entrances with 
little cover. I recall feeling very lonely and totally exposed.
I turned my attention to Trevor, who was screaming in a demented 
fashion and writhing on the ground. He had sustained multiple wounds; 
in fact, his was the most mutilated human body I had ever seen and ever 
want to. I had great difficulty deciding where to start as he had dozens 
of bleeding wounds, some of them very serious, broken limbs and many 
facial injuries. The front of his body was a mass of puncture wounds. 
I remember, as I started applying wound dressings, that I had to tie Trevor’s 
hands together to stop him dislodging dressings and doing himself more 
damage. I recall that I was crying at one point due to the frustration I felt 
in trying stop blood loss from so many wounds at once. I doubt if Trevor 
was aware at that time of anything, and his wild screaming continued 
unabated, but I do recall that Captain Tony White, the 5 RAR RMO, 
joined me at some stage. I have tried hard since to forget that incident, 
and have obviously partially succeeded, as I do not recall how or when my 
patient was evacuated, or what happened to the other soldier or even if 
I had treated him.
Tony White
Trevor Lynch survived but was totally and permanently incapacitated, 
losing both eyes and being confined to a wheelchair until his early death 
at the age of 51. Ian McDougall, despite being plagued by post-traumatic 
stress disorder, went on to have a successful career in the Australian Federal 
Police. No medic can erase the memory of the maimed soldiers for whom 
he did his best and that memory is rendered more painful by the flood of 
emotions that accompanies it.
The Nui Thi Vai hills operations were an intense, physically and mentally 
demanding 20 days of almost continuous and varied activity. Aside from 
the steady stream of medical problems – bronchitis, twisted knees, sprained 
ankles, crotch rot and so on – there were the fearful and intensely stressful 
battle casualties with which to contend. I am proud of all in the Medical 




At war, all infantrymen are continuously mindful of the inescapable 
likelihood of casualties. How well they function effectively for extended 
periods depends on an individual’s confidence in himself, his training, the 
systems within which he operates and others who support him. Much of 
this confidence emanates from a sense of being part of the hierarchical 
entity which includes his platoon, his company and his battalion. This 
cossets him in a brotherhood of identity, acceptance, obligation, shared 
danger, mutual dependence and pride. Deep interpersonal bonds which 
become unshakeable lifelong friendships are inevitable. To Australians the 
phenomenon is just ‘mateship’ – long held to be among the foremost 
of our distinctive national traits.
Much is written of such things; often without good, firsthand examples 
of the many factors which are at play in moulding the resilience of those 
whose duty is to seek out and destroy an enemy. The words of Tony White 
and Ian McDougall give a hint of the many facets of an infantry battalion 
at war which are sparsely aired in most postwar accounts. Notably, they 
vividly impart the morale effects of having members of our battalion’s 
dedicated medical team, including our RMO, deployed at the forefront 
of danger.
The impact of rapid aeromedical evacuation of casualties to sophisticated 
surgical facilities during the Vietnam War has deservedly been hailed for 
its effects on survivability and morale. But the comfort of having, right at 
hand, known mates who were trained to be casualty first responders was 
a pearl beyond price.
Our medical team, in providing that response on the battlefield, first had to 
reach the soldiers who had been wounded, lying immobile on the ground, 
often still under direct enemy observation. As they moved forward to 
help those in need, they had to make hard choices on whom to treat first. 
They had to shed normal concerns for their own safety and frequently 
accept a very high degree of personal risk over short periods. We never 
saw any of our Medical Platoon members hesitate as they entered a danger 
zone. Such areas were particularly threatening when they included hidden 
mines and booby traps, activated by barely visible tripwires, concealed 
pressure switches or remote-control wires laid underground and reaching 
back to a control point where the firer could lie, hidden from view and in 
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relative safety. They entered and moved about areas where mines or booby 
traps had been encountered, or where the enemy was in close proximity, 
to treat first those wounded whom they judged to be in greatest need.
A second difficult scenario that our medics had to face was the constant 
pressure to give effective assistance to the people in the villages through 
which we had to operate, and with whom we wanted to develop good 
relations. The locals trusted us, and that made our awareness of the 
limited nature of the medical assistance that we could provide particularly 
worrisome. This awareness arose first and foremost in the minds of our 
medical team, who could see the consequences of being able to provide 
only very limited assistance more clearly than any of us.
Many share the view that our medical team’s devotion to our casualties, 
with the special risks that such devotion entailed, was worthy of very high 
recognition. Similarly, their vital role in helping us gain the trust and 
confidence of local villagers merited special mention. Our confidence in 
their bravery, knowledge and compassion made a huge difference to our 






Jim Campbell, Bob Supple, Bob Askew,  
Robert O’Neill and Bill davies
Editors’ introduction
Air support played an important part in most operations that 5th Battalion, 
the Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR), undertook during the Vietnam 
War. Helicopters were ideally suited to the type of warfare and difficult 
terrain of Vietnam and they provided a level of air mobility, close fire 
support, air resupply, air reconnaissance and casualty evacuation that had 
not been seen in earlier conflicts. Army pilots, who were allocated in direct 
support of infantry battalions during operations from the beginning of 
1 ATF’s (1st Australian Task Force) deployment into Phuoc Tuy Province, 
provide this chapter’s narratives. They show the robust mutual regard 
which rapidly developed and long endured between them and those 
they supported.
Jim Campbell
No aircraft other than the helicopter could have provided ground forces 
with the various types of intimate air support which were essential to 
the nature of operations undertaken in Vietnam. The Bell UH-1 models, 
officially named ‘Iroquois’ but commonly referred to as the ‘Huey’, were 
particularly important. Troop and cargo-carrying versions, with two M60 
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machine guns operated by side-door gunners, were known as ‘slicks’. 
Heavily armed ground support versions with rapid-fire, multi-barrelled 
machine guns and high explosive (HE) rockets, were known as ‘gunships’. 
In operations, slicks inserted and extracted small patrols or entire infantry 
units like 5 RAR, using clear areas called landing zones (LZ). They then 
kept them resupplied. The casualty evacuation version of the Huey 
was code-named Dustoff. Larger helicopters such as the Boeing CH-47 
Chinook were able to lift artillery units into and out of remote jungle and 
hilltop fire base locations in support of the battalion.
Slicks could provide close fire support from their side-mounted M60 
machine guns. This could prove vital in infantry insertions into, and 
extractions from, unsecured LZs. In jungle or high rugged areas like the 
mountainous areas of Phuoc Tuy Province, suitable LZs were few and 
far between. Any suspected of being under Viet Cong surveillance could 
either be secured by ground forces or be ‘prepared’ by artillery or gunships 
immediately before the landing of troop-carrying slicks.
In its Dustoff role, the Iroquois could extract wounded soldiers from even 
the most inaccessible LZs. In thick primary jungle, casualties could be 
extracted by lowering, by winch cable, a vertical stretcher called a ‘jungle 
penetrator’. With the casualty secured he could then be winched, 
upright, out of the jungle into the Dustoff helicopter. Casualties could 
be transported, in less than 30 minutes, to either the Australian Army’s 
1 Field Hospital or the US Army’s 36 Evacuation Hospital at Vung Tau; 
or, if necessary, to specialist US medical facilities in Saigon within an 
hour. Dustoff support added greatly to the confidence and morale of our 
soldiers during operations.
Iroquois from both American and Australian units supported 1  ATF. 
9 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) provided the Australian 
Iroquois and their aircraft used the radio call sign Albatross. US Army 
Aviation units provided the US Iroquois gunships and usually used lurid 
and macho call signs. Later in the war RAAF gunships became available 
and used the call sign Bushranger. So successful was the Iroquois in the 
Vietnam War that it endures as an iconic symbol for veterans of the 
air-mobile operations in which it was so extensively used.
In addition to the Iroquois, the battalion was supported by the smaller 
three-seat Bell Sioux 47G 3B1 helicopters. Australian Army pilots of 
161 (Independent) Reconnaissance Flight (161 (Indep) Recce Flight) flew 
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this type, forever associated with the Korean War. They used the radio call 
sign Possum and their primary roles were to provide air reconnaissance, 
forward air control of close air support and artillery fire and casualty 
evacuation using two exterior mounted stretchers. The latter capability 
was very important in cases where the combination of a tight extraction 
LZ and limited time precluded the use of the larger Iroquois Dustoff.
The battalion could task air-delivered fire; this was called close air support. 
The US Air Force provided close air support with its fixed-wing propeller-
driven aircraft or jet fighter ground attack aircraft. The US Army’s ground 
attack helicopters could also be used. The aircraft could deliver a range 
of ordnance including HE bombs, cluster bombs and napalm to surface 
targets. The US Army’s gunships had very high rates of fire from both 
machine guns and automatic 40 mm grenade launchers, as well as volley-
fired rockets. Close air support was invaluable against hardened installations 
and enemy targets outside the range of artillery. Also available for tasking 
was the destructive power of US Air Force B-52 strategic bombers and the 
high potency fire from the many rapid-fire, multi-barrelled machine guns 
mounted on converted C-47 transport aircraft (the Second World War 
military version of the venerable 1930s civilian DC3). These were then 
redesignated AC-47; the added ‘A’ to indicate their attack role. The radio 
call sign used by these aircraft was Spooky. Their popular nickname was 
‘Puff the Magic Dragon’ because the ‘red rain’ of their voluminous tracer 
fire, particularly at night, suggested a fire-breathing, flying beast.
5 RAR made greater use of the different types of air support available to it 
during the period of Operations Canberra, Robin and Queanbeyan than 
at any other time during the battalion’s tour of duty in Vietnam. These 
operations commenced with the battalion making its initial movement 
into the Nui Thi Vai and the Nui Toc Tien Hills areas on foot. Insertion 
by foot rather than helicopter was necessary to conceal the deployment of 
5 RAR rifle companies from the Viet Cong. After the Viet Cong became 
aware of the presence of the battalion in the area, close air support was 
called in by the battalion as described in Chapters 6 and 7.
The Sioux from 161 (Indep) Recce Flight provided continuous daily air 
support for the battalion during these operations. The helicopter section 
of the flight had been operating with 6 RAR on the eastern and north-
eastern side of the Nui Dinh hills in September 1966 so the pilots were 
reasonably familiar with the area. Each day a pilot was assigned to 5 RAR 
for the whole day to fly whatever tasks the battalion required. The pilot 
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would be briefed the evening before, by the previous day’s pilot, on the 
location of Battalion Headquarters (BHQ) and the fire support base 
(FSB) and where they could land. The new pilot would also be advised of 
all current company locations and any other relevant information for the 
following day.
Bob Supple
Prior to their experiences in Vietnam, all army pilots had worked or served 
with infantry battalions on exercises in Australia. Captain Jim Campbell 
DFC, who commanded the 161 (Indep) Recce Flight’s helicopters, had 
been posted to 1 RAR for three years in Australia and Malaysia before 
becoming a pilot. Jim Campbell was awarded the Distinguished Flying 
Cross due largely to his actions during 5 RAR Operation Renmark when, 
on 21 February 1967, he flew Captain Tony White, the 5 RAR medical 
officer, into a minefield to assist our wounded personnel. Jim landed time 
after time in the minefield until all the wounded were evacuated to where 
the larger Dustoff aircraft could safely collect them. This was necessary 
because the stronger rotor downwash of the larger aircraft was likely to 
activate the sensitive anti-personnel mines.
161 (Indep) Recce Flight had operated out of Vung Tau until the end of 
February 1967. Then after their workshops and aircraft parking areas in 
the 1 ATF base were completed, they relocated alongside 5 RAR at Nui 
Dat. Sioux helicopters did not spend the night in the field with battalions 
during operations because the helicopters did not have any protection 
from enemy mortar attack or other action. Also, because they were 
difficult to conceal, their presence could give away the location of the unit 
they were supporting to the enemy.
Operation Canberra from 6 to 10  October 1966 involved 5  RAR’s 
preliminary clearance of the Nui Thi Vai hills prior to Operation Robin 
where the battalion was tasked to secure a section of Route 15 directly 
overlooked by the Nui Thi Vai hills. Operation Robin was mounted to 
ensure the safe passage by road of 3 Brigade of the US 4 Infantry Division 
from Vung Tau to Bien Hoa. Sioux helicopters completed discreet aerial 
reconnaissance of the Nui Thi Vai area for Operation Canberra by 
5 October 1966. On the following day the rifle companies and BHQ of 
5 RAR commenced an approach on foot through the jungle towards the 
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foothills of Nui Thi Vai. Late in the morning of 8 October, C Company 
suffered casualties from booby traps. The casualties were evacuated by 
a Dustoff Iroquois from an LZ hand-cut into the jungle by their mates.
In the early afternoon, B Company sighted a group of about 30 Viet Cong 
and a fire plan employing mortars, artillery and air support was prepared. 
B and C Companies were pulled back a safe distance from the Viet Cong 
location and artillery and mortar fire was directed onto the Viet Cong 
position. Then Iroquois gunships were called in and fired rockets and 
machine guns directly onto the Viet Cong position.
Following the gunship attack an airstrike was used to destroy any Viet 
Cong still occupying hardened bunkers. This airstrike was coordinated 
by BHQ and commenced with the arrival overhead of the US forward 
air controller in a light aircraft. I briefed the US forward air controller, 
nicknamed Bird Dog, on the target details and the locations of all friendly 
forces. When the F-100 Super Sabre ground attack aircraft arrived and 
started circling overhead, the forward air controller identified both enemy 
and friendly locations to the ground attack aircraft by means of coloured 
smoke grenades, which they used to help him identify their locations 
in the jungle. This involved somewhat lengthy radio communications 
between the rifle companies, BHQ and Birddog, followed by further radio 
communications between Birddog and the strike aircraft.
The air strike entailed an attack by two waves of F-100 jet aircraft using 
500-pound bombs, napalm and cluster bomb units (CBUs). CBUs were 
large containers which exploded above the ground, scattering many 
smaller bomblets through the surrounding jungle to detonate on impact. 
Once the intricacies of identifying the enemy and friendly locations to 
the F-100s were successfully completed, the attack began. The airstrike 
produced thunderous engine roars, deafening explosions and clouds of 
dust and smoke, concluding not long before daylight ended; with a ground 
force follow-up then impossible before the following morning. During 
the afternoon of the airstrike, 1,000 rounds of mortar ammunition had 
been flown in by Iroquois to the mortar base plate position close to BHQ 
and, that night, the two Mortar Platoon sections (four 81 mm mortars) 
fired 960 rounds as a follow-up to the air strike. The ground follow-up of 
the air strike which took place next morning is described in Chapter 6.
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On the afternoon of 10  October, Iroquois airlifted the battalion to 
positions along Route  15 to commence Operation Robin which was 
conducted from 11 to 16 October. It involved searching for mines and 
booby traps and intensive patrolling along Route 15 and its conduct is 
described in Chapter 6. A near-tragic event during this operation was the 
crash of the Sioux helicopter then supporting the battalion. The pilot, 
Second Lieutenant Bill Davies, was flying at low level beside Route 15 
when his main rotor blades appeared to strike a power pole; his aircraft 
crashed and was destroyed. Bill relates this incident and its aftermath later 
in this chapter.
The US 4  Infantry Division convoy with its own armoured vehicle 
and helicopter gunship support completed its passage along Route  15 
by 16  October. Australian Iroquois and Sioux helicopters had once 
again provided command and control, reconnaissance, resupply and 
casualty evacuation missions for 5  RAR throughout Operation Robin. 
The battalion immediately readied itself for Operation Queanbeyan – the 
much-anticipated return to the Nui Thi Vai hills. This commenced on 
17 October 1966 and was designed to destroy any Viet Cong remaining 
in or returning to their sanctuary. Intelligence reports had indicated that 
the Viet Cong were still active on Nui Thi Vai and the battalion knew 
that there were more installations to be dealt with.
After the deception measures described in Chapter 7, the rifle companies 
of the battalion moved on foot into their assigned areas around Nui Thi 
Vai and BHQ commenced its move to occupy the area surrounding 
a pagoda near the top of Nui Thi Vai. On that same afternoon BHQ with 
its protection elements, the Anti-Tank Platoon and the Assault Pioneer 
Platoon, came into heavy contact with the Viet Cong while ascending 
a spur of Nui Thi Vai. The contact lasted for several hours and helicopter 
gunships were called on to play an important role in assisting the heavily 
engaged Anti-Tank Platoon.
During this engagement, Second Lieutenant Bob Askew piloted a Sioux 
helicopter to evacuate casualties on two separate occasions, each under 
very difficult circumstances. Bob had to land his small helicopter on 
a  rocky projection on the side of the steep hillside slope, in a position 
where the surrounding trees allowed little scope for any error in judgement. 
The Sioux was also at a very real risk of being shot down by enemy ground 
fire during its approach and departure. Despite these risks, Bob completed 
291
14. THE CHALLENGES Of AIR SUPPORT
both casevac (casualty evacuation) missions. This feat of exceptional flying 
is covered both in Chapter  7 and in the following paragraphs, which 
include Bob’s own description of his difficulties.
Robert O’Neill
On the first day of the operation, in the very difficult terrain of the Nui 
Thi Vai hills, Captain Brian Le Dan and Corporal Norm Womal were 
wounded, with Norm dying of his wounds before he could be evacuated 
to hospital. Trees and bushes were cleared around a fairly flat rock ledge 
to form an LZ barely large enough for a Sioux helicopter to complete 
the extraction of the casualties. Second Lieutenant Bob Askew performed 
this very difficult flying feat twice. He first picked up the wounded 
Brian Le Dan and flew him to where a larger Dustoff Iroquois could 
land. He returned later that day to retrieve Norm Womal’s body. Bob’s 
amazing skills and committed flying achieved these casevacs on this day. 
The challenges he faced are described below by Bob and Jim Campbell 
who both operated in and out of this rudimentary LZ.
As soon as Brian Le Dan was wounded, Possum 5 (Bob’s call sign) was 
alerted. He had been repositioned from Nui Dat to an FSB alongside 
Route  15 where he waited until the area was made sufficiently secure 
for him to attempt to find an LZ. When the only available option was 
improved and secured, he was called forward. Captain Bob Supple, 
5 RAR’s assistant operations officer, guided Possum 5 onto the tiny LZ, 
while crouching low to avoid decapitation by its whirling rotor blades.
Bob Askew
I recall being on standby at an FSB beside Route 15 when the request 
came through for the first casevac. After the second one I returned to 
the FSB on standby for the rest of the day. With both missions the 
difficulties of the LZ were only part of the deal; the possibility of being 
exposed to Viet Cong fire by having to make my lengthy approach over 
steeply sloping ground, all of which could not be secured by the troops 
below, was the biggest concern for me. As I approached, the sounds of 
the fighting were plainly audible. Even while wearing a flying helmet and 
despite the chopper’s noise, the distinctive ‘whap’ sound of a close one lent 
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clarity to the term ‘aimed ground fire’. Hearing gunfire close at hand was 
considered normal; being under fire wasn’t – not by me! At the end of the 
day, sitting quietly somewhere and thinking over what I had learned, it 
was satisfying to know that when I was hard pushed, I was up to the job 
– something most of us have wondered about.
On landing to collect the first casualty I exited ‘the plastic helicopter’ (as it 
was sometimes affectionately described) for a couple of reasons. One, 
to check the main rotor blades as I had cut my way through some small 
vegetation on the approach. Two, I was sure my green pants might have 
turned brown during the approach. They hadn’t, but I did have an urgent 
call in the other department. I can remember thinking at the time, while 
standing urinating against the rock, under the now green-tipped rotor 
blades, a thousand feet up on the edge of a mountain, with a rather large 
and noisy firefight happening close by, that this was rather a different setting 
for having a pee! The third and most compelling reason for stepping out 
of ‘the office’ was that I felt somewhat exposed waiting in a prominent 
plexiglass bubble when a nice secure rock face was close at hand.
After lifting out Brian Le Dan I delivered him to the Dustoff helicopter 
which was waiting in a clear area beside Route 15. As there was no direct 
security there, the pilot had chosen the largest cleared area he could find 
with the nearest treeline about 300  metres away. I landed in front of 
him, not beside him, in case his side-door gunners needed to defend our 
exposed situation. I also asked if he would delay his departure until I had 
shut down and inspected my aircraft for damage. I didn’t want to be left 
stranded on the ground with an unserviceable aircraft. To my surprise 
no damage was readily visible. After a second approach and departure to 
pick up Norm Womal’s body, I returned to my standby location where 
our engineers thoroughly inspected the chopper and found no damage 
apart from about 120 centimetres of green foliage stains along the outer 
leading edges of both blades. I was amazed, and thankful, that the pilot 
had acquired no additional apertures.
Fifty years later I’m pleased to repeat my congratulations to the 5 RAR 
men who were involved that day. The organisation and execution needed 
in preparing the LZ, the coordination required to get the right people 
into the right place at the right time, while fighting was ongoing, was 
superb; as was Bob Supple’s tricky and dangerous task of guiding me in. 
Their efforts made the very difficult landing and departure of my aircraft 
achievable and contributed greatly to the success of my tasks.
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Bob Supple
The Anti-Tank Platoon remained pinned down under the weight of Viet 
Cong fire coming from caves and rocks further up the slope of Nui Thi 
Vai. The Viet Cong were too close for mortar or artillery fire to be used 
and supporting machine gun fire from a distant rifle company had proved 
ineffective and dangerous in trying to dislodge the enemy from their 
positions. Our commanding officer (CO) then decided to employ two 
US Army Iroquois gunships who were in support of the battalion to help 
clear the enemy from their rocky positions.
Once all elements had marked their position with coloured smoke, the 
gunships commenced their attack. The direct rocket and machine gun fire 
of the gunships was able to penetrate the caves and rock positions from 
which the Viet Cong were firing their weapons, and this finally caused 
them to withdraw. BHQ was then able to resume its move up the Nui Thi 
Vai slopes to reach its objective near a hilltop pagoda. The full story of the 
Anti-Tank Platoon’s engagement is described in Chapter 7.
Air support in the form of airborne command and control facilities, 
reconnaissance, resupply and casualty evacuation missions continued to 
be flown for the battalion throughout Operation Queanbeyan. LZs in 
the Nui Thi Vai area were mainly too small and hazardous for Iroquois, 
but they could fly water, rations and ammunition for the rifle companies 
to a larger LZ at battalion HQ or to the artillery FSB beside Route 15, 
for on-ferrying to the rifle companies by Sioux.
Jim Campbell
When I was about to take off in my Sioux from the BHQ pad at the 
pagoda with a load of supplies for one of the companies, the warrant 
officer directing my take-off gave the thumbs down signal and pointed to 
the side of the helicopter opposite the pilot’s seat. When I got out of the 
aircraft to investigate, I found the exhaust pipe had cracked and broken 
off at the supercharger and hot exhaust discharge was going straight onto 
the oil lines of the Sioux. An engine failure could have occurred if I had 
continued with the flight, so I aborted the take-off. A mechanic was 
immediately flown in from Vung Tau, a replacement part was fitted, and 
I was back flying within an hour.
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During the clearance and search of caves encountered on the Nui Thi Vai 
slopes, I flew into the same difficult landing spot Bob Askew had twice 
used to evacuate casualties on 17 October. Bob had briefed me on the 
landing site, saying:
It requires a curved approach and you are committed to a landing. 
The rock surface is very uneven, and the rotor blades just miss the 
tree branches. To take off, you need to hover backwards about 
30  metres and then rotate through 180 degrees and follow the 
same curved path out of the LZ.
I had to use this landing site over several days, to deliver bags of tear gas 
crystals to be used by the battalion to make the caves on Nui Thi Vai hills 
uninhabitable. I had already felt the effect of a slight leakage from the 
bags in flight on a previous day. On what I think was the last day of this 
mission, I made an approach to a pad near the top of the mountains on 
the north-west side. During the approach, I heard a dull bang and noticed 
a cloud of dust come out of the entrance to a cave not far from the LZ. The 
cloud came across the chopper as I came to a hover and my eyes became 
very irritated and breathing became difficult. I abandoned the approach 
and with laboured breathing and blurred vision, swaying through the sky 
for some time until the company on the ground advised that everything 
was back under control at the landing area. When my senses started to 
return to normal, I was able to return and land to complete the mission.
Ron Boxall
On 10 October 1966 Second Lieutenant Bill Davies was flying a Sioux 
helicopter in support of 5 RAR. He was involved in a serious crash which 
destroyed the helicopter and he and his passenger were injured, Bill very 
seriously. Since that time the incident has been the subject of speculation, 
with two conflicting versions of the cause. Was it ‘pilot error’, as some 
eyewitnesses inexpertly claimed, or was he shot down? After 50  years 
of frustration, Bill now has an opportunity to bring idle conjecture to 
a close. In doing so, he provides another insight into the mettle of our 
Possum brothers.
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Bill Davies
My first association with 5 RAR was in October 1965 during a training 
exercise in the Colo-Putty Training Area north-west of Sydney. The exercise 
in early 1966 was one of the battalion’s final tests before it embarked 
for Vietnam in April. This was my very first job as an operational army 
pilot after receiving my ‘wings’. In May 1966 I was posted to Vietnam as 
a replacement for Captain Bev Smith who, while flying a Sioux in Bien 
Hoa Province, had been shot in the left hand. The left hand normally 
operates the controls for climbing or descending and for varying engine 
power to suit either manoeuvre. Without the use of his left hand he made 
a remarkably skilful landing without further damage to the aircraft or its 
occupants. I visited him in the Military Hospital at Yeronga in Brisbane 
before I embarked for Vietnam where I found him negotiating with doctors 
to have his shattered left hand formed into a ‘grip’, so he could operate 
the twist-grip throttle on the collective lever of a Sioux. Subsequently, 
he rejoined the ranks of the army’s operational helicopter pilots.
On arrival in Phuoc Tuy Province I soon encountered the familiar faces of 
my 5 RAR acquaintances, remembered from when I had flown in support 
of their exercise earlier that year. I immediately felt at home. Soon I was in 
the thick of incessant demands for support by the humble Sioux, officially 
designated a light observation helicopter. While that was the primary role 
of the aircraft, the versatility and reliability which made it a legend in 
the Korean War was reinforced by the many diverse tasks we were called 
upon to perform. On one occasion I was tasked with the evacuation of 
a Vietnamese woman from the Binh Ba rubber plantation. She had been 
haemorrhaging for some days after childbirth. Captain Tony White, the 
regimental medical officer of 5 RAR, decided that she should be evacuated 
to the Vietnamese hospital in Ba Ria. We secured her in the external litter 
on my side of the aircraft where I could keep an eye on her as we flew 
to Ba Ria, the province capital. I fitted her with headphones with voice 
connection to the flight deck. This would slightly muffle the engine noise. 
In the passenger seat I carried an interpreter, so the patient could be kept 
informed to reduce her anxiety as much as possible. A bonus was that the 
interpreter would help to balance the helicopter laterally. I don’t recall 
this precaution being covered on our unit’s standard operating procedures 
(SOPs). I delivered her to Ba Ria airstrip where a Vietnamese ambulance 
was to meet us. None arrived and alternative transport had to be arranged 
hastily. I never heard whether the woman or her child survived.
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Another evacuation, carried out about 10 kilometres north-east of Nui 
Dat, involved the recovery of an injured 5 RAR soldier. I made an initial 
attempt to fit the helicopter into a very tight landing site, but the rotor 
blade tips began striking tree leaves and twigs and there was no way 
I could safely persist with the approach. I radioed to 5 RAR personnel on 
the ground about cutting down a large, centrally placed tree. Its removal 
would give me a better chance of landing. I stayed nearby while this was 
undertaken but ran low on fuel before it could be accomplished. When 
I returned after refuelling the tree had been felled with a waist-high stump 
remaining. The approach was still a Rubik’s Cube juggling job to get the 
Sioux onto the ground. With the casualty on one of the outside litters, the 
helicopter’s reaction to the extra weight made the trees on our exit path 
look impossibly tall and their proximity masked any possibility of using 
any headwind for additional lift; all of which heightened my attention 
to the task. We scraped out of that one and it has been the stuff of 
nightmares since. The CO of 5 RAR, Lieutenant Colonel John Warr, was 
kind enough to commend my efforts by radio to my boss, Major Laurie 
Doyle, whom I omitted to tell about the hairiness of the extraction in case 
it was considered in breach of SOPs. However, when there was an urgent 
request to free heavily laden infantry from having to carrying a casualty 
and his equipment, a balanced, on-the-spot decision by the tasked pilot 
was clearly required. There was also the need to show the infantry, who 
constantly bore the brunt, that we were always there for them and that we 
were prepared to take any calculated risk to support them.
On 10  October I was flying in support of 5  RAR’s part in Operation 
Robin. I was tasked to carry captured enemy materiel and the company 
quartermaster sergeant of B Company, Staff Sergeant ‘Sailor’ Mealing, to 
a designated site beside Route 15. I remember flying very low along the 
road but nothing more of what followed. When I awoke in a US military 
hospital I was being visited by my unit commander, Laurie Doyle, and 
my section commander, Jim Campbell. They commiserated with me 
and asked me a few questions which I tried to answer, unaware that the 
conversation was part of an investigation being conducted into the crash.
Although I had no idea what had happened to place me in hospital, 
I  wasn’t particularly curious. There was a war on and I knew I’d find 
out soon enough. As far as I was concerned, I would be back piloting 
choppers in a few days – a week at the most! I felt quite guilty about not 
being back at 161 (Indep) Recce Flight pulling my weight in flying duties 
with my fellow pilots. My optimism and guilt both proved to be wide of 
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the mark. The bones of my face and around my eyes had been broken 
in many places. Significant nerve damage caused sensory and muscle 
anomalies and I suffered severe double vision, among other problems. 
I vaguely understood that all this might mean the end of my flying career, 
only a couple of days after my 21st birthday.
As I lay in bed my tongue felt a strand of ‘spaghetti’ in my mouth 
between my upper gums and my top lip. I tentatively began pulling at 
this strand with my fingers but, fortunately, an alert nurse intervened 
and snipped it off close to the gums. Apparently, it was medical grade 
‘Silastic’ used to fill the sinus cavities to keep the cheekbones in place after 
they had been repositioned. The Red Cross handed out care packages to 
us patients and I can remember a toothbrush and some toothpaste that 
remained unused for some time. More so, I remember the efforts that 
the American Red Cross made to get telegrams to and from my family in 
Australia. This was especially gratifying for a foreign patient like me in an 
American hospital in Saigon. The resulting two-way communication was 
ultra-sweet. Eventually, as the fog cleared, I amended my news to family 
members from, ‘I’ll be flying again next week’ to ‘I’ll be coming home 
for Christmas, just so you won’t miss me’. Invaluable reassurance – for 
correspondents at both ends!
I found out from one of my fellow pilots who managed to visit me in the 
Saigon hospital that the wreckage of my helicopter was ‘wrapped around 
a steel telegraph pole’. I felt terrible at this news. No pilot wants to think 
that they have collided with an obstacle or flown into the ground. I told 
my friend that I understood that all the roadside poles in the crash area 
were on the western side of Route 15 and, if there had been one or two on 
the eastern side of the roadway, maybe I had collided with one of them; 
but I could not imagine colliding with one on the western side. When 
he confirmed that the pole concerned was on the western side it gave me 
some small satisfaction, because I was sure that, while I had undoubtedly 
struck one of them, it was unlikely that the crash was due to ‘pilot error’. 
Nonetheless, I experienced an intense feeling of shame and failure with no 
way of explaining what else might have contributed to the crash.
Left wondering, and in an information vacuum, I was moved to another 
US military medical facility at Saigon’s Tan Son Nhut airport where 
patients were tended on camp stretchers while awaiting evacuation from 
Vietnam. In a journey of many legs, I was flown by RAAF C130 Hercules 
to an overnight stay in Butterworth in Malaysia, thence to Christmas 
Island and through the RAAF bases in Western Australia, South Australia 
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and Richmond near Sydney. From RAAF Richmond I was transported 
to the army hospital at Ingleburn. Subsequently I was flown from RAAF 
Richmond to RAAF Amberly and transported to 1 Military Hospital at 
Yeronga in Brisbane. I promised myself I would do whatever it took to fly 
again. This was the beginning of 15 months of anguish and frustration, 
but I did fly again as an operational pilot. In fact, I flew once again in 
support of 5 RAR in 1968 as the battalion exercised in preparation for its 
second tour of duty in Vietnam.
During that exercise, on Holsworthy firing ranges, I was marshalled 
into an LZ by a 5  RAR soldier who obviously knew what he was 
doing. After shutting down the Sioux, I chatted to the soldier giving 
him some well-deserved feedback. At one point he said, ‘Yes, I was on 
the battalion’s first tour of Vietnam – I saw a chopper go in [crash].’ 
‘Whereabouts?’ I  asked, thinking mine might have been the incident 
he was recalling. ‘On  Highway  15’, he said, confirming that he was 
speaking of my crash. ‘Do you know what happened to the pilot?’ I asked. 
‘Oh, he’s a vegetable, I think’, he replied. It was a pleasure to introduce 
myself as a non-vegetative survivor.
Years later, in Perth, I met two former 5  RAR soldiers who also had 
witnessed to my crash. I was eager to hear anything from eyewitnesses 
and, although they were cautious with their opinions, they were pretty 
sure that, for whatever reasons, I had just flown into the steel pylon. 
I  suggested that I knew well the siting of the poles in relation to the 
road and was careful to keep clear of them. I also told them that when 
Major Doyle and a fellow Sioux pilot, Second Lieutenant Bob Askew, 
inspected the wreckage they found Perspex shards with bullet holes in 
them on the approach to the impact site. Bob Askew had told me this, 
after I had returned to flying, pointing out that there was also a projectile 
hole which was in the remains of the rear part of the helicopter’s cockpit 
bubble which would have been right behind where I was sitting.
Further, in January 1967, I received a letter from the commander of 
1 ATF, Brigadier David Jackson, telling me the cause of my crash was my 
having been fired upon. He hoped I wouldn’t be too inconvenienced by 
my injuries and that my Christmas had not been spoiled. While I was very 
pleased to receive such a letter from our task force commander confirming 
that I had been brought down by ground fire, my principal concern 
remained the severe double vision which persisted. Was I ever going to get 
back to aircrew medical standard?
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My hunger to learn all I could about the crash led me to trawl later through 
the evidence of the Army Court of Enquiry which began three days after 
the crash. I was relieved to read in its report that my lingering fears about 
‘pilot error’ were unnecessary. The enquiry found, inter alia, that:
• Small arms automatic fire was heard just prior to the impact and in the 
direction from which the aircraft was approaching. This was reported 
by three individuals from C Company, 5 RAR, who were deployed 
along the road adjacent to the crash site.
• One of my facial injuries was caused by a high-velocity fragment, 
identity unknown. The attending surgeon from the US 3rd Field 
Hospital, Saigon, had recorded that my facial injuries appeared to have 
been caused by a high-velocity fragment which entered on the lower 
left side of my head and exited on the upper right. The impact would 
have tended to throw my body to the right and the resulting shock 
wave would have rendered me unconscious.
• Damage to the Perspex bubble showed possible bullet holes.
Speculation about the cause of my crash has persisted for more than 
50 years despite the evidence taken by a Court of Enquiry and its findings. 
I was glad to learn that my passenger, Staff Sergeant ‘Sailor’ Mealing, made 
a full recovery from his injuries and went on to serve another tour of duty 
in Vietnam. I will always be indebted to those members of 5 RAR who 
swiftly came to our aid; particularly their medical officer, Captain Tony 
White, who made an on-the-spot decision that I should be flown directly 
to a US neurosurgical facility, bypassing the usual casualty evacuation 
chain. His fortuitous presence nearby and his quick decision probably 
saved my life.
Editors’ conclusion
Air support played a vital and dynamic part in what 5  RAR achieved 
during  Operations Canberra, Robin and Queanbeyan. The difficulties 
imposed by the steep jungle terrain of the Nui Thi Vai hills and the 
constant threat of Viet Cong ground fire were severe tests of the 
professional skills and courage of the pilots. On completion of operations 
in the Nui Thi Vai hills our CO, John Warr, conducted a debriefing during 
which he commended 161 (Indep) Recce Flight on the magnificent job 
their pilots had done flying in support of the battalion throughout these 
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operations. The closeness of their support in the most trying of conditions 
demonstrated that, being army pilots, they enjoyed a natural affinity 
for, and a detailed understanding of, an infantry battalion’s needs in 
operations. Their narratives clearly show a magnificent level of devotion 
to comrades who were locked in ground operations. Understandably, 
this was an outlook that was inherently more difficult for their RAAF 
counterparts to acquire. Much more could and should have been done, 
at all levels in both army and air force hierarchies, to narrow the ‘cultural 
divide’ which fuelled the initial and lingering poor understanding of each 
other’s operational imperatives (described in other chapters).
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON
Michael deak (Michael von Berg)
Editors’ introduction
In Chapter 5 it was noted that the conversion of the Anti-Tank Platoon to 
the Reconnaissance Platoon was a way of finding more useful employment 
for the platoon in the absence of a role for its anti-armour capabilities 
(the enemy having no armoured elements in Phuoc Tuy Province). The 
Australian Army had reorganised in 1965 to structure units for their roles 
in the Vietnam War and reformed its infantry battalions along the lines of 
those it had deployed during the Malayan Emergency and the Indonesian 
Confrontation of Malaysia. However, an Anti-Tank Platoon was added, 
probably because of the availability of large anti-armour weapons as 
hand-me-down items from the previous Pentropic organisation. This 
encompassed large, infantry-based, so-called ‘Battle Groups’ which 
could be brigaded to form a ‘Task Force’. For obscure reasons, this was 
modelled on a US Army five-sided Pentomic organisational structure 
for Cold War scenarios. By 1964 the Australian Army had deemed its 
Pentropic battle groups to be unsuited to operations in South-East Asia; 
and, with the advent of Australia’s new commitment to Vietnam, the 
concept was promptly abandoned. But, in brigading combat and combat 
support elements, the designation ‘Task Force’ was retained in preference 
to ‘Brigade Group’ which had previously been used for many years.
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Thus, the Anti-Tank Platoon was armed with large US M40 106  mm 
recoilless rifles (RCL) which were vehicle-mounted or could be fired on 
the ground, but only from a solid footing. Their use in a perimeter defence 
role at the Nui Dat base or at fire support bases, employing canister 
(grapeshot) ammunition, seems never to have been considered. They were 
not readily man-portable and their unwieldy weight of 210  kilograms 
and length of 3.4 metres rendered these RCL of no use against enemy 
bunkers in close jungle or cave systems in the mountains. A lightweight 
substitute for such purposes, the US M72 66  mm LAW (light anti-
armour weapon), a telescoping rocket launcher of 2.5  kilograms and 
0.63/0.88  metres long when folded/extended, were later carried in 
each rifle section. Consequently, the M40 RCLs remained in storage 
at Nui Dat, with two being deployed as decorative ‘sentries’ in front of 
the Battalion Headquarters (BHQ) facilities, and their crews and their 
cut-down transport vehicles put to other uses.
Michael Deak
My conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Warr took place a few days 
after Second Lieutenant Dennis Rainer, a handful of soldiers and I arrived 
back after marching as a part of the Australian contingent through Saigon 
on Vietnam’s National Day, 1966. We’d gone because after Operation 
Queanbeyan our commanding officer (CO) thought we deserved 
a break in Saigon. The march through Saigon, though, was anything but 
peaceful with the Viet Cong dropping mortar bombs on the forward 
elements of the marchers. While a little disconcerting, we completed the 
march without any further disruptions. On returning to Nui Dat I was 
summoned to see our CO. I was worried that he may have heard of some 
of the escapades that Dennis and I had got up to in Saigon after the 
parade and that mortar attack, when some soothing and relaxing elixir 
was in order. When I reached BHQ and saw the CO, our intelligence 
officer Captain Bob O’Neill, our operations officer Major Max Carroll 
and others, my mind went into overdrive and I thought, ‘This might not 
be good’. It wasn’t the first time I had fronted the CO for some social 
infraction or other misdemeanour. When it was explained to me that the 
battalion was keen to establish its own Reconnaissance Platoon and that 
I had been selected to form and command this new entity, a wave of relief 
swept over me.
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A detailed briefing followed, in the style of a fireside chat about the new 
platoon’s role, the selection and training of its personnel, its operational 
support requirements and administrative and logistics issues. I was given 
instructions to plan and conduct a selection process and training program 
to be held over a two-week period in the Vung Tau sand hills and the 
surrounding area. It was envisaged that the Anti-Tank Platoon, which had 
fought so valiantly up in the Nui Thi Vai hills, would take on the role of 
the battalion’s Reconnaissance Platoon. This would avoid disruption to 
any of the rifle companies. Because the enemy did not have tanks in our 
area of operations, the CO decided the employment of the Anti-Tank 
Platoon should be changed to something more needed. The originator of 
the idea, I discovered later, was Major Stan Maizey, our battalion’s second 
in command (2IC). ‘Stan the Man’, as he was affectionately called, was 
a keen punter like me, and on more than one occasion we tried our luck 
on a race at Rosehill or a game of seven-card stud.
I don’t know what the battalion would have done without Stan the Man’s 
industrious, far-reaching and occasionally questionable procurement 
methods in those early days of inadequate equipment and supplies. 
Supply in those first three months in Vietnam was a nightmare, and 
there were those who referred to 5 RAR as the ‘Hydraulic Battalion – 
will lift anything’. Maizey, although a senior major, was very much our 
own ‘Sergeant Bilko’, who believed very little was unprocurable. He was 
an amazing man who served us extremely well before his talents were 
identified and he was poached by the Task Force HQ.
After the briefing I went back to the tent I shared with my platoon 
sergeant, Ray ‘Skinny’ Calvert. Despite details of the proposal being 
restricted to a ‘need-to-know’ basis, I told him much of what was said in 
the briefing. The CO still had to gain the support and approval of the task 
force commander, but I knew I could rely on Skinny and wanted his views 
and recommendations about which of the men in the current Anti-Tank 
Platoon might be suitable, and his thoughts on how we might carry out 
our new role. Skinny was an excellent senior non-commissioned officer 
(NCO), but, unfortunately, he developed a major medical condition 
which resulted in his return to Australia shortly after the completion of 
the platoon’s training course for its new role. I was sorry to lose him at that 
stage because I liked and trusted him. I had also served with him before 
I was commissioned. Clearly, he was disappointed at having to return to 
Australia but his well-being and ultimately that of the platoon came first. 
I was pleased I was able to get his thoughts about the proposed changes as 
his input and suggestions proved invaluable.
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To enable me to look at a suitable structure for our new Reconnaissance 
Platoon it was arranged that I should spend some time with our 3 Squadron, 
Special Air Service (SAS). Thankfully I knew many of the NCO patrol 
commanders but was still a little apprehensive about meeting them on their 
turf. I assumed there might be some suspicion or resentment of a young, 
recently graduated platoon commander having the temerity to consider 
conducting small-manned reconnaissance patrols using conventionally 
trained diggers from an infantry battalion. How wrong I was! Major 
John Murphy, the officer commanding 3 SAS Squadron, and his officers 
and some of his hardened and experienced NCO patrol commanders 
could not have been more relaxed and helpful in supporting what we 
were trying to achieve. I think they were relieved that, with the advent of 
reconnaissance platoons which were organic to infantry battalions, they 
would be able to concentrate more on the stealthy, long-range patrols 
deep into enemy sanctuaries, which was their primary role in Vietnam. 
Unlike them, we would operate much closer to our own forces (within 
10,000 metres) and never out of artillery range. After these discussions 
I was heartened by John Murphy and his team’s encouragement and knew 
that with the right training and equipment, we could fulfil the role that 
our battalion had in mind. These discussions also enabled me to decide on 
our patrol composition, command structure, weapons, communications 
systems and the numbers of NCOs and soldiers required in the platoon.
I was very happy with the advice that I had been given and the support 
3  SAS Squadron was going to provide in conducting the personnel 
selection course and training. I felt that although we would operate in 
a different way to the SAS patrols, we needed their advice and support 
before we embarked on selection and training. In a two-week training 
period it could not be an SAS selection course, which would have 
entailed far too much for us to absorb. We needed a course suited to 
our competence levels and our small talent pool, half of whom would 
be national servicemen with barely 18  months of service under their 
belts. This is not meant to be derogatory in any way because our ‘nashos’ 
throughout the battalion were outstanding; but there is a thing called 
training overload which can do more harm than good, and all we needed 
were the basic reconnaissance patrol skills and specialist SAS contact drills 
which were not practised in the battalion. Thankfully, our SAS advisers 
agreed with my rationale. My proposed platoon structure and outline 
operating procedures were then discussed with our CO and his HQ team, 
and they agreed with my suggestions. I was then left to my own devices to 
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prepare the training syllabus, selection process, equipment and weapons 
lists, communications arrangements and the platoon’s modus operandi. 
For a recently graduated officer this task was daunting, but having the 
trust of the CO, the operations officer and the intelligence officer gave me 
tremendous confidence, a clear sense of purpose and a determination not 
to let the battalion down. To establish and operate a platoon in a totally new 
and demanding role in war is difficult, but we were helped by having the 
advantage of selecting NCOs and soldiers from within the battalion, who 
were battle-hardened and experienced through six months of patrolling, 
ambushing, cordon and searches of villages and contact with the enemy. 
Some had lost mates so there really wasn’t much for me to do in scene-
setting or preparing them for what they could expect. They had all been 
living with these realities since the battalion was inserted into Phuoc Tuy. 
With this experience behind them, I knew there was not much the men 
needed in the way of telling them what to expect. This meant the SAS 
instructors and I could concentrate on specialist reconnaissance tactics 
and techniques and on operating in small self-sufficient groups capable of 
gaining information and, importantly, staying alive to bring it back.
Because it was only a matter of weeks since one of my section 
commanders, Norm Womal, had been killed during a contact in the Nui 
Thi Vai hills, I was still feeling his loss and made a commitment I would 
do everything possible to ensure that all members of the Reconnaissance 
Platoon came home. Notwithstanding my determination, I knew that, 
even with the best intentions, there was only so much I could do and 
I resolved to select the best available men for the role. I was seeking men 
who could be moulded into a tight, efficient, fighting platoon; who shared 
the values of caring, supporting, helping and respecting one another; but 
who also had the determination and ruthlessness needed to close with and 
kill the enemy. This embodied the ethos that we would never leave anyone, 
wounded or dead, behind. Although many who had applied to join the 
platoon were former rugby and beer-drinking friends of my soldiering days 
before being commissioned, there is a big difference between protecting 
a mate’s back in a rugby ruck and protecting a mate in a firefight. A friend 
protects his mate’s back in a rugby ruck; a brother protects his mate’s back 
in a firefight. There is a big difference between friendship and brotherhood, 
which is not understood by many except those who have served in war 
and have experienced the death or wounding of men to whom they have 
grown so close. I was determined to instil strong notions of leadership 
throughout the platoon and a sense of ‘brotherhood’. We would not only 
be protecting each other’s backs, but looking after each other mentally 
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and spiritually as well. If a brother was feeling down, we could all pitch in 
to make a difference. This was generally done through some wicked prank 
or black humour which created lighter moments to help lift the spirits of 
any individual who was feeling below par. This approach was applied in 
abundance and I still laugh when recalling some of the antics.
Captain Peter Isaacs, the adjutant, promulgated a message throughout 
the battalion seeking volunteers for the new platoon while I canvassed 
the soldiers of the Anti-Tank Platoon and was delighted that many chose 
to try for selection. After interviewing volunteers, 40 soldiers and NCOs 
were named to attend the selection course. When told the course was to 
be conducted at Back Beach near Vung Tau, many thought that the course 
was going to be a beach holiday with barbecues, and would be a bit of 
a junket. How wrong were they!
I was absolutely delighted with the NCOs who had volunteered because 
I had served with many of them as a soldier, played rugby with them 
and engaged in the frivolities and mischief that young soldiers get up to. 
I considered them to be my mates. Of course, this can work for you or 
against you and, during the selection process, I marked my NCO mates 
very hard, for they would determine the success or otherwise of the platoon. 
Corporal Bernard ‘Bernie’ Smith was a very experienced NCO who had 
previously served in Malaya and possessed solid leadership skills. Corporal 
Bob ‘Dogs’ Kearney, the youngest section commander in the battalion at 
20 years of age, had been in my section in 1 RAR. Corporal John ‘Blue’ 
Mulby was an outstanding soldier, hard as nails, with an infectious black 
sense of humour. Lance Corporal William, or Bill, ‘Suave Harve’ Harvey 
was another great soldier, who could make masterful sidesteps on both the 
rugby field and the dance floor. Platoon Sergeant John Lea-Smith, who 
was relatively new to the battalion, very quickly became my trusted 2IC, 
confidante and friend and, like Blue Mulby, also possessed a warped sense 
of humour. All the men who applied were characters, and all good blokes. 
Many I knew well, so it was a challenge to ensure I assessed everyone fairly 
based on the standards that the SAS instructors and I wanted them to 
achieve. I professed an attitude of transparency and inclusiveness, which 
embraces all fairly and equally, and has no hidden agenda. Not being 
honest with soldiers is the quickest way to lose their respect and so I led 
with an approach of ‘what you see is what you get’, not asking anyone to 
do anything I was not prepared to do myself. During the selection course 
I occasionally thought this was not such a good policy.
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We had men from every part of the battalion and many did not know one 
another. A good way to get to know each other quickly is over a beer or 
something stronger; and that we did whenever we had no night training. 
Bonding and camaraderie was established within a short period of time 
and, in part, this was the making of the new platoon. To make sure the 
bonding sessions did not get out of hand, I would wake the whole team 
every morning at about 0500 hours and run through the beaches and 
sand hills of Vung Tau until all dropped – myself included. After a night 
of ‘bonding’, this was almost torture. It took me back to my early days of 
rugby and water polo where I had coaches who instilled in me an almost 
masochistic bent to drive my body until I was able to push through pain 
barriers and actually enjoy it. There wasn’t a lot of joy in this exercise 
but we pushed on and the men did extremely well, helped by the fact 
that all were already extremely fit through time already spent ‘in country’, 
where there were very few fat infantrymen. Our normal regimen was light 
rations, long periods on operations in sauna-like conditions, patrolling 
while heavily laden, going over and under natural obstacles, all with 
adrenaline pumping while being hyper-alert. These ensured an inability 
to accumulate fat or lose physical fitness. There were a few early drop-outs 
and they were sent back to where they came from in the battalion. As the 
numbers declined and the remaining individuals got to know each other 
better, I could see and feel the pride, confidence and cohesive spirit this 
group of individuals was developing. Over the period of the course this 
grew stronger and stronger so that, towards the end, they were champing 
at the bit to get out on operations in their new role.
My hardest task was to select the final members of the platoon, which 
I did in consultation with the SAS instructors. Those who were not 
selected were counselled about why they were not successful. In all cases 
the unsuccessful were good soldiers but not selected because of some 
characteristic which made them unsuitable for working as a member 
of a small reconnaissance patrol. All of these men did an amazing job 
and went back to their platoons and companies as better soldiers; which 
was of benefit both to them and the battalion. Not being suited for the 
reconnaissance role in no way diminished them as soldiers and valued 
members of the battalion. Importantly, getting a pat on the back for 




We needed to adopt many specialist skills of the SAS and some of their 
standard operating procedures. Achieving this in a two-week course was 
very demanding, but by adapting we adopted! Many of these changes 
centred on navigation, night movement, communications, observation 
and deduction skills, breaking-contact drills, medical support, 
demolitions, calling in supporting fire, bushcraft and survival. Only so 
much could be achieved in two weeks and, although the SAS instructors 
were very generous in sharing their knowledge and experience, there was 
a lot to learn and, in retrospect, our real learning was gained ‘on the job’, 
in operations. This on-the-job training aspect became a very important 
part of our post-operations debrief procedure, where lessons learned or 
mistakes made were shared, as a reinforcing part of our learning process.
The structure of the Reconnaissance Platoon was three five-man patrols, 
each commanded by a corporal and one six-man HQ patrol, commanded 
by me as platoon commander. The equipment carried by each patrol 
was a PRC-25 VHF radio and an M60 7.62  mm machine gun. Each 
soldier carried a personal weapon of choice, either a 5.56 mm M16 or 
7.62  mm self-loading rifle. Each patrol also carried an M79 40  mm 
grenade launcher, M26 hand grenades, smoke grenades, ammunition, 
a medical kit and food, water, maps and compass. The patrol would 
consist of a forward scout (a duty shared by rotation), the corporal patrol 
commander, a radio operator, a machine gunner and a ‘tail-end-charlie’, 
who was also the patrol medic. My HQ patrol would consist of a forward 
scout, myself, two radio operators, my platoon sergeant and the tail-end-
charlie who was also the platoon medic. The two radios of my HQ patrol 
were to provide control of the three five-man patrols and a separate radio 
to link with BHQ and to call for artillery or close air support. Because 
my HQ patrol had the additional weight of an extra radio and batteries, 
a machine gun was not carried, but we had everything else when it came 
to small arms, grenade launchers and ammunition. This platoon structure 
required a full complement of 26 individuals to be available for putting all 
patrols into the field at once. To allow for absences due to illness or leave, 
a total of 28 personnel were selected for the newly established platoon.
My reasoning for the patrols to be armed with the heavy M60 general 
purpose machine gun, at a small cost to mobility in fluid situations, was 
both tactical and psychological. When a small reconnaissance patrol 
contacted the enemy, the M60’s ability to put down fire at a cyclic rate of 
550 rounds per minute would keep the enemy occupied and their heads 
down, while the patrol extricated itself and rapidly departed the scene to 
309
15. THE dEVELOPMENT Of THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON
report on the enemy’s presence. Encountering machine gun fire could 
cause the enemy to think that the small five-man information-gathering 
patrol was actually a much larger unit, such as a platoon or company, 
which always employed M60s. This rationale proved to be sound, for it 
certainly worked for us.
Although we now had the Reconnaissance Platoon, we did not have all the 
equipment necessary to fulfil our new role. I had learned a lot from our 
battalion 2IC Stan the Man, so what we didn’t have we begged, borrowed, 
traded or found unattended until our requirements had been met. On our 
first operations we had to learn on the job, until we became comfortable 
with the standards achieved. Becoming familiar with the new platoon 
structure and the unusual benefit of having internal radio communications 
as well as direct contact with BHQ and fire support agencies for when we 
encountered serious trouble were significant changes for us. Of course, 
there was some concern about the risk of losing a patrol or even the entire 
platoon due to enemy action. It was not an unrealistic possibility and 
we needed to gain our ‘reconnaissance legs’ slowly, building up a record 
of competence and success.
The patrols would all be mobile, moving together on the one axis with 
HQ patrol in the centre, the best position for radio signals reception, 
with a patrol to the left, two to the right; or one on a piece of ground 
not necessarily on axis but of tactical importance. The key requirement 
was radio contact at all times, and although long periods of radio silence 
were encouraged, it was necessary that all were always on radio alert so 
that messages could be acknowledged by simply pressing the transmit 
switch using a simple, intermittent, on-off code without speaking; and 
the radio carrier wave could be silently detected by all radios operating on 
the frequency being used. If a patrol was in trouble, they could let it be 
known quickly so that assistance could be provided.
As we developed both skills and confidence, we were deployed further 
afield. Our tactics were determined by enemy activity, the terrain and the 
task in hand. After being silently inserted into the area of interest, slow 
movement of 400 to 1,000 metres maximum per day was involved. Where 
smaller enemy numbers were suspected or assumed, the platoon would be 
split into its small patrols to operate independently. If we were operating 
well away from the battalion and the likelihood of encountering a large 
enemy force was high, we would operate as a full platoon, concealing 
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indications that the enemy would associate with this size of group. Once 
we had perfected our methods, we were fully utilised by the battalion in 
a multitude of tasks which changed through necessity or innovation.
There was always the risk of death or wounding by booby traps or mines 
and, like the rest of the battalion, we did not wear or carry any personal 
protective equipment such as body armour or helmets. In our case, even if 
it had been available, it is questionable whether, loaded down by protective 
equipment, we could have operated effectively in a jungle environment. 
The heat, humidity, monsoonal rains and densely vegetated terrain would 
have made it almost impossible to move freely and quietly, or quickly 
when the need arose. We wore mostly US-style combat clothing (because 
it had more pockets and was more durable), bush hats and our personal 
webbing and backpacks which were made up of a mixture of Australian, 
UK, US and ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) gear. We went 
without underwear and socks. Being constantly wet through from sweat 
and rain, the less clothing worn the quicker a man would dry out. This 
also proved a good way of reducing our proneness to the ever-present skin 
problems of ringworm and tinea. We had a job to do and we needed to 
feel comfortable and able to move freely for long periods of time through 
different types of thick foliage and dense jungle, while remaining alert 
and effective. I remember one incident where a senior officer who had 
recently joined the battalion disapproved of the camouflage paint we 
had applied in irregular patterns to our weapons. I told him that on patrol 
the weapons’ plastic furniture and metal surfaces, when covered with our 
sweat or rain, glistened and could reflect light to indicate our presence 
to the enemy – at which he laughed. I respectfully told him I  would 
not be removing our camouflage paint from our weapons and if he had 
a problem with that he should take it up with the CO. I never heard more 
from him and we kept our camouflage paint. With our individual outfits 
and machine gun ammunition belts across each man’s chest we looked not 
dissimilar to Pancho Villa’s bandits.
Weapon cleanliness was not a problem because all took great pride in their 
weapons. Like every platoon in the battalion we test fired all weapons before 
operations to ensure they were in good working condition. Everyone in 
the Reconnaissance Platoon was permitted to carry as much ammunition 
as he wanted and all were well loaded-up in case we deliberately engaged 
an enemy force, as happened when we ambushed them.
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Adequate water supply was always at the top of our minds. Without it, 
soldiers soon become less effective and at risk of becoming heat casualties, 
jeopardising both their security and the mission. Personally, I carried seven 
water bottles and most others did the same. Some dumped certain large 
cans of food, especially the despised US ham and lima beans, to make 
room for a water bladder inside their pack. It is possible to operate in hot 
tropical environments without surplus food but not without adequate 
water. One of the major benefits of having the Reconnaissance Platoon 
was that it enabled the battalion to deploy us to the high ground of the 
Nui Dinh hills, west of Nui Dat, and the steep Long Hai range to the 
south-east where we were the first Australians to patrol there. We could 
scale these features quicker than a company, and it enabled the CO to 
fully utilise his rifle companies on other major operational tasks. Because 
many of our platoon tasks were on high ground in the dry season, the only 
water resupply we could expect was by helicopter at a tactically suitable 
time. Hence the need to carry as much as we could in case opportunities 
for resupply proved scarce.
Usually, the platoon managed to get on to high ground without being 
detected by the enemy or the local civilians, and water rationing needed to 
be strictly applied. In the dry season, if we were operating a platoon-sized 
fighting patrol to seek deliberate contact with the enemy, we would move 
parallel to creek lines (but not in them because the enemy were usually 
then located close to water). Here we had fewer problems in keeping up 
with our water requirements. But at night, if not ambushing, we would 
head back up to the high ground to harbour securely.
Our combat rations consisted of a mixture of dehydrated and canned 
US or Australian rations. Many carried an onion or fresh chillies to spice 
up a good curry mixed with rice. However we could only make curry in 
a relatively safe area because of its strong cooking smells.
It is amazing how little food is needed to survive but, without tea or 
coffee, hunger pangs are accentuated. A good brew is a great morale 
booster and nerve calmer. The platoon was normally inserted into search 
areas by helicopter, armoured personnel carriers (APCs) or on foot. If on 
foot, insertion would normally be from a secure area like a fire support 
base in first or last light, into a jungle area that was well covered from 
view. If deploying by helicopter, either Royal Australian Air Force or US 
Army Aviation units were used. As a deception measure, several dummy 
runs were done in and out of areas so that the enemy had great difficulty 
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in knowing exactly where the helicopters had landed and whether any 
troops had alighted. Extractions were mostly done in a similar manner, 
after we had been able to secure an area for the helicopters to touch down.
Insertion by APCs, although noisy, was used as a tactic to confuse the 
enemy. The platoon would be inside the APCs and out of sight, with 
some other troops or some of our own who were not being deployed 
carried openly on top of the vehicles to give the impression that it was just 
a routine APC patrol with some infantry protection. At a predetermined 
alighting spot in a well concealed area, while the APCs were still moving, 
keeping their engine revolutions high, the loading ramps would slowly 
be lowered while still moving; the patrol would quickly alight without 
any changes to the sounds and movements of the APCs. This was a very 
successful insertion tactic from fire support bases, where the enemy 
thought these were the regular APC-mounted clearing patrols providing 
security to the fire support base. Because they saw soldiers on top of the 
carriers going out and going back, they were unaware we had dismounted 
while on the move.
While patrolling, no one spoke aloud and hand signals were used for 
communicating. When in close proximity to another man, whispers were 
used. This was the standard form of communications for all Australian 
platoons on operations and was very effective, both for security and in 
keeping everyone informed at all times. Breakfast was light, mostly a brew 
with a biscuit, lunch was eaten cold with water, and a late afternoon meal 
was a good, morale-boosting cook up. Although cooking created smells, 
it didn’t matter much because we always moved away to another area just 
on last light.
Whether we were operating as a platoon or as small patrols, in any contact 
with the enemy we could call for artillery to drop initial rounds onto 
ground near the enemy’s position from where the fire could be adjusted 
onto the enemy or his likely withdrawal routes. This could be executed in 
about five minutes because wherever we were, there was always an artillery 
battery allotted in direct support (DS) which meant that its fire was 
guaranteed to the battalion. Working in isolation, with perhaps a backup 
force being some two to three hours away, the possibility of encountering 
a larger, well-equipped enemy force was a reality. If such a situation 
occurred, having artillery support immediately available, and able to be 
quickly adjusted to suit the circumstances, was a tactical advantage and 
huge morale booster.
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Both Australian and New Zealand artillery batteries were marvellous in 
these DS roles. Also readily available were the heavier guns of our US 
allies, whose 155 mm, 175 mm and 8 inch batteries could be called on 
through the battalion’s DS battery commander. He was always located 
with BHQ and, when we requested them, these fire support assets came 
on line quickly.
Naval gunfire was used in one incident to silence an enemy mortar which 
was creating havoc in a major enemy attack on the defended ARVN village 
of Lo Gom, located east of the Long Hai hills near the larger coastal village 
of Lang Phuoc Hai. The Reconnaissance Platoon, in an ambush position 
some 5,000 metres away, had identified the mortar position and engaged 
it with Australian and US artillery without success. 1 ATF HQ, through 
C Company’s artillery forward observer, offered US naval gunfire support 
from a vessel cruising on station in the South China Sea. Although we 
were about 5 kilometres from the target, the naval 5 inch shells sounded 
like freight trains passing our ambush position. The enemy mortar was 
silenced very effectively.
Like the rifle companies we also had access to gunships, airstrikes, flare 
ships, ‘Puff the Magic Dragon’ (Dakota C47 cargo aircraft using the call 
sign Spooky and armed with several multi-barrelled machine guns with 
very high cyclic rates of fire), and Dustoff helicopters. I cannot speak 
highly enough of our operations team at BHQ and the rifle company 
commanders for the incredible support they provided us when in trouble. 
Their unfailing support gave us the confidence and encouragement to be 
more enterprising and daring, knowing when the ‘proverbial’ hit the fan, 
the battalion would look after us.
We soon noticed that many of us had started to develop a sixth sense. 
There was often a feeling of something being not quite right where the 
hair, for whatever reason, stood up at the back of the neck and, in many 
cases, these feelings proved to be correct. In situations of danger, isolation 
and highly elevated alertness with constant adrenaline rushes, survival 
instincts seemed to kick in, like some form of human radar, to warn of 
danger or hint that something wasn’t quite right.
Another skill we developed was tracking. The entire platoon acquired 
this ability; some were better than others. Signs which others might 
not notice were quickly picked up and told a story – how many people 
had passed, how long ago, enemy or villager, what size loads were they 
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carrying, running or walking, travelling in which direction? These were 
all very important bits of information passed back for analysis. Dogs are 
great for detection and tracking, but they can’t make assumptions or draw 
conclusions!
Although we were getting very good at our game and were used extensively 
by the battalion, having only a day or two in base every month, we had 
to recognise any signs of burnout. When we were in base we would play 
hard. What was wonderful when coming back into base was to be met by 
the CO and the Salvation Army’s John Bentley, with a kind word from 
the CO and a hot cup of tea from John the ‘Salvo’; although most of the 
blokes were looking forward to something a bit cooler. The CO knew all 
my NCOs and soldiers by name and nickname and greeted them in that 
way, which for us was quite special. They thought the world of ‘Wingy’ 
as the diggers affectionately called the CO, knowing how much he cared 
and what he stood for.
Our other tasks included assisting in the training of the ARVN Regional 
Force NCOs with Captain George Mansford at Binh Ba, leading the 
5 RAR rifle companies into cordon positions on village cordon and search 
operations, surveillance cover for the rifle companies during minefield 
construction, riding on the splash boards of APCs while clearing roads, 
reinforcing D Company on the Horseshoe feature, and frequent patrolling 
and ambushing tasks throughout a large patch of jungle known as The 
Long Green. The lighter moments of the platoon and how this group of 
different personalities, backgrounds and experience became such a close-
knit family are worthy of mention. When in base, where alcohol was 
permitted, we all defused, using the time-honoured Australian cure-all 
of a relaxing drink with close mates. After a quick shower and getting rid 
of a month’s dirt I would go up to be debriefed by Captain Bob O’Neill, 
our intelligence officer, or sometimes the CO or operations officer. I 
would usually go to the diggers’ boozer where my blokes had already 
started with a beer or two and have a very informal chat with them about 
the operation. What did we do well and not so well, and what we could 
do better in the future? Sometimes the best ideas and innovations come 
from an unlikely quarter and my diggers and NCOs were not backward 
in coming forward with a couple of beers under their belt. The ideas and 
suggestions were not all good but they were being heard; and that was 
vitally important to them. Once the boozer had closed we moved to my 
tent and the conversations would continue until the early hours of the 
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morning. No matter how loosened the tongues became there was never a 
harsh word or disagreement and, 50 years later, those who have not passed 
away keep in touch.
The day following an operation or task was always spent getting ready for 
the next time we were to leave the base. In preparation, before attending 
the battalion Orders Group to receive my orders, I would warn out the 
platoon to attend a later briefing and platoon Orders Group at the back 
of my tent where I would use a terrain mud map to assist me in giving 
orders. I wanted every member of the platoon to know as much as I did 
by providing a good overview of the enemy situation, the terrain and area 
where we were going to be operating. I did this by giving them a description 
of our mission, how I saw it developing and where we fitted into the 
battalion’s overall scheme before assigning tasks to my patrol commanders. 
At the end of my briefing and orders, the patrol commanders went away 
with their patrols to conduct their own Orders Group, giving the detailed 
instructions on how each man in their patrol was to participate in the 
platoon’s part in the operation. I did it this way to personally pass on as 
much information as I could to every soldier, and to encourage interaction 
and input from them. Our lives depended on each other and I wanted 
them to understand this reality and for each of them to foster it. I would 
say to the platoon that if anyone was hit we would aim to get him out and 
on his way to hospital in Vung Tau within 30 minutes. Whatever we were 
doing, our primary objective would instantly become getting our man 
out, the operation or patrol objectives becoming secondary. Many of my 
ex-soldiers at reunions have told me that this policy really resonated with 
them because they knew they would never be abandoned. The positive 
effect this had on platoon morale cannot be overstated.
To gain information we would spend time in Vietnamese villages mixing 
with the villagers, particularly with the children. For these tasks I had the 
services of an interpreter who did a terrific job for us in engaging with the 
locals. This was as much a hearts and minds exercise as an information-
seeking operation, and although we never really knew who was friend 
or foe, I felt it best in these circumstances to look for the good, not the 
bad, and respect the villagers’ customs, culture and hospitality. At times, 
the latter was unbelievable. A poor village chief ’s family offering you 
a Vietnamese delicacy of roasted pigs ears with ‘nuoc mam’, a very pungent 
fermented fish sauce laced with sliced bullet chillies. With a swig or two 
of rice whisky this was not hard to accept, but when the chief was getting 
into his ‘mot, hai, ba, yo’ mood (one, two, three, down!), it was time to bid 
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farewell. After all, we were on duty and I needed to debrief our interpreter 
and others in the platoon about what they had observed or heard. These 
things would not have been possible without the platoon being friendly 
and respectful of women and children. The lives of kids in the midst of 
a dirty war about which they understood little would have been made a lot 
worse if we, the foreign ‘Uc Dai Loi round-eyes’ (Australian Caucasians), 
treated them badly. The Reconnaissance Platoon had a lot to do with 
locals and always treated them with compassion and respect.
The antics and sense of the ridiculous of everyone in the platoon were an 
immensely important relief valve. Some might say this bordered on being 
immature and irresponsible, and today I might agree, but at the time these 
lighter moments are what kept us sane. We worked hard and just loved 
each other’s company and all that it provided during a dangerous period 
in our lives. By the end of our tour we all had that blank ‘thousand-yard 
stare’ and, although we had become very good at what we were doing, we 
were mentally exhausted. The intensity, anxiety, mental concentration and 
enemy contacts were telling; and the relief when we all boarded HMAS 
Sydney for our trip home was not only felt, it could be seen.
It’s very difficult to touch on everything that the platoon went through 
from start to finish. The unique and gifted people with whom I served 
and who contributed enormously to our success made the platoon and 
its experiences very special to me. I was honoured to select, establish 
and lead a specialised infantry reconnaissance platoon and was humbled 
to have the privilege of leading an outstanding group of individuals who 
became brothers for life. In Vietnam they were ordinary young men doing 
extraordinary things. More than that cannot be asked.
Today, when I am asked to speak or give a presentation to a battalion’s 
reconnaissance platoon or to the Advanced Reconnaissance Course at 
the Infantry Centre, I look with great pride at the young men who have 
decided to take on this role knowing we, of the first infantry battalion 
reconnaissance platoon, spawned a legacy which is being kept alive and 
built upon by the magnificent young soldiers who are serving today.
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Editors’ conclusion
The availability of the Anti-Tank Platoon’s members as a basis for manning, 
equipping and training a desirable alternative capability was fortuitous. 
In the early days of 1  ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province, 3  SAS Squadron 
members were heavily committed to building up their knowledge of 
a new operational environment and honing their highly specialised tactics 
and techniques to suit any unfamiliar conditions which confronted 
them. Quite properly, they were not employed on reconnaissance tasks 
that were within the infantry battalions’ capabilities. For a battalion 
CO to detach a platoon from a rifle company to undertake specific 
missions meant reducing the capability and flexibility of that company, 
which restricted its employability. In 5 RAR, having available an organic 
component which was selectively manned, equipped and trained for 
intelligence missions meant that the CO could separately task it for 
reconnaissance, surveillance, selective ambushing or civic action tasks 
without cannibalising one of his four manoeuvre companies. This was 
a great advantage. It made a huge difference to the amount of accurate 
short-term intelligence information available to the battalion, for which 
our intelligence officer was extremely grateful.
The Reconnaissance Platoon was a very successful development but, 
surprisingly, it was not followed up by the battalions which came after 
5 RAR in Vietnam. Some retained the designated Anti-Tank Platoon and 
employed it as an extra rifle platoon, as 5 RAR had done initially. In others 
it was replaced by a Tracker Platoon which employed war dogs to detect 
enemy presence and to follow up their withdrawing elements. Perhaps 
the reconnaissance platoon idea required a particular combination of 
perceptive, adaptable people who could work well together, from CO to 




JOHN WARR AS 
COMMANDING OFFICER: HIS 
APPROACH TO THE WAR
Max Carroll, Peter Isaacs,  
Michael deak (Michael von Berg) and Mark warr
Editors’ introduction
In any infantry battalion the key person is the commanding officer 
(CO). His position is very challenging to hold, demanding knowledge, 
operational skill, judgement and humanity in directing the efforts of 
several hundred men in a complex and dangerous environment. COs vary 
in their effectiveness and how they are regarded by the men under their 
command. In 5th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR), the 
overwhelming consensus, both while we were on operations in Vietnam 
and over the several decades since then, was that we were very lucky to 
have had John Warr to lead us. In this chapter, three of the officers who 
related most closely with him on operations, and one member of his 
family, present their views from different perspectives to make clear the 
reasons for his high place in our esteem and affection. His personality 





I was still at the Staff College, Queenscliff, when my posting to 5 RAR as 
a company commander was promulgated in late 1965. I was very satisfied. 
I had been requesting a return to regimental duties as I had not served 
in a regular battalion since late 1959. I had done my time as a Citizens 
Military Forces adjutant, an instructor at an Army Headquarters School 
and a Grade 3 staff appointment before Staff College. It was common 
knowledge that 5  RAR was the logical replacement for 1  RAR in 
Vietnam, so I also had active service to look forward to. Many of my 
infantry student colleagues, who were destined for a variety of Grade 2 
staff appointments on various headquarters, were rather envious.
On one of my visits to Canberra, where my family had remained while 
I was at Queenscliff, I paid my respects to the Directorate of Infantry 
at Army Headquarters. I had the dual intent of not only saying ‘thank 
you very much’, but also of finding out all I could about my new CO, 
Lieutenant Colonel John Warr, who was a complete stranger to me. I learnt 
as much as the guarded staff officers were prepared to tell me, but it was 
enough to establish that he had a good reputation, otherwise he would 
not be commanding an Australian Regular Army battalion. He was an 
Royal Military College graduate of 1947, had served in Japan in the British 
Commonwealth Occupation Force and then in Korea with 3 RAR, where 
he had been badly wounded. He had also done an exchange appointment 
with the Canadian Army. I was looking forward to meeting him.
It was Wednesday morning, 5 January 1966, when I reported for duty 
with 5 RAR at the old Holsworthy Barracks. It was like coming home. 
I had last been there in 1957 with 3  RAR before going to Malaya. 
The  immaculately turned out regimental policeman who gave me 
directions at the front gate was a clear indication of the high standard of 
this battalion, and this in turn meant a good CO. I was duly ushered in 
to meet John Warr and he came around from behind his desk to greet me. 
I knew that he was appraising me, as I was him, but his keen eyes, ready 
grin and firm handshake made for a relaxed first meeting. I instinctively 
liked this bloke and knew I would enjoy working with him. In easy chairs 
over a cup of coffee he briefed me on all aspects of the battalion. We 
discussed current strength, reinforcements due, the likelihood of going to 
Vietnam, and the heavy training ahead. Then he got around to telling me 
what I would be doing. I was to be officer commanding (OC) Support 
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Company. He must have noticed my disappointment, as I badly wanted 
a rifle company. He went on to say that, in addition to Support Company, 
I would be battalion operations officer and battle second in command 
(2IC). This was a system that 1 RAR had necessarily adopted from being 
part of 173  Airborne Brigade. As we would be replacing 1  RAR, we 
would also be following the same system. He added that the job would 
be demanding and meant writing all the battalion operation orders, for 
which staff training was essential. When we were deployed, I would be 
running the battalion command post and the operational radio command 
net. He concluded by saying that as only himself, Stan Maizey – the 2IC 
– and I were Staff College graduates, perhaps I now understood why I had 
arrived straight from Staff College. This latter remark was delivered with 
his disarming grin! And I had been checking him out before joining. It was 
obvious to me then that he had been in close liaison with the Director of 
Infantry and subsequently I had won the lottery! And so began a very 
close, professional relationship, as well as a lifelong friendship.
John Warr was a commander with high standards, which is as it should 
be. He knew what he wanted, clearly expressed this in his orders and 
expected his subordinates to ensure these standards were met. Training 
for war is always at a hard, ruthless tempo, particularly so when it is 
known that in several months’ time shooting to kill will be the norm. 
The time from when we were officially warned in late January 1966 for 
deployment to Vietnam, until when our advance party left on 20 April 
1966, was short and so could not be wasted. Between late January and 
early February we had several hundred reinforcements march in who had 
never worked together at their final platoon or company levels, let alone 
as a battalion. Several new officers marched into the battalion, including 
myself, who had to get a grip rapidly on things. This was the time to get 
things right because errors here could be corrected without loss of life. 
We succeeded because John Warr was everywhere: observing, talking and 
listening to all ranks, and quietly and shrewdly assessing their strengths 
and weaknesses. He was a good manager who got the best out of people. 
He rode with a loose rein, but God help anyone, who, after a fair warning, 
didn’t measure up. They left! This particularly applied to officers, warrant 
officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs), as his soldiers’ 
lives depended on these people. He also continued this policy in Vietnam 
and we were a tightly welded unit, efficient, confident and proud when we 
departed from Australia; and our CO was held in high esteem by all ranks.
VIETNAM VANGUARd
322
Vietnam put all the training to the test; we hit the ground running and 
never looked back. There were difficult, often tense periods, particularly 
during prolonged operations, when strain and weariness were constant 
companions; it was then that the CO’s calm leadership prevailed. He led 
by example and I, as his senior operations officer who worked closely with 
him in the planning and execution of our war, often saw his coolness under 
stress. I admired him greatly and learned a lot from him. He had an easy, 
laid-back style with not only me but other officers on the headquarters 
who worked closely with him, such as Stan Maizey, the 2IC, Peter Isaacs, 
the adjutant/assistant operations officer, and Bob O’Neill, the intelligence 
officer. He would often pose questions which invited discussion, during 
which he would pick our brains. Obviously, he was testing a plan he had in 
his head for weaknesses when exposed to other viewpoints, and he always 
listened carefully to what was said. After he had formulated his plan for 
an operation he would then pass it to me to work out the fine detail, 
coordination and writing of the draft operation order. This I then cleared 
with him before the final production of the order, which he then issued at 
his Orders Group. I liked working for him.
I only disagreed with one of John Warr’s operational decisions, and that 
was during Operation Canberra, referred to in Chapter 6 and by Peter 
Isaacs in this chapter. I felt then and still do, that he should have allowed 
Bruce McQualter’s B  Company attack to proceed. ‘The Role Of An 
Infantry Battalion’, published in The Division in Battle Pamphlet No 1 is 
unequivocal, and reads:
To seek out and close with the enemy, to kill or capture him, 
to seize and hold ground and to repel attack, by day or night, 
regardless of season, weather or terrain.1
B Company had successfully found the enemy, were undetected and were 
ready to go in. Bruce was bitterly disappointed at being pulled back. 
We shared his disappointment, particularly as he had the key element 
of surprise in his favour. I knew him well, having served together twice 
before. He was a competent leader, with a superb company which he 
had trained well. If he said he could successfully attack, I believed him. 
However, the CO’s decision was final, so we obeyed and got on with the 
war, without recriminations.
1  Australian Military Board, The division in battle, nos 1–11, Pamphlet No 1: Organisation and 
tactics, Army Headquarters, Canberra, 1966, p 14.
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John Warr’s relations with the task force commander, Brigadier David 
Jackson, were good and easy, as the task force commander allowed both 
of his battalion commanders a fair bit of latitude. David Jackson was 
well experienced in Vietnam, having commanded the Australian Army 
Training Team Vietnam, then the Australian Army Force Vietnam, before 
assuming command of 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF). He ran a good 
Task Force, although he was severely restricted in terms of what could 
be done by only two battalions. His successor, Brigadier Stuart Graham, 
inherited the same problems. He too was easy to work with; our relations 
with the Task Force headquarters staff also improved when our 2IC, Stan 
Maizey, moved there to become the task force operations officer.
I feel I must offer some words of support for Stuart Graham, who has 
been maligned by a host of armchair warriors with perfect hindsight, for 
his decision to build the barrier minefield from Dat Do to the sea. In the 
planning stage, he sought the opinions of both John Warr and Colin 
Townsend, his two battalion COs, plus Brian Florence, the OC of 1 Field 
Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers. All were against it, pointing out the 
time-honoured principle that an obstacle must be covered by observation 
and fire. However, the Vietnamese province chief guaranteed to provide 
this cover. Graham next put his proposal to higher headquarters, both 
Australian and US, and NO ONE OBJECTED! His hope was that 
the obstacle would free his limited infantry resources for use elsewhere. 
In the event, the Vietnamese failed to fulfil their commitment, which was 
a bitter lesson learnt! The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) let 
him down! Again, I am not aware of any resultant ill feelings between 
Graham and his subordinate unit commanders. We, including John Warr, 
accepted his decision and got on with the job.
A few closing words on John Warr. He was a gentleman in his dealings 
with others, and was a gentle man by nature, although there was a strong 
band of steel beneath the quiet, smiling exterior. It was indeed remarkable 
that a man who did not drink alcohol, smoke, swear or lose his temper 
should be held in such high regard and esteem by the rather wild, hardened 
and at times ‘hairy-heeled’ bunch of officers, warrant officers, NCOs and 
men who were 5 RAR. We all respected his professional competence, but 
we also knew that he cared deeply for his battalion, and this was reflected 
in our sincere feelings for him. We all agreed that we were indeed lucky 




I joined the Australian Army from the UK in January 1963 and was 
posted to 1 RAR at Holsworthy, NSW. At the time, John Warr was OC 
B  Company. As I was a platoon commander in E  Company, I didn’t 
really get to know him at all, although I do remember him arranging for 
a Sydney stockbroker to come and address the officers one evening in our 
mess at Gallipoli Barracks. It was at a time when the darling of the Sydney 
Stock Exchange was the Kalgoorlie-based mining company Poseidon, 
and everyone with a few bob to invest was hoping to make a fortune in 
Australia’s burgeoning mining industry. I think it did, however, indicate 
John’s interest in business, an interest that he was to develop after he 
retired from the army.
It wasn’t really until 1964 that I got to know him. He had been appointed 
the senior administration and logistics staff officer on 1 RAR Battalion 
Headquarters (BHQ, which was multi-functionally organised and staffed 
to operate as a Battle Group HQ within the Pentropic divisional structure) 
where I had become a junior operations staff officer. In late 1964, orders 
were received to reform 1 RAR into a smaller 750-man infantry battalion 
suitable for operations in South-East Asia, and create 5 RAR from the 
‘leftovers’, it was largely John’s responsibility to bring this upheaval about. 
As was his nature, he set about it with his customary enthusiasm and 
eye for detail but was probably as disappointed as I was when informed 
that neither of us would remain with 1  RAR during its forthcoming 
deployment to South Vietnam, scheduled to occur in April 1965.
I’m sure that John was doubly disappointed to learn that he was not to 
become 5 RAR’s first CO; that honour going to Peter Oxley who was 
then the military attaché in Saigon and not due to join the battalion until 
May 1965. 1 RAR and 5 RAR separated at the beginning of 1965 and 
John assumed ‘administrative command’ of 5 RAR when the battalion 
was formally established on 1 March. This arrangement continued after 
1  RAR’s departure for South Vietnam in April and until Peter Oxley 
joined and assumed command in May.
Recognition of John’s hard work and unstinting efforts came with the 
announcement that he was to be promoted to command of the battalion 
in September. Although it was assumed that 5 RAR would relieve 1 RAR 
in South Vietnam in April 1966, this was not confirmed until January.
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John prepared the battalion for war with a combination of realism for 
the complexity of the task at hand, toughness when necessary and an 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of his officers, warrant 
officers and senior NCOs. Of the 16 officers who had formed the 
battalion in March 1965, only nine of the originals remained when the 
full complement of 37 embarked with the battalion for South Vietnam 
in April a year later. This enormous throughput of officers and a seriously 
understrength cadre of experienced warrant officers and senior NCOs 
occurred at a time when the battalion was being brought up to strength 
with the first drafts of partly trained national servicemen. By the time 
the battalion embarked for Vietnam, these comprised approximately 
50  per  cent of the unit’s strength. It was a severe handicap that John 
overcame through persistence with the various tiers of higher headquarters. 
He was able to obtain for the battalion the personnel and the equipment 
needed from what turned out to be a chronically under-resourced 
ordnance system. The reality was that in 1965–66, the Australian Army 
was ill-prepared for the task of mobilising the forces that politicians were 
committing to a war in South-East Asia.
As adjutant and assistant operations officer, it was my privilege to serve 
John closely and to develop a friendship that continued until he died 
in 1999. I don’t ever recall seeing John lose his temper, nor do I recall 
him raising his voice. He had an easygoing style and, unlike some COs 
I have known, was always approachable. He encouraged discussion, the 
exchange of views and ideas. We who served him did so to the best of our 
abilities because we all recognised his decent human nature, understood 
what he wanted to achieve and were determined to achieve it with him.
I have heard it said by a former senior NCO that he considered 5 RAR 
to have been outstanding because John Warr commanded the battalion 
and his officers led from the front. He cited the unusually high number 
of fatal officer casualties as evidence for this. His view of our officer 
casualties, although quite widely held, does not reflect the reality of the 
actual circumstances. The best infantry officers lead from the front when 
circumstances demand, but the five who were killed were all victims of 
mines which are indiscriminate. Nevertheless, they were certainly among 
the best officers we had.
In Chapter 6 there is an account of a near collision on 8 October 1966 
between B  Company and some 30 members of the Viet Cong (VC) 
274 Regiment. In deciding not to allow B Company to attack what was 
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probably the headquarters of this VC Regiment, but rather to call in 
massive artillery and offensive air support, I believe John was following 
the advice he had been given by Major General Tom Daly on the eve of 
our departure for South Vietnam.
Had we attacked and killed or captured 274 Regiment, it would have been 
an outstanding tactical victory, but would it have had a major impact on 
the war? Of course not, but we would certainly have taken casualties, 
possibly in significant numbers if, as 11th-hour intelligence had revealed, 
B Company had encountered a much stronger force than was revealed 
by their initial contact. Men are alive today and their descendants too 
because of John Warr’s decision on that day. It was not a war of Australia’s 
national survival, nor of great strategic importance. At the time, I thought 
John’s decision was wrong, but with the benefit of hindsight, I cannot 
now criticise him for that decision.
Like any man, John favoured some people more than others and, in 
my opinion, he was at times hard on some of his officers who were the 
least deserving of criticism. Nevertheless, he dealt decisively with those 
officers, warrant officers and senior NCOs who, prior to embarkation and 
in the early months of our deployment, failed to meet the high standards 
he set. Within BHQ John had several gifted individuals, namely his 
successive seconds in command Stan Maizey and Ivor ‘Blue’ Hodgkinson, 
operations officer and OC Support Company Max Carroll and, from 
August 1966, intelligence officer Bob O’Neill. Stan and Blue ran the 
administration of the battalion with energy and flair, and relieved John 
of what was a major headache prior to and during the first six months of 
our deployment. Max was a master of staff duties and wrote the complex 
plans to implement John’s operational concepts. He drove the operations 
and provided the ‘aggression’. Bob was the analyst and thinker, and was 
highly influential on John’s decisions as to the concept of operations. 
This was significant because until the arrival of Brigadier Stuart Graham 
as 1  ATF Commander in January 1967, Brigadier David Jackson had 
permitted both battalion commanders considerable freedom of action 
in deciding on their operational priorities. From the army’s experiences 
in the Malayan Emergency, John had developed a good understanding 
of the concept of counter-revolutionary warfare. He did not believe that 
pursuing VC Main Force units all over the province was either feasible at 
the time, or likely to produce the necessary results in terms of bringing 
security to the population and separating them from the VC.
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5  RAR developed the concept and procedures for cordon and search 
operations and conducted several highly effective examples. They 
were not dramatic, headline-grabbing events. Barbed wire enclosures 
containing fearful and uncooperative villagers morphed into white cloth 
tape enclosures in which villagers awaiting questioning were fed and 
entertained with music played by the Battalion Band! It was not because 
John necessarily believed that Vietnamese civilians should be treated 
gently; after all, many, if not most, were VC sympathisers and some were 
active supporters. It was mainly because better results were obtained by 
treating them with kindness, and many embedded VC cadre members 
were thus successfully rooted out of the communities which they had 
hitherto controlled.
Towards the end of our tour, we began the construction of what became 
the infamous ‘fence’; the 11-kilometre, mined wire barrier between the 
Horseshoe feature and the coast. John had misgivings about the concept 
and raised them with Brigadier Graham, but I don’t recall his expressing 
them within the battalion. We got on with it and built the fence with 
the assistance of our supporting Engineer Field Squadron who had the 
unenviable task of laying more than 30,000 mines. Brigadier Graham’s 
plans were fully supported by his operations and intelligence staff and 
approved by the Commanding General of II Field Force Vietnam (IIFFV) 
to whom he reported. So far as I am aware, no objection was raised by 
Commander, Australian Force Vietnam, in Saigon. If the Vietnamese 
military authorities had fulfilled their obligations, the VC might have 
been prevented from lifting so many mines and using them against our 
successors. Graham didn’t have the benefit of hindsight that his many 
critics have enjoyed.
During the year, we took 26 fatal casualties, some the results of our own 
errors, and a further 79 were wounded in action. Our grief was expressed 
through battalion parades at which our padres gave thanks for the lives 
of the fallen and their service to Australia. If John was affected by the 
casualties, he didn’t show it. Perhaps he drew strength from his Christian 
Science faith.
It was a privilege to have served John for almost two years in both peace 
and war. I learned much from his example and from those individuals 
I mentioned earlier. Battalions reflect their commander’s style and hence 
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John Warr led a battalion that was second to none. The late Ron Hamlyn, 
who commanded both Administration Company and B Company after 
Bruce McQualter was killed, summed it up when he said:
Every night for the next few years I used to thank the Lord for 
giving 5 RAR John Arnold Warr as commanding officer; the most 
compassionate and caring man I ever met.
Michael Deak (Michael von Berg)
Lieutenant Colonel John Warr and I go back to the days of 1 RAR (1962–
64) before I was commissioned. On more than one occasion I was a source 
of some concern in the battalion for the occasional social indiscretion 
and being somewhat high spirited. When I was selected for the Officer 
Cadet School, Portsea, it surprised John Warr and many others, but none 
more so when I graduated in December 1965 and was posted to 5 RAR 
in January 1966 where John Warr was now the CO. Although now 
commissioned, my past exploits could have very easily curtailed my new 
career before it had time to start. The CO, with one phone call or stroke 
of the pen, could have banished me from the battalion to some lesser 
role, as the battalion was going to war, but he didn’t and that’s where our 
journey really began. He must have seen something in me despite my past 
misdemeanours. A CO with less patience and understanding may not 
have been as accommodating.
Once deployed in Vietnam, I took my responsibilities as a platoon 
commander in A  Company very seriously, particularly on operations 
and in looking after my men, who were a great bunch. But there was 
friction between the OC A Company and myself, mostly on tactical and 
operational issues that I will not go into. Suffice it to say that my time 
in the company was limited after the OC A Company reported me for 
gambling with the troops. This resulted in my fronting the task force 
commander. The CO could have once again dispensed with my services 
but instead transferred me to Support Company and the Anti-Tank 
Platoon under the watchful eye, guidance and inspirational leadership 
of Major Max Carroll, for whom I had enormous respect. Respect is 
paramount in the relationship between any company commander and 
his platoon commanders. Where there is no respect there is no trust, 
and happily these two very important characteristics in Max were there 
in abundance, which assisted me enormously in my new role.
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When the CO tasked me to establish the battalion’s Reconnaissance 
Platoon, I was delighted and honoured to be given the opportunity and 
determined to do whatever was possible to not let him or the battalion 
down. My fellow officers and the battalion deserved nothing less. In many 
ways that task, its responsibilities and the wonderful men I had the honour 
to lead have made me what I am today.
The CO was respected and admired by the soldiers in the battalion, who 
referred to him affectionately as ‘Wingy’, because as a platoon commander 
in Korea a mine incident had left him with a right arm unable to be fully 
extended. Given the penchant for Australian soldiers to give everyone 
and everything a nickname, Wingy was born. The soldiers not only 
respected and admired Wingy, they were very fond of him because they 
knew he cared and no matter where he came across the soldiers, he would 
always have that wry smile to put diggers at ease. More importantly, he 
would engage with them meaningfully in asking about their families and 
about themselves. He always placed a gentle hand on the shoulder when 
thanking someone for a job well done.
What I really respected about John Warr as a battle commander and as 
a leader was that the BHQ group was always in the field with us, doing 
the hard yards, the same as everyone else in the battalion. They shared 
with us liana and thorny ‘wait-a-while’ vines that were very difficult to 
get through, bamboo thickets and impregnable jungle that were just as 
much a hindrance and as annoying to the CO as they were to us in the 
rifle companies. As the battle commander, if one of the companies said it 
was facing rough going, the CO didn’t have to be convinced, sitting back 
in a static command post or floating about in a Sioux helicopter. He led 
from the front and when we were wet, tired, exhausted and miserable 
there was a good chance the CO shared our discomforts.
In the Reconnaissance Platoon debriefs that I underwent with the CO 
and Bob O’Neill, at times I was disappointed that our patrols had not 
revealed anything of major importance. They both advised me that 
negative information is often positive information, and Bob O’Neill 
would  put it into an intelligence-gathering context. All information, 
positive or negative, was appreciated and the CO would take this all on 
board and then question me about my men, their health and disposition. 
This would be followed by a beer in the mess where the CO, as a teetotaller, 
would have a can of Coke before I went down to have a drink with my 
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blokes in the diggers’ boozer. I have had many commanders who claimed 
they cared for their soldiers. With John Warr there was no doubt or 
ambiguity; I knew he really did care. A huge difference!
This feeling of someone really caring is particularly relevant when you 
are out on patrol somewhere and all hell breaks loose. Knowing that all 
available support is there for you to use when needed gives you great 
confidence as a young platoon commander in fighting the fight and 
extracting your blokes from a tough situation if warranted. After a very 
difficult contact where ‘Bluey’ Twaits was badly wounded, resulting in the 
loss of his leg below the knee, the very next day John Warr arranged for 
me to fly over to see Blue in 36 Evacuation Hospital, because John knew 
we were all very concerned about him.
It’s very difficult to describe the fondness and enormous respect I have for 
John Warr still to this day. Although he saved my arse on more than one 
occasion, I think the basis for my feelings is much more than that. It’s 
both spiritual and humanistic, where John epitomised everything that is 
so special and unique about old Christian values. Forgiveness, empathy, 
compassion and a brotherly love that was evident in so many ways. This 
brotherly love was felt throughout the battalion, whenever we lost good 
officers and men. I know John Warr felt it deeply, but through his strong 
personal beliefs, strength of character and quiet leadership, he  kept us 
together to continue in our respective roles. He certainly had a  major 
effect on me, and some of his principles and ethics have remained with me 
to this present day. Don’t always look for the bad, look for the good; don’t 
close your mind off because it’s not your idea; if you believe in something, 
pursue it strongly; be approachable and honest with your subordinates; 
and, most importantly, be fair in your judgements. It was a great honour 
and a lot of fun, mostly at my expense, in serving a very special CO, 
mentor and leader.
Mark Warr
My father, the man the battalion got to know in Vietnam and after, 
I believe was very much the same man within his family. His motives and 
thoughts were always first for those around him, be it battalion or family, 
and was constantly considering how he could help improve things for 
them. In the last 10 years I have become more interested in the Vietnam 
War, and the more I read and learn about it, the more impressed I am by 
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how and what 5 RAR achieved while there. When I see photographs of 
John in Vietnam, he seems particularly content, and while there was much 
sadness and devastation experienced, John was given pretty much free rein 
on how best to do the job. Every decision was motivated to help not 
only his men, but also the Vietnamese people. Some publications I have 
read mention the differences of view that John had about Brigadier Stuart 
Graham’s decision, when Graham had decided to lay land mines. John’s 
primary concerns would have been not only for his men and the Australian 
battalions that would come after, but also for the local Vietnamese people, 
who he felt would be adversely affected by this development.
John never liked how some in the media, particularly in America, 
would gauge military success by the highly inflated enemy body counts. 
He didn’t see this fraudulent approach as helpful to winning the war in 
Vietnam. While he could be confrontational if necessary, his decisions 
were intended primarily to win the Vietnamese people over and to protect 
his men.
I think his refined cordon and search operations exemplify his thinking 
on how to conduct this kind of war. Under the circumstances, he saw 
it as the safest way of sifting the VC out of the villages, and protecting 
the men of 5 RAR, while bringing the villagers onside. When I see film 
footage and hear about the battalion’s band playing in the villages during 
these operations, I think, yep, that’s John. He’s doing whatever he can to 
make the situation more tolerable for the Vietnamese, but I’ve sometimes 
wondered what the villagers thought of the music.
Another incident that showed his need to protect his men was covered in 
Bob O’Neill’s book Vietnam Task.2 B Company had about 30 VC covered, 
in the Nui Thi Vai hills, and were in a perfect position to attack them. 
Bruce McQualter was waiting on the order from John to go ahead when 
John was given intelligence at that very moment that a large unit of VC 
could be in the vicinity. It was fresh intelligence and his mind would 
move quickly in situations like this. I understand that it only took a few 
moments for him to consider the implications and decide that the task 
was likely to be too big for the isolated B Company alone. He would 
never put his soldiers’ lives unnecessarily at risk.




Another incident that I learnt about was related in the battalion’s medical 
officer Tony White’s book Starlight.3 C  Company were performing 
a cordon and search in An Nhut village when a mine was set off, killing 
three and wounding five more. John was bending over Major Don Bourne, 
talking to him and giving him words of comfort. Tony knew that Don 
had already died but didn’t have the heart to tell John. It was apparently 
quite a few moments until he realised Don was dead. In the words of 
Tony, ‘the look of pain and dismay that came over his face at that moment 
was, for me, one of the most poignant moments of the war’.4
How John felt doesn’t surprise me. The achievements of 5 RAR during 
this tour I think are very much still a great unsung story. The operations 
of the Australian Army, and its tactics and strategies, had to change to 
meet a new kind of warfare. But on top of that, 5 RAR were the first 
in Vietnam to be manned by a high proportion of conscripted national 
servicemen. The controversy over using these men in this war was very 
divisive in Australia and there were also problems caused, for example, 
by the Seamen’s Union when they refused to load ships with supplies 
necessary for the war front. 1 ATF eventually needed to beg, borrow and 
occasionally ‘liberate’ from the Americans some of the equipment they 
needed. When 5 RAR arrived at Vung Tau in 1966, it was estimated that 
about 70  per cent of the population of Phuoc Tuy Province in South 
Vietnam was effectively under some form of VC control. By the time 
they left, one year later, that level of control had been reduced to about 
15 per cent. John always supported the doctrine that it is difficult to win 
a counter-insurgency war without winning the hearts and minds of the 
people. The battalion began that process very effectively in the relatively 
short time they were in Vietnam.
John was an extremely empathetic person who would never back down 
from a challenge but would take it on enthusiastically. He would revel 
in the situation, and he gave any chance he could to the people in his 
battalion to do the same. He would work with them and create clear goals 
that met the challenges of the battalion as a whole. It was all the things 
that I learned to believe a good leader should do. But knowing John as my 
father, I do not find this surprising.
3  Tony White, Starlight: An Australian Army Doctor in Vietnam, CopyRight Publishing, Brisbane, 
2011.
4  White, Starlight, p 144.
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In my opinion, I can’t imagine a better person to lead 5 RAR through so 
many challenges, from before the time they left Sydney until their return, 
having achieved so much. I vividly remember attending Government 
House in Sydney when John was presented with the insignia of the 
Distinguished Service Order. From the moment John received that award 
I can remember him telling anybody who asked about it that it recognised 
the achievements and work done by the whole battalion. Whenever I was 
with him, and the same question was asked, he would give the same or 
similar answer for the next 30 years. He never stopped praising the efforts 
of the whole battalion and making light of what he had done.
Bruce Ruxton was the president of the Victorian Returned and Services 
League (RSL) for many years after the war. He was John’s brother-in-law 
and my maternal uncle. I noticed over the years that Vietnam veterans 
were negative towards the RSL and complained that it had done little for 
them on their return. I used to think that it must be something to do with 
the branch to which they belonged. In Bruce’s later years he was living 
in Noosa, and I visited him. I remember telling him that I found the 
Vietnam War extremely interesting and asked if he knew anybody I could 
visit, to tell me more about events there. He looked at me sheepishly and 
appeared somewhat embarrassed. Anybody who knows Bruce, or knows 
of him, is aware that it takes plenty to move him. Looking quite moved, 
he answered, ‘I don’t know much about that period at all, Mark’. I think 
he realised the lack of recognition he and the RSL had given Vietnam 
veterans, and it had become a cause for deep regret to him.
I was fortunate enough to travel to Vietnam several years ago, and even 
more fortunate to have been taken around the old base of Nui Dat, and 
to have visited the original site of the Battle of Long Tan and the port of 
Vung Tau, by Graham ‘Breaker’ Cusack. Graham was a second lieutenant 
with 6 RAR and had been that battalion’s command post duty officer on 
the afternoon of the Battle of Long Tan. He was the first to hear ‘contact’ 
by D Company and listened in to the constant radio communications 
with them during the battle. When he took me and my partner Sue to 
Long Tan, he could still remember word for word the radio conversations 
he had had that day. It was 2011, almost 45 years later, but he described it 
like it was yesterday. I am very grateful to Graham for the experiences of 
that day, but even more grateful to have been given the father I had in John 
Warr, and to have learnt so much about the extraordinary 5th Battalion of 





THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
A 5 RAR APPROACH
Robert O’Neill
By November 1966, 5th  Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment 
(5  RAR), had developed its own approach to the conflict and the 
battalion’s role in it. We could see that the Viet Cong, while powerful, 
did not yet fully control the civil population of South Vietnam: it was for 
the people’s support that the war was being waged by both sides. Despite 
the importance of the psychological battle for hearts and minds, military 
operations were still critical. The Viet Minh had achieved success against 
the French by meeting them in major engagements such as the battles in 
the highlands of 1951–53, and at Dien Bien Phu in the north in 1953–54. 
While the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong did not have forces powerful 
enough to defeat the Americans in the Tet Offensive in 1968, they soon 
realised that the American position depended on the willingness of the 
American people to keep their forces engaged and well supplied with men 
and materiel. Eventually this realisation became the key to the North 
Vietnamese successful strategy of protracting the war until well into the 
1970s, by which time they had well and truly undermined American 
public willingness to continue the conflict.
While we, and particularly our commanding officer John Warr, were aware 
of the sensitivity of Australian public and political opinion to casualties, 
our soldiers continued to operate with high morale and plenty of spirit, 
despite the significant risks of losses that they faced. There was no way of 
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wholly avoiding these risks. However, the dangers could be managed by 
being on the alert ourselves and clearly able to win engagements with the 
Viet Cong, despite our relatively small forces. Had the Viet Cong come to 
believe that we were averse to fighting, or unable to fight well, they would 
have constantly harassed us. Our main objective in tactical engagements 
was to avoid having the battalion, or even a company, cut to ribbons. 
Offensive action, such as our operations in the Nui Thi Vai hills, had an 
important role to play. But we had to keep casualties within strict limits 
to remain effective over the long haul in this kind of war.
To this end, the battalion was helped greatly by the quality and training 
levels of our soldiers. It was gratifying to see how quickly and effectively 
our national servicemen had made the transition from their civilian 
occupations  to become effective infantrymen over a period of less than 
a year. In February 1966, while watching some of our men shoot on a field 
firing range near our barracks at Holsworthy in western Sydney, I remarked 
to our company sergeant major, John Bates, on the skill of their shooting. 
He replied, ‘Just wait until they are on the two-way range. In Vietnam, the 
target fires back at you!’ It was a salutary thought and I never forgot it. Hence, 
I was profoundly relieved at seeing how quickly and effectively our soldiers 
swung into action from the outset in May 1966 when the Viet Cong first 
opened fire on them. Men who a year previously had been automechanics, 
hairdressers, clerks and shop assistants had become very proficient infantry 
soldiers. They showed that they could hold their own with confidence, and 
they achieved a high rate of success against experienced guerrillas, fighting 
on their own soil and not willing to give way.
During 1966–67 we worked and fought hard, hoping that our actions 
would contribute in the long term to a successful outcome to the war. 
For those who followed us, that prospect changed after the Tet Offensive 
of 1968. Thereafter, public confidence in eventual victory progressively 
declined, as it became apparent that the Americans, and hence the South 
Vietnamese, were not going to prevail. The Royal Australian Regiment 
battalions who followed us ruminated little on such matters. In the 
immutable tradition of their forebears they applied their Regiment’s 
motto, ‘duty first’, in fine spirit until the day in 1972 when the last RAR 
company was withdrawn. However, this is not a book about our postwar 
experience and concerns. Suffice to say that after our return to Australia, 
the problem of readjustment in a world which did not value our efforts 
and sacrifices in Vietnam was formidable for all of us. However, it has had 




There was no feeling within 5 RAR in 1966–67 that we were going to 
have an easy year. We were aware of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 
superiority in numbers, and their long, successful record in warfare since 
1946. They had a capacity to do us real harm in ambushes and raids, 
and by continually laying mines and setting booby traps in areas through 
which we had to move. They also fought well in defence of their own 
forward positions and base camps. They had their own political system 
which was partially in effect in much of Phuoc Tuy at the time of our 
arrival. They had access to local people who could provide reinforcements, 
food, money and intelligence when called upon to do so. They knew our 
movements because their supporters saw us coming to and going from Nui 
Dat and other places that we held, especially when we used helicopters or 
surface vehicles.
The one form of movement that our enemies could not always detect 
was when we went on foot, especially during hours of darkness. So we 
became accustomed to peering into the darkness, operating off tracks and 
footpaths, or through jungle and rubber plantations, moving our feet 
slowly and carefully, preventing metal items of equipment from clanging, 
and speaking to each other in whispers or by hand signal when there was 
some light. Our soldiers had to get used to operating without much sleep 
at night, and to the tensions which built up naturally as we strove to be 
stealthy. We never could be entirely sure that there was not an armed 
enemy crouching in the darkness behind the base of a tree or behind 
a rock, lining us up in his weapon sights or preparing to detonate a mine 
or bomb. The Viet Cong soon learned that we could be equally or more 
adept at their tactics. Our companies set ambushes and sent out clearing 
patrols around their positions at every morning and evening stand-to. 
Moving silently at night became a very familiar experience to most 
5 RAR soldiers.
Other challenges our men had to contend with were fatigue, the weather 
and shortages in some important items of weaponry and equipment. 
When we were out on operations, a normal carrying load was around 
30 kilograms. This included a lightweight, foldable shelter, water, food 
for up to five days, a weapon, claymore mines for ambushing, grenades 
and, heaviest of all, ammunition both for one’s own weapon and for the 
heavy consumers such as our general purpose machine guns. Often there 
were additional heavy items to be portered such as bombs for our mortars. 
Patrols and platoons had to carry radios (for tactical communications, not 
entertainment) and their heavy batteries to be shared around whatever 
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group needed them. The prevailing heat and humidity caused copious 
sweating, and the pressure of pack straps gave us sore shoulders as 
a constant accompaniment to patrolling.
Our infantrymen had to be young and fit to cope with these pressures, 
and they stood the test well. Commanders had to take all these factors 
into account and seek to mitigate them by practical measures such as 
establishing a pack-dump where soldiers’ heaviest loads could be kept 
secure while their owners moved to get to grips with the enemy. For our 
first few months in Phuoc Tuy we had to contend with the wet season, 
when on most afternoons, and frequently at night, we were subjected to 
heavy rain. Had the weather been cold, the rain would have been a health 
hazard, but in the warmth of the tropics it was more of an inconvenience 
than a danger. The climate did, however, lead to the added problem of 
skin complaints of various kinds, creating a major challenge for Tony 
White and his medical team in keeping us all fit for operations.
While learning to live with these various problems and pressures, we felt 
a special confidence in the leadership of John Warr. I shall not repeat what 
has been conveyed in Chapter 16, but simply observe that, having studied 
battalion commanders of the wars of the 20th century, he is in the upper 
bracket. By the time that he had appointed me to work with him directly 
as intelligence officer, I knew that he was thinking hard about how to use 
our capacities most effectively throughout the following nine months. 
In November 1966, when the pressure of operating in the hills had eased, 
John gave me the task of making a detailed analysis of the results of all our 
operations in Vietnam to that date. He particularly wanted a balance of 
results – of gains versus costs. The gains were to be measured in terms of our 
effectiveness in weakening the Viet Cong, while the costs were to be assessed 
in terms of our own casualties and time taken to achieve results.
My analysis first focused on eight conventional operations, in which we 
were opposing Viet Cong main force and provincial mobile units. We had 
suffered six killed and 31 wounded, while the Viet Cong had lost 33 killed, 
an unknown number of wounded and two captured. The analysis then 
moved to our five cordon and search operations, in which we had suffered 
one killed in action and none wounded, while the Viet Cong had lost 16 
killed, 47 captured and 112 suspects apprehended. Clearly, the cordon and 
search method was the more effective way of operating. This conclusion was 
reinforced when the amount of time that had been spent on operations was 
taken into account. We could spend days patrolling in the jungle with only 
occasional contact with the enemy, whereas in a well-planned and prepared 
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cordon and search operation, the numbers of Viet Cong apprehended per day 
of operational time were several times greater. And, more importantly, the 
weakening of Viet Cong political authority in the villages that we searched 
and then developed friendly contact with was far greater than would have 
been achieved by battles deep in the jungle between opposing forces.
After discussion with Max Carroll, Peter Isaacs and myself, John put his 
thoughts onto paper, and proceeded to develop them for publication in 
the Australian Army Journal when we returned to Australia. It appeared 
in No. 222 of the Journal, published in November 1967, under the title 
‘Cordon and Search Operations in Phuoc Tuy Province’. It is included in 
this volume as Appendix  C. The article was essentially an argument for 
greater use of these operations, based on a careful appraisal of all the various 
types of operations that we had undertaken. John stressed the point that the 
essential nature of the war was the competition to win the lasting support 
of the Vietnamese civilian population. Therefore, it was of paramount 
importance to help the local people and not to add to their burdens 
by destroying what little they had by way of houses and means of food 
production. John much preferred to offer help with activities such as the 
building of dispensaries and school rooms, and to provide support for visits 
to the villages by our medical specialists. Our regimental medical officer, 
Tony White, had a very full agenda in looking after the health of some 800 
young Australians and then trying to give medical assistance to the local 
population, many of whom had rarely seen a doctor in their lifetimes.
John’s article received a wide circulation, not only though the Australian 
Army, but also through other armies who exchanged their journals with 
us, especially the Americans, the British, the Canadians, the Irish and 
the New Zealanders. As well as identifying 5  RAR with a preferred 
modus operandi, he raised our army’s reputation for taking a thoughtful, 
committed approach to a difficult set of military problems. It was very 
fitting that his contribution to the improvement of methods of counter-
insurgency was recognised by his receipt of the Distinguished Service 
Order. His citation referred particularly to his development of the cordon 
and search method:
The techniques for these later operations were developed so 
successfully by Lieutenant Colonel Warr that they have been 
accepted as standard procedures in the First Australian Task Force.1
1  See 5th Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment Association website, Citation accompanying the 
award of the Distinguished Service Order to Lt-Col. Warr, www.5rar.asn.au/history/cite_warr.htm.
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In a field where it is hard to be original, he fostered a fresh approach which 
was both more effective as a means of limiting the influence of the Viet 
Cong and more economical in terms of the casualties suffered by our own 
soldiers. It also demonstrated to villagers that Australians were firm, fair 
and determined in rooting out our enemy, and careful of the local people’s 
welfare and property in doing so.
When I became intelligence officer John also appointed me to be the 
battalion’s civil affairs officer. The two jobs went well together because 
I could often gather some useful intelligence while visiting a village for 
civil affairs purposes, and I could give better advice on the civil affairs 
program based on what I had learned through intelligence gathering and 
analysis. The first stage in establishing a civil affairs program was to gain 
the trust and cooperation of the villagers. This took time, but John gave it 
high priority. Individual platoons, especially the Anti-Tank Platoon under 
Mick Deak (von Berg), were stationed in villages for several days at a time. 
There were some villages where the Viet Cong influence was high, and 
others where government policies had not helped them as much as they 
might have. But there were yet others where the people were keen to make 
friendly contact with us, and accept assistance, offering information on 
local Viet Cong activities in return. Mick’s platoon combined the essential 
skills required for counter-insurgency because they had much more to 
offer than simply intruding on the villagers and applying restrictions 
to their way of life.
In conducting cordon and search operations, the local police sometimes 
caused problems for us. We were dependent on them doing their job of 
identifying known Viet Cong supporters fairly and accurately, and we 
had to face the possibilities that justice could be dispensed on an arbitrary 
basis, or sometimes abused to settle old scores. We tried to limit these 
problems by following up with visits to those who had been arrested, to 
see how they were being treated and what was happening to them in terms 
of legal process. The fact that local officials knew that we would take an 
interest in whatever action followed our apprehension of a Viet Cong 
suspect made a difference to the way they were treated, but it was far from 
perfect in ensuring that justice was meted out evenly to everyone.
The Viet Cong, for their part, had to accept that in late 1966 they lost 
substantial control over western Phuoc Tuy, thereby enabling South 
Vietnamese and allied forces to pass freely between Vung Tau, Ba Ria 
and the base complexes around Bien Hoa. The Viet Cong could still take 
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offensive action by raiding villages and South Vietnamese military posts 
along Route 15, but they could not stay in the area for any lengthy period. 
Government and allied forces, especially the 1st  Australian Task Force 
(1  ATF), were now able to respond quickly and powerfully. The  Viet 
Cong therefore had to turn their attention elsewhere in the province to 
be able to strike effectively, and at a reasonable cost in terms of their own 
lives and resources.
From late 1966, the Viet Cong focused on strengthening their presence in 
the eastern part of Phuoc Tuy, and this resulted in an increasing number 
of Australian operations there, especially in the Long Hai Hills in the 
south-eastern corner. The Viet Cong had positions of real strength in this 
part of the province, and they remained able tacticians. We suffered nine 
deaths in a 19-day period in February and early March 1967, chiefly due 
to mines and booby traps. By the time we had completed our operational 
tour in Vietnam on 26  April, the Viet Cong had lost military control 
in central and western Phuoc Tuy, but they had retained and probably 
increased control in the east. Our replacement battalion, 7 RAR, and its 
successors still had formidable challenges ahead of them, both in Phuoc 
Tuy and beyond, as the Americans drew more on our resources to resist 
a growing North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military presence in the 
crucially important area east of Bien Hoa and Saigon.
The Viet Cong retained and reconstructed their political network in the 
central part of Phuoc Tuy. It may not have been as strong as it had been 
before we began our cordon and search operations, but nonetheless it 
remained a formidable asset to them. In February and March 1968, when 
the Tet Offensive burst into the media headlines around the world, it 
became obvious that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese had retained 
a substantial degree of control in South Vietnam, and it would take 
a major and prolonged effort to break that grip. Public opinion in the 
United States and other allied countries turned against making this kind 
of commitment, and so the war ground on for seven more years before 
ending in defeat for the United States and its allies.
One of the key challenges of the war was the development of smooth and 
effective inter-allied relations. For us in Phuoc Tuy, that meant essentially 
our cooperation with the Americans and the South Vietnamese Army. 
Although other nations were taking part in the conflict, we had little to do 
with the South Koreans, Filipinos and Thais. We also worked closely with 
the New Zealand gunners, but we never felt that they were foreigners.
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The Americans were our closest partners from the day of our arrival. 
As Max Carroll and Peter Isaacs have related, they accepted us as valued 
allies and immediately invited some of our key people to directly 
observe their operations. They helped us to settle in and gave us a quick 
feel for what it was like to work in the Vietnamese environment. They 
supported us closely with helicopters and ground attack aircraft when 
we needed them. They based heavy artillery elements right alongside 
us at Nui Dat. They were particularly good to work with because they 
respected our national sovereignty. Occasionally, when supporting their 
operations, we were placed under their command, but they did not give 
us unusually dangerous or difficult missions. Nor did they relegate us 
to a safe corner because they did not think we could handle the more 
challenging assignments. It was a good working relationship, based on 
close cooperation and mutual respect formed in the two World Wars and 
the Korean War.
During our first few months in Vietnam, and before our supply system 
was functioning properly, the Americans were very helpful in meeting 
some of our needs. Soon various members of our battalion, from the 
second in command downwards, knew where the main American stores 
in our vicinity were located, and they bargained and traded for badly 
needed items ranging from tents and furniture to heavy machine guns. 
Another area in which the Americans were willing to be particularly 
helpful was that of intelligence cooperation. Given their excellent signals 
interception capability, we always felt confident that if the Viet Cong or 
North Vietnamese were planning a major operation against us, such as 
their attack at Long Tan, we would receive warning from the Americans. 
However, the major American headquarters, such as that of II Field Force 
Vietnam (II FFV) near Bien Hoa, were vast and the routine passage 
of intelligence down to our level could be slow. Fortunately, American 
common sense enabled less formal ways of communicating to develop, 
enabling me to have some very fruitful visits to II FFV for direct personal 
briefing on the latest intelligence available. As Max Carroll has said, 
generally we found the Americans to be good working partners and they 
had our respect. We did not always agree with their methods. There 
was a  need, we felt, for a little more understanding of the fragility of 
Vietnamese rural communities. But our allies were learning as they went 
along, as we also had to do in different fields.
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Our contact with the armed forces of South Vietnam was not as close as it 
was with the Americans. The principal South Vietnamese forces in Phuoc 
Tuy were the Regional Force and Popular Force companies. They were 
scattered widely but thinly across the province. They varied considerably 
in effectiveness. They sometimes had to fend off strong Viet Cong attacks 
on their remote compounds, and the outcomes of such clashes showed 
that some of the South Vietnamese were brave and would fight hard. But 
sometimes we also saw that such performance by the South Vietnamese 
could not be relied on, and we suspected that there was sometimes 
outright collusion between the two opposing sides. This possibility gave 
us a security problem in that we had to judge very carefully how far we 
disclosed our own intentions to South Vietnamese military personnel, and 
how fully we shared our intelligence information with them. Similarly, we 
had to be careful about how much credence we gave their reports on their 
own and Viet Cong activities, especially in the northern and eastern parts 
of Phuoc Tuy.
This is not to say that we did not receive any worthwhile help from the 
South Vietnamese military or their local civilian administration. Our 
working relations with them, which began in the area around Binh Ba 
and Duc My, developed considerably in following months while we were 
securing the area around Route 15. Nonetheless, the South Vietnamese 
military effectiveness in Phuoc Tuy was on the low side, and for most of 
the operations described in this book, we did not factor the Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam into our planning as a major asset.
Just as the South Vietnamese had problems in maintaining morale and 
commitment among their soldiers, so also did the Viet Cong and North 
Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese Chieu Hoi (or returnee) program 
encouraged some of their enemies to come forward and surrender in 
return for cash, resettlement opportunities and, hopefully, ending up on 
the winning side in the war. This program caused the Viet Cong leaders 
real problems. As they admitted themselves, in the period from January 
to October 1966 they lost 66 cadre personnel and soldiers to the Chieu 
Hoi program in Phuoc Tuy. The actual number of returnees was probably 
greater. However, this program was badly resourced and often given low 
priority by the South Vietnamese authorities.
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Another scheme developed by the South Vietnamese Government was the 
Revolutionary Development Cadre Program. These cadres were trained 
groups of young men who were sent out to help individual villages with 
development and local defence projects. We called them the ‘Rev Devvers’ 
and often they appeared to us as the gilded youth of Saigon, sent out 
on relatively safe assignments to the countryside for periods of a few 
weeks at a time. Some of them appeared on their own smart motorcycles, 
with guitars slung across their shoulders. During 1966 they were not so 
noticeable, although we did work with them occasionally. On one fence-
building project, when the Rev Devvers were not making rapid progress, 
we were able to have a platoon of Viet Cong returnees sent in to help. The 
comparison between the effectiveness of the two groups was not a bad 
indicator of the final result of the war!
During the period focused on in this book, September–November 1966, 
we were too busy up in the hills and along Route 15 to have had much 
contact with these activities of the South Vietnamese. We needed, however, 
to keep them in mind because they did show that the Saigon government 
recognised the political nature of the war. But for us on Nui Thi Vai and 
the Nui Dinh hills, the war still posed strong military demands because 
that was the way in which the Viet Cong had come to control western 
Phuoc Tuy. We had to clear the enemy off the dominating high ground or 
they could frustrate everything we attempted.
Once the high ground had been taken and the Viet Cong driven away, 
we had some resources free with which to establish a friendly and helpful 
presence in and around the villages. It was a good opportunity to enjoy 
some more relaxed operations in which we were not carrying 30-kilogram 
loads several hundred feet up steep slopes, while under fire from enemy 
in well-chosen positions. Our platoons sometimes deployed alongside 
several of the larger villages. Their inhabitants were friendly and seemed 
good-humoured towards us, and our soldiers reciprocated. We set about 
getting to know those in the leading positions in the villages, explaining 
what we were trying to do, asking how we could help them and gaining 
useful information in return.
We could not take for granted that the Viet Cong would stay away from 
the high ground. Reconnaissance and fighting patrols remained necessary, 
but they were lighter operations than the ones we had mounted to gain 
control of the heights. The continuing process of maintaining surveillance 
over the dominant ground was greatly helped by 3 SAS Squadron’s regular 
patrol operations in the province’s hill complexes.
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We also had to think about the low ground between the hills and the 
Rung Sat, the extensive area of mangroves to the west and south-west 
of Phuoc Tuy, which the Viet Cong used to conceal their supply routes 
along which equipment, weapons, ammunition and other useful items 
were brought into the area east of Bien Hoa and south of War Zone D. 
In November 1966, we followed Operation Queanbeyan with two further 
operations in this area: Operation Yass, which was a cordon and search 
of the village of Phuoc Hoa; and Operation Hayman to clear the Viet 
Cong off Long Son Island. This sweep concluded a very intense period 
of 37 days of operations which changed the way in which Phuoc Tuy was 
shared between the Government of South Vietnam and the Viet Cong. 
Route 15 was now open as a secure road for reinforcements and supplies 
to use from Vung Tau to the crucial Saigon–Bien Hoa area. The important 
villages of western Phuoc Tuy were now able to receive medical and dental 
assistance, more schoolrooms and other community facilities, and to 
know thereby that their welfare was one of our major concerns.
This was a major transformation. The effectiveness of our drive against 
the Viet Cong was recognised by the awards of several decorations to 
5 RAR members. These are listed in Appendix A. All of us had learned 
a lot about the complexities of counter-insurgency warfare. Given the 
changes that have taken place in warfare and conflict during the following 
50 years, the year that we spent in Phuoc Tuy in 1966–67 gave us all a very 
relevant education, and a set of practical insights which still enlighten the 
Australian Army’s operational methods.
Readers may decide whether and to what extent the lessons that we 
learned in Phuoc Tuy are relevant to the present and future problems of 
national and international security. Perhaps most will agree that Australia 
needs to take preparation for international military commitments much 
more seriously in times of peace than we have done in the past. In the 
cases of the two World Wars it took the best part of two years to raise, 
train and equip our forces for service abroad. We sent them off in less time 
than that, but they had to learn on the battlefield. Similarly, in the Korean 
War we were not able to field a second battalion of troops until mid-
1952, two years after the war had begun, despite having a large number 
of veterans of the Second World War on which to draw. To raise a force 
of two battalions for service in Vietnam, Australia had to introduce a very 
controversial national service scheme in 1965. It was not until late 1967 
that a third battalion could be provided to make up a full, brigade-sized 
force. And regarding essential equipment, as Stan Maizey has stated in 
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Chapter  3, the two battalions sent to Vietnam in 1966 went without 
some of their key items, and we had to beg or borrow what we needed 
from our allies in the field.
Numbers of troops available were not the only manpower problem 
confronting 1 ATF. To fight wars successfully, much depends on the quality 
of tactical leadership available on the battlefield. Company commanders 
and platoon commanders do not grow on trees. The latter take about 
a year to train properly, and company commanders take much longer. 
Shortage of trained company commanders is probably the key bottleneck 
in mobilising our army for operations. Similarly, non-commissioned 
officers take a year to train at the junior levels, and several years at the 
most senior. Given the normal size of Australia’s army in time of peace, 
these are powerful limitations on our ability to raise and deploy other 
than token forces for service with allies. One can imagine the reaction 
of a long-term major ally, upon whose power our national security was 
predicated, being told by a present or future Australian prime minister, 
‘Sorry, one battalion is all we can field initially; 12 months later we can 
make it two battalions and after another year we can add a third’. This was 
the prevailing scenario when an expanded Australian Army involvement 
in Vietnam was implemented in 1965. Starting in 1945, 20  years of 
governmental lip service to military defence was its progenitor.
This history of the operations of a single Australian battalion in the 
Vietnam War offers food for further thought on how we might fight 
another war, either abroad or in Australia, and how we ought to approach 
this possibility in terms of anticipation, preparation, training, operational 
methods and equipment. This book also stands as a memorial to the 
service of several hundred young Australians, volunteers and national 
servicemen, who, in 5 RAR, showed the bravery and commitment to have 
done as well as they did in Vietnam. They established a strong mateship 
in battle which has endured over the past 54  years. We are not about 
to forget those who paid with their lives, or endured severe incapacity, 
as a result of their service in Vietnam! Nor shall we forget the love and 
support of our wives, families, fiancées and other close friends during our 
year in Vietnam. It was a very big team effort!
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APPENDIX A. 5TH BATTALION 
DECORATIONS AND AWARDS: 
VIETNAM 1966–67
Distinguished Service Order
Lieutenant Colonel John Arnold Warr
Military Cross
Second Lieutenant Michael Joseph Gunther Deak (Michael von Berg)
Second Lieutenant John Douglas McAloney
Second Lieutenant Dennis Claude Rainer
Military Medal
Private Colin John Cogswell
Private Peter Fraser
British Empire Medal
Sergeant Robert George Armitage
Commendation for Distinguished Service





Major Owen Maxwell Carroll
Major Paul Netherton Greenhalgh
Major Ivor Ronald John Hodgkinson MBE
Major Stanley John Maizey
Major Malcolm Bruce McQualter*
Captain Peter James Isaacs
Captain Harold Anthony Duckett White
Captain Robert John O’Neill
Lieutenant John Curtis Hartley (two awards)
Lieutenant John Carruthers*
Second Lieutenant Dennis Claude Rainer
Warrant Officer Class 2 Brian Malcolm Hughson
Sergeant Robert George Armitage
Corporal Norman James Womal*
Private William Roy Cavanagh
Private Sydney Lawrence Shore
Private Arthur Douglas Hillier
Private Lawrence Victor Lewis
* posthumously
Citations accompanying these awards can be found on the 5 RAR 
Association website: www.5rar.asn.au/history/awards.htm.
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APPENDIX B. AUTHORS’ 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
213017 Second Lieutenant Robert William Askew, aged 26, of 
Guildford, New South Wales. Australian Regular Army – helicopter pilot 
of 161 (Independent) Reconnaissance Flight; he was awarded a Queen’s 
Commendation for Brave Conduct. He enlisted as a soldier in 1959 
and was commissioned after qualifying as an army pilot. Post-Vietnam 
his military flying appointments included an exchange posting with the 
British Army in Malaysia. After resigning as a captain in 1970 his civilian 
aviation career included flying helicopters, small and large VIP jets and 
airliners throughout Australia, Papua New Guinea (PNG), South-East 
Asia and the Middle East. As a senior aircraft captain, his passengers 
included the Prince and Princess of Wales and Middle Eastern royalty, 
presidents, prime ministers and other potentates; and he was seconded 
from Air Niugini to the PNG Prime Minister’s Department for four years 
of world-wide assignments.
54154 Captain Peter Clive Aspinall, aged 24, of Sydney, New South 
Wales. Australian Regular Army – 103  Field Battery forward observer 
with A and B Companies. An Officer Cadet School, Portsea, graduate 
(June 1961) with a 29-year career in unit, training and staff postings. 
Leaving the army in Sydney 1988, he gained a postgraduate qualification 
in strategic marketing leading to a position in the International Marketing 
Institute of Australia. He returned to the financial services sector prior 
to retiring to the Blue Mountains in 2000. In 2003 he relocated to 
his home town of Albany in Western Australia where he has served as 
president of the Albany Aero Club, the Albany Returned and Services 
League (RSL) sub-branch and chair of the Albany Centenary of ANZAC 
Alliance. Currently president of RSL Western Australia, he was appointed 
a Member of the Order of Australia in 2018.
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17089 Captain Ronald William Bade, aged 24, of Brisbane, 
Queensland.  Australian Regular Army – second in command 
of A  Company and, subsequently, acting as officer commanding 
Administration Company, 5  RAR (5th  Battalion, the Royal Australian 
Regiment). Graduating from the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 
1963, his career spanned 28  years, retiring as a colonel. He graduated 
into the Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RAEME) 
and, in 1966, he was seconded to infantry and posted to 5 RAR. Post-
Vietnam he returned to RAEME. He is a graduate of the British Royal 
Military College of Science and the Australian Joint Services Staff 
College. He held senior appointments in the army’s Logistic Command, 
including commanding officer of 4 Base Workshop Battalion, and in the 
Maintenance Engineering Agency. Post-army he joined Kodak as logistics 
manager in Melbourne, Singapore and Hong Kong until retiring in 2004.
235167 Captain George Bindley, aged 29, of Sydney, New South Wales. 
Australian Regular Army – battery captain of 103 Field Battery. A 1959 
Royal Military College, Duntroon, graduate, his early postings included 
two years with the British 26 and 45  Field Regiments in Malaya and 
a tour of duty in Vietnam. Returning to Australia in 1967, on promotion 
to major, he was appointed Artillery Instructor, Senior Instructor of 
Military Arts Wing and Coordinator of Training at the Officer Cadet 
School. On resigning from the regular army in 1970, he transferred to 
the Citizen Military Force and joined a prominent stockbroking firm in 
Melbourne as a private client adviser. In 1977 he became a director of the 
Capel Court Corporation and, in 1984, managing director of ANZCAP 
Management. Since 1990 he has been principal and director of his 
family business.
14967 Captain Ronald Edward Boxall, aged 25, of Toowoomba, 
Queensland. Australian Regular Army – second in command of 
D  Company, 5  RAR. An Officer Cadet School graduate (December 
1959), leading to a 31-year army career. His early appointments were 
mostly in infantry battalions and army schools. He completed a second 
tour of Vietnam in 1971 as a rifle company commander with 4 RAR/NZ 
(ANZAC) and was awarded the South Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry. 
A graduate of Australian and Canadian defence staff colleges, his mid-
career postings included concepts and doctrine development staff 
appointments. Following these he became chief instructor of the Infantry 
Centre and then chief instructor of the army’s Command and Staff College. 
In 1983, on promotion to colonel, he was appointed the first director of 
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military education and training at the Australian Defence Force Academy 
after which he was promoted to brigadier and appointed commander of 
4 Military District. Then followed his only appointment in Army Office, 
Canberra, as deputy chief of operations until he left the army in 1990. 
Post-army, he was a businessman and held several tyre industry company 
directorships and chairmanships until retirement in 2006.
61597 Lieutenant Barry John Campbell, aged 30, of St Helens, 
Tasmania. Joined the Australian Regular Army on completing national 
service in 1955. He served in the Malayan Emergency 1957–59 and was 
commissioned in 1964. He was awarded the Royal Humane Society’s 
Stanhope Gold Medal in 1965 for saving a life. He deployed to Vietnam in 
1966 with 1 Field Regiment as survey officer and then as forward observer 
attached to D Company, 5 RAR. He completed a second tour in Vietnam 
as battery captain and, subsequently, battery commander of 106 Battery 
in 1970–71, for which he was Mentioned in Dispatches (MID). Post-
Vietnam, he served in various appointments including on the Australian 
Army Staff, London. He graduated from the Army Staff College in 1973. 
In 1981, as a lieutenant colonel, he left the army and worked for Hawker 
de Havilland (Australia) until retiring in 1992.
18548 Captain James Douglas Campbell, aged 28, of Gympie, 
Queensland. Australian Regular Army – helicopter pilot of 
161 Independent Reconnaissance Flight. Trained as a motor mechanic at 
the Army Apprentice School in 1954–56, he served with 1 RAR during 
the Malayan Emergency in 1959. Selected for flying training in 1961, he 
graduated first in his course at Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Point 
Cook and completed training as a helicopter pilot at RAAF Amberley 
in June 1962, when he was commissioned and posted to 16 Army Light 
Aircraft Squadron. Later that year he flew for the UN in Irian Jaya. 
He qualified as an Iroquois instructor in the United States and returned 
to be a helicopter instructor with 16  Army Light Aircraft Squadron 
in 1964. In 1966–67 he was the rotary wing section commander in 
161 Independent Reconnaissance Flight, part of 1 ATF (1st Australian 
Task Force). For his performance during numerous hazardous missions 
he was awarded the first Distinguished Flying Cross of the Vietnam War. 
Postwar he had a wide range of flying and non-flying appointments and 
graduated from the Australian Staff College in 1975. Leaving the army 
in 1980, he was involved in setting up and operating three permanent 
helicopter rescue services on the Sunshine Coast, the Gold Coast and 
at Bundaberg. The recipient of many awards for community service, in 
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retirement he has continued his involvement in a wide range of activities 
and still competes in outrigger paddling titles at both state and national 
levels.
52680 Major Owen Maxwell Carroll, aged 35, of Perth, Western 
Australia. Australian Regular Army – 5  RAR’s operations officer 
(while also commanding Support Company) and, later, commanded 
A Company. A 1953 graduate of the Officer Cadet School, Portsea, he 
previously had served as a rifle platoon and tracker team commander 
in 3 RAR during the Malayan Emergency and was MID. He graduated 
from the Army Staff College in 1965 and was immediately posted to 
5 RAR. Post-Vietnam, he served on loan to the Malaysian Army, and as 
an instructor at the Officer Cadet School, Portsea, and the Royal Military 
College, Duntroon. He  held multiple staff appointments including on 
the Australian Army Staff in London. Retired as a colonel after 31 years 
service. Post-army pursuits included rural interests, executive assistant 
to the Australian Federal Police Commissioner and on the staff of the 
Australian War Memorial.
215835 Captain Ernest Chamberlain, aged 25, of Sydney, New South 
Wales. A Vietnamese linguist, Australian Regular Army. A 1965 graduate 
of the Officer Cadet School, Portsea, in 1969–70 he was an intelligence 
officer in Ba Ria and Nui Dat, at the Australian Embassy, and as a staff 
officer/aide on an Army of the Republic of Vietnam Headquarters. 
He was later the Vietnam desk officer in the Australian Joint Intelligence 
Organisation, revisiting Vietnam in 1974. In his 36-year military career, 
he was the Army’s Director of Military Intelligence and Director of 
Studies at its Staff College. He also served in Singapore and the UK, as 
Defence Attaché in Cambodia (awarded the Conspicuous Service Cross) 
and as Head of Australian Defence Staff in Jakarta as a brigadier. Retired, 
he worked in East Timor for several years, including as strategic policy 
adviser to the Timor-Leste Defence Minister. He has written seven 
published books on Timor and five on the Vietnam War.
19991 Second Lieutenant William Davies, aged 20, of Brisbane, 
Queensland. Australian Regular Army – helicopter pilot, 161 Independent 
Reconnaissance Flight. Straight from high school, he was commissioned 
after completing flying training as an officer cadet. He was evacuated 
from Vietnam to Australia after being shot down and, after a long 
rehabilitation, he returned to flying duties as an army pilot. He then served 
as an army recruiting officer in Perth, Western Australia, for 16 months 
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before resigning his short service commission and travelling extensively 
throughout the world. On return to Australia he completed six years of 
full-time study in psychology and was appointed to the foundation staff 
of the Vietnam Veterans Counselling Service in Perth. After several years 
of counselling, recurring ill health and infirmity due to his injuries led to 
his retiring and settling in Perth.
216701 Second Lieutenant Michael Gunther Deak, aged 23, 
of Adelaide, South Australia. He enlisted as a soldier in 1962 and, in 
December 1965, graduated from the Officer Cadet School, Portsea, 
and was posted to 5 RAR in 1966 as platoon commander of the Anti-
Tank Platoon. He was awarded the Military Cross for his actions as 
its platoon commander. He was later tasked to establish the battalion’s 
Reconnaissance Platoon in Vietnam. Postwar, he served in the Special Air 
Service Regiment, 2 Commando Regiment, various staff appointments 
and again in 5 RAR as adjutant. In 1973 he resigned his commission, 
took up his rightful name and title as Michael Baron von Berg. On his 
return after 12 years overseas, he was appointed group marketing director 
of the Hardy Wine Company. In 1991 he established his own consultancy, 
operating globally for some 20 years until his retirement. He was awarded 
the Order of Australia Medal for services to rugby in 2015.
235277 Lieutenant John Henry Griggs, aged 23, of Sydney, New 
South Wales. Graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon, 
in 1964 – gun position officer of 103  Field Battery until attached to 
C Company, 5 RAR, as forward observer in early 1967. He completed the 
gunnery staff course at Larkhill in the UK in 1968–69, then was posted as 
an instructor in gunnery at the School of Artillery, and, later, as a battery 
commander. He served in Headquarters, PNG Defence Force, graduated 
from the Australian Staff College in 1975 and then was a senior instructor 
(trials and development) before promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1979. 
His last appointment was in operational doctrine development. He left 
the army in 1982 to become a hotelier for 30 years, before retiring.
215812 Lance Corporal Edmund William Dennis Harrison, aged 19, 
of Lewisham, New South Wales. Australian Regular Army – posted to 
5 RAR on its formation in early 1965. Second in command of 1 Section, 
1 Platoon of A Company until seriously wounded on 17 October 1966 
and evacuated to Australia. He served for another 13  years in various 
postings until 1979, then formed a career in middle management within 
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the printing industry before retiring in 2000 due to ill health caused by his 
war service. He is the long-serving webmaster of the 5 RAR Association’s 
multi-award-winning website and a Life Member of the Association.
17105 Lieutenant John Curtis Hartley, aged 21, of Woombye, 
Queensland. A 1965 graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, 
he was commander of 1 Platoon, A Company throughout 5 RAR’s first 
tour in Vietnam. During this tour, he was twice MID and twice wounded. 
In 1970, he returned to Vietnam as an adviser with the Australian 
Army Training Team Vietnam when he received the Vietnamese Cross 
of Gallantry and two US awards for valour. Seriously wounded, he was 
evacuated to Australia where he recovered and served in the army for 
nearly 40 years, achieving the rank of major general. He was appointed 
an Officer of the Order of Australia in 1992 for his service. His senior 
appointments included head of the army’s Training Command, Director 
of the Defence Intelligence Organisation, Deputy Chief of the Army 
and Land Commander Australia. Post-army he has been head of the 
Royal United Services Institute, national president of the National 
Rifle Association, chairman of the Battle Honours Committee and is 
presently CEO and director of the not-for-profit research institute, Future 
Directions International.
335162 Lieutenant Douglas James Heazlewood, aged 22, of 
Warrnambool, Victoria. Australian Regular Army – section commander 
and, later, gun position officer of 103 Field Battery, he graduated from the 
Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1965. Post-Vietnam, he underwent 
advanced training in the UK and held various unit and instructional 
appointments. After commanding a field battery, he attended long-term 
training at the UK Royal Military College of Science and completed an 
exchange appointment in the UK Ministry of Defence. There followed 
materiel acquisition, intelligence and Australian Army Staff Washington 
appointments and a period on the Joint Plans staff at Defence 
Headquarters. Leaving the army in 1987, as a lieutenant colonel, he was 
marketing manager of the Small Arms Factory in Lithgow, becoming 
general manager until 1993 when he returned to Warrnambool and 
retired in 2011 as finance manager of a human services agency.
47056 Lieutenant David Murray Horner, aged 23, of Adelaide, South 
Australia. Australian Regular Army – a platoon commander in 3 RAR in 
Vietnam in 1971. A graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon 
(1969) and of the Australian Army Staff College, he had regimental and 
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staff postings before transferring to the Army Reserve and becoming an 
academic. Later, as a colonel in the Army Reserve, he was the first head of 
the army’s Land Warfare Studies Centre. He was professor of Australian 
defence history at The Australian National University for 15 years and 
is now an emeritus professor at that university. The author or editor of 
35 books on Australian military history, defence and intelligence, he is 
also the Official Historian of Australian, Humanitarian and Post-Cold 
War Operations. He was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia 
in 2009 for services to higher education in Australian military history and 
heritage as a researcher, author and academic.
311478 Captain Peter Isaacs, aged 25, of the Isle of Wight, UK. 
Ex-British Army and Australian Regular Army – adjutant and assistant 
operations officer 5  RAR, then an instructor at the Officer Training 
Unit Scheyville, before returning to the UK in 1968. In 1975 he was 
a company commander, then second in command of a Baluch infantry 
battalion during the Dhofar war in Oman. Wounded by a mine in 1976, 
losing a leg and an eye. Awarded a Sultanate of Oman Commendation 
for Brave Conduct. From 1986 he was director of several international 
security companies followed by management of UN mine clearance 
operations in Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan and border 
management and counter-narcotics programs in Central Asia including 
Northern Afghanistan. Latterly, director of a British company providing 
armed guards at US military bases and embassies in Afghanistan and 
in the Middle East. Retired in 2016, he lives in the United Kingdom.
43268 Corporal Robert Stanley Kearney, aged 20, of Adelaide, 
South  Australia. Australian Regular Army – section commander in 
9 Platoon 5 RAR. He joined the army at the age of 17 in 1963. He served 
a second tour in Vietnam in 1971 when he was a platoon sergeant 
throughout 3  RAR’s second tour. Following retirement as a warrant 
officer in 1983, he gained a commission in the Army Reserve and was 
employed by South Australia Correctional Services and, later, the South 
Australia Country Fire Service. Since retirement in 2014, he volunteers 
with the Virtual War Memorial Australia (vwma.org.au). He is the author 
of three books about the First World War, and co-author of two about 
Vietnam. He received an Order of Australia Medal in 2001 for services to 
military history preservation, and to the community. In 2019, the History 
Council of South Australia named him the South Australian Historian 
of the Year for his ongoing work.
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4717396 Corporal Ian Alexander McDougall, aged 20, of Basket 
Range, South Australia. A national serviceman of the first intake in 1965, 
he served as a medic with artillery and then with all companies of 5 RAR, 
being the first national service medic to serve with an Australian infantry 
battalion in operations. He joined the Australian Federal Police in South 
Australia and served also in the Northern Territory and New South Wales; 
at times in charge of various substations and squads before returning to 
South Australia in 1987 as a detective sergeant. After 31 years, he retired 
as detective station sergeant in charge of the General Crime Branch 
(Commonwealth Investigations Branch) in Adelaide. He completed 
numerous periods of higher duties as inspector or superintendent and 
received Commendations from three different Commissioners.
235023 Major Stanley John Maizey, aged 36, of Sydney, New South 
Wales. Australian Regular Army – second in command of 5  RAR. 
A 1951 graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, he attended 
the Army’s Staff College in 1963. Being a Staff College graduate, he was 
transferred from 5 RAR to 1 ATF headquarters in December 1966 to be 
the operations officer. As a junior officer he served in Japan and Korea 
with 1  RAR and 2  RAR, in Malaya with 2  RAR and in training and 
staff assignments in Australia. He was later chief instructor of the Officer 
Training Unit. On promotion to colonel he was commanding officer of 
2 Recruit Training Battalion, head of Operations Branch in Headquarters 
Training Command, and commander of a District Support Group. He 
retired in 1979. Post-army, in Sydney, he was manager of Randwick 
Racecourse and then the Royal Motor Yacht Squadron. Later, in 
Kempsey, he was manager of the childhood cancer charity, the Challenge 
Foundation. He died in 2018.
15878 Corporal Brian Edward Mortimer, aged 23, of Blacktown, 
New South Wales. Australian Regular Army – medical assistant of 
103 Field Battery. Post-Vietnam, his army career extended to 38 years, 
retiring as a major. His career highlights included medical sergeant of 
1 RAR in Malaysia and Singapore, an instructor at the Australian Army 
School of Health, an attachment to the British Army School of Health at 
Aldershot in the UK, and regimental sergeant major of 9 Field Ambulance 
in  Townsville and 1  Military Hospital in Brisbane. Commissioned in 
1985, he was adjutant of 10  Field Hospital in Hobart, administration 
officer of the Army Malaria Research Unit and of 1 Military Hospital. 
In a headquarters staff appointment, he coordinated army support for 
Northern Territory Aboriginal communities. He retired in 1999.
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5713701 Second Lieutenant Henry Thomas Neesham, aged 21, of 
Palmyra, Western Australia. A national serviceman, he commanded 
7  Platoon, C  Company, for all but a few weeks of 5  RAR’s first tour 
of Vietnam. A member of the first class (1965) to graduate from the 
Officer Training Unit, Scheyville. Post-Vietnam, he rejoined the Western 
Australia public service in late 1967. In a 43-year career, his prominent 
positions included 23 years as CEO of the Western Australia Workers’ 
Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission, including three years as 
chairman of the Australian Heads of Workers’ Compensation Authorities. 
In 2001 he attended the Cole Royal Commission into the Building and 
Construction Industry as an expert witness. A founding director, in 2000, 
of the Clontarf Foundation, which fosters the education, self-esteem and 
life skills of indigenous boys, he remains a member of the board.
2781397 Private John Patrick O’Callaghan, aged 21, of Leichhardt, 
New South Wales. A national serviceman of the first intake in 1965 – 
machine gunner of 5 Platoon, B Company, and later a member of the 
Regimental Police Section in Battalion Headquarters. After completing 
his national service obligation, he returned to Sydney and worked as 
a waterboard maintenance crew member and a vehicle serviceman, truck 
driver, transport manager and plant operator in the earth-moving and 
horticulture industries until his retirement.
1731021 Second Lieutenant Terrence Harold O’Hanlon, aged  21, 
of  Boonah, Queensland. National serviceman – commander of 
5  Platoon, B  Company. A member of the first class to graduate from 
the Officer Training Unit, Scheyville. Returning injured from Vietnam, 
he completed his service obligation as a member of the staff of the Officer 
Training Unit. On leaving the army, he returned to his family’s property at 
Boonah where he ran cattle and bred horses. He has a lifetime commitment 
to breeding working horses and has judged at many Royal Shows. He has 
been a director and president of the Australian Quarter Horse Association 
and a director of the National Cutting Horse Association. He has owned 
and partnered in cattle stations in the Northern Territory and hotels 
and motels in central Queensland. In retirement he still breeds horses.
335113 Captain Robert John O’Neill, aged 29, of Melbourne, 
Victoria. Australian Regular Army 1955–68, graduate of the Royal 
Military College, Duntroon, in 1958, Bachelor of Engineering, University 
of Melbourne, 1960, Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy, Oxford 
University, 1965. Second in command of B Company, 5 RAR, January–
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August 1966, battalion intelligence officer, August 1966 – May 1967. 
Transferred to the academic staff at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, 
in 1968; Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian 
National University, 1971–82. Official Historian of Australia’s Role in 
the Korean War 1970–82, director of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, London, 1982–87, Chichele Professor of the History 
of War and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, 1987–2001. Chairman 
of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996–
2001. Trustee of  the  Imperial War Museum, London, 1990–2001, 
Chairman of Trustees, 1998–2001. Member Commonwealth War Graves 
Commission, 1991–2001. Honorary colonel, the 5th Battalion, the Royal 
Green Jackets, 1993–99. Honorary Doctor of Letters, The Australian 
National University, 2001. Chairman of the council, Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, 2000–05. Chairman of the board, Menzies Centre for 
Australian Studies, London, 1990–95. Author of The German Army and 
the Nazi Party 1933–39, 1966, Vietnam Task, the Fifth Battalion, The Royal 
Australian Regiment, written during operations in Vietnam 1966–67 
and published in 1968, General Giap – Politician and Strategist, 1969. 
Australia in the Korean War 1950–1953, 2 vols, 1981 and 1985. Honorary 
Fellow, Australian Institute for International Affairs, 2008. Jubilee Fellow, 
Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, 2018. He was MID in 1967 
and appointed an Officer of the Order of Australia in 1988.
2412265 Private Daniel Eric Riley, aged 19, of Granville, New South 
Wales. Australian Regular Army 1965–68 – served in the Anti-Tank 
Platoon and subsequently the Reconnaissance Platoon. Upon return to 
Australia he trained as a paratrooper and became a corporal in 5 RAR. 
Post-service, he completed teacher training with postings to rural and 
regional New South Wales before completing a doctoral program in 
the United States. Throughout his tertiary qualifications, experience 
and publications, he maintained links with both Australian and New 
Zealand defence forces as part of his tertiary responsibilities. His study 
of professional learning included visits to the US Army and Canadian 
defence staff colleges, post-2001. In addition to tertiary appointments, 
his career included service as an educational consultant with school 




214040 Captain Robert William Supple, aged 24, of Cowra, New 
South Wales. Australian Regular Army – second in command of 
A  Company, 5  RAR, and assistant operations officer on Battalion 
Headquarters during some major operations. An Officer Cadet School 
Graduate (December 1962), he served as the platoon commander of the 
Royal Australian Regiment’s Airborne Platoon before joining 5 RAR in 
1965. Upon leaving the battalion in 1967, he served as the adjutant/
training officer of the Citizen Military Force’s 1 Commando Company in 
Sydney and was later an instructor in Tactics Wing of the Officer Training 
Unit, at Scheyville in New South Wales, involved in training national 
service officer cadets for service in Vietnam. In 1971 he resigned from the 
army to commence a career in business.
47046 Lieutenant George Roger Wainwright, aged 21, of Adelaide, 
South Australia. Australian Regular Army – he commanded 8 Platoon, 
C Company, for the duration of 5 RAR’s tour of Vietnam in 1966–67 
and was wounded in action. His 1965 graduation from the Royal 
Military College, Duntroon, was followed by a 35-year military career, 
retiring as a colonel. He served in four RAR battalions and several army 
schools. He is a graduate of the Australian Army Staff College and the US 
Armed Forces Staff College. His later career involved senior postings in 
training environments, including Director of Military Art at the Royal 
Military College, Duntroon; and in strategic operational and intelligence 
appointments. Post-army, he was contracted to conduct several 
Australian Defence Force personnel projects. He has been president of 
the 5  RAR Association since 2005 and is an inaugural director of the 
RAR Corporation.
Lieutenant Colonel John Arnold Warr, aged 41, of Mosman, 
New  South Wales. Australian Regular Army – commanding officer of 
5 RAR (see Chapter 16). A 1947 graduate of the Royal Military College, 
Duntroon, he served as a junior officer with the British Commonwealth 
Occupation Forces in Japan post–Second World War and was seriously 
wounded during the Korean War, while serving with 3 RAR. As a major 
he served with the Canadian Army as an exchange officer in 1960–62. 
In  1967 he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his 
command of 5 RAR in 1966–67. He resigned from the Army in 1972 as 
a colonel. There followed a period as Assistant Registrar of the University 
of New South Wales, during which time he appeared before the Senate 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, assisting with its 
examination of the Australian Army’s future roles. He later spent many 
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years as a businessman in the swimming pool industry. He instigated the 
5th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment Association, in 1967 and 
served as its president until his death in May 1999.
J. Mark Warr of Sydney, New South Wales, son of Lieutenant Colonel 
John Warr. In his early 20s, Mark was assistant export manager for 
a  timber milling company and a meat processing company in NSW. 
In  his late 20s, he developed a business publications business that 
imported and published specialised publications for Australian and 
New Zealand companies. Mark sold this business in the late 1980s, 
married and had two children. During this time, he bought, with his 
father, a retail swimming pool business comprised of two shops and three 
service vans on Sydney’s North Shore. This grew to three stores and 17 
service vans and was servicing and maintaining 80 per cent of the major 
commercial swimming pools in Sydney’s CBD. With 28 staff, a program 
to restructure the company was undertaken, which successfully franchised 
13 service vans, before being sold to Poolwerx in 2006. Since then, Mark 
has undertaken new business ventures.
216799 Captain Harold Anthony Duckett White, aged 26, 
of Sydney, New South Wales. Australian Regular Army (five-year short 
service commission) – 5  RAR’s regimental medical officer. A graduate 
of Cambridge  and Sydney universities. He served, post-Vietnam, as 
regimental medical officer of 1 Recruit Training Battalion at Kapooka in 
New South Wales and with the British Military Hospital in Singapore. 
Back in civilian life, he qualified as a dermatologist, and was in private 
practice and a visiting medical officer at Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, 
Sydney, as well as a senior lecturer at the University of Sydney. 
As a colonel in the Army Reserve in Army Office, Canberra, he served as 
a consultant dermatologist. He was appointed a Member of the Order of 
Australia for remote area dermatology and medical education in Australia 
and the Pacific Islands. He retired in 2010. He published a book on his 
experiences in Vietnam in 2011: Starlight: An Australian army doctor 
in Vietnam.
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APPENDIX C. CORDON AND 
SEARCH OPERATIONS
John warr
This article was originally published in the Australian Army Journal 
No. 222, in November 1967. Note that all images and maps included in 
this reproduction are modern reconstructions.
Introduction
The war in South Vietnam is being fought with the aim of controlling the 
people, as the side which controls the people must eventually control 
the government and the country.
As a basis for achieving this aim, the communists, wherever possible, have 
established their own administration at village and hamlet level. This is 
achieved by creating in each village a cadre, usually composed of dedicated 
communists, whose tasks are to discredit the government, indoctrinate 
the villagers with communist propaganda and build an organization 
to support the Viet Cong forces in the field. The methods used by 
the cadres to obtain the co-operation and support of the villagers are, 
brutal but effective. The headmen, schoolteachers, policemen and local 
administrators are either eliminated or their families killed or tortured it 
they fail to co-operate. The cadre is also used to recruit young men and 
women into the Viet Cong forces and to provide labour when required.
The French Army in Indo-China found it almost impossible to operate in 
such an environment where they were like goldfish in a bowl with the Viet 
Minh almost invariably being aware of their intentions and all movement 
being reported. Ho Chi Minh considered that the establishment of the 
cadres was of prime importance as they would allow his guerrilla forces to 
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operate like fish in a sea of peasants. It is suggested that if the village cadres 
were eliminated and the people secured against Viet Cong influence, the 
major advantages enjoyed by the Viet Cong would disappear. Unable to 
use the villages as operational bases the Viet Cong forces would be isolated 
from the people and their military effectiveness reduced as their ability 
to obtain food, tax and intelligence decreased. The Viet Cong would 
not be able to visit their homes and families and their morale would be 
reduced accordingly. In addition, the villagers would not be subjected to 
communist propaganda.
If the Viet Cong lost their ability to use the villages for their own purposes, 
they would be compelled to operate from bases in the mountains, swamps 
or thick jungle and, while they remained in such bases, would be unable 
to achieve their aim and would therefore be ineffective except as a threat. 
To become effective, the Viet Cong would have to leave their bases and 
seek battle with the government forces. Such battles would, as a result, 
almost certainly be in areas where the great fire power of the Allied forces 
could be employed most effectively. If the Viet Cong chose to remain 
in their bases they could, be harassed by air and artillery which, as has 
already been illustrated in South Vietnam, will reduce their morale and 
Increase the number of Hoi Chanh (Viet Cong who surrender).
With the elimination of the Viet Cong cadres, government armed forces 
and police (but not Allied troops) must be employed to secure the 
villagers against Viet Cong activities and the movement of the people and 
distribution of food must be controlled. Then the government will be 
positioned to re-establish local administration, including medical services, 
education and transport; civil aid can also be commenced.
The re-establishment of government control should also convince the 
villagers that the Viet Cong lacks the ability to secure, administer and 
assist the people. Once the villagers have been convinced this will be 
passed onto the Viet Cong through their families in the villages and the 
number of Hoi Chanh will further increase.
In addition, with the added security gained by the elimination of Viet 
Cong support in the villages, increased intelligence gained from the Hoi 
Chanh and the villagers, more effective operations can be mounted against 
the Viet Cong bases. Such operations should not be mounted until the 
Viet Cong cadres are destroyed and the people secured.
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During its service in Vietnam in 1966–67, 5  RAR cordoned and 
searched villages on nine occasions in to remove Viet Cong cadres. From 
these operations, 5  RAR devised sympathetic methods and techniques 
for controlling civilians. This article will describe cordon and search 
operations in three villages, each of which produced different problems in 
its planning and execution. The operations were:
• Operation SYDNEY TWO – The cordon and search of Duc My village 
on 20 July 1966
• Operation HOLSWORTHY – The cordon and search of Binh Ba 
village on 9 August1966
• Operation YASS – The cordon and search of Phuoc Hoa village on 
7 November 1966
Map 1 [located in Acknowledgements section] illustrates the location of 
these villages in Phuoc Tuy Province.
Cordon and search of Duc My Village
The Village of Duc My is one of the Binh Ba estate villages situated on 
Route 2 about 3  miles north of the First Australian Task Force base 
of Nui Dat. These villages are
• Duc Trung – population approximately 700,
• Binh Ba – population approximately 1,800, and
• Duc My – population approximately 500.
Duc My is separated from Binh Ba to the north by 500 yards of clean 
rubber plantation. Before the operation it was known that 97 Viet Cong 
had relatives or friends in these Binh Ba villages and, of these, 26 visited 
Duc My occasionally. The attitude of the local population was pro-Viet 
Cong due to the absence of government control for several years.
Operation SYDNEY ONE, which required 5 RAR to clear the area to the 
west of Duc My, commenced on 4 July and continued until 14 July. For this 
operation, a base (code-named Tennis) was established about a mile south 
of the southern part of Duc My village. Tennis was occupied by battalion 
headquarters, one rifle company, the assault pioneer platoon, anti-tank 
platoon, the mortar platoon, less one section, 105 Field Battery and one 
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troop of 1 Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron. As a preliminary to 
the cordon and search of Duc My village, the establishment of the base at 
Tennis had the following advantages:
• It allowed 13 days (later increased to 16 days) for the Viet Cong and 
villagers in Duc My to become accustomed to the presence of the 
battalion so close to the village and lulled them into a false sense 
of security.
• It permitted easy air and ground reconnaissance of the village and 
approach routes without unduly arousing Viet Cong suspicions.
• It allowed the battalion to concentrate at Tennis immediately before 
commencement of the operation without affecting the operation’s 
security.
Duc My consisted of about 80 houses, widely scattered on the west side 
of Route 2. The villagers were mainly Montagnards and the majority were 
employed as rubber tappers on the Binh Ba estate. Banana plantations 
and mixed gardens located in and around the village made movement 
difficult at night. The perimeter of the village was poorly defined except 
on the north side where a broad track ran along the edge of the rubber 
plantation. Air reconnaissance indicated some bunkers in the village.
Forces Available. The following forces were available for the operation: 
5  RAR about 550 strong; the remainder were required to defend the 
battalion base area, or were in hospital, on leave, or attending language 
courses.
Under 5  RAR command were one troop of 1  Armoured Personnel 
Carrier Squadron with one of its mortar sections and elements of 3 Field 
Engineer troop. 105 Field Battery was allocated ‘In Direct Support’ and 
allocated ‘In Support’ were D Company of 6 RAR; two Sioux aircraft; 
four RAAF Iroquois; six Vietnamese policemen and some Vietnamese 
interpreters.
Considerations. Duc My village was scattered over an area of 600 metres 
from east to west and 1,200 metres from north to south. It was considered 
that each rifle company in the cordon could cover approximately 
450 metres, with two platoons forward in the cordon, each with all three 
sections forward, and men positioned in pairs at 22  metre intervals. 
A platoon would be held in depth some 75 to 100 metres in rear of the 
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forward two platoons of each company. Thus, if all four rifle companies 
were used, the complete village could not be cordoned. It was therefore 
decided to place the cordon as indicated in Map A.1. This plan had the 
disadvantage of excluding from the cordon a small number of scattered 
houses to the east and south but would permit most of the cordon to be 
along easily located tracks and tree lines.
The use of all rifle companies in the cordon required that:
• 105 Field Battery (Major P. Tedder) be returned to Nui Dat base area 
as troops would not be available to protect the gun area at Tennis.
• One of the rifle companies be relieved by armoured personnel carriers 
or other troops after the cordon had been closed to allow the rifle 
company to search the village and apprehend suspects.
• One of the rifle companies be held as battalion reserve while the 
cordon was moving into position. A Company (Major AP Cassidy), 
mounted on armoured personnel carriers was nominated for this task.
The next problem was to determine the time that the cordon would be 
in position. It was decided that the final movement of the companies 
into their cordon positions should be carried out immediately after first 
light. This would permit the movement to be carried out with the greatest 
possible speed and reduce the danger of companies clashing with each 
other as they closed the cordon. If the cordon companies commenced 
moving into their positions at 0545 hours, the time of first light, it was 
estimated that the cordon would be completed by 0615 hours. A move at 
first light into the final positions permitted the use of armoured personnel 
carriers, armed helicopters, Sioux helicopter and a Cessna light aircraft 
fitted with loud-speakers to advise the villagers to remain calm and stay 
in their houses etc. However, the operation taught that a cordon must 
be in position before first light for at that time the normal life in the 
villages commences with people moving out to begin tapping rubber 






































Map A.1: Operation Sydney Two: 
19–20 July 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 
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The next consideration was the choice of approach routes to the village. 
As the cordon was to be completed just after first light it was necessary 
for most of the movement to be at night. While this produced problems, 
it also increased the likelihood of achieving surprise for, at that time, the 
Viet Cong accepted that Allied troops did not move at night.
The main problems posed by the move were seen to be:
• The need for reconnaissance to confirm routes into assembly areas and 
into the final cordon positions. In some areas the eastern and southern 
cordons would pass between houses.
• Control at night when hand signals could not be used. This problem 
was partly overcome by using a toggle rope tied to equipment on the 
back of each soldier for the soldier following behind to hold. Radio was 
used to control and confirm the movement of companies. All radio 
users spoke in whispers and the use of radio was kept to a minimum.
• Control and deployment of the battalion if a major contact occurred 
while the companies were moving into position (when it would not be 
in the best posture to meet such a threat). The CO’s party (CO, BC, 
IO, batmen and operators) moved immediately behind the leading 
company. In addition, A company, mounted on armoured personnel 
carriers, was made the battalion reserve and in an emergency could have 
moved in the vehicles at night along Route 2 to support B Company. 
(Major B. McQualter) and D Company (Major P. Greenhalgh).
• Security. If the Viet Cong learnt of the intention to cordon and search 
the village, they would not only have left it, but might also have laid 
booby traps and ambushes on the probable approach routes.
The initial plan was to move all the companies, except the one which was 
to cordon the north side, into position via a re-entrant running into the 
village from the south-west as this route would have assisted in navigation 
and provided covered approach. The final company was to move by 
armoured personnel carrier along Route 2 and close the cordon on the 
north side at the last minute.
On the night 14–15  July, reconnaissance parties of company seconds-
in-command (Captains Bade, Milligan and Boxall) under command 
of Captain O’Neill and including company guides and representatives 
from the armoured personnel carrier troop checked the proposed routes 
to assembly areas and cordon positions. As a result, the proposed route 
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along the re-entrant was found to be unsuitable for the movement of large 
numbers of troops at night due to thick undergrowth and fallen dead 
timber which would have made silent movement Impossible.
Plan. From the reconnaissance it was decided to move C  Company 
(Major  N.  Granter) into its cordon position from the west. B and 
D Companies and the CO’s party would from the east and A Company 
with battalion headquarters (under Major M. Carroll), with the mortars 
and the anti-tank platoon on armoured personnel carriers would move 
from the south at the last possible moment. A  Company would also 
be battalion reserve unit the cordon was closed, when the armoured 
personnel carrier troop and anti-tank platoon would take over this role. 
Once A Company was in position, the armoured personnel carrier troop 
would relieve D Company of cordoning the north side of the village.
Two sections of mortars were to move in mortar armoured personnel 
carriers to an area between the village and Route  2 while the Assault 
Pioneer Platoon was to provide protection for Battalion Headquarters 
and construct enclosures for suspects and villagers awaiting interrogation.
On 15 July the operation was deferred when B and C Companies retuned 
to the 1  ATF base to participate in 6  RAR’s Operation BRISBANE. 
On the night of the 16–17 a further reconnaissance was carried out to 
confirm the proposed new routes. On the 19th B and C  Companies 
rejoined 5  RAR at Tennis and the Battalion moved that afternoon to 
cordon Duc My next morning.
Security. The following precautions were taken to ensure that the 
intention to cordon the village was not disclosed to the Viet Cong:
• No movement of ground forces north of Tennis towards the village 
was permitted except for the reconnaissance parties of 14–15 and 
16–17 July.
• 105 Field Battery was returned to Nui Dat from Tennis during the 
afternoon of 19  July inside armoured personnel carriers. While 
the battalion base was located at Tennis there had been frequent but 
irregular movement of personnel carriers to and from the base. The 
movement of 19 July should not therefore have caused undue concern 
to any Viet Cong who observed it as the guns were concealed within 
the armoured personnel carriers. Tyres from the Italian-made pack 
howitzers were placed onto the larger field guns used by 105  Field 
Battery on this operation to permit the guns to be carried inside 
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the APCs. It should be noted that the introduction of the twin .30 
calibre machine-gun turret has restricted the interior space of the 
APC and, as a result, it cannot transport the 105-mm field gun as an 
internal load.
• Air reconnaissance by all company and platoon commanders was 
permitted over the village up to 16  July. There was a risk that this 
would alert the Viet Cong despite each flight being allowed to pass 
over the village only once and then to fly westwards to the area where 
the battalion operated until 14 July. The deferment of the operation 
for three days assisted in reducing any suspicion aroused by the air 
reconnaissance.
• The Vietnamese police and interpreters who were to assist with the 
search of the village joined the battalion at Tennis during the afternoon 
of 19 July and were not briefed about their tasks until that time.
• A rear battalion assembly area was selected about 800 metres south of 
the cordon area. This allowed the battalion less C Company to move 
from Tennis late in the afternoon of 19  July and arrive in the rear 
battalion assembly area just at last light when the possibility of contact 
with woodcutters and other civilians in the area would be reduced. 
From the battalion assembly area, it was comparatively easy for B and 
D Companies to move after last light to their forward assembly areas 
as the going was through a clean rubber plantation. The rear battalion 
assembly area was considered sufficiently far from Duc My to allow the 
armoured personnel carrier troop to move into it just before last light, 
at low speed without being heard. Next morning, however, when the 
armoured personnel carriers started up at first light, the noise of their 
motors would be heard by the CO’s party 1,400 metres to the north-
east. However, at that time, speed was more important than quietness. 
The direction of movement of the vehicles could not be determined 
from their sound. C Company was allocated a forward assembly area 
about 800 metres to the west of the village. The company could occupy 
the area by last light on 19 July and the area and the routes into it were 
such that detection was most unlikely.
Execution. To assist the movement by night, all back-packs were moved 
in armoured personnel carriers, daylight rehearsals were held at Tennis and 
companies used toggle ropes to assist soldiers in following the man ahead.
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Everything went according to plan until about 0100 hours on 20  July 
when the leading soldier of D  Company, Private F.  Clark, fell 50  feet 
down a disused well. Fortunately, he was rescued unhurt within about 
15  minutes. At 0545  hours B  Company commenced to move into 
its cordon position.  Soon afterwards, 4  Platoon (Second Lieutenant 
J. Carruthers) met six Viet Cong moving towards them. One Viet Cong 
was killed, four were wounded (of whom three were captured) and one was 
captured unhurt; 4 Platoon was unscathed. The captured and wounded 
Viet Cong were handed over to the reserve platoon and B  Company 
closed its portion of the cordon on time.
A Company in armoured personnel carriers moved at full speed along 
Route  2 but experienced some difficulty in crossing the re-entrant to 
the south-west of the village and one of the armoured personnel carriers 
became bogged. Some troops then dismounted and ran into position.
The mortars and battalion headquarters (less the CO’s party who were 
with D Company) arrived on time.
The Battalion Second-in-Command (Major S. Maizey) flew overhead at 
0615 hours in a Sioux helicopter with two armed Iroquois helicopters and 
the Cessna loud-speaker aircraft.
Minor resistance was encountered in the village. At 0630  hours 
C Company, on the west side of the cordon, killed one Viet Cong trying 
to move through the cordon. At 0730 hours another Viet Cong who tried 
to break the cordon in C Company area was wounded and later he was 
flushed from a nearby bunker. About 1130 hours an armed Viet Cong, 
who had been hiding in thick undergrowth in the village, suddenly stood 
up and ran. He was killed by a soldier in the A Company cordon with 
one round.
These contacts emphasized the need for good fire discipline, the ability to 
recognize our own soldiers quickly, and observation of the following rules 
of engagement which were issued before the operation:
• Fire only
a. When fired at.
b. When a suspect is about to commit a hostile act.




• Don’t fire into the cordoned area unless the fire is controlled, and the 
target can be clearly seen.
• If fired on from a house:
a. Take cover.
b. Call an interpreter forward.
c. Have the interpreter advise the occupants by means of a loud hailer 
to surrender.
d. If this fails, call in the village chief and have him speak to the 
householder.
e. If the occupants still refuse to surrender, burn the house (this is 
the only circumstance under which houses will be burnt).
• If in doubt, don’t shoot.
D  Company, with engineers, seven interpreters, six policemen, the 
Battalion’s medical officer, the bandmaster, the stretcher-bearer sergeant 
and a medical team from 1 ATF commenced to clear the village about 
0630 hours. By this time the cordon was in place and the loud-speaker 
aircraft had advised the villagers that they were surrounded and to remain 
in their houses and obey directions. The village was divided into platoon 
areas tor the search. Half section groups cleared each house in turn, 
evacuating the males and directing sick villagers to company headquarters 
for medical treatment. The clearance of the village was completed about 
1400 hours.
The Assault Pioneer Platoon constructed three separate barbed wire 
enclosures at Battalion Headquarters. Two of the enclosures were provided 
with screened toilet facilities and the third had a screened interrogation 
area. The Battalion’s Regimental Police and Intelligence Section guarded 
the cages. All males of Viet Cong military age (12 to 45  years) were 
evacuated by the clearing company to the north end of the village where 
the anti-tank platoon and a section of armoured personnel carriers 
evacuated them to the enclosures.
The Intelligence Officer (Captain D.  Willcox), assisted by Vietnamese 
interpreters, interrogated the men, and suspects were evacuated to the 




The battalion withdrew from the village area late in the afternoon and 
four ambushes were laid around the village that night, but no further 
contacts occurred.
Lessons. As this was the first cordon of a village undertaken by troops of 
the 1st Australian Task Force in South Vietnam, a great number of lessons 
were learnt:
• The success of such an operation depends on meticulous preparation 
at all levels, sound security and good reconnaissance. As a guide, it 
is considered that seven clear days are required to plan, prepare and 
execute a cordon and search of a village.
• The cordon must be in position before first light as this is the time that 
the Viet Cong leave the villages and rubber tappers commence work. 
All later cordons undertaken by 5 RAR were in position at least one 
hour before first light; all were successful, and no enemy contacts were 
made while the cordon was moving into position. The time for the 
completion of the cordon must also be varied. In December 1966 it 
was learnt that the Viet Cong at Quang Giao, east of Binh Gia, were 
leaving their village each morning an hour before first light as they 
believed the battalion cordons were always completed at that time.
• A more efficient interrogation system was required. In all later cordons 
Vietnamese interrogation teams were provided and had marked success 
in locating Viet Cong cadre and sympathizers in the villages.
• Medical, dental and civil aid teams must be available to give 
assistance to the villagers once the initial search bas been completed. 
Arrangements  were improved with each cordon and the final 
organization is described below.
• Food, water, shelter and latrines must be provided for villagers awaiting 
interrogation.
• Barbed wire should not be used for compounds as this creates the 
wrong atmosphere.
• In later cordons, white tape was used, sentries were kept as inconspicuous 
as possible and, to assist in creating a friendly atmosphere, the Battalion 
Band played popular Vietnamese and other music.
• Twelve Vietnamese police for each rifle company used to clear the 
village are required and should be used to give orders to the villagers 
and to move them about. The use of Vietnamese police provides 
evidence to the villagers  that their government is actively engaged 
in clearing the Viet Cong from their village.
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Organization for Interrogation, Distribution of Civil Aid etc. 
The  diagram below illustrates the layout used by 5  RAR in the final 
cordons in 1967. The whole layout could be established by a platoon in 
about an hour, by which time the first suspects would be arriving from 
their houses. The main features to be accommodated were:
• The battalion command post should be established a little distance 
from the interrogation area.
• Where sick people and children are encountered and cannot be moved 
from their houses, battalion headquarters should arrange medical 
treatment and interrogation in the houses. Civil aid personnel should 
also visit such houses and assist if possible.
• Children should accompany their mothers to the interrogation area.
• Villagers must be allowed time to have breakfast before moving to the 
interrogation area.
• When all the people are in the holding area and before interrogation 
begins, have a Vietnamese senior official explain to the people why 
they are being interrogated and the procedure to be followed. The use 
of Hoi Chanh to move among the villagers and talk to them has also 
assisted.
Results. The cordon and search of the village of Duc My resulted in the 
elimination of the Viet Cong cadre from the village, paved the way for the 
restoration of Government control and permitted the commencement of 




























































































































































Figure A.1: 5 RAR Interrogation Compound.
Source: Redrawn from the original and produced by Ron Boxall.
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Cordon and search of Binh Ba Village
The Government’s influence in Binh Ba had been eroded gradually since 
1961 and its forces were compelled to leave the village in 1964. From then 
on, the village had been controlled by the Viet Cong. It was estimated 
that perhaps 20 per cent of the population (particularly the younger men) 
were actively supporting or were sympathetic towards the hard-core Viet 
Cong cadre within the village.
It was accepted that most of the village would have collaborated with 
the Viet Cong and that many had become members of the civil or 
political organizations or of the military elements. As a matter of personal 
survival, the villagers would have had little choice but to pay their taxes 
and provide food and labour. In 1965 one of the village leaders who 
refused to co-operate with the Viet Cong was taken from his bed late 
one night and killed on the village soccer field. Several others who had 
resisted conscription disappeared without trace. It was considered that the 
political allegiance of most villagers probably was more related to military 
strength than to ideology.
The enemy force in the area was believed to consist of:
• Main Force. 5 Division comprising 274 and 275 Regiments. It was 
considered unlikely that Main Force units would be uncounted initially 
in strength in or near Binh Ba during the cordon and search phase of 
the operation. Small reconnaissance elements might be encountered at 
any time. It was possible that during the pacification stage, the Main 
Force units (in conjunction with the Provincial, District and Guerrilla 
Forces) could quickly launch a major attack unless a sizeable force 
actively patrolled the area surrounding Binh Ba.
• Provincial Force. It was believed that the Viet Cong Provincial 
Headquarters was based in an area a few miles south-east of Binh Ba. 
The Provincial Mobile Battalion (D445) was considered unlikely to be 
encountered in strength in or near Binh Ba in the cordon and search 
phase of the operation. It was believed possible that small reconnaissance 
elements could be encountered at any time. The  50th  Platoon was 
known to consist of three squads each of eight to 10 men and to 
be in the area and directly subordinate to the Viet Cong Provincial 
Headquarters. The platoon was armed with Soviet 7.62-mm M1944 
rifles, US .30 calibre carbines, possibly three Thompson Sub-machine-
guns and M26 grenades. The area of responsibility of the platoon was 
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the forest area on each side of the Inter-Provincial Route 2 near Binh 
Ba and was about 6 square kilometres in extent.
• District Forces. It was considered unlikely that the Duc Thanh 
District (C20) Company would be encountered in strength; however, 
if the cordon force achieved surprise, it could encounter elements of 
the Binh Ba Village Guerrilla Platoon within the village. This platoon 
consisted of three squads each of twelve men and was armed with 10 
Soviet 7.62-mm M1944 rifles, eight US .30 M1 carbines, two German 
rifles (possibly Mauser 7.92 mm) and four M26 grenades. The task of 
the platoon was to exercise military control over Binh Ba village.
The intelligence available was far more detailed than that provided in 
July for the cordon of Duc My village. The additional information was 
obtained from Viet Cong prisoners and documents taken at Duc My 
and other Viet Cong captured during Operation Sydney, together with 
information from other sources.
Apart from the cultivation of minor fruit and vegetable crops, the 
major source of income for the Binh Ba villagers was the Gallia Rubber 
Plantation which surrounds the village. The plantation was under French 
ownership and management. To keep the plantation operating the French 
owner had agreed to pay tax to the Viet Cong.
The clearance of the Viet Cong cadres from Binh Ba and Duc Trung and 
the subsequent pacification of the villages were aimed at:
• Permitting the Province Chief to re-establish government control in 
the village and, as a result, depriving the Viet Cong of tax, food and 
intelligence. The Viet Cong in the village had been taxing the villagers 
one day’s pay and two litres of rice per month.
• Opening the road from Binh Ba to the Catholic (and therefore 
anti-communist) village of Binh Gia to the north-east to permit the 
people of Binh Gia to have access to the Ba Ria market. Binh Gia had 
a  population of some 6,000 and the Viet Cong had not permitted 
them to use Route 2.
• Allowing a large quantity of rubber stored in the processing plant 
at Duc Trung to be moved to Saigon via Ba Ria.
Late in July ’66, 5 RAR was ordered to carry out a simultaneous cordon 
and search of the adjacent villages of Binh Ba and Duc Trung, to make 
a second search of the village of Duc My and later to open and secure 
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the road from Binh Ba to 1 Australian Task Force base. There was also 
a requirement to secure the village area to allow a Vietnamese commando 
company to be established on the village outskirts. This was to be 
Operation HOLSWORTHY.
Forces Available. The following forces were allotted to assist 5 RAR in 
the cordon and search: 2  Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron, less 
one troop; 105 Field Battery; 161 Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery; 
A  Battery 2/35  Artillery (USA) equipped with 155-mm self-propelled 
guns; one troop from 1 Field Engineer Squadron; C and D Companies 
of 6 RAR; one section of 1 Transport Platoon; one Sioux helicopter of 
161 (Independent) Recce Flight; one Iroquois helicopter of 9 Squadron 
RAAF; a Light Fire Team (two USA armed Iroquois helicopters); a Cessna 
aircraft equipped with loud-speaker; a Psychological Warfare detachment; 
a Forward Air Controller Detachment; interpreters from 1  Australian 
Task Force Linguist Section; six Vietnamese policemen; and an additional 
Medical Officer (for civil aid assistance). In addition, elements of 
3 Special Air Services Squadron were to operate well to the north-west 
and north-east of the villages to give early warning of large-scale Viet 
Cong movements.
Considerations. Duc Trung village was about 800 by 850 metres and 
surrounded by a high wire fence with a deep ditch outside the fence. 
Its total length of 1,300 metres could be cordoned in the clean rubber 
plantation by two rifle companies. Binh Ba was approximately 600 metres 
by 300 metres with well-defined sides. This would require a company on 
each of the larger sides and approximately two platoons on each of the 
shorter sides to complete the cordon. It was therefore decided to cordon 
each village as follows:
• Duc Trung: D  Company 5  RAR (Major P.  Greenhalgh) and D 
Company 6 RAR. (Captain I. McLean-Williams)
• Binh Ba: A  Company (Major Maizey) less one platoon to cordon 
the west side. B Company (Major B. McQualter) to cordon the east 
side. (After first light two sections of 1 Armoured Personnel Carrier 
Squadron were to relieve B Company of the cordon task and allow the 
company to search the village.) C Company 5 RAR (Major J. Miller) 
to cordon the north side of the village. C Company 6 RAR (Major 
B. McFarlane) to cordon the south side of the village.
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The rubber plantation was worked daily and therefore the cordon force 
could approach only to the edge of the plantation by daylight. Thus, the 
final approach had to be under cover of darkness. An approach from 
the  east would have required the force to move through thick country 
outside the plantation. This was often frequented by woodcutters and 
to conceal the 900-man force would have been difficult. An approach 
from the south was not possible due to the location of Duc My village. 
Consequently, an approach from the west appeared to be the best and 
offered the following advantages:
a. A covered approach to the south-west corner of the plantation through 
an area regularly patrolled by our forces and in which no civilians 
were allowed.
b. The edge of the rubber plantation and the air strip could be used to 
assist night navigation, particularly since the air strip led directly to 
both villages.
The western approach was therefore selected for the cordon force, 
less B Company, which was to cordon the east side of Binh Ba village. 
B  Company was given the eastern approach to reduce the number of 
companies on the western route, to give flank protection to the main 
force, to cut off any Viet Cong who may have received warning of the 
approach of the cordon and fled to the east and to enable the cordon to be 
placed around Binh Ba as quickly as possible early on 9 August.
It was considered that one rifle company on the east route could move 
into position undetected and, if it was seen by Viet Cong trail watchers, 
its size would not indicate its cordon task.




























































Map A.2: Operation Holsworthy: 
7–8 August 1966. 
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 







Terminology:  Appendix E
Symbols:        Appendix F
The cordon was to be in place by 0530 hours which was one hour before 
first light. In addition to the cordons by the six rifle companies, ambushes 
were sited on the likely exits towards Duc My village and north of Duc 
Trung to stop any Viet Cong who tried to escape. These ambushes were 
to be in position before the cordon was closed and would be able to give 
protection and early warning to the cordon companies of the presence of 
any Viet Cong forces. Four ambushes each equipped with radios were to 
be established by the A Company platoon not included in the cordon and 
by the Anti-Tank Platoon.
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The village of Duc Trung was to be searched by the platoon of A Company 
after it lifted its ambushes near Duc My on the morning of 9 August. This 
platoon was to be assisted by engineers of 1  Field Engineer Squadron 
during the ambushes and search of the village.
It was estimated that the search of the village of Duc Trung would be 
completed by midday, as both the area and the population were small. 
The greater part of Duc Trung was covered by the rubber processing 
plants. As soon as the search of Duc Trung was completed, and all males 
of Viet Cong military age had been evacuated, D Company 5 RAR was to 
move to Duc My village and search it while D Company 6 RAR moved 
to an area south-west of Binh Ba village to secure a gun area for use by 
105 Field Battery and A Battery of the 2/35 Artillery (US). Armoured 
personnel carriers were to block off possible escape routes from Duc My 
while D Company 5 RAR searched the village.
The Assault Pioneer Platoon was to provide protection for Battalion 
Headquarters during the approach march and in cordon, and was then 
to construct, enclosures in the Battalion Headquarters area and secure 
suspects until they were evacuated by road transport to Ba Ria for 
interrogation. The vehicles were to be escorted by armoured personnel 
carriers. All males of ages between 12 and 45  years were to be taken 
for interrogation. In all later cordons, women 15 to 35 years were also 
screened, and some female Viet Cong cadre members were apprehended. 
On this occasion it was considered undesirable to take both the women 
and the men from the village as it may not have been possible to return 
them to their homes for a day or two in which case their young children 
would have been neglected.
A light aircraft equipped with loudspeakers was to be over the villages at 
0615 hours using prepared tapes to inform the villagers that they were 
surrounded, that a house curfew had been imposed and that they were 
to obey directions. Leaflets were also prepared by the 1 Australian Task 
Force to be distributed during the search of the village and the ensuing 
civic action.
The mortar platoon, less one section, was to come forward in mortar 
armoured personnel carriers at first light on 9 August. Armoured personnel 
carriers were also to take over the cordon from B Company, block Route 2 
north of Duc Trung and provide a reserve from shortly after first light on 
9 August. The Battalion Headquarters Group under Major M. Carroll, 
together with the CO’s party, moved in rear of D Company 6 RAR.
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Execution. On 5  August, C  Company established a base some 
1,000 metres due south of the south-west corner of the airfield and on 
the night 5–6 August reconnaissance parties from all companies except 
B Company operated from the base to check routes and timings. During 
this reconnaissance it was discovered that the proposed battalion assembly 
area for the evening prior to the cordon would be unsatisfactory and it 
was therefore decided to move the cordon force into the rubber plantation 
just at last light.
C  Company and the reconnaissance groups returned to 5  RAR on 
6 August and orders were issued the following morning. On the 8th at 
0800 hours, the Adjutant, Captain P. Isaacs, who had the task of laying 
out the battalion assembly area together with company guides, departed 
from Nui Dat and the remainder of the battalion group departed at 
0930 hours. The battalion group, less B Company, were in the selected 
area by 1700 hours and just at last light moved into the rubber plantation. 
The companies were then laid out ready to move later that night.
Toggle ropes were to be used to assist movement in the dark by troops 
tying the toggle rope of the soldier ahead of them to a piece of their 
equipment which they placed on the ground while resting. The leading 
company (D  Company 5  RAR) was scheduled to depart from the 
assembly area at 2300  hours. Troops were alerted in time and minor 
movement, including closing-up, occurred in preparation to move off, 
with the result that, in some instances, equipment attached to toggle 
ropes of the man ahead suddenly took off between the rubber trees in the 
dark, much to the consternation of the owners. In this way the Forward 
Air Controller lost his radio and one officer lost a bag containing maps 
and papers. (These were recovered in the assembly area next day.) As a 
result, the move commenced 15 minutes later than planned but, because 
of the bright moonlight, the easy going through the plantation along 
the side of the airstrip and the time reserve which had been allowed, all 
companies and ambush parties arrived in their allotted areas on time. No 
contact was made with any Viet Cong forces. At 0615 hours the voice 
aircraft arrived over Binh Ba and 45 minutes later the armoured personnel 
carriers relieved B Company of its cordon task. At 0730 hours the search 
of Binh Ba and Duc Trung began. By the end of that day the searches of 
the villages of Duc Trung and Duc My were completed and the search of 
Binh Ba and evacuation of males was completed by midday on 10 August.
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Pacification. The pacification programme which followed over a period 
of months was just as important and significant as the operation on 
9 August. Unlike the operation at Duc My village in July, the battalion 
did not leave the area immediately after the search of the villages but 
remained until 16 August patrolling and Searching the plantation area 
and approaches. On 11 August the road to Ba Ria was opened for the first 
time in more than three months and picqueted to prevent interference 
from the Viet Cong. The opening of the road had a remarkable effect on 
the morale of the people. In the first two days, 1,500 people travelling 
on Lambretta taxis, ox carts, bicycles, tractors and army transport moved 
south to Ba Ria.
During the period 9 August to 16 August, effective contact was made with 
the villagers in the following ways:
• Companies organized football matches with the villagers, particularly 
with the Children.
• Medical and dental teams from l  ATF gave regular treatment. 
The  French  doctor from the head office of the plantation 
recommenced regular weekly visits by aircraft to the plantation.
• Civil affairs section of l ATF distributed food and clothing.
• 5 RAR’s Roman Catholic padre (Chaplain John Williams) conducted 
services with the village priest in the village church and some soldiers 
attended services with the villagers on a voluntary basis.
• Above all, the soldiers were courteous to the villagers, respectful to 
the women and elderly folk and did their best to treat the Vietnamese 
as equals.
1  Australian Task Force arranged for a newly raised Vietnamese 
Commando Company (with Captain R. Boxall of 5 RAR as adviser) to 
be moved to Binh Ba to give security to the village after the withdrawal of 
our forces. To support this Vietnamese company, C Company and later 
other companies from the Battalion, together with a section of mortars, 
remained at Binh Ba for the next two months.
Lessons. The lessons learnt during the cordon of Duc My were applied, 
but other lessons emerged:
• Ample time must be allowed in a night move to ensure that all soldiers 
are awake and have checked their equipment before moving.
• The need for Australian interpreters was vital.
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• All tinned food issued to villagers must first be opened to prevent it 
being stored and later given to the Viet Cong. It is better to deliver 
gifts of food to each house to ensure an equal distribution or give the 
food to the village chief (if reliable) or the village priest to distribute.
• Never throw food or gifts to crowds of children or adults. The resultant 
scramble or fight among themselves for the items on the ground 
destroys their self respect.
• Do not give food to children as their parents generally disagree with 
such action. It destroys parental discipline and makes beggars of the 
children.
Results. A total of 168 males of military age were apprehended and 
interrogated and of these, 17 Viet Cong were captured, and 77 suspects 
detained. Thus, without a shot being fired, the Binh Ba village guerrilla 
platoon and the Viet Cong cadre in the village was eliminated. There is 
little doubt that to have killed or captured these Viet Cong in ambushes 
and search and destroy operations would have required several months of 
constant patrolling and would probably have resulted in casualties to us. 
The cadre members employed in the villages could not have been captured 
by any other means.
The psychological effect on the villagers of the operation was tremendous 
for they saw the Viet Cong taken from the village, the re-establishment of 
government control and a return to a more normal life.
The road from Binh Ba to Ba Ria has not been closed since the operation 
and the Viet Cong have not attempted to interfere with its traffic.
Reports late in 1966 indicated that some Viet Cong had infiltrated back 
into the village so, early in January 1967, 5 RAR again cordoned and 
searched Binh Ba village during Operation CALOUNDRA and 9 Viet 
Cong were apprehended.
Cordon and search of Phuoc Hoa Village
The area of flat ground to the west and south-west of Phuoc Tuy was 
of considerable importance to the Viet Cong. This region linked the sea 
transport routes of the Rung Sat, a marshy low-lying area to the west, with 
a system of foot and cart tracks which ran through to the Hat Dich area, 




Viet Cong activity was concentrated in the area between the villages of 
Phu My, Phuoc Hoa and Long Huong and Long Son Island. The island 
was situated near the junction of several sea routes leading into landing 
points and was ideally situated for use as a refuge and a rest centre. The 
main routes for water-borne traffic were the rivers which fanned out on the 
northern side of Long Son Island. The most direct route for the Viet Cong 
into Phuoc Tuy Province was through the fishing village of Phuoc Hoa. 
This village was also the one best served by land and sea routes and simple 
harbour facilities. It was therefore the scene of the most significant Viet 
Cong activity which passed through into western Phuoc Tuy Province.
The western strip of the Province was also of interest to the Viet Cong 
because of Route  15, the main road between the major port of Vung 
Tau, the provincial capital, Ba Ria, and Saigon. The Viet Cong had made 
attacks in the area to dominate their supply routes by crushing villagers 
who resisted them and by exploiting people who were sympathetic.
Along Route  15 were located a few military posts garrisoned by the 
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). These were largely ineffective 
because,  at that time, the troops did not patrol sufficiently or ambush 
at night. In addition, the Viet Cong intelligence net invariably obtained 
details of any activities initiated from these posts. The Viet Cong, however, 
had a regular patrol system which covered the whole area at night, usually 
with platoon strength patrols although company-sized patrols had 
been reported.
The Viet Cong also used the area for gaining intelligence concerning 
Allied movements by observing road movement along Route  15, air 
movements to and from Vung Tau airfield and shipping arriving at Vung 
Tau or moving along the river to Saigon.
There was much civilian activity in the area; woodcutters moved far inland 
with ox carts and fishermen covered the waterways. Theoretically, night 
movement was forbidden but this was rarely policed along Route 15 and 
never policed on the water. Many fishermen worked at night and it was 
impossible to tell a Viet Cong sampan from an innocent one. Because 
of the impracticalities of enforcing the night curfew, the area was not 
a free-fire zone and fire could not be opened unless direct physical contact 
occurred with the Viet Cong. This situation was of tremendous assistance 
to the Viet Cong.
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In September 1966 Brigadier O. D. Jackson, the Commander, 1 Australian 
Task Force, indicated that 5 RAR would be required to clear Long Son 
Island, later in the year. In October 5  RAR conducted Operations 
CANBERRA, ROBIN and QUEANBEYAN in the area along Route 15 
and in the Nui Thi Vai hills nearby; and, as a result, came to know the 
whole area quite well. During Operation ROBIN, A Company (Major 
P.  Cole) established a company base 800  metres east of Phuoc Hoa 
village and a study was made of the village layout in case it might be 
required later. Documents captured during Operation QUEANBEYAN, 
together with information from other sources, confirmed that Phuoc 
Hoa village, despite having an ARVN Popular Force Company located 
in it, was the centre of Viet Cong activity in the area. 1 Australian Task 
Force therefore directed that 5 RAR would cordon and search Phuoc Hoa 
village (Operation YASS) immediately before it carried out the operation 
to clear Long Son Island (Operation HAYMAN). Some troops could then 
be located in Phuoc Hoa village to block any movement of Viet Cong 
from Long Son Island to the village during Operation HAYMAN.
The main Viet Cong unit known to be in the area was the C20 guerrilla 
company which had three platoons, each of three squads with a total 
strength of 110  men. They were armed with 1  medium machine-
gun, 4  light machine-guns, 19  sub-machine-guns, 2  revolvers and the 
remainder of the company carried US .30 calibre carbines or AK44 long 
rifles. The members of the company were drawn from Long Son Island, 
Phuoc Hoa and Long Huong villages. The morale of the company was fair.
It was considered probable that some water transportation (sampan) 
members would be at Phuoc Hoa overnight. It was also feasible that 
a medium sized Viet Cong force could be staging through the area at the 
time of the operation. It was thought that once the operation commenced 
the C20 company might harass the Battalion by sniping and setting 
booby traps. Other Viet Cong in Phuoc Hoa would probably try to flee 
by sampan into the mangroves or by the track to the north-east.
Phuoc Hoa had a population of about 700 adults who were engaged 
mainly in woodcutting or fishing. Many sampans used the small boat 
harbour and several families lived on these sampans permanently. 
The village area was well defined with Route 15 on the north-east side, and 
a high embankment and ditch on the other sides; in addition, mangroves 
bordered the village on the south-west side.
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Forces Available. Additional forces were allotted to assist 5  RAR 
in the operation. These comprised: 1  Armoured Personnel Carrier 
Squadron, less  a  troop; 103  Field Battery, one platoon of A  Battery 
2/35 Artillery Battalion (USA); one troop of 1 Field Engineer Squadron 
(30 all ranks); C  Company 6  RAR; elements of 3  Special Air Service 
Squadron; 30  Vietnamese policemen; six interpreters; one light 
fire team (two  armed  Iroquois helicopters); one Sioux helicopter of 
161  (Independent) Reconnaissance Flight; and one Cessna aircraft 
equipped with loud speaker.
Considerations. The sides of the village were between 550 and 650 metres 
long. One company would therefore be allocated to cordon each side, 
and C  Company 6  RAR (Major B.  McFarlane) would secure the gun 
area. A detailed ground reconnaissance of the village immediately prior to 
the operation was not possible, but it was believed that booby traps and 
mines were probably laid along the ditch on the outskirts of the village. 
It was therefore decided that the cordon companies on the north-west side 
(B  Company, Major B.  McQualter) and south-east side (D  Company, 
Captain R.  Boxall) would not approach closer to the ditches than 
20 metres.
The village was beyond the range of field artillery at the 1 ATF base and 
so the supporting artillery had to be moved to a suitable location nearby. 
This would make it impossible to hide the fact that an operation was to be 
undertaken in the general area. It was therefore decided to move the force 
via Route 15 in armoured personnel carriers and trucks. If the cordon was 
to be in position about an hour before first light, the force would have to 
be moved to an area east of Route 15 where it could be concealed by day 
and able to establish the cordon by night. A, B and D Companies and the 
Battalion Headquarters group would therefore dismount from vehicles in 
the general area of Phuoc Hoa village and move on foot to harbour areas 
about 1,000 metres east of Route 15.
C Company (Major J. Miller) was to cordon the south-west side of the 
village adjacent to the mangroves. Air reconnaissance indicated that even 
at low tide it would be impossible to move this company in the dark 
through the mangroves quickly enough to ensure that the cordon was 
closed before any Viet Cong in the village had an opportunity to escape 
by sampan into the mangroves.
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It was therefore decided to use the armoured personnel carriers to move 
C  Company through the village from Route  15 to the boat harbour 
area at maximum speed when the other sides of the cordon were in 
position and to establish the cordon along the top of the embankment 
while simultaneously securing the boat harbour area to prevent sampans 
escaping.
It was also considered that two assault boats would be required in the 
Rach Tre river channel to the west of the village to ensure that there was no 
movement from the village in sampans. 3 Special Air Services Squadron 
was given the task of providing the assault craft, crews and radios for this 
task. Consideration was given to moving the boats into position along 
the Rach Tre channel to the west of the village, but this was ruled out 
due to difficulty of navigation at night in the mangrove waterways and 
the possible loss of surprise. C Company with the assault boats was to 
harbour some 1500 metres north of Phuoc Hoa and off Route 15 where 
there was reasonable cover. The outline plan for the movement of the 
cordon force and detailed cordon positions are shown in Map A.3.
Security and Deception. 103 Field Battery and the platoon of A Battery 
2/35  Artillery were required to support both Operation YASS and 
Operation HAYMAN, including the air assault onto Long Son Island, at 
first light the day after Operation YASS. It was therefore desirable that the 
selected gun area meet the requirements of both operations. The general 
area was flat and muddy and there were only a few likely sites. The gun 
area selected by 1 Australian Task Force was on the west side of Route 15 
about 500 metres south of Phuoc Hoa. As the gun area was to be occupied 
on November 6, the day preceding the cordon, a cover plan was necessary 
to convince the Viet Cong that the activity in the area was not related to 
Phuoc Hoa village or Long Son Island. The proximity of the gun area to 
the village should have convinced most Viet Cong that the guns were not 




































































































































































































Map A.3: Operation Yass: 6–7 
November 1966.
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced 
by Alan Mayne from circa 1966 US military 
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A cover plan was issued by 1 Australian Task Force one week before the 
operation and the actual details of both Operation YASS and Operation 
HAYMAN were restricted so that in the Battalion only four officers 
(Commanding Officer, Second-in-Command, Operations Officer 
and Intelligence Officer) were informed. The cover plan gave the exact 
details of Operation YASS as they were to occur, including times, dates 
and method of movement up to the stage where the troops debussed on 
Route 15 and moved east. Here the cover plan varied from the true plan 
and indicated that the battalion would continue to move east to the Nui 
Dinh hills to carry out a clearing operation. The cover plan was given 
a wide distribution.
In addition, two ‘teams’ (Second Lieutenants J.  McAloney and 
J.  Carruthers, and W02 B. M.  Hughson and Sergeant T.  Witheridge) 
were provided with money and sent on two occasions to Vung Tau to 
spend the evenings in the bars talking about the ‘forthcoming’ operation 
in the Nui Dinh hills.
The four members knew only the details of the cover plan and no members 
other than the four officers mentioned above knew of the tasks of the 
teams in Vung Tau. During their ‘tour of duty’ in Vung Tau, the NCO 
team had their conversation recorded on tape by a Vietnamese barman 
in one establishment, were questioned at length about the operation by 
Vietnamese girls in another bar and on another occasion were followed 
from a bar for some distance by a Vietnamese civilian. The four concerned 
all agreed that it was the most enjoyable task ever given to them.
An ARVN Popular Force company located In Phuoc Hoa village raised 
the problems of either moving the company or risking a clash with it 
while the cordon was being placed in position.
As C Company was required to move through the middle of the village 
to establish the south-west side of the cordon, contact with the Popular 
Force company was inevitable and it was necessary therefore to move the 
company without arousing the suspicions of the villagers. The Province 
Chief, who was the only Vietnamese to know of the operation, agreed to 
direct the Popular Force Company to move to an adjacent ARVN post 
on 6 November for training purposes and to remain there for the night. 
Apparently, it was not uncommon to move these companies to other 
ARVN posts for training.
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It was essential that the two assault boats to be used by the Special Air 
Services soldiers should be hidden from view and so the boats were moved 
inside 2 ½ ton vehicles with their cargo canopies closed.
On 6 November, the initial movement was carried out according to the 
cover plan and the troops left the vehicles near Phuoc Hoa and moved 
about 1,000 metres east as shown in Map A.3.
An hour after this eastward movement commenced, 103  Field Battery 
fired artillery missions to the east on the Nui Dinh Hills where the falling 
rounds were clearly visible for many miles and a Sioux helicopter made 
flights over the same area to convince any Viet Cong observers that the 
battalion was moving towards and intended to operate in the Hills.
The Vietnamese policemen and interpreters allocated to assist in the 
clearance of the village were not informed of their tasks by the Province 
Headquarters until early on the morning of 7 November.
Execution. On 6 November (the day preceding the cordon) everything 
went according to plan until 1530 hours when B Company, while moving 
into its harbour area, met 35 civilians from Phuoc Hoa. B Company sent 
the villagers back to their village and continued moving east, harbouring 
a little further east than had been planned.
When C Company, in armoured personnel carriers, passed the entrance 
to Phuoc Hoa village they noticed a large moveable barbed wire barricade 
with M26 grenades hung on it at the village entrance. It seemed possible 
that the barricade might be placed across the entrance each night and as 
this would have delayed movement of the APCs by the minute or two 
needed to enable Viet Cong in the village to escape into the mangroves, 
the company commander Major Miller, returned to the village later that 
afternoon on the pretext of arranging for a medical team to visit the village 
next morning. During his visit, Major Miller leant that the barricade was 
not placed across the entrance each night.
By 0400  hours next morning, all companies of the cordon except 
C Company were in position. The curfew along Route 15 was supposed 
to be enforced until 0530  hours daily, but at 0430  hours the civilian 
traffic began to move. A little later A Company observed movement in the 
village. So, at 0500 hours, 30 minutes earlier than planned, C Company 
was ordered to move. The APCs carrying C Company and escorting the 
two trucks carrying the assault boats came down Route 15 at maximum 
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speed, with headlights on, and turned in straight through the middle 
of the village. Within minutes the SAS assault boats had been launched 
into the boat harbour and the cordon completed. 103 Field Battery fired 
illumination rounds over the western end of the village and APCs with 
spotlights on each turret lit up the boat harbour and mangroves so that 
any movement by Viet Cong would have been easily detected. Some APCs 
were then moved back to Route 15, where all traffic had been stopped, 
and their headlights and spotlights were used to light up the ditches on 
the north-west and south-east sides of the village.
The voice aircraft; which was not due to fly until first light (0630 hours), 
did not arrive at all, because of mechanical failure. Interpreters, with loud 
hailers and mounted on armoured personnel carriers, were then used to 
advise the villagers of the procedures to be followed.
At 0800 the first of the villagers departed by truck and APCs for 
interrogation in Ba Ria and by midday the last of the 700 villagers to be 
screened (men 12 to 45 years and women 15 to 35 years) had departed. 
Fifteen members of the Popular Force company who had remained in the 
village were also apprehended.
Results. 16 Viet Cong were captured in the cordon, again without loss to 
the battalion. One of the captured Viet Cong was a cadre leader who had 
been sought for many months by the Vietnamese Government authorities. 
These results would indicate that the cover plan and deception activities 
were successful.
The Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon (Second Lieutenant M.  Deak), 
formerly the Anti-Tank Platoon which had been retrained for 
a reconnaissance role remained in Phuoc Hoa village until 12 November 
to prevent Viet Cong using the village as an escape route from Long Son 
Island. In this period a sound, friendly relationship was established with 





In the seven-month period, July 1966 to February l967, 5 RAR carried 
out nine village cordon and search operations. These resulted in 14 Viet 
Cong killed, 5  wounded, 224 prisoners and detainees for the loss of 
4 men killed and 5 wounded. Except for one, all casualties suffered by the 
Battalion were caused by one booby trap.
When 1 Australian Task Force commenced operations in Phuoc Tuy in 
May 1966, the Viet Cong controlled the entire province except for the 
capital Ba Ria, which was expected to fall to the Viet Cong at any time. 
1  ATF operations in 1966–67 resulted in a majority of people in the 
province being brought under effective government control.
The speed with which the Viet Cong cadres can be eliminated by cordon 
and searches must be adjusted to the capacity of the government forces to 
secure the villages against the return of the enemy. Once village security is 
established certain restrictions is necessary. A detailed census of all people 
in each village is required. Daily road-checks are essential to ensure that 
the Viet Cong are unable to move as civilians on the roads and use public 
transport. Food control needs to be established so that all rice is collected, 
accounted for and secured centrally in each village, and issued weekly to 
villagers in accordance with the number of people in each family. Daily 
checks are required by the police in the village to ensure that villagers take 
with them only enough cooked rice (which cannot be stored) for their 
midday meal. In this way the villagers will be protected against Viet Cong 
demands for food. Where farmers live outside a village and cannot be 
protected, a resettlement programme needs to be initiated before cordon 
operations are undertaken. A poor resettlement program can quickly 
nullify all other efforts.
Cordon and search operations and follow-up pacification programmes are 
the only effective means of re-establishing effective village control and 
such operations are an essential preliminary to the defeat of the Viet Cong 
main force.
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APPENDIX D. THE ENEMY: 
UNCONTESTED TENANCY 
PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL 
OF 1 ATF
Ernest Chamberlain
The Saigon government’s Phuoc Tuy Province was about 55 kilometres 
from east to west and about 35 kilometres from north to south (an area 
of some 1,958 square kilometres – 2.86 per cent of the size of Tasmania). 
The province capital, Phuoc Le/Ba Ria Town, was about 110 kilometres 
by road south-east of Saigon via Route 15 (nowadays Route 51). In mid-
1966, the official population of the province was about 105,000, including 
Ba Ria Town’s population of about 10,000. Vung Tau (Cap St Jacques), 
22 kilometres south-west of Ba Ria Town, had a further population of 
42,000. Phuoc Tuy comprised six districts (early 1966 populations shown 
in brackets): Long Le (31,800), Long Dien (24,500), Dat Do (24,700), 
Duc Thanh (12,650) and Xuyen Moc (6,260). There were 29 villages and 
129 hamlets in the province.
As the deep-draft river port at Saigon – the only one in the III Corps 
Tactical Zone – had a limited capacity, Route  15 was an important 
strategic route linking Saigon and Bien Hoa with the limited berthing 
facilities at Vung Tau port. The Route had been completed in 1896 
during the French colonial period.1
1  A second, different ‘Route 15’ in southern North Vietnam was a major infiltration route from 
Vinh to the Mu Gia Pass (the principal entry point to the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos). During 
the war, US and South Vietnamese forces also conducted operations along Route 15 in the Kampong 
Cham area of Cambodia.
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An early 1966 US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 
technical survey described Route 15 as: ‘an all-weather highway with an 
intermediate bituminous surface  …  with well-compacted macadam in 
good condition. … and limited off-road dispersal possibilities’.2 The road 
surface was from 4.2 to 4.9  metres wide. With 11 significant bridges3 
on Route  15 within Phuoc Tuy Province, and many minor bridges 
and culverts, the route was highly vulnerable to interdiction by anti-
government forces. Heavy rains during the wet season (May to October) 
could flood sections of the roadway and also restrict daytime vehicle 
passage. The route was overlooked by ranges of wooded and jungle-
covered hills covering an area of about 80 square kilometres comprising, 
from the north-west to the south-east: the Nui Thi Vai – 467 metres high; 
the Nui Toc Tien – 221 metres high (2 kilometres east of Route 15); the 
Nui Ong Trinh – 504 metres high; and, reaching to the north-western 
outskirts of Ba Ria Town, the Nui Dinh – 491 metres high (whose summit 
is about 4 kilometres to the north of Route 15). Many caves and larger 
caverns were scattered throughout these granite hills – with crevasses 
and rock falls of larger boulders covered with vines and tree roots. These 
natural features and tunnels had been used by resistance elements over 
many decades. Several small isolated Buddhist temples and shrines were 
scattered throughout the hills.
To the west of Route 15 lay the Rung Sac/Sat (‘Salty Jungle’), an area of 
about 1,250 square kilometres of tidal swamp, mangroves and nipa palm 
bordering Can Gio District of Gia Dinh/Bien Hoa Province. The Rung 
Sat encompassed villages within Can Gio and Quan Xuyen Districts, and 
the large island of Long Son4 within Phuoc Tuy Province. The Long Tau 
River and the Soai Rap River ran through the Rung Sat and connected 
Vung Tau and South China Sea with Saigon.
2  USMACV/JGS Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV), ‘Area Analysis Study 66-36 – 
National Route 15’, 1 March 1966.
3  The Song (River) Dinh flows through Ba Ria Town and is bridged within the town at coordinates 
YS 375610.
4  Long Son Island (population 5,300) was dominated by Nui Nua Hill – 183 metres. 1 ATF 
conducted its ‘first combat assault’ and a ‘search and destroy’ operation (Operation Hayman) into 
Long Son Island, adjacent to the Rung Sat, in the period 8–12 November 1966; 1 ATF, ‘OPORD 
1/14/66’, 4 November 1966, Australian War Memorial (AWM), AWM95 1/4/16.
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The first Indo-China War
On 9 February 1946, the French forces reoccupied Ba Ria Province5 – 
with columns advancing along Route 15 through Long Thanh and also 
through Xuan Loc, down Route 2 to seize Ba Ria Town. En route, the 
French briefly engaged a Viet Minh ‘Republican Guard’ force on Route 15 
at Phuoc Hoa. Government machinery was re-established in the province 
under Bui The Kham as the province chief and Lieutenant Colonel Pougin 
de la Maissoneuve as the sector commander.6 A small Viet Minh guerrilla 
unit – the Quang Trung force – was formed at Long Phuoc village in 
1946, and by the end of that year had reportedly grown to 25 ‘secret self-
defence guerrilla units’7 covering 40 villages across the province. Rubber 
plantation workers in the Route 2 area provided recruits, and further units 
were raised: the 16 Detachment, the 307 Regiment (established in May 
1948) and the 397 Regiment (December 1949, combining the 307 and 
309 Regiments). During this period, the Viet Minh were mostly active in 
the central and eastern areas of Ba Ria Province – principally in the Dat 
Do area, and from their Minh Dam Secret Zone bases in the Long Hai 
hills. However, the 700-strong Viet Minh 300 Battalion operated against 
Route 15 – principally interdicting the route in the Phu My area on the 
Ba Ria Province/Bien Hoa border and to the north. In September 1947, 
the route was cut by the Viet Minh for almost five years. Road traffic from 
Saigon to Vung Tau was forced to travel eastward along Route 1 to Xuan 
Loc Town, and then south down Route 2 to Ba Ria and on to Vung Tau 
– a total distance of 155 kilometres, or to Long Hai on the shore of the 
South China Sea.
5  In October 1956, the Saigon Government of President Ngo Dinh Diem retitled their Ba Ria 
Province as Phuoc Tuy Province, which included the adjacent Can Gio District and Vung Tau. 
However, the communist side preferred the earlier title of Ba Ria Province. While the province capital 
was officially titled Phuoc Le (until 1982), it was commonly referred to as ‘Ba Ria Town’ by both 
sides.
6  Trần Văn Khánh (et al.) and the Executive Committee of the Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party, Lịch sử 
Đảng bộ tỉnh Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu 1930–1975 [The history of the Party in Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Province 
1930–1975], Vol I, 1930–1954, Nhà Xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia [National Political Publishing 
House], Hà Nội, 2000 (hereafter ‘the Ba Ria History’), and Le Thanh Tuong, Monographie de la 
province de Baria Sud Vietnam, Saigon, 1950.




According to the Viet Cong (VC) Long Dat History: ‘At the beginning of 
1951, all the Viet Minh elements were forced to move into the Minh Dam 
base area.’8 However, on 15 March 1953, the Main Force Battalion 300 
and the Long Dat local unit attacked Route 23 – and captured a French 
officer (Fardel, the commander of Dat Do). In late February 1953, French 
forces retook Phu My village, re-established a subsector there, and cleared 
Route 15. They then moved east of Ba Ria Town and cleared Route 23 to 
Dat Do. The Chau Duc History records that:
In the first months of 1953, 96% of populated area [104 villages] 
was temporarily seized by the enemy, and our guerrillas were 
under great pressure. Co Trach village [i.e. the centre of Chau Duc 
District] was one of the only villages held by the Party.9
However, in early May 1953, a French officer, Captain Joseph Suacot 
(called ‘la Panthère noire’ by the Viet Minh10), led elements of the 
64 Vietnamese Infantry Battalion on a sortie into the Hat Dich.11 The 
force was ambushed by the Viet Minh’s 3  Company/300  Battalion 
– and Captain Suacot was killed. Six months later, on 5  November 
1953, 3  and  4  Companies of 300  Battalion attacked a French convoy 
2 kilometres from Binh Ba Subsector and killed Lieutenant Colonel de 
la Maissoneuve, the sector commander, a captain, a number of officers, 
and 60 soldiers of the local ‘65th BVN Battalion [sic]’12 (BVN: Bataillon 
Vietnamien).
8  Phan Ngọc Danh and Trần Quang Toại, Lịch Sử Đấu Tranh Cách Mạng Của Huyện Long Đất 
[The history of the revolutionary struggle in Long Dat district], Nhà Xuất Bản Đồng Nai [The Dong Nai 
Publishing House], Đồng Nai, 1986, hereafter ‘the Long Dat History’, p 70.
9  Le Minh Duc and Ho Song Quynh (eds), The history of the armed forces of Chau Duc District 
(1945–2014), The Truth – National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2014, hereafter ‘the Chau 
Duc History 2014’, p 81.
10  Nguyễn Công Danh and Lê Minh Nghĩa (et al.), Lịch sử Đấu Tranh Cách Mạng Của Đảng Bộ Và 
Nhân Dân Huyện Châu Đức (1930–2000) [The history of the revolutionary struggle of the Party Chapter 
and the people of Châu Đức District (1930–2000)], Nhà Xuất Bản Chính Trị Quốc Giả, [National 
Political Publishing House], Hà Nội, 2004, hereafter ‘the Chau Duc History 2004’, p 84.
11  The small village of Hat Dich was located in the vicinity of YS 3477, about 11 kilometres west 
of the Duc Thanh District Sub-Sector. The Hat Dich area was defined in a US 9 Infantry Division 
report as an area of 190 square kilometres, bounded by coordinates YS 2693, YS 4093, YS 4078 and 
YS 2478, containing the jungle area south of the Binh Son Rubber Plantation and east of Route 15 
to Route 2, with the Thi Vai Mountains on the south. G. McGarrigle, ‘9th Div Operations’, Vietnam 
Center and Archive Texas Tech (VCAT), Item No. 1071514010, Chapter 9, p 3 (Map).
12  Hồ Sĩ Thành, Đặc Khu Rừng Sác [The Rung Sac Special Zone], Nhà Xuất Bản Trẻ [Youth 
Publishing House], Ho Chi Minh City, 2003, p 10.
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The river route between Vung Tau and Saigon – via the Saigon, Long 
Tau and Soai Rap rivers – was only occasionally interrupted. On 26 May 
1951, the Viet Minh’s 300  Battalion sank the 8,000-ton French vessel 
Saint Loubenbier on the Long Tau River using limpet mines – this was the 
largest French vessel sunk during that conflict.
On 21 July 1952, a Viet Minh commando and security element, disguised 
as auxiliary troops, attacked the Le Centre de Repos officer recreation centre 
in Vung Tau. Twenty French were killed and 23 wounded – including 
women and children.
Post-Geneva
Under the Geneva Accords of 20 July 1954, large numbers of Viet Minh 
were ‘regrouped’13 from the South to North Vietnam. Over a 300-day 
period, about 90,000 Viet Minh reportedly regrouped, in phases, to North 
Vietnam from six assembly areas, including the Ham Tan-Xuyen Moc area 
(10,700). Many ex-Viet Minh, including men born in Phuoc Tuy, later 
infiltrated back into the South beginning in the early 1960s. In 1955, 
large numbers of Vietnamese Catholics moved from the North and were 
settled in the South. The government of Ngo Dinh Diem settled many 
of these refugees in Phuoc Tuy – principally in the villages of Binh Gia, 
Binh Ba and Phuoc Tinh, but also in villages along Route 15 including 
Phu My, Ong Trinh South, Phuoc Hoa, Lang Cat and Long Huong. The 
Saigon government established posts along Route 15 manned by the Civil 
Guard/Civil Defence Force (Bao An – later the Regional Forces) and the 
paramilitary Self-Defence Corps (Dan Ve – later the Popular Forces), but 
bandits from the Rung Sat continued to harass travellers and commercial 
traffic on Route 15. As noted, night movement was not possible along 
the route.
The Ba Ria History relates:
In 1956, after many armed clashes with the Saigon government’s 
armed forces, the Binh Xuyen14 [a paramilitary gangster group in 
Saigon driven out by president Diem] were defeated, fled, and 
13  Chamberlain, The Viet Cong D445 Battalion, p 9 and fn 24.
14  The Binh Xuyen were formed in the early 1920s as a loose coalition of gangs and contract 
labourers. From 1945, Binh Xuyen forces fought against the Viet Minh and from 1949, having been 
allowed to monopolize gambling in Saigon-Cholon and the trucking industry, became a self-funded 
element of the Vietnamese National Army. In 1955, the Binh Xuyen were almost wiped out by the 
National Army in the Rung Sat region. In 1956, a number of Binh Xuyen fighters joined the then 
nascent communist forces in Ba Ria Province.
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lodged their troops scattered throughout the Rung Sac (Long 
Thanh), the Nui Thi Vai Mountains, and the Giong Chau Pha 
jungle  …  At the beginning of 1957, the Eastern Region Inter-
Provincial Committee deployed the unit led by Nguyen Quoc 
Thanh from the Rung Sac (Long Thanh) to the Giong jungle (Hat 
Dich) to build a base … in the Bung Lung (Hat Dich) area.15
At the beginning of 1958, the Military Committee of the communists’ 
Eastern Region appointed Le Minh Thinh to take a section and a radio to 
Ba Ria and organise an armed force. After more than ‘20 days of cutting 
through the jungle and crossing hills, the group of Eastern Region military 
cadre safely reached central Phuoc Tuy’.16 In June 1958, a provincial 
40-strong VC C-40 Company was established with a base in the Bung 
Lung (Hat Dich) area in the west of the province.17
North Vietnam’s Politburo Resolution No.  15 of January 1959 stated: 
‘The Way for the Vietnamese Revolution in the South’ directed a ‘violent 
revolution in the South’.18 On 12 March 1960, as part of the broader 
Dong Khoi (‘Simultaneous Uprising’) movement, the Ba Ria Province 
Committee’s C-40 Company attacked Binh Ba village on Route 2. This 
attack reportedly ‘began the armed uprising movement across the whole 
Province’.19 In April 1960, a second VC company, C-45 Company, was 
raised and operated to the west of Route 2 as a mobile unit to defend 
the Hat Dich base and to harass both Route  2 and Route  15. These 
elements operated under the communists’ Chau Thanh District (retitled 
Chau Duc District in 1965).20 With declining security, in 1960 the 
Saigon government established a Route 15 Security Task Force to protect 
commerce on the route and provide safety for Saigon elites travelling to 
their villas in Vung Tau and Long Hai. Nguyen Van Buu, a Vung Tau 
businessman, reportedly funded 300 quasi-official paramilitary soldiers 
to ensure his seafood shipments reached Saigon on Route 15.21 In Phuoc 
Tuy, a 50-man Political Action Unit – the forerunner to the 1 Commando 
15  The Ba Ria History, p 13.
16  Chamberlain, The Viet Cong D445 Battalion, p 11.
17  While C-40 was established in August 1958, to maintain secrecy it was only officially announced 
in February 1960. Later, C-40 became C-440 and subsequently joined with C-445 to form D445 
Provincial Battalion in early 1965.
18  Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s war: An international history of the war for peace in Vietnam, 
University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2012, pp 39–43. See also Tai Sung An, ‘Hanoi’s 
15th Plenum Resolution – 1959’, VCAT, Item No. 23130010009.
19  Chamberlain, The Viet Cong D445 Battalion, p 12.
20  VC Chau Duc District was formed from Chau Thanh and Duc Thanh Districts on 24 May 1965.
21  S. Methven, Laughter in the shadows: A CIA memoir, Naval Institute Press, 2014, pp 105–106.
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Company/Province Reconnaissance Unit – operated in concert with 
these ‘shrimp soldiers’.22 However, commercial enterprises in Vung Tau 
utilising Route 15 to Saigon continued to pay the VC for safe passage. 
While strategically important for the movement of cargo to Saigon, also 
any ‘closure to Saigonese holiday-makers due to enemy action tended 
to lower morale in the capital and serve as an indicator of Viet Cong 
encroachment’.23
According to the communist Tan Thanh District history, at this time 
‘the revolutionary movement along Route 15 was weak’, and the senior 
communist cadre Tran Ngoc Buu was dispatched to the area to conduct 
‘armed propaganda’ and develop an ‘infrastructure’ network.24 Soon after, 
in July 1960 at Ben Tau near Hat Dich village, C-45 Company attacked 
and destroyed a 55-strong Civil Guard (i.e. Regional Force) force from 
the Phu My Special Sector, seizing 50 weapons including three machine 
guns. Hat Dich village became the first ‘liberated village’ in the province. 
The Chau Duc History relates that in December 1962:
the C-45 Provincial Unit combined with village guerrillas to attack 
and destroy the Binh Ba post, seized a large number of weapons, 
ammunition and food, and captured three Western commercial 
managers … [who] were taken to the base for education and urged 
to pay taxes to the Front for their exploitation of the rubber.25
In 1962, the population of the province, excluding Vung Tau, was 
reportedly about 117,000. The Route 15 area was only lightly populated, 
with the villages and hamlets astride the route dependent on rice 
cultivation, fishing in the Rung Sat, salt processing, charcoal production 
and wood gathering in the foothills. The villagers along Route 15 were 
forbidden by the government to move more than 1,000 metres from the 
road. From Ba Ria Town north-west to the Bien Hoa Province border 
– a  distance of 28  kilometres – the settlements were: Long Huong 
village, Phu/Chu Hai hamlet, Kim Hai hamlet, Long Cat hamlet, Phuoc 
Hoa village, Ong Trinh hamlets (north and south) and Phu My village 
22  Methven, Laughter in the shadows, p 106.
23  Ian McNeill, To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966, Allen & Unwin, 
St Leonards, 1993, p 11.
24  Unknown authors, Lịch sử Đấu Tranh Cách Mạng Của Nhân Dân Huyện Tân Thành [The history 
of the people’s revolutionary struggle in Tan Thanh District], Vung Tau, 2014.
25  The Chau Duc History 2014, p 112.
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(2  kilometres from the border with Long Thanh District of Bien Hoa 
Province). The total population along Route 15 within Phuoc Tuy was 
about 18,000 – 15 per cent of the province’s population.
In 1962, the VC’s C-40 and C-45 Companies were reportedly combined 
as the C-445 Provincial Company (D445 Battalion’s predecessor), and, with 
the C-20 Chau Thanh District Company, continued to operate principally 
in the more populated central and eastern regions of the province in the 
Binh Ba, Long Phuoc, Dat Do and Long Hai areas. In early 1962, the 
Saigon government established the headquarters of the Phuoc Bien Special 
Zone in a camp beside Route 15, 2 kilometres north of Phu My village, to 
control security across Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy provinces. 
To improve security on Route 15, artillery detachments of 105 mm howitzers 
were based at Phu My, Ong Trinh and Ba Ria; and six of the province’s 23 
strategic hamlets26 were developed along Route 15 (at My Xuan, Hoi Bai, 
Kim Hai, Chu Hai, Phuoc Hoa and Phu My). Subsequently, from October 
1962, strategic hamlets were also developed at Ong Trinh, Phuoc Loc and 
Lang Cat, and the strategic hamlet at Phuoc Hoa was further strengthened 
and incorporated the villagers of Hoi Bai.
The VC also developed fortified ‘combat villages’ with complex tunnel 
systems – the largest at Long Tan and Long Phuoc. On 5 March 1963, 
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and Regional Force (RF) forces 
– with supporting M113 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and 105 mm 
artillery – attacked the fortified VC village of Long Phuoc. Exploiting the 
extensive system of tunnels, the VC forces (the C-45 Provincial Company 
and the C-20 District Company) reportedly held out for 44 days before 
withdrawing.
In November 1963, president Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown in 
a military coup and a period of significant instability began with rapidly 
changing governments. The strategic hamlet program faltered, and the 
VC made significant gains in the countryside.27 In February 1964, a high-
26  In 1962, the focus of the strategic hamlet program was on the six provinces around Saigon 
(including Phuoc Tuy) and Kontum Province. Initially, 11,316 strategic hamlets were planned 
country-wide. In Phuoc Tuy, as at 31 July 1963, reportedly 135 of the province’s planned 162 strategic 
hamlets had been completed – covering 121,000 (87 per cent of the province’s population), and 
171 hamlet militiamen had been trained: see US Operations Mission (USOM), ‘Notes on Strategic 
Hamlets’, 15 August 1963, VCAT, Item No. 239070130036.
27  On 23 February 1964, the program was ‘revitalized’ as the ‘New Life Hamlets’ (‘Ap Doi Moi’) 




level CIA report for the US Administration noted that ‘a recent report 
from COMUSMACV [the commanding general of MACV] estimates 
that in 23 of the Republic of Vietnam’s 43 provinces, the Viet Cong 
dominate more that 50 percent of the area’. The same report states that 
‘the  Viet Cong exercise 80% control in Phuoc Tuy. It thus appears 
that Phuoc Tuy should be considered as a possible addition to the list of 
[13] critical provinces’.28
Security responsibility for Phuoc Tuy fell to the ARVN III Corps Zone’s 
33 Tactical Zone – with its major force as the 5 ARVN Infantry Division, 
under Colonel (later president) Nguyen Van Thieu, headquartered in 
Bien Hoa. In the period 1963–66, the VC Ba Ria Province Committee 
group (up to 60 strong) and its special action element was centred in their 
Bung Lung base in a treed valley between the Nui Ong Trinh and the Nui 
Dinh, in the far south of the Hat Dich zone. Also at this time, to escape 
security forces, communist youth activists from Saigon – the Thanh Doan 
Saigon-Gia Dinh – established operating bases in the Nui Thi Vai and 
Nui Dinh hills.
The ‘Sea Trail’ from the north and the Battle 
of Binh Gia
The communist headquarters south of the Central Highlands – the 
Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)29 – began preparations in 
1962 to receive arms and ammunition by sea from the North at two 
principal locations – Loc An/Ho Tram on the Phuoc Tuy coast north of 
Phuoc Hai village, and at Ben Tre (Kien Hoa Province) in the northern 
Mekong Delta. From Ben Tre, the off-loaded materiel – principally arms 
and ammunition – was moved north to Can Gio (in the Rung Sat), then 
via the Thi Vai River to Route 15, where porters of the Group 445B unit 
moved the loads across Route 15 (principally near Phu My) and up into 
the Hat Dich base area, and northward into the major VC base area of 
28  Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ‘Memorandum/Weekly Report OCI No.1061/64: The 
Situation in South Vietnam’, 28 February 1964, VCAT, Item No. 0410102003.
29  COSVN: directed from Hanoi and located in the Cambodia/South Vietnam border area north-
west of Saigon, COSVN was the communist political and military headquarters responsible for South 
Vietnam south of the Central and Southern Highlands – an area termed ‘Nam Bo’ (equating to the 
French colonial ‘Cochin China’ region). The COSVN area covered 32 of the South’s 44 provinces and 
nominally 69 per cent of its population.
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War Zone D.30 Landings were also made near Phuoc Hoa farther south 
on Route 15, and materiel was portered northward on the track between 
the Nui Toc Tien and the Nui Dinh into the Hat Dich base. The activities 
of Group 445B reportedly developed the Hac Dich base area, including 
Base Area 303, as a ‘Thanh Dịa’ (‘Citadel’) of COSVN’s Eastern Nam 
Bo Region.31 On 3 October 1963, the first shipment of 20 tonnes was 
landed on the coast at Loc An north of Phuoc Hai from a 40-tonne vessel 
– including 1,500 rifles, 24 machine guns and two 75  mm recoilless 
rifles (RCLs). By November 1963, the ‘Sea Trail’ to Loc An and Ben 
Tre regularly moved large tonnages, supplying the VC multi-regimental 
force with weapons for the Battle of Binh Gia (18 kilometres north of 
Ba Ria Town) in December 1964 and January 1965 – including AK-47s, 
B-40s and ammunition. The VC force at the Battle of Binh Gia, under 
a ‘Campaign Headquarters’, comprised the 271 and the 272 Main Force 
Regiments and the local C-445 and C-440 Companies. The communist 
victory at Binh Gia was a significant defeat for the Saigon government. 
Three ARVN ranger battalions (30, 33 and 38) suffered heavy casualties, 
and the 428-strong 4  Marine Battalion suffered 112 killed and 71 
wounded. Three US advisers were captured: a captain, a sergeant and 
a private first class.
Route 15 insecure – and ‘accommodation’
On 24 November 1964, an element of the 274 VC Regiment ambushed 
a four-vehicle ARVN convoy on Route  15 near Phuoc Hoa village – 
15  ARVN/RF were killed (including a major) and 10 were wounded. 
A US Army sergeant was also killed. Four vehicles were destroyed – 
including two armoured vehicles – and three .30 calibre machine guns, 
one 60 mm mortar, 27 individual weapons and two radios were seized by 
the VC force. The MACV account summarised: ‘VC activity along the 
heavily-travelled Route 15 is sporadic; the area of the ambush is, however, 
30  Located about 40 kilometres north-west of Saigon, War Zone D was the VC designation for 
a major base area encompassing roughly 2,000 square kilometres that in 1965–66 was a haven for the 
271, 272 and 273 Regiments – and, occasionally, the 274 Regiment. In the last days of June 1965, 
the US 173 Airborne Brigade – including 1 RAR – conducted a major search and destroy operation 
into the western area of War Zone D.
31  Chamberlain, The Viet Cong D445 Battalion, p 31, fn 108, for a detailed explanation of Group 
445B and its activities.
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prone to such incidents’.32 On 17 December 1964, the 272 VC Regiment 
reportedly destroyed six ARVN armoured vehicles on the route – but this 
may have been the foregoing ambush of 24 November 1964.
During 1964, the senior Chau Thanh District communist cadre 
reportedly negotiated an ‘accommodation/local détente’ with the ARVN 
officer based at Phuoc Hoa responsible for the security of Route  15, 
Major Nguyen Van Phuoc, who provided 50 M26 grenades and 2,000 
rounds of ammunition to Vo Van Lot (the commander of VC Intelligence 
Unit 316). According to the Dat Do History:
Thanks to our winning over of Major Phuoc,33 we were able to 
render ineffective a whole Ranger Group (nine companies – more 
than 800 men), completely control Route  15, and safely move 
hundreds of tons of weapons from the Rung Sac across the Route 
to the Hat Dich.34
Such ‘accommodation’ arrangements – sometimes euphemistically 
referred to as ‘mutual self-limitations’ between isolated Territorial Forces 
along Route 15 and the VC were not uncommon.35
32  US  MACV, ‘Military Report, 21–28 November 1964’, 30  November 1964, VCAT, Item 
No. F015800030978.
33  The suborning of Major Phuoc is also related in Trần Văn Khánh (et al.) and the Executive 
Committee of the Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party, Lịch sử Đảng bộ tỉnh Bà Rịa–Vũng Tàu 1930–1975 
[The history of the Party in Baria–Vung Tau Province 1930–1975], Nhà Xuất bản Chính trị Quốc 
gia [National Political Publishing House], Hà Nội, 2000, hereafter ‘the Province Party History’. The 
Long Dat History refers to Major Phuoc’s activities as lasting until January 1965, and also notes that 
Phuoc had formerly been a Binh Xuyen commander. Formed in the 1920s, the Binh Xuyen was 
a militarised group of heavily armed criminal gangs. The Binh Xuyen were almost wiped out by the 
Saigon government in 1955, but their forces were later used against the Vietnamese communists.
34  The Dat Do History relates: ‘Our military proselytising cadre assigned a cadre to his [Major 
Phuoc’s] unit to explain the Revolution’s policies to Phuoc and his soldiers, and sent two Province 
reconnaissance cadre to be introduced to Phuoc – and proposed that Phuoc take them into the Phuoc 
Bien Commando Base [i.e. the Ranger base at Phu My airfield] to assess the situation.’ (Trần Quang 
Toại and Đặng Tấn Hương (eds), Lịch Sử Đấu Tranh Và Xây Dựng Của Đảng Bộ, Quân Và Dân Huyện 
Đất Đỏ (1930–2005) [The history of the struggle and development of the Party Committee, the forces and 
the people of Dat Do District (1930–2005)], Nhà Xuất Bản Tổng Hợp Đồng Nai [Dong Nai Collective 
Publishing House], Biên Hòa, 2006, hereafter ‘the Dat Do History’.)
35  The Territorial Forces (RF and PF) elements totalled about 4,000 men: all were understrength, 
some PF platoons had only 18–20 men, some RF Companies had only 30–80 men. The personal 
weapons of the RF and PF soldiers were the Second World War–vintage M1 and M2 carbines and 
the heavier Garand rifle. These Territorial Force troops were not capable of engaging VC Main Force 
regiments armed with AK-47 and SKS automatic rifles, RPD light machine guns and B-40 rocket-
propelled grenades. Main Force VC elements were equipped with AK-47s from very early January 1965.
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The 10 ARVN Division was formed in May 1965 and, headquartered in 
Xuan Loc, had responsibility for the 33 Tactical Zone. Its 52 Regiment 
often deployed into Phuoc Tuy Province. On 1 January 1967, the division 
was retitled the 18 ARVN Division. On 10 July 1965, 1st Battalion of 
the 274  VC Regiment36 ambushed a 14-vehicle convoy – including 
two armoured vehicles – on Route 15 in the Phu My area. Some of the 
captured weapons were reportedly passed to local VC forces.
In July 1965, the US Provincial Representative reported that:
The security situation in the districts of Duc Thanh and Xuyen 
Moc  continues to remain critical as only the district towns 
[capitals] are under GVN control. All roads leading into the 
district capital of Duc Thanh and Xuyen Moc are cut and under 
VC control … The cutting of Hwy #15 has caused an economic 
pinch on incoming supplies and out-going marketings of fish. 
Much of the economy of this Province is based upon the fishing 
industry, and the cutting of Hwy #15 has stopped the flow of this 
commodity to the Saigon markets.37
36  Based on the 800 Dong Nai Battalion, and with infiltrated cadre from the 308 NVA Division, 
the 274 Regiment was founded in War Zone D north-east of Saigon in January 1964. The Dong 
Nai River flows south from the Central Highlands, through Bien Hoa, and joins the Saigon River 
29 kilometres north-east of Ho Chi Minh City. In October 1964, the 274 Regiment assisted with 
the movement of arms and materiel landed on the coast north of Phuoc Hai for the Binh Gia 
Campaign. The regiment’s principal battlefield was in southern Long Khanh Province – ambushing 
Route 20, attacking the railway line and strategic hamlets – including at Vo Su and Gia Ray. On 
24 November 1964, its 800 Battalion attacked an ARVN convoy on Route 15 near Phu My, inflicting 
heavy casualties. In 1965–66, the regiment developed base areas in the Hat Dich and in the east 
of Route 2 in northern Phuoc Tuy Province. On the founding of the 5 VC Division in September 
1965, the 274 and the 275 Regiments were subordinated to that formation. In October 1965, the 
274’s strength was 1,977. The 274 Regiment also ambushed ARVN troops on Route 15 on 1 August 
and 10 August 1966. Based on captured documents, in June 1966, the strengths of the Regiment’s 
battalions were: 800 Battalion (formerly D1 unit) – 411; 265 Battalion (D2) – 401; 308 Battalion 
(D3) – 316. The Regimental Headquarters and its support companies (C16 to C23 inclusive) and the 
convalescent unit numbered about a further 660 personnel, for a total regimental strength of about 
1,790. Seasonally, effective combat strength was seriously depleted by malaria (e.g. in August 1968, of 
141 hospitalised 274 Regiment troops, 113 patients had malaria, 14 were for ‘other causes’, and four 
were wounded in action (WIA)). 
37  USOM, ‘Reports of USOM Provincial Representatives for the Month Ending 31 July 1965’, 
31 July 1965, VCAT, Item No. 6-20-19B7-116-UA17-95_001492. Also available at: spartanhistory.
kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/6/32/6-20-19B7-116-UA17-95_001492.pdf. The next report for August 
1965 noted the ‘spurt of inflation caused by the closing of Route 15 to Saigon’.
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At the end of August 1965, MACV assessed that 62.6 per cent of Phuoc 
Tuy’s population were within ‘dark blue’ areas – that is, under government 
control – but 12.5 per cent were in ‘red’ areas under VC control.38
In early September 1965, COSVN formed the 5 VC Infantry Division 
under its Military Region  1 to command the 274 and the 275  Main 
Force Regiments – the 275 Regiment had originally been raised in the 
Mekong Delta. The division’s base was in the May Tao Mountains with 
its initial area of operations in Long Khanh, Binh Tuy and Phuoc Tuy 
Provinces. The D445 Provincial Mobile Battalion was officially formed on 
19 September 1965 – and only rarely operated in the Nui Dinh and Nui 
Thi Vai hills, and is not known to have harassed Route 15.39
In mid-October 1965, VC Military Region  1 (later Military Region  7 
from late 1967) issued an ‘Intelligence Order’ directing province 
military intelligence staffs to provide information on the movement and 
deployment of enemy troops. Ba Ria was specifically cited: ‘Observe 
the enemy movements on Route 15, especially on the route from Cap 
[i.e. Vung Tau] to Ba Ria and Phu My.’40 In Bien Hoa Province, the 
Intelligence Order directed the observation of ‘III Corps and the American 
and Australian troops [i.e. 1 RAR Battalion Group]’. Observation posts 
– ‘Special Detachment – Route 15’ – were established on the Nui Thi Vai 
and Nui Dinh features, manned by local VC elements, who reported to 
intelligence cadre equipped with high-frequency (HF) radios (US AN/
GRC-9 or Chinese Communist 102E, 71B, transceivers). The US military 
signals intelligence (SIGINT) organisation in South Vietnam intercepted 
VC HF Morse communications and determined VC locations with 
direction-finding equipment.41
38  US MACV, ‘US MACV Monthly Report of Rural Reconstruction Progress: 25 July – 25 August 
1965’, 11 September 1965, VCAT, Item No. F01570001007.
39  The battalion was actually formed earlier, on 23  February 1965, as the ‘Ba Ria Province 
Concentrated Unit’ with Bui Quang Chanh (aka Sau Chanh) ‘as the “Battalion Commander’. 
For a detailed history of D445, see Chamberlain, The Viet Cong D445 Battalion.
40  The Intelligence Order by the G2 staff of Military Region 1 was captured by the US 25 Infantry 
Division on 18 May 1966, and the English translation can be found: ‘Captured Documents (CDEC): 
Intelligence Order Stating That C2 Personnel Must Know the Enemies Tactical Position’, VCAT, Item 
No. F034600110656, p 2.
41  For example, the headquarters of the 5 VC Division – nicknamed ‘Fred’ – was ‘fixed’ 25 times 
in  the two months to 17 February 1966 in north-eastern Phuoc Tuy, south-eastern Long Khanh 
and in Binh Tuy Province.
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The Rangers’ victory on Route 15 at Kim Hai
On 11 November 1965, 3rd Battalion of the 275 VC Regiment attempted 
to ambush an ARVN convoy on Route 15 (the 52 Ranger Battalion and 
RF elements) at Kim Hai hamlet, Phuoc Hoa village (about 10 kilometres 
north-west of Ba Ria Town). However, forewarned, the ARVN force 
drove off the 275 Regiment elements and inflicted heavy casualties on the 
VC force.42 However, the account in the 5 VC Division History relates 
a VC victory:
From the beginning of November, Comrade Nguyen Thoi Bung 
[the 275th Regiment’s commander – who later commanded the 
Regiment at the Battle of Long Tan in August 1966], together 
with Battalion Commander Hai Phung, engaged directly in the 
preparations for the battle on Route 15.43 On 4 November, the 3rd 
Battalion deployed from its base at Song Ray to Long Thanh for 
the engagement. After three days of difficult and tiring movement, 
and avoiding discovery by enemy commandos and outposts, on 
7 November the 3rd Battalion reached its fighting positions at the 
base of the Nui Thi Vai Mountain [sic]. The fighting strength of 
the battalion at this time was still low44 – a company only had 40 
weapons. The 1st Company (of the 1st Battalion) with a strength 
of only 45 was attached to the 3rd Battalion as a reinforcement. 
As  a consequence, the problem required that the ambush had 
to be truly secret and a surprise if the intention to completely 
destroy two enemy companies and their vehicles was to be 
42  The Ranger Force – the 3 and 4 Companies under the battalion executive officer – and the RF 
force were returning along Route 15 from an ambushing operation when they were warned by Phuoc 
Tuy Sector Headquarters and halted 2 kilometres short of the 275 Regiment ambush site. Air support 
from F-100 jet aircraft struck the VC positions. The Rangers reportedly recovered the first B-40 
captured in South Vietnam.
43  This was the only significant engagement west of Route  2 involving the 275 VC Regiment 
during the period 1966 to early 1970. The ambush is mentioned briefly in 1  ATF’s ‘INTSUM 
No 1/66: Vung Tau’, 21 May 1966 (AWM95 1/4/1) (as is the later 11–12 April 1966 battle against 
US forces during Operation Abilene at Tam Bo north of Nui Dat involving elements of the 274 VC 
Regiment, in a subsequent Intelligence Review: ‘1  ATF Intelligence Review No.  2’, 29  October 
1966, AWM95 1/4/14). See also 1 ATF, ‘Troops Information Sheet No. 31, 13–19 February 1967’, 
AWM95  1/4/30. The Kim Hai/Phuoc Hoa ambush is related in the Australian Army’s official 
history, but the location is incorrectly cited as occurring at ‘Binh Gia’, and the outcome is incorrectly 
described as a win for the VC: ‘The Viet Cong demonstrated their capacity to mount regimental-sized 
ambushes on 11 November 1965, when 275 Regiment ambushed and virtually destroyed the elite 
ARVN 52 Ranger Battalion near Binh Gia’ (McNeill, To Long Tan, p 222).
44  However, captured 274 Regiment documents detail the strengths of the regiment’s battalions in 
October 1965 as: 1st Battalion – 404; 2nd Battalion – 684; and 3rd Battalion – 486. The regiment’s 
strength was 1,977. 
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achieved … After  a day of fierce fighting, the 3rd Battalion and 
the 1st Company of the 5th [i.e. 275th] Regiment had killed a 
large number of the enemy, inflicting heavy casualties on the 52nd 
Ranger Battalion and a Phuoc Tuy Sector provincial company, 
destroyed two helicopters, 16 mechanised vehicles, a jeep, 
captured six enemy and seized 12 weapons and two radios. We lost 
16 comrades and a further 32 were wounded.45
According to a contemporary VC pamphlet titled Victories in November 
1965, two Ranger companies were wiped out and 16 vehicles destroyed on 
11 November 1965. However, as related in the 275 Regiment History,46 
a ‘Traitor S’ had defected and revealed the 275’s ambush plans to the Ba 
Ria sector headquarters. Thus warned, the 52 Ranger Battalion force, the 
701 RF Company, and the 31 RF Mechanised Platoon attacked and drove 
the compromised VC ambush force back into the hills. For defeating 
the 3rd Battalion/275 Regiment and 1 Company of its 1st Battalion at 
Kim Hai, the Vietnamese forces were awarded a US Presidential Citation 
on 18  November 1966.47 A mid-November Saigon press report cited 
‘VC Piles Up Phuoc Le Ambush Toll for Burial: 150 Bodies Spotted in 
Village’,48 and a Joint US Public Affairs Office Report of 30 November 
1965 noted ‘300’ VC were killed in the action at Kim Hai.49
Soon after that engagement, US aircraft increased Operation Ranch 
Hand chemical defoliation missions in Phuoc Tuy Province50 – spraying 
60,000 litres in the period 18 December 1965 to 30 January 1966. This 
included missions to reduce roadside cover along Route 15 and the banks 
of the principal waterways in the Rung Sat.51 In mid-December 1965, 
45  Hồ Sơn Đài (ed.), Lịch sử Sư đòan Bộ binh 5 (1965–2005) [The history of the 5th Infantry Division 
(1965–2005)], Nhà Xuất Bản Quân Đội Nhân Dân [The People’s Army Publishing House], Hà Nội, 
2005, hereafter ‘the 5 VC Division History’, pp 59–60.
46  Ho Son Dai – Senior Colonel (ed.), The history of the 5th Infantry Regiment (1965–2015), 
The People’s Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2015.
47  Lyndon B. Johnson, ‘Presidential Unit Citation Awarded to the 52d Ranger Battalion, Army of 
the Republic of Vietnam, and Attached Units’, 18 November 1966.
48  The Sunday Post, Saigon, 14 November 1965.
49  JUSPAO Field Representative, ‘Reports of USOM Provincial Representatives for Month Ending 
30 November 1965’, VCAT, Item No. 23970103001, p 30.
50  The inaugural Ranch Hand operations in South Vietnam were flown along Route 15 by US Air 
Force C-123 aircraft in the period 10–16 January 1962 at 150 feet and covering a 500-foot swathe – 
but avoiding crops.
51  After Operation Vaucluse, on 21 September 1966 1 ATF requested approval from Province 
Chief Lieutenant Colonel Le Duc Dat for defoliation in the Nui Dinh Hill mass because ‘the foliage 
in this area provides concealment for VC movement and base areas’.
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Chau Duc District ordered a five-day campaign on Route 15 of ‘striking 
strategic hamlets, laying mines, digging holes on the road, and setting up 
mounds in the form of crocodiles’ teeth’.52
1966: Route 15 queried in Washington – D445 
into action – Vung Tau shelled
In US Senate Appropriation Hearings in late January 1966, the US 
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, was queried on the ‘status of 
Route 15’. He responded: ‘It is, I believe, closed at the present time, and 
if it isn’t actually closed today it is closed off and on.’ Senator Mansfield 
asked: ‘Closed to the Americans?’ Secretary McNamara responded: ‘Well, 
it is not closed to a military convoy. We can fight our way through and 
over any road in the country, as a matter of fact. But it is closed to unarmed 
and unescorted traffic.’53
At the end of January 1966, the 2  Brigade/1  US Infantry Division 
conducted Operation Mallet – ambitiously described as ‘a search and 
destroy operation to open Route 15’.54 However, Phase 2 of the operation 
was conducted in the Binh Son area of Long Thanh District and did not 
extend into Phuoc Tuy Province.
On the other, eastern, side of the province, near the Minh Dam/Long Hai 
hills at Da Giang on Route 44 (Upper), the D445 Local Force Battalion 
ambushed a large group of ARVN trainees from the Long Hai non-
commissioned officer (NCO) school on 8 January 1966. A MACV report 
noted 31 ARVN soldiers killed and 30 wounded – and three US advisers 
killed.55 On Route  15, in January 1966, D445 Battalion reportedly 
ambushed and destroyed six trucks of the ‘South Korean forces’.56
52  Captured document: ‘Chau Duc District Directive’, December 1965, USMACV/JGS 
Combined Document Exploitation Centre (CDEC), Saigon, Item No. 10-2287-66.
53  US Armed Services Committee, ‘Appropriations, 89th Congress, S2792’, 2  February 1966, 
VCAT, Item No. 2184815002, p 143.
54  A.G. Traas, Engineers at war, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 2010.
55  US MACV Military History Branch, ‘Chronology of Significant Events during 1966’, 27 April 
1967, VCAT Item No. 13370149004.
56  Chamberlain, The Viet Cong D445 Battalion, p 56 and fn 197. That mention of South Korean 
troops may be a reference to the major RVNAF Operation Dan Tam 36 (late February – early 
March 1966) that extended into the Minh Dam Mountains. A Republic of Korea engineer company 




On 12 March 1966, a force comprising VC sappers (240C Company) 
and an artillery element from 5 VC Division moved from the Minh Dam 
base and attacked and shelled the Vung Tau airfield and the Chi Linh 
Rural Development Cadre Training Centre in Vung Tau. According to 
a rallier from the 240C Sapper Company, the unit incorporated a platoon 
from D445 Battalion and had undergone training directed by Sau Chanh, 
the commander of D445 Battalion, prior to the attack on Vung Tau. 
According to the 5 VC Division History:
In only 45 minutes of combat, 138 rounds of 82mm mortar 
and 75mm RCL were fired – together with 70 other rounds, 
and 25  B40s. The artillery and sappers of the 4th Regiment 
[274 Regiment] killed and wounded a large number of the enemy 
– including a senior officer [of major to full colonel rank], and 
destroyed nine enemy aircraft.57
The biography of Tong Viet Duong – the commander of the ‘70-strong 
sapper company’, claimed ‘almost 300 Americans were killed at the airfield 
while watching an outdoor movie – including a colonel’58 and 37 aircraft 
(C130, AD6, T28 and L19s) were destroyed. The Royal Australian Air 
Force Caribou Flight at Vung Tau reported a shelling by 60 mortars on 
that date – four bombs impacted near the flight’s hangar, and two DHC-4 
Caribou were damaged.
About 17 per cent living under VC Control 
in Phuoc Tuy
According to a US military report in March 1966, of Phuoc Tuy and 
Vung Tau’s population of 138,000 (Phuoc Tuy, 100,000; Vung Tau, 
38,000), 87,000 lived in government-controlled areas, 22,000 in areas 
‘undergoing pacification’, 12,000 in areas considered ‘relatively free 
of VC’, and 17,000 ‘living in VC-controlled areas’.59 A curfew was in 
effect between 10 pm and 4 am – but was ‘not rigidly enforced’ and the 
‘VC infrastructure was established down to village and hamlet level’.60 
‘Approximately 32% of the population is Pro-GVN, 12% Pro-VC, and 
57  The 5 VC Division History, p 74.
58  Xuan Bao, The story of a war hero: Tong Viet Duong, Dong Nai On-Line, 6 September 2012.
59  US 1st Infantry Division, ‘Combat Operations After Action Report – Operation Abilene, April 




56% are neutral’.61 The VC had ‘a high degree of control over the rural 
population and had little difficulty moving throughout the Province’.62 
The CIA assessed the VC ‘militia and political cadre’ in the province’s 
35 villages numbered ‘2.956’.63
In the period 30 March – 15 April 1966, the US 1  Infantry Division 
(with 173 Airborne Brigade that included the Australian 1 RAR Battalion 
Group) conducted Operation Abilene in Phuoc Tuy and Long Khanh 
Provinces. Operation Abilene had the aim of ‘destroying the 94th [i.e. the 
274] VC Regiment, the 5th [i.e. the 275] VC Regiment, and the May 
Tao Secret Zone’.64 Support bases were established in the Courtenay 
Plantation area near the Long Khanh/Phuoc Tuy border from 29 March 
and subsequently farther south at the Binh Ba airstrip. In a ‘southern’ phase 
of Operation Abilene, on 4  April 1966, two US battalions conducted 
a search and destroy operation north and north-east of the VC-controlled 
village of Long Tan while an ARVN force searched the village – and then 
moved the villagers to Dat Do, Long Dien and Hoa Long.
VC victory at Tam Bo
1 RAR returned to Bien Hoa from Operation Abilene’s Binh Ba logistic 
base area on 8–9 April 1966 by road and air to prepare for Operation 
Denver in the Song Be area of Phuoc Long Province.65 On 11  April, 
Charlie Company/2nd Battalion of 16 Regiment of the US 1  Infantry 
Division engaged a VC force that included ‘800 Battalion’ (i.e. 1/274 VC 
Regiment) in north-eastern Phuoc Tuy – about 5  kilometres south 
of the Long Khanh/Phuoc Tuy border and about 8  kilometres east of 
61  Ibid.
62  Ibid. The US MACV ‘Monthly Report of Revolutionary Development Progress: Population 
and  Area Control’ for May 1966 (dated 15  June 1966, VCAT, Item No.  F01500010098), 
later showed Phuoc Tuy as 65  per cent ‘controlled’, with 24  per cent ‘undergoing clearance’ and 
11.5 per cent ‘under VC control’. At the end of June 1966, according to MACV, 70 hamlets in the 
province were classified as ‘secured’, six ‘undergoing securing’ and 35 ‘undergoing clearing’. Of the 
province’s population, 65,900 were deemed ‘secure’ – that is, 64.3 per cent. US MACV, ‘MACV 
Monthly Report of Revolutionary Development Progress: 1–30 June 1966’, 15 July 1966, VCAT, 
Item No. F015700010112.
63  However, these figures were not considered ‘completely accurate’ due to ‘input limitations’. 
CIA, Director of Current Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Viet Cong Strength by Village’, 12 May 1966, 
VCAT, Item No. F02920030138.
64  1 RAR, ‘OPORD 7/66, Bien Hoa’, 24 March 1966, AWM95 7/1/69.
65  US 1st Infantry Division, ‘Combat Operations After Action Report – Operation Abilene, 
April 1966’, DTIC, AD387599. On 8 April 1966, D445 Battalion’s 4 Company mortared the US 
1 Division support base at Binh Ba airstrip.
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Route 2. Initially unsupported by other US companies, the 134-strong 
Charlie Company suffered 48 killed in action (KIA) and 58 wounded 
in action (WIA). Reportedly, the bodies of 41 VC were found on the 
battlefield, and 100–150 VC were assessed by MACV as having been 
killed or wounded in the engagement. That engagement on 11 April 1966 
is known as the Battle of Cam My in US records and as the Battle of Tam 
Bo in Vietnamese communist accounts.66
Increased interdiction on Route 15 and in the 
Rung Sat
In late April 1966, the VC Chau Duc District directed their guerrilla 
elements on Route  15 in Chu Hai, Phuoc Hoa and Phu My villages 
to develop ‘American Killing Belts’ along Route 15. On 19 May 1966, 
the Ba Ria Province Unit assigned demolition tasks on Route  15 and 
on Route 2 to the Chau Duc District Unit – to counter US operations. 
West of Route  15, by early 1966, COSVN had established the Rung 
Sat Special Zone (Group 10/T.10) – with a reported strength of 600, to 
support the movement of materiel from Ben Het in the upper Mekong 
Delta and to interdict shipping transiting the Rung Sat. On 26 August 
1966, Group 10 sappers attacked a US vessel, the Baton Rouge Victory 
(8,500 tons), on the Long Tau River with two limpet mines. Seven 
American civilian sailors were killed, and the vessel’s captain was forced to 
run the ship aground.67
Clearing Long Phuoc and Long Tan – mid-1966
In the period 17–21 May, in the first phase of Operation Hardihood, the 
US 173 Airborne Brigade (without 1 RAR) and 3/43 Battalion of the 
ARVN 10 Division cleared the tunnels and bunkers of the VC’s fortified 
66  The battle took place at YS 5408620 – about 4 kilometres east of the site of the late September 
1971 ‘Battle of Nui Le’, when 4 RAR/NZ engaged elements of the 33 NVA Regiment. Detailed VC 
accounts are available in the captured notebook of the second in command of the 274 Regiment, 
Nguyễn Nam Hưng: see VCAT, Item No.  F03460056029 (CDEC Log 11-1253-66 – with the 
Vietnamese text in CDEC Log 11-1259-66). The Battle of Tầm Bố is also recounted in Hưng’s 2006 
memoir: Nguyễn Nam Hưng – Major General, Một Đời Chinh Chiến [A life at war], Nhà Xuất bản 
Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, 2006.
67  Group 10 – later the 10 Sapper Regiment – reportedly lost 631 personnel killed during the war 
(319 Northerners and 312 Southerners).
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Long Phuoc village. Elements of D445 and the Chau Duc District’s 
21  Company (C-21) resisted strongly, and the 173’s 1/503 Battalion 
lost 19 killed and 90 wounded in the battle.68 Half of Long Phuoc’s 
3,000 villagers were moved to Hoa Long, and others to Dat Do and to 
Long Dien.
The 1st Australian Task Force arrives
The 1st Australian Task Force Headquarters (HQ 1 ATF) was formally 
activated in Vung Tau on 20 May 1966. As agreed in the 17 March 1966 
Military Working Arrangement with MACV, its directive included ‘to 
conduct operations related to the security of Highway 15, as required’.69 
On 12 May 1966, Lieutenant General JO Seaman, commander II Field 
Force Vietnam (II FFV), issued his Campaign Directive for the 1966 wet 
season that included a task for 1 ATF: ‘to clear and secure route QL15 
from Vung Tau to Ba Ria [sic] and LTL2 [i.e. Route 2] within sector 
in coordination with appropriate ARVN commanders’.70 On 19  May 
1966, the Australian Chief of the General Staff expanded on 1 ATF’s role, 
stating:
The military reason for the deployment of the Australian Task 
Force  in Phuoc Tuy Province under national command was 
to improve the military situation so that Route 15 from Vung 
Tau to Bien Hoa can be used for major military movements. 
This is required to allow the development of the port of Vung 
Tau in order to relieve the congestion of military shipping in the 
Saigon area.71
68  According to accounts of the fighting by the Ba Ria Province Headquarters dated 3 June 1966: 
‘In the period 17–25 May 1966 D445 Battalion – in coordination with Chau Duc District troops 
and the Long Phuoc guerrillas, killed 556 Americans and 45 wounded.’ VC losses were reportedly 
10 killed and 25 wounded. Captured Documents CDEC Log 09-1885-66, 29 August 1966, VCAT, 
Item No. F034600822587.
69  Mc Neill, To Long Tan, pp 238–240.
70  McNeill, To Long Tan, p 240 and endnote 36, p 534.
71  McNeill, To Long Tan, p 238.
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Vietnamese Government security forces 
in Phuoc Tuy in mid-1966
In June 1966, government troops in Phuoc Tuy and Vung Tau comprised 
3rd  Battalion of the 43  Regiment/10  ARVN Infantry Division, the 
52 Ranger Battalion, 16 RF companies, 22 Popular Force (PF) platoons, 
and the 1  Commando Company (later the Provincial Reconnaissance 
Unit – PRU). The ARVN National Training Centre was located at Van 
Kiep on Ba Ria’s eastern edge, and an ARVN NCO Training Centre 
operated near Long Hai village.
Along Route 15, the 701 RF Company was at Phu My, and the 673 RF 
Company was distributed between Ong Trinh North and Ong Trinh 
South. PF platoons had been established at Phuoc Hoa and Long Huong 
villages.72 The RF and PF were under the command of the province chief/
military sector commander, Lieutenant Colonel Le Duc Dat,73 and those 
along Route 15 were under the control of Long Le district subsector at 
Hoa Long, commanded by Lieutenant Tran Tan Phat.74 The 40-strong 
MACV Team  89 advisory team – headed by a lieutenant colonel – 
included Captain Mike Wells (AATTV) from early June 1966 as the 
operations and training adviser at sector headquarters in Ba Ria. Team 89 
advisers also served in the subsectors at Long Le (Hoa Long), Long Dien 
and Dat Do; and 20 Team 78 personnel were assigned to the National 
Training Centre at Van Kiep and the NCO Training School at Long Hai. 
The 3rd Battalion of the ARVN 43 Regiment was located on Route 2 on 
Ba Ria’s northern outskirts.
At the end of June 1966, according to MACV, 70 hamlets in the 
province were classified as ‘secured’, six ‘undergoing securing’ and 
35 were ‘undergoing  clearing’. Of the province’s population, 65,900 
(i.e.  64.3  per  cent) were deemed ‘secure’; 3,800 of the population 
72  By early October 1966, prior to 5  RAR’s Operation Canberra/Robin, RF deployments on 
Route 15 were 578 RF Company at YS 285630 (Phuoc Hoa village); 609 RF Company at YS 264673 
(Ap Ong Trinh); and 701 RF Company at YS 252745 (Phu My village). An ARVN unit occupied the 
Phu My post, 2 kilometres north of the village.
73  Lieutenant Colonel Le Duc Dat (born 1928) was the province chief from early 1964 until 
September 1967, when he was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Truoc. Subsequently, in 
April 1972, during the communist Nguyen Hue Offensive, Colonel Le Duc Dat was killed at Tan 
Canh in the Central Highlands when commanding the 22 ARVN Infantry Division. Posthumously, 
he was appointed brigadier.
74  Phat was replaced in the second half of 1966 by Captain Vo Sanh Kim.
VIETNAM VANGUARd
414
(i.e. 3.7 per cent) were reportedly under VC control.75 This was a significant 
improvement over the MACV assessments for previous months. At the 
end of March 1966, VC control of the population had been reported as 
17.1 per cent, at the end of April 15.6 per cent, and at the end of May 
11.5 per cent. The resettlement of the villagers from Long Tan and Long 
Phuoc – and the location of 1 ATF adjacent to Hoa Long – significantly 
reduced the extent of the population under VC control.
The VC in Phuoc Tuy in mid-196676
Subordinate to the VC’s Military Region 1, the Ba Ria Province77 Unit 
had approximately 16 subordinate elements and entities. The principal 
elements of the Province Unit’s headquarters were a ‘Staff’ (73 members),78 
‘Political’ personnel (27) and military staff (46). The Province Unit’s 
operative elements were D445  Battalion (about 380 strong), a Ba Ria 
Town Special Action Unit (C610/982 – 34  members), the Long Dat 
District Unit (159), the Chau Duc District Unit (about 110), the Xuyen 
Moc District Unit (29), a small province reconnaissance unit, a rear 
services element, a medical element (46), a prisoner of war camp (14) 
and a military training school (18). Additionally, the Ba Ria Province 
Unit commanded, through its three district units, several village guerrilla 
units and militia elements (including at Phu My, Phuoc Hoa and Phu Hai 
75  US  MACV, ‘MACV Monthly Report of Revolutionary Development Progress: 1–30  June 
1966’, 15 July 1966, VCAT, Item No. F015700010112. The report noted that the areas on the map 
depiction were ‘not precise’ and were only a ‘rough approximation’.
76  The figures provided here have been compiled from captured documents in Chamberlain, 
The Viet Cong D445 Battalion, Annex J, p 1, fnn 1–6.
77  In the following years, several reorganisations occurred that modified the geographic extent of 
‘Ba Ria’. In late 1966, the Viet Cong Military Region 1 (T1 – Eastern Nam Bo) was re-organised to 
comprise three provinces: Tay Ninh, Thu Dau Mot and Ba Bien. Ba Bien Province then comprised 
the former Ba Ria Province together with three districts of Bien Hoa Province (Long Thanh, Trang 
Bom and Binh Son) and districts of Long Khanh Province (including Dinh Quan).
78  ‘Staff’ included the Finance and Economy Section that managed the budget – including tax 
collection. For example, in Chau Duc District, 10 per cent of farm produce was to be collected as 




on Route 15), and the VC Infrastructure79 (VCI – including the Party 
and front entities). The VC province headquarters had encrypted HF 
Morse communications with Military Region 1 (later Military Region 7), 
and with its principal subordinate military units and districts. However, 
a primary means of contact within the province was by courier (‘commo-
liaison’) and employing a postal system utilising ‘cover designators’ and 
‘Letter Box Numbers’.80 Also subordinate to VC Military Region 1, the 
274 and 275 VC Main Force Regiments of 5 VC Division were the VC 
Main Force elements that operated within the province.
Figure A.2: VC organisation in Phuoc Tuy Province in mid-1966.
Source: Drawn and produced by Ron Boxall from details provided by Ernest Chamberlain.
79  The primary agency that directed communist efforts in the South was the People’s Revolutionary 
Party – the southern arm of the Vietnam Workers’ Party (VWP). The VWP managed the war in the 
southern half of South Vietnam through its Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), reinstituted 
in January 1961 to replace the Xu Uy Nam Bo (Nam Bo Regional Committee). Party structures 
controlled all geographic entities, military units and front organisations. In the South, the ‘umbrella’ 
front organisation was the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, formed in December 1960. 
Subsequently, a Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) was formed on 8 June 1969.
80  Chamberlain, The Viet Cong D445 Battalion, fn 200.
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A 1 ATF view of the enemy
Reviewing VC activity in Phuoc Tuy in May 1966, Brigadier David 
Jackson declared that the province ‘was not a backwater’.81 1 ATF’s first 
intelligence summary (INTSUM),82 supporting Operation Hardihood 
in central Phuoc Tuy, did not report any VC elements in the Route 15 
area – but noted that the route ‘was subject to VC interdiction’. Enemy 
forces listed as operating in the province comprised the 2,000-strong 
274  VC Main Force Regiment (also known as the Dong Nai Regiment, 
4 Regiment, 94 Regiment, Group 94, Q764 and Q4) and the 275 VC 
Main Force Regiment (1,800 troops – also known as the 5 Regiment, 
Group 45, Group 54, Q765 and Q5) – both formations of the 5 VC 
Division – and the D445 Local Force Battalion (550 troops). Several VC 
local companies were also listed in the INTSUM: C-20, C-300, C-70 
and C-610 (the Baria Special Action Unit – located on the southern 
slopes of the Nui Dinh); and ‘an estimated 400 local guerrillas, lightly 
armed were operating throughout the Province in 5 to 15-man groups’.83 
That INTSUM briefly referenced the 275 Regiment’s failed ambush on 
Route 15 on 11 November 1965 against the 52 ARVN Ranger Battalion.
Having deployed to its Nui Dat base, the initial operations of the 
4,500-strong Task Force84 focused on securing its immediate Tactical 
Area of Responsibility, including ‘reclearing’ the villages of Long Phuoc 
and Long Tan. In June, a brief 1 ATF terrain survey of ‘Zone Cherry’ 
(Route  15) noted reliable indications of observation posts on the 
81  Taped interview, Dr Bruce Horsfield, 20 August 1990, Burradoo NSW, AWM: AWM 3849628, 
Tape 1. During US operations in Phuoc Tuy Province in the period April to mid-September 1966, 
US forces reportedly lost 87 personnel KIA and 408 WIA – in Operations Abilene, Hardihood, 
Hollandia and Toledo. MACCORDS (MACV Civil Operations and Rural Development) Team 89 
– based in Van Kiep, lost three KIA in a D445 ambush on 6 January 1966.
82  1 ATF, ‘INTSUM No 1/66’, 21 May 1966, AWM95 1/4/1.
83  In mid-July 1966, the CIA reported confirmed communist strength in the South as: Viet 
Cong Main Force combat strength at 59,035 (83 battalions) with 17,553 support personnel; North 
Vietnamese combat troops as 34,910 (55 battalions); and 103,600 ‘paramilitary combat personnel’ 
(with a further 40,000 armed political cadre). A further 23 combat battalions were unconfirmed 
(six  VC, 17 NVA). More than one-half of the 138 confirmed combat battalions were organised 
into 29 regiments (13 VC, 16 NVA), with most of the regiments controlled by five divisional 
headquarters. The confirmed infiltration rate from the North for June 1966 was 10,460 troops (both 
Northerners and Southerner ‘regroupees’). CIA, ‘The Status of North Vietnamese Infiltration into 
South Vietnam’, 24 February 1967, VCAT, Item No. F029200040263.
84  At the end of June 1966, Australian forces in Vietnam totalled 4,487 with 2,830 personnel 
at Nui Dat and 1,011 with 1st  Australian Logistic Support Group (1  ALSG) at Vung Tau. US 
military personnel in the Republic of Vietnam numbered 278,810. Others were: ‘New Zealand – 
150; Philippines – 57; Republic of China – 20; and Thailand – 19’. The 12-strong Spanish military 
medical team arrived in September 1966.
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eastern heights of the Nui Ong Cau (part of the Nui Dinh complex and 
overlooking Route 2), and that VC mortars had been fired on 10 June 
1966 from the eastern slopes of the Nui Dinh hills (from YS 361671 and 
YS 372670).85
A VC view of 1 ATF
The 2004 Chau Duc History described the introduction of Australian 
troops into the province as follows:
The Australians – who were very experienced mercenaries having 
fought a counter-guerrilla war in Malaya, were given the task by their 
American masters to conduct pacification ‘trials’ in Ba Ria, in order 
to create a key defensive barrier for them for Saigon and to directly 
protect the military port of Vung Tau. The Australian military were 
very expert in ambush tactics, small-scale raids, moving in scattered 
half-section and section groups, and striking deep into our bases. 
They quickly adapted to the climate and the tropical jungle. They 
also bore hardship – and would conceal themselves in the marshy 
swamps for hours – and would put up with the heavy wind and 
rain throughout the night in order to ambush us. They could cross 
streams and swamps – and even traverse jungles of new bamboo 
that was thick with thorns in order  to secretly approach their 
objective. Most dangerous of all was their ambush tactic in which 
they ‘assimilated’ into the terrain – and this cost us many killed and 
other losses. Cay Cay and Bau Lung were routinely under fire – and 
the hills and jungles, the villages and hamlets, and the base areas 
were torn apart and crushed.86
In September 1966, a rallier from the 274 Regiment’s 1st Battalion related 
to his MACV debriefers that:
The VC were very cautious in confrontations with the 
Australians … The Australians had considerable combat experience 
from the Korean War … In addition, the Australians were strongly 
supported by artillery and air force firepower – therefore the VC 
dared not cause the engagement to last long.87
85  ‘Area Analysis of Zone Cherry, Appendix 2 to Annex A (Intelligence) to Op Plan 1-66’, 
June 1966, AWM95 1/4/3.
86  The Chau Duc History 2004, pp 148–149.
87  Le Van Sang (rallied at Binh Gia, 28 September 1966), 274 VC Regiment, US MACV/JGS 
Combined Military Interrogation Centre (CMIC) Interrogation Report 1325.
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A high-level defector, North Vietnam Army (NVA) Lieutenant Colonel Le 
Xuan Chuyen (chief of staff/chief of operations of the 5 VC Division),88 
had a similar view:
The Australian forces have much experience in conducting 
operations, bivouacking troops and attacking, but because they 
are too tall and big, it is difficult for them to keep from being seen 
and thus being shot at and wounded. The US forces have strong 
firepower, but because they are big and tall, they are easy to see. 
Their operation regulations are followed almost as if they were 
fixed and their attack capability lacks activeness and speed.89
VC observers in the hills
NVA Lieutenant Colonel Le Xuan Chuyen disclosed in his mid-1966 
debrief that there ‘was an observation post equipped with a 15-watt radio 
on the Thi Vai Mountain to conduct air observation and observe RVNAF 
[Republic of Vietnam Air Force] activities along Route 15’.90
In July 1966, 1  ATF’s 547  Signals Detachment, a SIGINT element, 
intercepted VC Morse communications – including the HF transmissions 
of the VC observation groups overlooking Route 15 and including one 
post that was nicknamed ‘Dodo’.91 At the end of July, the commanding 
general of MACV (COMUSMACV) General WC  Westmoreland had 
personally urged that the VC observation and reporting posts monitoring 
the vulnerable Route 15 be eliminated ASAP – a ‘Priority One Alfa task’.92 
On deployment to Vietnam, 547  Signals Detachment had no integral 
88  Le Xuan Chuyen had defected on 2 August 1966, and was debriefed extensively.
89  US MACV/JGS CMIC, ‘Interrogation of Le Xuan Chuyen, Saigon’, 7 August 1966, VCAT, 
Item No. 4080124002, p 11.
90  Ibid, p 6, para 46.
91  Dodo’s SIGINT ‘station identifier’ was RAD1963 and its ‘notation’ was VNGB (Vietnamese 
Guerrilla Morse) M7178. Another station, called ‘Leech’ (RAD255A, VNGB M7191) and probably 
associated with Dodo, also operated in the Thi Vai area. These stations were usually ‘secure’ in caves 
– with observers of Route 15 providing information to them by courier.
92  ‘ATF [was] ordered by General Westmoreland to capture VC radio station in our area (substation 
on Priority One Alfa).’ Captain TJ Richards (OC 547 Signal Detachment), signal to DMI-A(Mi8) 
(Directorate of Military Intelligence-Army (Military Intelligence 8)), 2 August 1966, DMI-A, Army 
Headquarters. The Australian official history cites a later date for General Westmoreland’s interest: 
‘In late [sic] July, 547 Signal Troop [sic] began picking up powerful Viet Cong radio transmissions 
from the Nui Dinh hills … General Westmoreland … seemed to attach particular importance to 
it. In October, he [General Westmoreland], sent word personally to the task force to “take it out”’ 
(McNeill, To Long Tan, p 395).
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radio direction-finding (DF) capability, either land-based or airborne, to 
determine the location of NVA/VC radio stations. Initially, ‘fixes’ on the 
location of Dodo were acquired by EC-47 aircraft of the US Air Force’s 
6994 Security Squadron.
From mid-July, patrols from 1 ATF’s 3 SAS (Special Air Service) Squadron 
were tasked to eliminate Dodo – that is, tasked against the ‘special target 
(a communications station)’, the ‘OPs and comms station’, or the ‘special 
target area’ on Nui Ong Trinh Mountain (YS 680688) closely overlooking 
Route 15, and in the Nui Dinh hills (YS 3365). ‘Fred’ – a US vernacular 
term for an unidentified enemy radio transmitter – was also used in SAS 
reporting as a nickname for Dodo.93
On the return of SAS Patrol No 22 on 23 July, the 1 ATF commander 
and the operations officer spoke with the patrol commander (Sergeant 
E Tonna) on the deployment of further patrols to the ‘special target area’. 
On 27 July, SAS Patrol No 31 led by Sergeant AG Urquhart killed five 
VC, including two VC women, in the Nui Dinh hills (at YS 351668). 
Captured documents indicated that the two women were couriers and 
food suppliers for the VC’s Dodo observation posts and its radio team.94
However, Dodo was not silenced. The US airborne direction-finding 
(ARDF) ‘fixes’ were often unreliable – at times out by several kilometres: 
‘ARDF has been found wanting so far as its accuracy is concerned’.95 
In  late July 1966, in order to more accurately locate Dodo, two AN/
PRD-1 ground-based DF sets of equipment were allocated on loan to 
547 Signal Detachment by the US 17 Radio Research Group at Long Binh, 
specifically to ‘fix’ Dodo, which would then be attacked and eliminated 
by 1 ATF SAS patrols. The PRD-1s were initially sited on Nui Dat hill 
within the 1 ATF base and at the ARVN National Training Centre at Van 
Kiep on the eastern outskirts of Ba Ria Town – and the fixes acquired were 
more accurate than the locations reported by the US ARDF.
Dodo was eventually eliminated on 24  October 1966, when a female 
VC radio operator (To Thi Nâu – also known as Ba Hoang, alias Minh 
Hoang – Military Proselytising Section, Hoa Long village) was captured 
93  3rd SAS Squadron, ‘Commanders Diary – Narrative’, July 1966, AWM95  7/12/2. Also 
discussed in Chamberlain, The Viet Cong D445 Battalion, Annex E, p E-14.
94  D Horner, Phantoms of the jungle: A history of the Special Air Service, Allen & Unwin, 1989, 
p 190.
95  Captain TJ Richards, transcript of an audio tape to DMI (Mi8), 13 September 1966, DMI-A, 
Army Headquarters, received October 1966.
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by B Company, 6 RAR, on Nui Dinh Mountain (at YS 332657) together 
with a US Type RT-77 AN/GRC-9 radio.96 In early August, SAS patrols 
were also conducted on the eastern-facing slopes of the Nui Dinh 
and  in the Chau Pha Stream area – including a squadron-level raid on 
10–11 August.
Securing Route 15
The limited capacity of port facilities to receive the incoming build-up of 
US forces into southern South Vietnam was of serious concern to MACV. 
While the Saigon Port could accommodate the unloading of materiel, 
a large number of US vehicles and personnel were planned to be landed 
at Vung Tau and moved via Route 15 to US military complexes at Bear 
Cat, Long Binh and Bien Hoa. The principal formations planned to 
arrive were the 196 Light Infantry Brigade (mid-August), the 4 Infantry 
Division (expected 2–16 September – its 2 Brigade had already arrived), 
the 11 Armored Cavalry Regiment (scheduled to disembark at Vung Tau 
beginning on 7 September),97 the 199 Light Infantry Brigade (expected 
late November), and the 9 Infantry Division (expected late November).98 
As noted, General Westmoreland understandably took a close personal 
interest in the security of Route 15.
On 9  July 1966, the VC’s Chau Duc District issued a directive for 
increased offensive activity to commemorate 20  July – the anniversary 
of the 1954 Geneva Accords. Village VC committees were ordered to 
organise ‘special units to attack RVNAF on Route 15, sabotage roads and 
bridges, and build obstacles to block road traffic’.99 A ‘High Point’ was 
scheduled for 23 July 1966. On 3 August, the military intelligence staff 
96  1  ATF, ‘Intelligence Review, Nui Dat’, 29  October 1966, AWM95  1/4/14. Ms Nau was 
subsequently interrogated at 1 ATF – and was the object of the infamous ‘water torture’ incident – 
see McNeill, To Long Tan, pp 395–98; Ian McNeill and Ashley Ekins, On the Offensive: The Australian 
Army in the Vietnam War, January 1967–June 1968, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2003 (including 
endnotes); and AWM file AWM98, R670/1/7.
97  With Route 15’s security not guaranteed, the 11 Armored Cavalry Regiment personnel were 
flown from Vung Tau to Long Binh in US Air Force C-130 aircraft. The Regiment’s advance party 
and equipment landed at Saigon on 18 August. The remaining eight vessels disembarked equipment 
at Saigon between 16  September and 9  October (499 wheeled vehicles, 483 combat full-tracked 
vehicles and 22 helicopters).
98  II FFV, ‘Operation Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1966, Saigon’, 15 November 
1966.




of Chau Duc District sent a directive to VC village committees at Phu 
My, Phuoc Hoa and Chu Hai requiring them to collect intelligence on 
‘Route 15, the local terrain, and enemy elements’. These reports were to 
be submitted by 30 August 1966 in order to develop plans to ‘to disrupt 
enemy lines-of-communications – Route 15’. The directive included 
examples of information required and a format.
In mid-July 1966, a report from HQ II FFV had indicated that elements 
of the 274 VC Regiment had occupied areas of the Nui Toc Tien and 
Nui Dinh hills, and threatened movement on Route 15.100 On 16 July, 
1 ATF launched Operation Brisbane – 6 RAR with an APC squadron and 
artillery support – into the area.101 However, no enemy were found, and on 
18 July, B/6 RAR conducted an uneventful three-hour APC-borne ‘Road 
Runner’ operation along the length of Route 15 from Ba Ria to Phu My. 
This was the first of 1 ATF’s Road Runner operations, aimed at securing 
the main and secondary roads in the province – with the Route 15 area 
designated ‘Road Runner West’.102
Heightened concerns – 274 VC Main Force 
Regiment
The captured diary of Nguyen Nam Hung – the second in command/
chief of staff of the 274  VC Regiment (whose diary was captured by 
5 RAR on 21 October 1966 in the Nui Thi Vai hills), indicated that in 
June and July 1966, elements of the Regiment were engaged in observing 
Route 15 in preparation for attacks in the Phu My area and interdicting 
the route.103 As a light infantry formation, elements of the regiment could 
move swiftly from their base areas east of Route 2 and in the Hat Dich to 
100  II FFV, ‘HQ 1ATF Log Sheet 476’, 15 July 1966, AWM95 1/4/4.
101  At 2020 hours on 15 July, a VC battalion was reported at YS 2963. The order for Operation 
Brisbane (16–18 July 1966) noted: ‘recent intelligence reports indicate that the VC will attempt to 
ambush a convoy on Route QL 15 between mid-July and 30 July 1966’, FRAG O 1-3-66, 18 July 
1966. The mission was to ‘search and destroy the enemy in GR 3164 … with a suspected enemy 
battalion located at YS 313649’. The 1 ATF Commander’s Diary reported that the operation did ‘not 
find trace of any large VC force … a very useful ground mobility exercise … and introduced SAS 
patrols secretly into the hills’. The official history noted: ‘Airstrikes in the area prior to the operation 
may have forced the enemy away.’ McNeill, To Long Tan, p 446.
102  Road Runner operations were formally initiated under 1 ATF, ‘Op Plan 2/66’, 24 July 1966, 
AWM95 1/4/5.
103  Chamberlain, The Viet Cong D445 Battalion, Annex N, p N-4, fn 14. See also, 1 ATF, ‘Troops 
Information Sheet No. 31’, 13–19 February 1967, AWM95 1/4/30.
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the Route 15 area with little chance of detection. On 1 August 1966, the 
274 VC Regiment attacked the base of the 2nd Battalion/48 Regiment 
at Phu My and ambushed an ARVN convoy nearby on Route 15 just 
north of Phu My.104 ARVN casualties were 32 KIA (23 in the base, and 
nine in the convoy), 14 WIA and five missing in action (MIA); with 21 
individual weapons and two crew-served weapons lost to the VC.
Soon after, on 10  August, the 274  Regiment’s 265 (i.e. 2) Battalion 
attacked an ARVN 48 Regiment convoy of 15 trucks on Route 15 about 
14 kilometres south of the border with Bien Hoa Province (YS 270660); 
and on 11  August an estimated VC battalion attacked the ARVN 
compound at Phu My on Route  15 (YS  237766). The ARVN sector 
headquarters in Ba Ria reported 18 VC killed and three ARVN killed 
and five wounded.105 From mid-August 1966, the 274 Regiment observed 
Route  1 in Long Khanh Province, planning attacks on the strategic 
hamlets of Hung Nghia and Hung Loc, before conducting rice-portering 
operations in late August.
Clearing the way
Route 15 through Phuoc Tuy Province from Ba Ria to the developing US 
Bear Cat base in Bien Hoa Province (YT 155015 – about 30 kilometres 
north of the Phuoc Tuy/Bien Hoa border) had been classified as ‘red’ 
– meaning ‘route is VC-controlled and a major military operation or 
engineer effort is required to clear it’. To secure the road deployment of 
3 Brigade/4 US Infantry Division from Vung Tau along Route 15 to its 
Bear Cat base, II FFV mounted a corps-level operation, Operation Robin, 
104  The ARVN convoy was ambushed on Route 15 at YS 236784. The ARVN 2/48 Battalion base 
was located at YS 238773 beside Route 15 – beside the Second World War airstrip about 2 kilometres 
north of Phu My village. The ARVN base was shelled by 57 mm RCLs, and the ARVN reaction 
force was reportedly ambushed by a VC battalion. Lost weapons included a .30 MG, a 60  mm 
mortar and 21 small arms; 10 trucks were damaged. See 1 ATF, ‘INTSUM No. 62’, 2 August 1966, 
AWM95 1/4/6, Part 2. The 5 VC Division History relates: ‘In August, the 4th [i.e. 274th] Regiment 
organised an ambush of mechanised vehicles on Route 51 [i.e. previously Route 15], destroying seven 
military vehicles, 50 enemy, shooting down an aircraft and seizing two weapons.’ Liberation Radio 
reported that on 1  August, ‘the Liberation Armed Forces attacked an enemy military convoy on 
Highway 15 (Bien Hoa – Ba Ria). Two companies of the puppet Regiment 48 of Division 10 were 
put out of action after 10 minutes of fighting.’ – ‘One Puppet Company wiped out east of Saigon’, 
Vietnam Courier, Hanoi, 8 November 1966.
105  1  ATF, ‘Log Sheet  666’, 10  August 1966, AWM95  1/4/6, Part 1: ‘a battalion of 48 Regt 
ambushed on road near Phu My – 4 ARVN KIA, 6 WIA, 38 VC (BC) – claimed.’
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beginning on 3 October 1966.106 Route security for the three-hour move 
of the 3 Brigade to Bear Cat was provided by 1 ATF within Phuoc Tuy 
and by the US 173 Airborne Brigade in Bien Hoa Province.107 Subsequent 
Route 15 security operations directed by Headquarters II FFV were titled 
Operation Duck and Operation Canary.
These operations were acknowledged in General Westmoreland’s 1968 
‘Report on the War in Vietnam’:
After a brief training period, the task force came under the 
operational control of the U.S. II Field Force and moved to 
Phuoc Tuy Province with the mission of supporting pacification 
operations along Highway 15 and in the eastern portion of the 
critical Rung Sat Special Zone.108
Today Route 51 – previously Route 15 – is a four-lane highway, built 
up along its length from Ba Ria to Phu My.109 With a population of 
over 23,000, Phu My is a large industrial town and the district capital of 
Tan Thanh District. Industries in Phu My include a steel mill, chemical 
plants and electricity generation – reportedly providing 35–40 per cent of 
Vietnam’s total electricity requirements. Phu My also includes the major 
Thi Vai-Cai Mep deep-water container port that is also visited regularly by 
international tourist liners. An international airport is being constructed 
north of Phu My in the Long Thanh area. There are smaller ports along 
Route 51, including on the Dinh River at Ba Ria Town. Particularly on 
weekends, traffic on Route  51 from Ho Chi Minh City/Bien Hoa is 
extremely heavy with domestic tourists travelling to Vung Tau and Long 
Hai. Popular tourist attractions in Phuoc Tuy Province include the former 
‘resistance bases’, and temples and shrines in the Nui Thi Vai and Nui 
Dinh hills.
106  The equipment and cargo of the 3 Brigade arrived by ship at Saigon, with personnel moving in 
50-vehicle truck convoys from Vung Tau along Route 15 to Bear Cat – a three-hour journey.
107  An 11 Armored Cavalry Regiment report related that: ‘On 4 October, the 2nd Squadron conducted 
a route reconnaissance of Route 15 from Bien Hoa to Baria … During the period 10-17 October, the 
1st Squadron was under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade participated in Operation 
Robin.’ 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, ‘Operational report lessons learned’, 31  October 1966, 
DTIC, AD386101.
108  General WC Westmoreland, ‘Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 June 1968)’, Section II, 
VCAT, Item No. 168300010017. p 222.
109  Until recently, most road travel from Saigon/Ho Chi Minh City to Vung Tau was via Bien Hoa 
and then via Route 51. However, since February 2015 the shortest and fastest route is the tolled Ho 
Chi Minh City – Long Thanh Expressway, which joins Route 51 at Long Thanh.
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For decades, the insecurity of South Vietnam’s major highways had been 
a major impediment, frustration and embarrassment to governments 
in Saigon – suggestive of a failing state. In September 1966, following 
the arrival in country of further significant allied military formations, the 
securing of the strategic Route 15 to Vung Tau – to at least ‘amber’ status 
– was in prospect. The newly arrived 1 ATF was to play a key role in 
that operation.
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APPENDIX E. GLOSSARY 
OF MILITARY TERMS
ANPRC radio American Pack Radio Communications radio
Aslt Pnr Platoon Assault Pioneer Platoon
ATk Platoon Anti-Tank Platoon
battle order A soldier’s full range of personal fighting 
equipment
breaking harbour Moving out of a temporarily secured area
cannabilisation point A US Army salvage unit’s location
casevac Casualty evacuation
contact A skirmish, joining with the enemy in battle.
delousing Rendering safe a mine or booby trap
Dustoff A casualty evacuation, the code word for 
casevac helicopters
enfilade fire Gunfire directed from the side across a front
fire for effect (FFE) Artillery fire applied after initial fire has been 
satisfactorily adjusted
fire support base A secured location in which supporting artillery 
is temporarily based
gun line An assemblage of artillery within a base
harassing and 
interdiction (H&I)
A type of artillery fire designed to aggravate 
more than destroy
hutchie A soldier’s individual shelter from weather
in country In Vietnam




interdict To impede or intercept
KIA Killed in action
Mentioned in 
Dispatches (MID)
An award for commendable service
MIA Missing in action
movement axis The centre line of movement of a body of troops, 
some of whom might be deployed some distace 
from the axis
moving by fire 
and movement
A tactical drill in which designated troops 
maintain covering fire, while others move 
forward to take up firing while the first group 
then moves forward to repeat the process
on net Mutual understanding
Orders Group A formal gathering at which orders are imparted 
by commanders
Pentomic US Army scheme of organisation for Cold War 
nuclear scenarios
Pentropic Australian Army short-lived scheme of 
organisation for tropical warfare scenarios
pogo A non-combatant soldier
punji stakes Sharp metal or wooden stakes used by the 
Viet Cong in mantraps
re-entrant A gully between ridgelines
rock sangar A protective embrasure constructed with rocks
search and clear axis See: movement axis
SLR Self-loading rifle
sortie A single aircraft mission
strafing Fire applied against ground targets by aircraft 
using cannon or machine guns
tropical studded Fitted with brass studs for improved grip in wet 
tropical terrain (Second World War Australian 
Army boots)
warn out Give prior notice to
WIA Wounded in action
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APPENDIX F.  
MAP SYMBOLS
Division








Squadron   (36 APCs)
Troop   (10 APCs)
Section    (3 APCs)
Temporary storage site
Secure locations
Helicopter Landing site (Sioux)










Battery   (6 Guns)








Showing Location of HQ
Location of an Infantry Battalion HQ
Future Location of a Battalion HQ
HEADQUARTERS
LZ
Note:   symbols indicate friendly forcesBlue
            symbols indicate enemy forcesRed
Source: Designed by Ron Boxall and produced by Alan Mayne.
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Daly, Tom (Major General), 27, 39, 
101, 116–17, 326
D’Antoine, Gordon (Private), 136–7, 
280
Dat (Colonel), 224
Dat Do, 323, 393, 395–6, 400, 403, 
410, 412–13
Davies, Bill (Second Lieutenant), 250




Vietnam service, 295–6, 352–3
Davis, RJ (Second Lieutenant), 246
DC3 aircraft, 287
de la Maissoneuve, Pougin 
(Lieutenant Colonel), 395–6
De Puy, William (Brigadier General), 
29–30
Deak, Michael ‘Skip’ (Second 
Lieutenant) (later von Berg), 
244–6
A Company, 5 RAR, 328




Operation Queanbeyan, 127–32, 
185
Reconnaissance Platoon, 85, 
301–17, 329, 391





Deane-Butcher, John (Second 
Lieutenant), 246–7
national serviceman, 204






Defeat into Victory (Slim), 152
Defence and Employment (D&E) 
Platoon, 267, 269
Defence Committee, 24–5, 29, 34
Delaurey-Simpson, Ron ‘Frenchy’ 
(Private), 224, 232, 247
Delsar, Barry (Private), 251
Dereliction of Duty (McMaster), 230
Derringer, 101
Devlin, Joe (Private), 100, 171
diary of Nguyen Nam Hung, 90
Dien Bien Phu, 9, 335
Dinh River, 423
direct support, 312–13, 364
Directorate of Infantry, 320
Division in Battle Pamphlet No 1, The 
(Australian Military Board), 322
Doda, 125
‘Dodo’, 418–19
Dohle, Cliff (Flight Lieutenant), 135
‘Domino Theory’, 10
Don Dien de Gallia, 223
Dong Khoi movement, 398
Doyle, Laurie (Major), 296, 298
Drennan, Bill ‘Sharpe’ (Corporal), 
128–9
drills, 162
Duc My, 69–71, 73, 160, 343, 
363–74, 376, 378–9, 381–2
Duc Thanh, 74–7, 84, 147, 224, 232, 
255, 376, 393, 404
Duc Trung, 73, 363, 376–81
Dunstan, Sir Donald (Lieutenant 
General), 39, 41
Dustoff evacuations, 46, 59, 98, 107, 
133, 136, 160, 164, 171, 179, 
184, 207–9, 213–14, 274, 276, 
279, 286–9, 291–2, 296, 313
Dwyer, John (Second Lieutenant), 204
Eastern Command, 27
Eastern Region Inter-Provincial 
Committee, 398
Edwards, John ‘Blue’ (Private), 245
Egan (Brandt), Robert ‘Bobby’ 
(Private), 245
8 RAR, 33–4
11 Armored Cavalry Regiment (US), 
420
Engineer Field Squadron, 327
equipment, 47–8, 51, 64–5
Exercise Sky High, 40
F-100 Super Sabre aircraft, 289
Fall, Bernard, 192
Fardel (French commander), 396
Ferrier, Raymond ‘Ferret’ (Private), 
245
field telephones, 50
Fifth Battalion, the Royal Australian 
Regiment, see 5 RAR
Filipino forces, 341
1st Australian Logistic Support 
Group, 47, 51, 102, 104
1st Australian Task Force see 1 ATF
1st Brigade, 46
First Battle of Britain, The (Fredette), 
90
Fitzgerald, John (Private), 251
5 RAR see also member Companies
arrival in Vietnam, 48, 154–6, 
194–5, 204
Battalion Advance Party, 55
Battalion Headquarters, 55
casualties, 276–7, 280–1
under 173 Airborne Brigade (US), 
58
raised for Vietnam service, 9, 29, 
33, 154, 321, 324
relations with South Vietnamese 
forces, 343–4
relations with US forces, 342
second Vietnam tour, 298
structure, 3
supported by 103 Field Battery, 
253–71
tactics, 335–46
training for Vietnam deployment, 





5 RAR Association, 8
503 Airborne Infantry Regiment 
(US), 56–9
fixed-wing propeller-driven aircraft, 
287
Florence, Brian (Major), 323
FO Parties, 254
Foale, Les (Warrant Officer), 132
F100 Super Sabre fighter-bombers, 
101–2
food aid for villagers, 119–20
food distribution rules, 383
foot problems, 181–2, 213
Foran, Ian (Private), 111, 162
Forbes, Jim, 27
Forward Air Controller Detachment, 
377, 381
forward observer officers, 254, 257, 
264–5, 267
4 Infantry Division (US), 166, 213, 
290, 420
4 RAR, 29, 33
France
defeat in Indo-China, 9, 335, 
395–7
occupation of Ba Ria, 395
Fraser, John (Second Lieutenant), 170
Fraser, Malcolm, 35, 42, 155
Fraser, Peter ‘Doc’ (Private), 130, 
132, 186, 188, 245, 280
‘Fred’, 419
Fredette, Raymond, 90–1
Fridolf, Merv (Sergeant), 56
‘friendly fire’, 261
FSB Tennis see Tennis
Gair, Neville (Major), 95, 146, 249, 
258
Gallia rubber plantation, 232, 234–5, 
376, 378
Gambold, Barney (Private), 245
Geneva Accords, 397, 420
George Medals, 136, 167, 178
German Army and the Nazi Party, 
The (O’Neill, R), 90
Gia Dinh, 394
Giap, Vo Nguyen (General), 6
Gilbert, George (Corporal), 171
Godfrey, Robert ‘Bobby’ (Sergeant), 
245
Goodman, David (Private), 138
Gospers Mountain training area, 11, 
46, 154
Gower, Steve (Major General), 8
Graham, Stuart (Brigadier), 323, 
326–7, 331
Granter, Noel (Major), 155, 368
Greenhalgh, Paul (Major), 111, 116, 
246





Operation Sydney Two, 367
Greville, Philip (Brigadier), 39
‘grey funnel line’, 19
Griggs, John (Lieutenant), 255–9, 
262, 271, 353
‘grunts’, 104
gun aiming points, 261
gun platforms, 260–1
gun positions, 255–9
Gunning, RR (Second Lieutenant), 
246
gunships, 286–7, 289–90, 313
Guymer, Ross (Lieutenant), 233
H hour, 259
Hai Phung commander, 406
Hall, Jim (Corporal), 99
Ham Tan, 397
Hamlyn, RD (Major), 246, 249, 328
Hannigan, Richard (Major), 116, 271
harassing and interdiction missions, 
256–7, 259, 261, 271
Harris, Terry ‘Harry’ (Private),  
163–4
Harrison, Ted (Lance Corporal)





Hartley, John (Lieutenant), 246
A Company, 5 RAR, 192–202
Operation Canberra, 181, 183–4
service history, 191–2, 353
Harvey, William ‘Suave Harve’ 
(Corporal), 245, 306
Hasluck, Paul, 33
Hassall, Sam (Sergeant), 170–1
Hassett, Frank (Major General), 26–7
Hat Dich, 16, 383, 396, 398–9, 
401–3, 421
Hay, Bob (Brigadier), 35, 41
HE 70 mm Mighty Mouse rockets, 
101–2
Healy, John (Sergeant), 192
Heazlewood, Doug, 259–63, 354
Heffernan, Ted (Captain), 263
Helio Courier, 224
Henry, Mick (Sergeant), 232, 235–6
Henrys, Mick (Sergeant), 47, 168
Heroic 445 Battalion: Its History and 
Tradition, The, 17
Hicks, Sir Edwin, 24, 30–1, 33–4
Hill Jan, 102, 118
Hill Julie, 102, 118, 125
Hillier, Doug (Private), 98–9
Hindmarsh, Ralph ‘Rowdy’ 
(Sergeant), 116, 154, 163, 204–5
HMAS Jeparit, 51
HMAS Sydney, 19, 48, 155, 204, 316
Ho Chi Minh, 6, 361
Ho Chi Minh City, 423
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 14, 16
Ho Tram, 401
Hoa Long, 219–24, 226, 410, 
412–13, 419
Hodgkinson, Ivor ‘Blue’ (Major), 
246, 249, 326
Hoi Bai, 400
Hoi Chanh (defectors), 228, 362, 373
Holsworthy, 9, 46, 153–5, 193, 196, 
298, 320, 324, 336
Holt, Harold, 35
Hopper, Colin (Sapper), 136
Horner, David (Colonel), 354–5
Horseshoe Hill, 42, 215–16, 228, 
314, 327
‘Huey’ helicopters, 19, 189, 195, 
285–6
Hughson, Bruce ‘Hughie’ (Warrant 
Officer), 128, 132, 389




Illman, Colin (Private), 175
Indo-China War (first), 395–7
Indonesian confrontation with 
Malaysia, 10, 23, 301
inter-allied relations, 341
interpreters, 73, 232–3, 295, 315–16, 




1 Australian Task Force Linguist 
Section, 377
interrogation, 373–4
Iron Lady Exercise, 154
Irwin Barracks, 202
Isaacs, Peter (Captain), 246, 249
adjutant, 8, 56–7, 78, 87, 306, 
322, 325
appreciation of 5 RAR, 80
Bade and, 231
BHQ staff officer, 55
O’Hanlon and, 170
Operation Canberra, 98–101
Operation Holsworthy, 73, 381
service history, 324, 355
Warr and, 324–8, 339
work with US forces, 56, 59







Commander 1 ATF, 38, 61
Cubis and, 269–71









permission to return to Nui Thi 
Vai, 109, 123
on Phuoc Tuy, 416
relations with US command, 34
selection of Nui Dat, 38, 41
Warr and, 61, 109, 323, 326
Westmorland and, 27, 31, 84




Joint Chiefs of Staff, 25
Joseph (Pere), 223, 235
J2 division, MACV, 91
J3 (Operations) division, MACV, 91
Kapooka, 169
Kearney, Bob ‘Dogs’ (Corporal), 
176–8, 245, 251, 306, 355
Kellor, Kerry (Lieutenant), 258
Kim Dai Uy (Captain), 221, 223
Kim Hai, 399–400, 406–7




Australian and US cooperation, 
342









Ky, Nguyen Cao (Air Marshal), 33, 
121
Landing Zone Hudson, 57–8, 157, 
176, 195–6, 206–7
Landing Zone Michael, 105, 166
Landing Zone Snakepit, 157
Lang Cat, 397, 400
Lang Phuoc Hoa, 258–9, 267, 313
Langley, Mike (Lieutenant), 258, 268
Larteguy, Jean, 192




signals officer, 57, 78
wounded, 127–8, 132–3, 242, 
279–80, 291–2
Le Duan, 6
Le Duc Dat (Lieutenant Colonel), 413
Le Duc Tho, 6
Le Minh Thinh, 398
Le Xuan Chuyen (Lieutenant 
Colonel), 418
Leaman, John (Sergeant), 57
Lea-Smith, John (Sergeant), 214, 
245, 306
Leslie, Gary (Corporal), 143
Lestrange, Robin (Private), 116
Light Fire Team, 377
Lo Gom, 313
Loc An, 401–2
Lockhart, Greg, 40, 42
Long Binh, 83–4, 93, 176, 420
Long Cat, 107, 278–9, 399
Long, Charles, (Major General), 33
Long Dat, 40, 396, 414
Long Dien, 393, 410, 413
VIETNAM VANGUARd
442
Long Green, The, 314
Long Hai, 77, 400, 413
Long Hai hills, 16, 40–1, 61, 170, 
313, 341, 395, 408
Long Huong, 383, 385, 397, 399, 413
Long Khanh, 400, 405, 410, 422
Long Le district, 219, 224, 393, 413
Long, Phil (Private), 116
Long Phuoc, 59, 64, 395, 400, 
411–12, 414, 416
Long Son Island
clearance, 53, 258, 385
location, 394
map, 146
Operation Hayman, 189, 240, 
267, 271, 345, 385, 387
Viet Cong escaping from, 391
Viet Cong haven, 189, 384
Long Tan
clearing, 411–12
D Company, 6 RAR, 14, 52, 76, 
212, 333
Nguyen Thoi Bung, 406
Operation Abilene, 410
Operation Smithfield, 264
public interest in battle, 2
reclearing, 416
role of artillery, 259–60







Long Tau River, 394, 397, 411
Long Thanh, 395, 398, 400, 406, 408
Lovell, DG (Second Lieutenant), 246
Luscombe Field, 210
Lynch, Trevor (Private), 138, 280–1
M16 rifles, 48, 99, 118, 137, 145, 
165, 168, 193, 206, 221, 308
M2A2 105 mm howitzers, 271
M18 Claymore mines, 159, 193
M26 grenades, 99, 220, 308, 375–6, 
390, 403
M40 recoilless rifles, 302
M60 machine guns, 48–9, 51, 64
M72 light anti-armour weapon, 302
M79 grenades, 137, 193, 308
Mackay, Ken (Major General), 112, 
117
Commander, Australia Force 
Vietnam, 35, 40, 51
Director of Military Operations 
and Plans, 24, 35
Nui Dat, 40–1
Phuoc Tuy, 30, 36
service history, 24–5
visits to Vietnam, 25, 29, 32, 51
Westmorland and, 32
Wilton and, 25–6
Madden, Ernie (Sergeant), 88







Operation Sydney Two, 370
Reconnaissance Platoon, 303, 309
service history, 45, 356
2IC 5 RAR, 46, 53–4, 56, 65, 
321–2, 326
Malaya, 10, 12, 22, 29, 107, 177, 
306, 417
Malayan Emergency, 10, 22, 87, 192, 
301, 326
Mallinson, KG (Captain), 246
Mansford, George (Captain), 314
Mason, Bruce (Private), 116
Matheson, Reg (Sergeant), 260
Mathews (CIA), 222
Mavin, Keith ‘Shorty’ (Sergeant), 
154, 201
Mavromatis, Jim (Corporal), 181
May Tao Mountains, 76, 405, 410
443
INdEx
May Tao Secret Zone, 16
‘Mayfair, The’, 52, 250
McAloney, John (Second Lieutenant), 
121, 134, 136–8, 246, 389
McCombe, Daryl (Private), 116, 164
McCray, Graham (Corporal), 207–8
McDermott, Arthur (Major), 271
McDougall, Ian (Corporal), 114, 
138, 280–2, 356
McFarlane, Brian (Major), 267, 
269–70, 377, 386
McGregor, Don (Warrant Officer 
Class 2), 111
McLaren, John ‘Macca’ (Private), 245
McLean, Allan (Corporal), 128–9, 
131
McMaster, HR (Lieutenant General), 
230
McNamara, Robert, 30, 408
McNeill, Ian, 41
McNeill, Robert, 2, 58
McNulty, Alan (Corporal), 214
McQualter, Bruce (Major), 246
B Company, 331, 367, 377, 386




McShane, John (Private), 203–4
Mealing, ‘Sailor’ (Staff Sergeant), 107, 
279, 296, 299
MEDCAP, 263, 276, 278–9
Medical Civic Action Program, 263, 
276, 278
Medical Platoon, 168–9, 274–83, 382
Mekong Delta, 31–2, 53
Mentioned in Dispatches, 132, 136, 
167, 178, 188, 348
Menzies, Robert, 25–6, 202
Meredith, Gordon (Lance Corporal), 
241, 251
Middleton, Peter (Flight Lieutenant), 
136
Military Crosses, 85, 121, 188, 347
Military Medals, 99–100, 132, 188, 
347
Military Region 1, 405, 414–15
Military Region 7, 405, 415
Military Working Arrangement, 25, 
42, 412
Miller, John (Major), 246
advance party, 155
C Company, 5 RAR, 164–5, 177, 
179, 258, 377, 386, 390
Operation Canberra, 98
Milligan, RB (Captain), 246, 367
Mills, Denis ‘Millsey’ (Private), 245
Minh Dam, 16, 395–6, 408–9
Minh Hoand, 419
Mission Vietnam, Royal Australian 
Air Force Operations 1964–1972 
(Odgers), 135
Moles, Douglas ‘Douggy’ (Private), 
181–2
Molloy, WJ (Captain), 246
Monash, Sir John (General), 34
monsoons, 50, 63, 83, 143, 181–2, 
196, 310
Montagnards, 69, 74, 220
moratoriums, 12
Moreau (Monsieur), 223–4
Moroney, Darryl ‘Butch’ (Private), 245
Morse code, 140, 405, 415, 418
Mortar Platoon, 95, 254–5, 289
Mortimer, Brian ‘Doc’ (Lance 
Corporal), 263–4, 356
Mulby, John ‘Blue’ (Sergeant), 245, 
306
Murphy, John (Major), 304
My Xuan, 400
Nam Bo Region, 402
napalm, 102, 180, 289
National Liberation Front see 
Viet Cong
national servicemen


















Neesham, Harry (Second Lieutenant), 
246








OTU graduate, 169, 203
service history, 357
7 Platoon, 177, 203–16
Warr and, 215–16
Negus, GN (Lieutenant), 246
New Zealand forces, 33, 267, 313, 
341, 377
Ngai Giao, 77
Ngo Din Diem, 397, 400
Nguyen Nam Hung (Colonel), 90, 
140, 421
Nguyen Quoc Thanh, 398
Nguyen Thoi Bung, 406
Nguyen Van Buu, 398
Nguyen Van Phuoc (Major), 403
Nguyen Van Thieu, 401
night operations, 78–9
9 Infantry Division (US), 420
9 RAR, 43
9 Squadron RAAF, 21, 286
Noack, Errol (Private), 59, 61, 158, 
171, 197
non-commissioned officers (NCOs), 
153–4, 346
North Vietnamese Army, 198, 418
Nottage, Gary ‘BG’ (Private), 245
Nui Dat
Battalion Headquarters, 157
chosen for Australian base, 21, 
38–43
construction of base, 39, 159, 173
cordon and search operations, 210
defences, 14, 160–1
‘Dust Bowl’, 274




mortared by Viet Cong, 196, 256
Operation Hardihood, 19, 49, 58, 
60–3, 65, 82, 170–2
Task Force holdings, 102
Viet Cong presence, 16
Nui Dinh hills
capture of radio operator, 420
D445 Provincial Mobile 
Battalion, 405
5 RAR stationed, 13
mortar attacks, 417












Nui May Tao, 16
Nui Nghe, 63, 65–6, 68, 77, 177, 209
Nui Ong Cau, 417




Nui Thi Vai, 121
D445 Provincial Mobile 
Battalion, 405
equipment flown to, 52
Landing Zone Michael, 105
Operation Canberra, 98, 183, 
213, 289
Operation Hardihood, 200
Operation Queanbeyan, 85, 
89–90, 123–49, 184–8, 290, 
293–4
Operation Robin, 106, 109
‘resistance bases’, 423
Route 15, 94, 394
Viet Cong, 401
Viet Cong route through, 53
‘Warburton mountains’, 175
Nui Toc Tien, 94, 141, 147–8, 394, 
402, 421
Nungs, 74, 205, 220
O’Callaghan, John (Private), 188–90, 
357
O’Dea, L (Second Lieutenant), 246
Odgers, George, 135
Officer Cadet School Portsea, 153
Officer Training Unit, Scheyville, 46, 
153, 169, 203
O’Hanlon, Terry (Second Lieutenant)







service history, 169, 357
1 ALSG see 1st Australian Logistic 
Support Group
1 Armoured Personnel Carrier 
Squadron, 364, 377, 386
1 ATF
C Company location, 107
CIA activities, 219–30
Civil Affairs Unit, 232, 382
Dental Unit, 107
547 Signals Detachment, 418–19
Headquarters, 45, 53, 84, 89, 




mortared by Viet Cong, 196, 256
Nui Dat base, 21, 38–43, 48–9, 
68, 81–2, 154, 196, 217–18




Phuoc Tuy Province, 24, 42
role of 5 RAR, 153, 412, 417
roles, 36–7
Tactical Area of Responsibility, 77
two battalions, 84, 88
2/35 Artillery Regiment, 94
1 Commando Company, ARVN, 
212, 220–8, 230, 398–9
1 Field Engineer Squadron, 377, 386
1 Field Hospital, 286
1 Field Regiment, 95, 98, 271
Tactical HQ, 267–8, 271
1 Field Squadron, 166
1 Infantry Division (US), 410
1 RAR
AATTV, 17
arrive in Vietnam, 23
Battalion Group, 405
Bien Hoa, 21, 26
deployment, 24–8, 33–4
deployment with US forces, 56
173 Airborne Brigade (US), 16, 
55, 161, 321, 410
Operation Denver, 410
Operation Silver City, 42
replaced by 5 RAR, 46–8
1 Transport Platoon, 377




103 Field Battery, Royal Australian 
Artillery, 5, 94, 227, 253–71, 
386–7, 390–1
105 Field Battery, Royal Australian 
Artillery, 66, 363–5, 368–9, 377, 
380
161 Field Battery, RNZA, 267, 377
161 (Independent) Reconnaissance 
Flight, 133, 244, 286–8, 296, 
299–300, 377, 386
173 Airborne Brigade (US)
assessment of Viet Cong, 16
Bien Hoa, 31, 55, 170
5 RAR, 56–9, 61, 63, 82, 158
Landing Zone Hudson, 157, 195, 
206
1 RAR, 25, 27, 55, 57, 155, 161
Operation Abilene, 410





War Zone D, 42
196 Light Infantry Brigade (US), 420
199 Light Infantry Brigade (US), 420
O’Neill, Robert (Captain), 246, 
249–50
Bade and, 231
civil affairs officer, 340
Deak and, 302, 314, 329
intelligence officer, 78, 84–91, 
105, 177, 322, 326, 340
Operation Queanbeyan, 291
Operation Sydney Two, 367
service and academic history, 
357–8
2IC B Company, 5 RAR, 1, 
12–13, 84, 170, 264
Warr and, 338–9
Ong Trinh, 397, 399–400, 413
Operation Abilene, 410




A Company, 5 RAR, 95, 100, 105
air support, 287–8
airstrikes, 183
B Company, 5 RAR, 95, 98–105, 
183, 265, 267, 289, 322, 
325–6, 331
Battalion Headquarters, 106
C Company, 5 RAR, 95, 98–101, 






follow up actions, 123, 134





Nui Thi Vai hills, 109, 227
103 Field Battery, 264–7
Route 15, 94
Vietnam Task (O’Neill, R), 177
‘Warburton mountains’, 175
Operation Crow’s Nest, 77, 94, 179





A Company, 5 RAR, 157, 171, 
196–7
B Company, 5 RAR, 157, 171, 
197
C Company, 5 RAR, 157









Nui Thi Vai, 200
O’Hanlon, 171–2
173 Airborne Brigade (US), 49, 
411–12
68 Assault Helicopter Company, 
156
Sweetnam, 160
Operation Hayman, 189, 240, 243, 
267–71, 345, 385, 387, 389
Operation Hobart, 72
Operation Hollandia, 61
Operation Holsworthy, 73–5, 188–9, 
211, 226–7, 363, 375–83
Operation Mallet, 408
Operation Queanbeyan, 122, 242
A Company, 5 RAR, 124–5, 131, 
133–4, 137, 140, 148, 185
air support, 287, 290
Anti-Tank Platoon, 124–5, 127, 
132, 134, 136–7, 139–40, 
185, 187, 290–1, 293
ARVN, 144
Askew, 290–2, 294
Assault Pioneer Platoons, 121, 
124, 128, 132, 134, 137–40, 
185, 188
B Company, 5 RAR, 124–5, 134, 
138, 140–1, 147–8, 185
Battalion Headquarters, 124–5, 
127–8, 130, 132–4, 137, 148, 
185, 293
C Company, 5 RAR, 124–5, 
134–5, 138, 140–1, 148, 166
Carroll, 123–7, 132–41, 147–9
D Company, 5 RAR, 124–5, 134, 
141–2, 146–8, 185, 188









Nui Dinh hills, 89
Nui Thi Vai, 52, 85, 89–90, 109, 
123–49, 184–8, 290, 293–4




Operation Ranch Hand, 407
Operation Renmark, 288
Operation Robin
A Company, 5 RAR, 105–6, 
116, 385
air support, 287–8, 296
Anti-Tank Platoon, 166
ARVN, 229, 271
B Company, 5 RAR, 105–7
C Company, 5 RAR, 106, 166
Carroll, 104






‘no fire zone’, 78
Nui Thi Vai, 106, 109
1 ATF, 423
Route 15, 94, 166, 215, 290
II Field Force Vietnam, 422–3
White, 107
Operation Silver City, 42
Operation Smithfield, 264
Operation Sydney, 65–7, 69, 72, 
209, 363
Operation Sydney Two, 69, 71–2, 
160, 363–74, –374
Operation Toledo, 76–7, 116, 231
Operation Vaucluse, 77, 94
Operation Woolloomooloo, 226–7
Operation Yass, 345, 363, 383–91
operational capability, 53




Orchard, Ray (Corporal), 206, 
213–14
Orders Group, 109, 183, 315, 322
OTO Melara L5 105 mm pack 
howitzers, 253–4
Owen machine gun, 118, 133, 168, 
193, 206, 280
Oxley, Peter (Lieutenant Colonel), 
153, 324
Pacific Islands Regiment, 191
Page, Wayne ‘Pagey’ (Private), 245
‘Palace Guard’, 95
Paltridge, Shane, 28, 30
Panthère noire, la, 396
Parker, Ken, 90
Parkes, Bill (Private), 209






ARVN, 261, 271, 413
B Company, 5 RAR, 124
Ba Ria Province Unit, 414
D Company, 5 RAR, 124




Route 15, 93–4, 395, 400, 421–2
Special Sector, 399
taken by French forces, 396
Viet Cong, 384
Viet Cong attack, 422
Phu/Chu Hai, 399
Phung Hoang, 228
















government control, 405, 413
location, 393
main Australian base, 21
map, xxiii
map Viet Cong locations, 15
Operation Albinene, 410
population, 393, 413
Provincial Intelligence Operations 
Centre, 228
selection as field of operation, 5
Viet Cong, 1, 31, 81–3, 332, 
340–1, 344, 401, 405, 
409–10, 414–15
Viet Minh, 397
Piper, Alex (Major), 89, 100
Pix magazine, 205
platoon commanders, 151–2, 173
Plimsoll, Sir James, 24
‘pogos’, 104
police relations, 340, 372
Politburo (North Vietnam), 398
Political Action Unit, 398
Possum call sign, 287, 294
Possum 5 call sign, 291
post-traumatic stress disorder, 19, 281
Pott, Ted (Second Lieutenant), 169, 
203, 246
Prescott, Bill (Major), 75–7, 232, 
234–5
Presidential Citation, 407
Provincial Intelligence Operations 
Centre, 228




Psychological Warfare detachment, 
377
Public Affairs Office (US), 407
public opinion
after the war, 336
American, 335, 341
opposing conscription, 12, 332
opposing the war, 1–2, 6, 12
supporting the war, 12
Puckapunyal, 202–3
‘Puff the Magic Dragon’, 287, 313
punishment cages, 237




Quang Trung force, 395
Quinn, Russell (Corporal), 118, 154, 
160, 163–5
RAAF
army relations with, 200–1
base Richmond, 48
Bell Sioux helicopters, 180, 
215–16, 279, 286, 288, 290, 
295–6, 298, 377
Caribou Flight, 409
C130 transport aircraft, 51
helicopter crash, 166–7, 178, 180, 
279, 290, 294, 296–9
Iroquois helicopters, 21, 28–9, 
34–5, 52–3, 122, 134–5, 
166–7, 195, 285–8, 290, 364, 
377
9 Squadron, 135, 286, 377
Rach Tre river channel, 387
radios, 50
Rainer, Dennis (Second Lieutenant), 
141, 143–6, 175, 244, 246, 302
‘Rat Pack, The’, 251
rations, 46, 51–2, 64, 168, 200–1, 
311–12
Reconnaissance Platoon, 85, 188, 
245, 279, 301–17, 329, 391
Red Cross, 59
Republic of Vietnam Air Force, 418, 
420
‘resistance bases’, 423
Returned and Services League (RSL), 
214, 333
Revolutionary Development Cadre 
Program, 344
Reynolds, John (Private), 251
Riik, David (Private), 111, 118, 165
Riley, Daniel ‘Bluey’ (Private), 184–8, 
245, 358
‘Road Runner’ operations, 77, 421
Roby, Peter (Warrant Officer), 236
Roe, Melford (Second Lieutenant), 
169, 203–4, 246
Rogers, ‘Midge’ (Gunner), 144–6
Rose, Dave (Bombadier), 258
Route 1, 395
Route 2
Ap Ngai Giao, 223
Binh Ba, 223
defence of, 412
Dong Khoi attack, 398
Duc My, 70, 363
French forces, 395
Long Le district, 219
map, 68
opened to civilian traffic, 74–5
Viet Cong, 421
Route 15
ambushes of ARVN convoy, 
402–3, 406, 416
ambushes of South Korean forces, 
408
‘American Killing Belts’, 411
Ap Ong Trinh Dp, 227
ARVN, 413
ARVN posts, 384
Ba Ria, 405, 411
closure, 408






Operation Canberra, 176, 183, 
213, 215, 266
Operation Mallet, 408
Operation Queanbeyan, 89–90, 
125, 166




Saigon to Vung Tau, 13
secured, 345








Route 23, 396, 410
Route 44, 77, 408
Route 51, 423
Rowe, DJF (Lieutenant), 246
Royal Australian Air Force see RAAF
Royal Australian Army Medical 
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